

The Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Assistance to
Least Developed Countries

Mid-Term Review of the EIF

Final Report

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Disclaimer

This report represents the views of the independent evaluation team only. They are not necessarily the views of the participating countries and agencies.

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The Team also acknowledges the important written and oral comments provided by Board Members and the ES Secretariat in response to the draft MTR report submitted on 17 October, 2012. The Team has prepared and submitted a 26-page list of all these comments and its specific responses to each. The comments included requests that, where possible, the Team offer even tentative ideas for implementing the strategic recommendations and a good number are now found reflected in the Report itself. The list of comments and responses may be a useful resource in consideration and follow-up of this Report, together with management and Board responses to the MTR.

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Supplementary documents

Available at www.saana.com/eif-mtr

- EIF MTR Inception Report, 13th July 2012
- EIF MTR Progress Update, 30th August 2012

List of Acronyms

AfT	Aid for trade
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DF	Donor facilitator
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
ES	EIF Executive Secretariat
FP	Focal Point
IF	Integrated Framework
ITC	International Trade Centre
LDC	Least developed country
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MTS	Multilateral trading system
NIA	National Implementation Arrangement
NIU	National Implementation Unit
NSC	National Steering Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SWAP	Sector wide approach
Tier 1 TAC	Tier 1 Appraisal Committee
Tier 2 TAC	Tier 2 Appraisal Committee
TFM	Trust Fund Manager
ToR	Terms of reference
TRTA	Trade-related technical assistance
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Executive Summary

Purpose: This is the executive summary of the final draft report of the independent Mid Term Review (MTR) of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for Trade-Related Assistance to Least Developed Countries (EIF). In line with its Terms of Reference and approved Inception Report, the Mid Term Review Team has applied rigorous evaluation methodologies and standards to this Review, focusing its assessments on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and potential impact of the EIF to this point. The methodology, evidence base and limitations of the Review are documented in the full report. This summary focuses on the main conclusions and recommendations.

Because of the late and extended start of actual operations of the EIF – for which all partners to the arrangement share responsibility - October 2012 should be treated as the mid-point in its initial five-year term. This marks two and a half years since the constitution of the EIF Board in April 2010, with a functioning base of staff, policy, partner agreements and the imminent conclusion of the financial management contract.

The nature and expectations of the EIF: The EIF is not a simple contractual arrangement or even a conventional assistance programme. It is intended to provide a framework for a concerted international effort to accompany LDCs on their different journeys - usually long and difficult ones - to build their capacity to integrate into the international trading system and benefit from trade for their development. Paradoxically, the greatest potential strengths of the EIF are also its greatest potential weaknesses. It is supposed to serve in a kind of “honest broker” function. It does not bring any competing programme or institutional vested interest of its own to the tasks of accompanying the LDCs, but is intended to carry with it the political, institutional and intellectual backing of the major international institutions in the trade and development field and the financial support and commitment to collaboration by a substantial coalition of bilateral donors. These assets, together with the full engagement of the LDCs themselves and a now-proven commitment to their ownership of the programme, can be great strengths. But if the other partners do not deliver as promised, the EIF is left with very little to offer.

Clarifying expectations: One of the most important conclusions to emerge from this Mid Term Review is that the limited instrument of the EIF is in practice widely misunderstood, suffers from differing and often unrealistic expectations, and is not getting the concerted, constructive support from all its partners that is essential to its intended model of operation.

Often the EIF is taken by the LDCs, donors and some agencies to be another spending programme, when it is just what its name says: a framework for coordination and integration. As such, its job is to mobilise and leverage resources (financial, institutional, and political – in the higher sense) around the trade agenda of each country. But the EIF’s more complex mission has not been strong enough to withstand the normal expectations of LDCs, donors and some of the agencies that it will perform and disburse like a ‘normal’ assistance programme. There is now a danger of trying unsuccessfully to be both a framework and programme especially as Tier 2 projects multiply, so clarification is needed.

The findings demonstrate important (and sometimes contradictory) differences in expectations, especially among some donors, about the role and responsibilities of governance as well as expectations about the results to be achieved and in what timeframes. Moreover, it is clear that for the nature of the EIF’s mission its centre of gravity is far too much in Geneva and with the Board and Executive Secretariat and far too little in the LDCs and with partners and agencies active on the ground.

Relevance: The MTR Team’s overall assessment is that the basic objectives and strategic approach of the EIF (particularly in its capacity-building Tier 1 activities, which have been more developed and tested) are highly relevant to the current trade and economic priorities

of the LDCs. Importantly, in all the main evidence streams on this issue – country case studies, other LDC, donor and Board surveys – overwhelming majorities of respondents agreed that “Compared with the situation in 2007 the EIF’s strategic approach to date is of greater relevance to the LDCs’/country’s trade and economic priorities.” Further, across all these same categories of respondents, more than three quarters disagreed with the proposition that “The EIF’s strategic approach to date is a “marginal or a small factor in responding to these priorities.” A number of documented success stories give further tangible support to this conclusion. At the same time, the highly-standardised and centralised approach to managing the EIF limits its relevance to individual LDCs (and their ownership) particularly those countries with limited capacities to adapt it to their particular systems and needs.

Effectiveness: In assessing the history of the EIF from its formal inception, the MTR Team concludes that all stakeholders represented on the Steering Committee and Board share the responsibility for gaps that now exist between expectations for results at this stage and what has so far been achieved. The LDCs, who now express less disappointment, were also less responsible than others for creating delays, even with their more limited capacities than other partners.

A key factor in assessing the effectiveness of the EIF to date is to determine the timeframe over which that assessment can legitimately be made. In launching the EIF with a five-year term in May 2007 and an interim Board set up in July 2007, the three sets of founding partners reflected their sense of the importance and urgency of acting, and helped create an international expectation that this programme (almost on its own) could somehow generate substantial results over that period. But they certainly did not explicitly factor in a delay of more than two years before the EIF could be set up and even minimally staffed and organized, or three and four years before financial agreements could be concluded with two core agencies, the UNDP and World Bank respectively.

Seeing the EIF as a tool to accompany the LDCs on a journey, the direction of travel for all the 43 LDCs where the EIF is active is in the right direction, although for a dozen or more countries the advancement is still minimal. At the other end of the scale, a significant minority of at least 10 countries (from different starting points) is already well advanced in strengthening their capacities, taking control of the agenda, and effectively calling on EIF and other resources to meet their requirements. The majority has made the initial steps, some are consolidating for the next stages and some are faced with internal and external hurdles (e.g. changes of key staff, waiting for DTIS or updates). Given the very strong findings about the key role of an up-to-date DTIS and Action Matrix in advancing the priority objectives of the EIF – and guiding the aid provide by donors and the design of Tier 2 projects- it is a major concern that only a quarter of intended beneficiary countries now have an up-to-date DTIS in place, with roughly another quarter in progress.

The pace of travel is extremely varied among countries: some have progressed quite rapidly by any standard, the majority is moving gradually and sometimes fitfully, and again a small minority is stalled or close to stalling. The distance remaining to be travelled for the LDCs as a group has to be measured against the milestones that have been set on the road to the “Goal” of full trade integration and the higher-level “Purpose” results.

Effectiveness of outcomes: Even in the limited period that the EIF has really been in effect, we conclude that it has been used by different LDCs to make contributions (ranging from important to minor in different countries) to reinforcing and in some cases catalysing positive trends. There is evidence of such contributions, especially through Tier 1 activities in the first three of its four intended outcome areas: strengthening capacity for trade-related strategies and implementation plans, mainstreaming of trade into national development strategies and plans, and coordinated delivery of trade-related assistance following country priorities. There

are also several clear cases of results in helping secure further resources to support initiatives addressing DTIS Action Matrix priorities.

Experience on the Tier 2 front is still limited, but there are grounds for concern that in fact the design and the process for Tier 2 projects is so far only in a few cases reflecting the intended strategic, catalytic, “joined-up” and “crowding in” objectives for this Tier. In the understanding of the MTR Team, the move from the primary Tier 1 emphasis on capacity building to a Tier 2 resource mobilization focus in an LDC is supposed to involve a deliberate opening up and extension of the process reaching out to different parts of government including sector ministries, agencies the private sector and donors, to build strategic and substantial project responses to the country’s specified trade priorities. We have seen evidence of this kind of process so far in at least 9 countries, but some other Tier 2 project proposals or ideas elsewhere appear much narrower and focused wholly or mainly on EIF’s own limited financial resources.

Efficiency of the EIF. By the most commonly-used, but crude and flawed, measures of efficiency in international assistance programmes - the cost relative to money transferred - the EIF has so far proved to be less efficient than a notional norm among possible comparators.¹ Given the very nature of the programme, it will probably always look “expensive” by this rough test. The EIF is not at a stage where a deeper test (measured by the cost, time and effort expended relative to results achieved) can yet be definitively applied, although there is substantial evidence of results in this Review.

Moreover, start-up almost always costs more than once a programme reaches cruising altitude. But among the factors that can be controlled is the fact that the Board has selected a complex, elaborate and expensive system of governance and management for the programme, with a hands-on Board, staffing and accommodation through the WTO, and separate arrangements for programme and financial management. It is the assessment of the Team that efficiency (and effectiveness) could now be significantly improved through streamlining of overly-prescriptive procedures and steps (fully dissected in this report), some decentralizing of ES coordination staff, better preparing for the transition to “Tier 2” projects and better engaging partner agencies and active donors in the work of the programme.

Sustainability of the EIF’s work. What is important to sustain is not the EIF as an institution or even a programme. Instead it is the contributions that the EIF has begun to make and can further make to the capacities of LDCs themselves to target and maximize the resources directed to their most important needs in trade and development. In our assessment, the EIF should not and cannot try to compete as a “retail brand” or a major source of financing with some far larger programmes of trade-related technical assistance and massive “aid for trade” resources. Instead it must strengthen and sustain its special ‘honest broker’ position and its potentials for leverage and convening these bigger players to permanently reinforce the ability of the LDCs to carry on this work. The fairly substantial evidence is reassuring that many if not most of the capacity-building contributions of the EIF would leave some lasting benefits in the absence of the programme - a claim that many such programmes could not make.

At the same time these gains are far from entrenched as yet, and the completion of an effective five-year term, with other reinforcements of the types recommended, should make a further positive difference. The Review examined the achievements against the EIF’s core principles as key pillars of sustainability. It found that the EIF has started well in supporting the use of trade for development, country ownership and capacity building support. It has done less well so far in helping spur donors and agencies to coordinate their responses and in finding the right balance between stronger and responsive governance and management of a complex capacity-building programme.

¹ Even as far as these measures go they are notoriously difficult to document and frequently suspect.

Monitoring and evaluation. As such systems go, it is our conclusion that the design of EIF's monitoring framework is comparatively reasonable and potentially useful. Like all such systems, however, it will have to work its way into practice gradually, mainly by proving that it is genuinely useful as a management tool and not by imposing a kind of artificial compliance ritual which may even be counter-productive.

Stronger governance of the EIF: The three-pillared partnership between LDCs, core agencies and supporting donors is inevitably complex, especially given the imbalances between their respective presences in countries and at the WTO base in Geneva. This complex partnership, together with problems with the IF, and the drawn-out process of agreeing on changes from the IF model have led to some abnormal and unhelpful governance practices of micro-management and loss of a strategic grasp, although the Board appears to play other roles well. The successful functioning of the Board-management relationship depends on mutual confidence – for the Board to empower senior managers to carry out the programme and be held accountable for doing so – and for senior managers to secure the necessary expertise and provide the Board with salient and straightforward performance and financial information appropriate for strategic oversight. Neither condition is now properly fulfilled and these gaps need to be rectified.

Potential impact of the EIF: There is a significant number of areas where there is evidence of likely contributions (and even actual ones) by the EIF in the directly trade-related impacts identified for the Review. These are in trade facilitation, market development, enhancing productivity, improving product quality, addressing supply capacity constraints, and trade integration. It is a significant finding that large proportions of participants in the programme from different responsibilities share the conviction and commitment that this impact can be achieved. Even contributions to the higher level impacts of economic growth, raising incomes, poverty reduction and sustainable development represent results that significantly guide and motivate this work.

Recommendations

The MTR has formulated a small number of strategic recommendations to build on the successes of the EIF to date and make some important improvements and mid-course corrections where there are evident needs. Each recommendation is clearly built on the evidence, findings and conclusions in the body of this Report and supporting materials. As requested by the EIF Board when the draft Report was presented, the Team has added possible ideas for implementation where it finds a basis for doing so.

The Board and, as appropriate, the Steering Committee of the EIF should:

1. Recognise the effective start-up date of the EIF term as April 2010, when the EIF Board was constituted and there was a functioning base of staff, policies and partner agreements and an imminent agreement on the financial management contract. Thus a five-year term for the programme would extend to mid-2015. Resist pressures for growing disbursement in favour of the more difficult tasks of maximising strategic leverage. Agree on realistic strategic expectations for the second half of this term in the light of this Review and the responses to it.
2. Gear up, through a serious re-examination by all EIF partners – especially donors and agencies, from the top to the field level - to re-commit to full implementation of their responsibilities as EIF partners in the crucial second half of this term. This will be particularly critical as the focus begins to shift from capacity-building to greater coordination and mobilisation of trade-related resources. These recommendations would imply some modest changes in the ways each of these actors do business, a reasonable demand in relation to the stakes for LDCs and the promises made to them.

3. Recognise that the basic objectives and strategic approach of the EIF (particularly in its capacity-building Tier 1 activities, which have been more developed and tested) are highly relevant and important to the current trade and economic priorities of the LDCs, and are seen to be so by all sets of partners. While an appropriate degree of standardization is needed, the main work has to be flexibly adapted at the country level. Seeing the EIF as a tool to accompany the LDCs on a journey, the EIF needs to customise support to the individual requirements of the countries at different levels of progress, including the consolidation and catch-up of capacity-building where it has not yet taken hold. WTO and the Executive Secretariat of EIF need to adopt a more flexible, 'developmental' mode in the management of the EIF, moving away from the rules and compliance-based emphasis up to now. The EIF cannot be run from Geneva with a rulebook. More detailing of rules will not improve effectiveness or accountability. To reduce the gaps of communication and support between the LDCs and the Executive Secretariat, it should move rapidly to mirror the TFM's successful model of partial de-centralisation, if possible economising and building synergies by co-locating the services in regional offices. Given the nature of their respective tasks, regional offices of the Executive Secretariat would need more staff on the ground than the TFM.
4. In the interest of efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the EIF, start afresh at this turning point with clarified and revamped relationships between the Steering Committee, Board, Executive Secretariat and Trust Fund Manager, with reciprocal confidence-building steps. It is important to return the Board to a strategic guidance function, removing it from detailed regulatory, compliance and project approval functions. The Board has mandated a whole management process and ethos that is over-centralised, rigid, and unnecessarily complex, in which the rapid approval of final submissions to the Board is highly misleading as to its real role. Empower and hold accountable the Secretariat for the normal functions of executive direction of a capacity building program, with more regular, and thorough reporting including strategic directions, programme performance and financial reporting to the Board at the appropriate management information level. The distinct rationale, functions and potential contributions of the additional layer of governance in the Steering Committee are not readily evident and need to be clarified.
5. To strengthen substantive support and quality assurance around project design and approval - particularly as the programme moves more into Tier 2 activities – greatly reinforce the role and makeup of Technical Advisory Panels, in countries and at the programme level. Set up rosters of recognised experts from core, donor, and other agencies and sources to be called upon short term at design and/or approval stages to serve on these panels according to the nature of the project in question. Relying on these resources more, radically prune the current numerous and drawn-out procedures for the consideration and approval of activities.
6. To ensure appropriate preparation for high-quality, resource-mobilizing Tier 2 projects of the kind envisaged in the EIF design, introduce and fund a new "transitional support" phase in the programme between Tiers 1 and 2 in countries where necessary. This would be designed to make the mainstreaming of trade real and literally help to 'frame' strategic and catalytic programmes. It would support and promote opening up and extending engagement of the process, reaching out to different parts of government including sector ministries, agencies, donors, and private sector and regional actors. It could promote and support trade fora and engagement in consultative groups and round tables, sectoral consultative arrangements, or even look toward new trade and/or private sector SWAPs or similar arrangements, all to help build strategic and substantial project responses to the country's specified trade priorities. It will also provide the resources for effective

management support to Tier 2 projects, an area in which the NIAs cannot be expected to have developed the necessary capacity.

7. Recognise that the Monitoring and Evaluation system for the EIF, while a promising tool for the longer term, will have to work its way into practice gradually, mainly by proving that it is genuinely useable and useful as a management tool and not by imposing a kind of artificial compliance ritual, which may even be counter-productive.
8. At this milestone of a Mid-Term Review and a growing movement toward transitional and Tier 2 activities, take special initiatives to communicate better the distinctive and targeted mission of the EIF in order to manage expectations and reduce misconceptions. Particularly with the advent of Tier 2 these messages should now be aimed at helping Focal Points, Steering Committees and NIAs in each LDC to reach out, in an open partnership mode, to wider parts of government, private sector and other national stakeholders, donors and agencies who will collectively be more responsible for the resources and programmatic partnership in future. If the EIF itself consolidates its enabling function in countries that still require further Tier 1 assistance and builds on it to serve appropriate enabling functions in this wider resource mobilisation phase, it will have served its unique purpose well.

1. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

This is the draft report of the independent Mid-Term Review of the Enhanced Integrated Facility for Trade-related Assistance to Least Developed Countries (EIF). The mandate to the Team to carry out this Review was confirmed by the EIF Board on 27th July 2012 and a contract with the WTO completed on 9th August 2012. The Team has carried out the Review in line with the original Terms of Reference and the approved Inception Report.

The Report is directed in the first instance to the Board and Steering Committee of the EIF, but is intended to be of interest and use to wider groups of stakeholders, decision-makers and others interested in the Facility's mission and in trade development in least developed countries (LDCs). Therefore the Report is designed to stand alone by briefly situating the EIF and its background in a wider context, not assuming "inside" knowledge on the part of the reader², explaining clearly how the Review was carried out, and avoiding the use of specialized jargon and acronyms.

The task of a review is to make a mid-course assessment of an evolving set of activities, as distinct from a final evaluation.³ At the same time, the approach taken here has applied rigorous evaluation disciplines and techniques and specifically the recognized quality standards for development evaluation.⁴ As planned, the Review Team's final report is designed to be clear, straightforward, evidence-based and jargon-free in order to make it as useful as possible for wider dissemination and ultimate use.

The principal timeframe covered in the Review is the period since the formal launching of the EIF in May 2007. At the same time, it takes into account that the EIF evolved from predecessor programmes that dated back nearly a decade earlier, that the EIF as such became operational in October 2008, and that the five-year term of the current programme extends only to 2013.

1.2 Brief background on the Enhanced Integrated Framework

The LDCs face special constraints in integrating into the international trading system and benefitting from trade for their development.⁵ The Integrated Framework (IF) was established in 1997 as an international initiative - with concerted backing from the main multilateral institutions concerned - to build LDC capacity to formulate, negotiate and implement trade policy to support the integration of these countries more fully into the global trading system. In 2000, a "revamped" IF strategy was formulated with the objectives of mainstreaming trade into LDC's national development strategies and coordinating delivery of TRTA.⁶

² To reduce the bulk of the report itself but make supplementary information readily available to participants, some items (as indicated) have been placed on the Saana MTR website at www.saana.com/eif-mtr

³ DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts,

http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en_2649_33721_42632800_1_1_1_1_00.html. In technical parlance, the review is thus more "formative" than "summative", although its timing comes much closer to the end of the current five year term of the EIF in 2013 than to the middle of that term.

⁴ OECD/ DAC, Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, 2010

⁵ These include supply-side constraints that severely limit their ability to benefit from trading opportunities. They face trade integration obstacles in technical and hard infrastructure capacity, human resources, as well as managing adjustment and transition costs. "To overcome these constraints and realize the benefits from trade, LDCs must build awareness of such opportunities, overcome their supply-side constraints and create an enabling environment to benefit from global trade."

⁶ GTZ EIF Evaluation (2010), p.1

Following a series of evaluations, a Task Force recommended strengthening the delivery process of the IF by linking the activities and results at programme and project levels. This led to a restructuring of the IF in 2007 into the present EIF. The EIF programme aims at creating a strong and effective results-oriented partnership among all EIF stakeholders. This involves close cooperation amongst the LDCs, the current 23 donors, six core agencies, one observer agency, the Executive for the EIF (ES), the Trust Fund Manager (TFM) and other development partners who are supporting the LDCs' own drive to achieve the EIF objectives:

- To mainstream trade into national development strategies;
- To set up structures needed to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance; and
- To build capacity to trade, which also includes addressing critical supply side constraints.

1.3 The place and limits of the EIF in aid for trade

The EIF forms part of a complex of international programmes and projects that are now clustered under the very broad umbrella of aid for trade. It is important for the Team to highlight a few key elements in the nature and roles of the EIF in this broader context that have been found particularly important in carrying out the Review, and avoid some of the confusion that poses serious challenges for the EIF.

The Scope of EIF - programmatic and financial:

The basic rationale and role for the IF (carried on under the EIF) predated by a substantial period the rapid growth of massive sums of international assistance that have, especially since 2005, been labelled 'aid for trade'. By 2010 these flows amounted to some US \$32.1 billion annually. Of the grand total over the period 2006-10, lower-middle income countries received US\$ 49.2 billion, while LDCs – the target beneficiaries of the EIF - received US\$ 35.1 billion.⁷ These sums have been allocated to a broad range of trade-related needs, including major infrastructure projects (e.g. roads, ports, etc.) and support to productive sectors (e.g. mining, manufacturing, etc.) Putting these figures alongside the total funds allocated to the EIF to date – US \$ 165 million – should immediately give a sense of perspective on the very modest financial scope of EIF.

From its inception in 1997, the earlier Integrated Framework approach was seen as an “upstream” enabling instrument for the broader and larger flows of assistance rather than a major delivery system of its own. The aim was “to increase the benefits that least developed countries derive from the trade-related technical assistance available to them from the six agencies involved in designing the Framework as well as from other sources”.⁸

The IF already recognised the principles that trade-related technical assistance activities should be demand-driven and country-owned. A particular objective was that of integrating the approaches of the six multilateral agencies concerned – through the WTO, UNCTAD and ITC Secretariats, in collaboration with the staff of the IMF, the World Bank and the UNDP. This implied “allow[ing] the trade-related technical assistance activities of all the agencies to be properly coordinated, sequenced and synchronized.” It also aimed at “provid[ing] comprehensive information about the specific needs of each least developed country and about the trade-related technical assistance activities of the six agencies involved, as well as at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of each agency's delivery.

⁷ Among LDCs, the largest recipients of this substantial aid for trade financing over the period were Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Bangladesh

⁸ http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/framework.htm

While the volumes of aid for trade and even trade-related technical assistance have ballooned over the period since 2007, the enhanced successor programme has worked to maintain its upstream, enabling mission with very modest resources in relative terms. It is clear that this can be a major challenge, when the attention and effort of many of the key stakeholders in countries are drawn to the operational programmes and projects being launched and the large volumes of resources attached to them.

The EIF, with its sharpened focus on helping build the capacity of the LDCs to mainstream trade into national development strategies and helping set up structures needed to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance clearly fits into the category of “Aid directed to trade policy and regulations” among the six categories of aid for trade clarified in 2006 by the WTO AfT Task Force, and set out in Box 1 below. Within this more targeted category, EIF’s resources, while still limited, have still been relatively significant, in relation to the total flows estimated at US \$ 711 million over the period 2006-10. Annex 10 indicates the relative volumes of total aid for trade spending and spending for trade policy and regulations in individual LDCs.

MTR Assessment

In almost all of the Review’s case study countries there has been sufficient understanding and support of the EIF’s strategic roles, through its Tier 1 activities, of helping build capacity for trade mainstreaming and a diagnostically-sound Action Matrix to guide trade-related assistance. Nonetheless the problem of competing with much larger assistance projects for scarce attention and engagement has been a real one, beyond those most directly involved with the programme.

On the other hand, as the EIF’s moves to focus more directly – through its Tier 2 activities – on its third main objective, “helping to build capacity to trade, which also includes addressing critical supply side constraints” the challenges of competing for attention and managing expectations are becoming more serious. Here this very small programme will be venturing into a number of the other heavily-funded categories of aid for trade. It can only “deliver” significant resources to the extent that countries can in fact succeed as intended in using the EIF’s own very modest funds and their strengthened strategic platform to steer, catalyse and increase the flows of aid for trade assistance, and other resources from government and the private sector. Such a “leverage” function is not always easy to understand, to realise or to demonstrate. This must be seen as one of the most important challenges facing the EIF as it moves ahead, and it is an important theme in key findings and recommendations of this report.

Box 1: Six categories of aid for trade

1. **Aid directed to trade policy and regulations**, which includes training of trade officials, analysis of proposals and positions and their impact on national stakeholders, technical and institutional support to facilitate the implementation of trade agreements and compliance with rules and standards;
2. **Aid directed to trade development**, such as investment and trade promotion, support in different trade sectors and trade finance, market analysis and development;
3. **Aid directed to trade-related infrastructure**, including physical infrastructure to connect domestic and foreign markets;
4. **Aid directed to building productive capacity**, meaning investments in industries and specific sectors so that countries are able to diversify production and exports;
5. **Aid directed to trade-related adjustment**, which comprises complementary measures absorbing some of the costs linked to tariff reductions or declining terms of trade to make developing countries benefit from trade liberalisation.
6. **Aid directed to other trade-related needs.**

Source: WTO (2006)

1.4 The rationale and objectives of the Mid Term Review

Rationale

The Mid Term Review was built into the EIF programme, requested by the EIF Donors and endorsed by the EIF Board. It is seen as an integral part of programme implementation and a necessary phase in the programme cycle. Accordingly, the results-based management nature of the programme requires that it be reviewed at mid-term for efficient programme planning and implementation and as input into the way forward in aid for trade programming for LDCs.

Objectives⁹

The main purpose of the MTR is to undertake an independent evaluation of whether the programme is performing in such a way as to achieve the objectives, identify issues and recommend programme adjustments as necessary. The MTR will assess progress made against project (i.e. country level) outcomes and how these are contributing to the achievement of the overall programme outcomes and the programme purpose. The Review will also aim to identify challenges and opportunities and capture success stories and lessons learned from implementing the EIF for future strategic programming.

The specific objectives of the MTR are:

1. To assess the progress made against the programme's goal, purpose and outcomes based on the programme-level logframe;
2. To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of the EIF programme at the global (programme) level, country (project) level and the intersection between project and programme levels, including a full evaluation of the EIF's operation systems and structures, as well as project and financial management processes;

⁹ Direct referencing to ToRs

- To assess the constraints and opportunities facing EIF implementation at the country and programme levels;
- To assess the strategic direction of the EIF and make recommendations for any adjustments.
- To promote accountability, lesson-learning, feedback and knowledge-sharing among all the EIF partners, as basis for achieving the programme objectives and purpose.

1.5 The structure of the report

The report begins by briefly outlining the approach and method of the Review. The report is then structured to systematically assess and explain progress against the purposes and objectives of the MTR, geared to the objectives of the EIF itself. It also treats the place and limits of the EIF within the wider domain of trade-related technical assistance, and aid for trade. The Synthesis chapter (4) on detailed evidence and findings reflects directly the assemblage of the extensive and thoughtful contributions received from the large number of informants interviewed, as well as other sources. It is included in detail in the interest of transparency, and to permit tracking the logical development from evidence and findings to conclusions and then recommendations.

2. THE APPROACH AND METHODS FOR THE MID-TERM REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The approach and methods adopted for the Review have followed closely the lines set out in the approved Inception Report¹⁰ and the Terms of Reference on which it was based. This section of the Report will simply outline how the Review was carried out. As background to the substantive findings Annex 2 on “Process, inputs and methods” describes these elements in more detail, and further technical issues and details of different component studies can be elaborated on request.

2.2 Scope and approach

The main timeframe for the Review is the period from the formal launching of the EIF in May 2007 to the end of August, 2012. At the same time, it takes into account as necessary the legacy of predecessor programmes, important stages in the development of the EIF to this point, and the projected end in 2013 of the five-year term of the current phase of the programme.

The building of the EIF since 2007

Importantly, the Review Team has found that the translation of the 2007 agreement to launch an enhanced Integrated Framework into an operational programme with the necessary supporting governance and management arrangements and systems has been an extended process. This fact has had a substantial impact on the start and development of the programme at all levels, and thus on the assessments that can be made at even this late “mid-term” point against initial expectations that had not explicitly built in these evolutionary steps. At the same time, this history and its explanations must be part of the mid-term assessment itself. The approaches to carrying out the specific objectives of the MTR are briefly described below and some key elements are spelled out in Annex 2 on “Process, inputs and methods.” The structure of the sections setting out the Review findings closely

¹⁰ The Inception Report, along with other key documents are available at www.saana.com/eif-mtr

follows the structure set out here that is also reflected in the guiding evaluation matrix and the Review's data-gathering and assessment tools.

Review objective 1: "To assess the progress made against the programme's goal, purpose and outcomes based on the programme level logframe (Logical Framework)."

Although the overall programme level logframe was only adopted in July 2011 and is still in the process of being introduced in country programmes, the Review did, as mandated, test it as a basis for assessing progress. The Review builds up from documentary and statistical sources an overall factual picture and analysis of the programme's development across the whole portfolio in 43 countries¹¹ where it has been initiated to date. This was supported by a survey to key stakeholders in 34 countries where case study missions would not be possible.

The assessment of progress against the four main intended outcomes of the EIF was deepened in 12 country case studies carried out in September and early October, 2012¹². Further key inputs were the results of customized but consistent surveys for donors and also for agencies and constituency representatives on the Board of the EIF partner agencies. From this level the Review reaches ahead to see how far contributions are being made to the overall programme goal of "supporting the LDCs' integration into the global trading system with a view to contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable development" and the purpose of "enabling EIF countries to become fully integrated and active players in, and beneficiaries of, the global trading system." In extending to this level, the Review has shared the sensible caution of the EIF's Logical Framework itself about expectations or claims that the EIF can show substantial direct impacts on the broad goal and purpose, especially at this stage. The test has rather been to see whether there is plausible evidence of actual or potential contributions to the broader programme and purpose

Review objective 2. "To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of the EIF programme at the global (programme) level, country (project) level and the intersection between project and programme levels, including a full evaluation of the EIF's operation systems and structures, as well as project and financial management processes."

The Report reflects the agreed decision to organize the main evaluation questions for the entire MTR around the specified evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, potential impact, and relevance of the EIF. These criteria and questions are applied to the full portfolio of activities in all participating LDCs, deepened in targeted country case studies and then brought back up for synthesis at the programme level. As seen below in the evaluation questions, and the methods for answering them, this multi-level picture has:

- Used and tested the agreed performance framework and the (so far limited) data being developed around the EIF logframes at both the project and international levels;
- Integrated the evaluation of the EIF's operation systems and structures, as well as project and financial management processes, as they affect activities at both levels,¹³ and

¹¹ The portfolio review excluded Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Madagascar as these countries are currently not engaged in EIF activities.

¹² These countries were selected at the inception report stage through a transparent set of criteria to maximize representativeness and guard against bias. They were: Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Chad, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.

¹³ As specified in the Inception Report, the scope of this Review has not included a specific, in-depth analysis of EIF financial management, but with access to audit reports and programme and project documents, it has included both general assessments reflecting good management practice and a sample-based crosscheck of financial reporting possibilities.

- Checked the observance in practice of the EIF’s operating principles on the use of trade as a development tool for LDCs, LDC ownership, and a partnership approach in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
- Similarly the Review has checked the application of the two “enhanced outcomes” targeted in launched in 2007: “Increased capacity-building support to LDCs through the EIF process”¹⁴: and “Stronger governance of EIF”¹⁵

Responses to three additional objectives: Moving to the level of conclusions, the Review has summed up its findings to respond to the three explicit challenges in the Terms of Reference:

- “To assess the constraints and opportunities facing EIF implementation at the country and programme levels;
- To assess the strategic direction of the EIF and make recommendations for any adjustments to the implementation process, if deemed necessary, as well as measures necessary to enhance the programme's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability; and
- To promote accountability, lesson-learning, feedback and knowledge-sharing among all the EIF partners, as basis for achieving the programme objectives and purpose.” (ToR p. 3)

The Review’s approach, methodology, evaluation questions and plan of work were set out in the Inception Report, showing how these purposes, objectives and the final three sub-objectives would be pursued through the course of the Review, together with the task of “identifying challenges and opportunities and capturing success stories and lessons for future strategic programming.” (See Inception Report pp. 4-15 for details). This plan has been applied rigorously, as mirrored in the structure and content of this report and in the Annex 2 on “Process, inputs and methods”.

2.3 The Main Review Questions and Evaluation Matrix

It is important in this Report to set out here (in Table 1) the agreed evaluation questions for the Review and to provide for reference (on the dedicated website) the Working Evaluation Matrix also detailing sub-questions, which has, as planned, served as the “spine” of the Review. The questions can be readily traced through the synthesis chapter (chapter 4) of detailed evidence findings.

¹⁴ This is supposed to come about through “increased financial resource, support provided to NIUs and technical assistance, training and knowledge transfer to be provided for by implementing bodies in project delivery,” Compendium

⁹ This is supposed to come about through “collective decision making by the EIF Board, ES and TFM and through clearly defined accountabilities and rigorous monitoring and evaluation.” Compendium

Table 1: Evaluation questions for the Review

Effectiveness
<p>1. To what extent have EIF objectives so far been achieved or advanced over the Review period, assessing primarily against its contributions to its four specific intended outcomes? What are the main explanations for progress or lack of it on each, and appropriate remedial measures?</p> <p>i. Is sufficient institutional and management capacity being built in EIF countries to formulate and implement trade-related strategies and implementation plans?</p> <p>ii. Are EIF countries mainstreaming trade into their national development strategies and plans?</p> <p>iii. Is there more coordinated delivery of trade-related resources (funding, technical assistance, etc.) by donors and implementing agencies to implement country priorities following the adoption of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Action Matrix? And</p> <p>iv. Are EIF countries securing resources in support of initiatives that address DTIS Action Matrix priorities?</p>
<p>2. Is the monitoring and evaluation system now functioning, effective in measuring progress towards EIF objectives, and being used as intended? What are the key risks to the EIF achieving its objectives? Are risks identified and managed appropriately through EIF implementation?</p>
<p>3. Are there observed changes (in capacities, institutions, donor harmonization and coordination, resource flows, etc.) at country level over the period be plausibly linked to contributions of the EIF? Can any unintended positive or negative effects in these areas be observed as a consequence of the EIF?</p>
<p>4. Do findings at this stage point toward improved ways that the EIF could advance these objectives, or alternative approaches to do so?</p>
Efficiency
<p>5. Have EIF resources and inputs so far been converted to results delivered in LDCs in an economical and timely fashion? The analysis will examine as inputs: funds; the time and talents of Board members, Steering Committees, national, agency and EIF international staff (ES and TFM), etc.</p>
<p>6. What have been the main factors affecting timely and economical delivery (e.g. obstacles, facilitators, bottlenecks, troubleshooting capacity e.g. reaction time to problems at different levels areas of EIF)? Have these factors changed over the period, how and why? What implications do they have for the design, structure and operational processes of the EIF?</p>
<p>7. What are the most important changes at the programme and project levels that could be made to improve delivery?</p>
Sustainability
<p>8. Has the support of EIF helped generate engagement in trade development by wider constituencies than specialized trade officials, include trade actors and stakeholders in productive sectors? Where and why or why not?</p>
<p>9. How likely are the contributions so far of the EIF to each its four intended outcomes to be sustainable by national governments and institutions after the EIF support ceases/ends – are LDCs able, willing and committed to continue with this work? What are realistic timescales for achieving this sustainability?</p>
<p>10. To what extent has mainstreaming of trade into strategies been formally implemented but not followed up with concrete action, resources and projects? What are the main obstacles to follow-up? What actions could be taken to increase the likelihood that the EIF will be sustainable?</p>
<p>11. Is the EIF now making essential contributions to trade development at the country level that if suspended (or when ended) would /could not be taken up effectively by the LDCs themselves</p>

and/or other programmes?

Potential impact

12. At the global level, what are the observed changes (in trade integration, growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development, etc.) by LDCs over the EIF period to date?

At the country level, are there specific cases (through case study countries and examples from across the entire constituency) of significant improvements to LDC integration in the MTS

At both levels, are there actual or prospective changes that can be plausibly linked to contributions of the EIF?

13. Can any unintended positive or negative effects in these areas be observed as a consequence of the EIF?

14. Projecting beyond the current lifespan of EIF, how likely is it that the Framework will make significant contributions to the overall goal of integration of LDCs into the global trading system with a view to contributing to economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development? Why or why not? Do findings at this stage point toward improved ways that the EIF could advance these objectives, or alternative approaches e.g. through changes in its focus, structure and / or processes?

Relevance

15. How relevant is the EIF to the current state and directions of the overall aid for trade campaign in LDCs?

16. To what extent and how have important changes in the context (e.g. economic or other crises, changing trade patterns, markets and sources of competition, new regional, multilateral and bilateral trade initiatives) affected the relevance of the EIF to LDCs' national priorities?

17. Is EIF seen as being of high relevance by key decision-makers as well as trade and economic actors beyond trade ministries or central Government in different LDCs? Why or why not? What are the implications or lessons?

2.4 Methods, quality assurance and standards applied in the Review

As detailed in Annex 2, the approach and methods used to answer these questions have been as specified in the Terms of Reference. The Review has been carried out in a participatory manner with stakeholders at the country and programme levels. Both desk-based and field work have been extensively deployed and the analysis has been both quantitative and qualitative, incorporating structured perceptions of stakeholders. The Review has applied and expanded upon all the specified methods of document reviews, portfolio review, stakeholder interviews and country case studies (selected through rigorous and transparent criteria).

For the final phase of the work – the analysis, aggregation and synthesis of Review results – the Team has maintained the unifying framework of the Evaluation Matrix. It has tested and calibrated findings to the strength of the supporting evidence, and conclusions for their relevance to the agreed Review questions and the clarity of the analysis. Quality assurance of component studies has been maintained by the Team Leader and Project Manager. For the overall report, Team peer review and validation at the draft stage has helped to ensure that all components have been properly reflected. A final quality assurance check has been carried out by a senior staff member of one of the participating firms who did not take an active role in the Review work itself.

The recognised DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation have guided the Team's work throughout the Review, taking account of the important issues of evaluation ethics including the protection of confidentiality.

2.5 Limitations of the Review

Given the distinct mandate and scope of a mid-term review, it is not a limitation in itself that the study must assess the EIF as “a work in progress” which it surely is. At the same time, there have been serious challenges.

- a. First, taking account of the EIF’s “start-up”, time for organizing governance, administration, leadership, staffing and contracting, and creating procedures, guidelines and performance management systems was not factored into the Review’s Terms of Reference for assessing performance. But it is a major material fact that must and will be taken into account, and explicitly assessed as part of the performance of the programme.
- b. Given the breadth and complexity of the EIF as an object of evaluation and the dearth of organized inputs of information, monitoring and evaluation much more time and resources could have been well used to go into much further depth in this Review. When it set the Terms of Reference and agreed to the Inception Report, however, the EIF Board decided to proceed on the basis of receiving the best professional job that could be accomplished within the time and resources allowed.
- c. The practical milestones for monitoring and reporting on the progress of EIF activities were not as solid, useful or clearly agreed or documented as they needed to be, so that the Review team had to take an active role in setting up such milestones for the Review (which hopefully will remain useful for the EIF in future).
- d. Progress has been highly varied among the 43 different countries active in the EIF, making generalizations difficult and potentially misleading. On the assumption that the designers and sponsors of the programme were conscious of the difficult and diverse constraints on different LDCs – not “one size fits all” - this varied progress has been taken by the Review Team as an inescapable reality to be built into the analysis rather than attempting to impose any single model or standard of progress.
- e. Because the starting date set by the WTO for the main work of the Review was poorly timed for almost all case study countries, the very tight schedule for the whole Review had to be even more compressed. For this reason, some of the plans in the Inception Report for additional information sharing systems in the course of the Review were simply not practicable or necessary. As it worked out, there were two opportunities within six weeks to update all stakeholders through their representatives at the Geneva end. In the case study countries, the missions provided full briefings. Surveys of other LDC stakeholders, donors and present and past Board members served to inform them. The commitment was reaffirmed that all informants who wish will receive a copy of the final report, and all country case reviewers provided at least informal feedback sessions to key stakeholders at the end of their respective missions.
- f. To complement the statistical and documentary materials on the performance of the EIF, the Review was mandated to depend on inputs from stakeholders and informed respondents. Because the EIF programme is relatively small and not very widely known, most of the respondents who are sufficiently informed to make any assessment actually have an immediate stake in the programme itself. There are very few knowledgeable but “disinterested” informants. These stakeholder perspectives are of course legitimate inputs in themselves, and far from homogeneous, coming from different vantage points and interests. But this base of informants does mean that the Review Team has had to be extra careful to take into account potential biases in the informant base, triangulate the evidence for assessments from different sources, and arrive at its own independent judgements after weighing all the evidence. In studying the inputs from informed respondents, however, the Team has been struck that even if there were a need to discount somewhat for a possible positive bias among informants with a “vested interest”

in the EIF, the highly plausible variations among their responses on different questions give a strong indication of both the seriousness and credibility of responses. In other words, in none of these evidence streams was there any like a tendency to claim that everything was just fine with the EIF.


- g. The Review exercise has generated a wealth of thoughtful input from many different informants, not just in quantifiable answers to specific questions but also in comments and suggestions. Every one of these inputs has been carefully read and considered by the Review Team and reflected in preparing the report. Regrettably, however for reasons of space, time and confidentiality, the text cannot do them full justice or capture all of this valuable material, or even illustrate with representative and balanced quotes and examples.
- h. The Team has concluded that it has an adequate and sufficiently balanced base of information to produce a reliable Review report across the range of issues in its Terms of Reference. This conclusion should be read in conjunction with the transparent presentation of the overall coverage and distribution of different survey inputs, as explicitly noted where those results are introduced, and spelled out in Annex, 2.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE EIF PORTFOLIO

3.1 EIF Roadmap and decision points

The EIF's basic objectives, procedures, structures and tools have, since April 2011 been carefully and extensively documented in the User's Guide, the "Compendium of EIF documents". Many sections of this Report will make reference to particular issues or documents, and there is no need to try to summarize all its "statutory" aspects here. To set the context, however, the simple diagram below illustrates how the essential operations of the EIF are intended to function.

Figure 1: Basic EIF roadmap and decision points



3.2 The EIF Portfolio: Profile and progression

3.2.1 Methodology for analysis

A key requirement for the Mid-Term Review has been to obtain the clearest possible factual picture of the actual status and evolution of the whole EIF portfolio of activities, taking into account the carryover activities from the IF. As planned in the Inception Report and Matrix, as part of the preparation of this Review, the Team worked with the EIF's Executive Secretariat and Trust Fund Manager to map the multi-level EIF processes including decision points in EIF operations.

Once the requisite data were retrieved and organized - noting that in some cases there is still room for discussion about whether and when individual milestones were reached - it has been possible for the Team to reconstruct a broad picture of the step-by-step operation of the EIF in all the LDCs concerned.

This is essential as an evidence base for understanding and assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of different elements and stages, particularly given the different views and expectations around the timeframes for EIF implementation. The detailed mapping of steps in Checklist for Country Progress in Annex 6 represents this picture.

3.2.2 Analysis of the EIF portfolio

One important objective of the MTR has been to ascertain the ranges and averages of the time that has been required to achieve each of the different stages under the programme, bearing in mind that some can actually move concurrently. Clarifying this picture has been far from straightforward as only some of the portfolio milestones had been clearly identified or recorded. The key milestones tracked here begin with the DTIS. The following analysis sums up that picture giving ranges of timing for the individual steps. The findings chapters of the Review will then explore the explanations behind these facts and any trends that are found, as well as qualitative assessments.

The portfolio analysis here is based on information supplied by the Executive Secretariat on the most important milestones in the country checklists put to the ES by the MTR Team, and on the country progress reports (from early 2012). It has been further refined in the light of corrected and updated information received on the draft MTR report. While stronger than past information on the overall portfolio, it is clear that some of these figures are still indicative and there are data issues which do not allow for definitive comparisons across countries and the project cycle. Less complete information on the more detailed steps in the development of an EIF programme has been used by the team to analyse EIF workflows in more depth. (See also Annex 6)

DTIS

42 countries have validated diagnostic studies, with the vast majority carried out prior to the transition to the enhanced IF. Of the 42 validated DTISs, six were completed under the EIF. There are four on-going diagnostics (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Haiti and Kiribati¹⁶) and two countries which have yet to begin the DTIS process (Eritrea and South Sudan¹⁷).

¹⁶ According to the ES, the DTIS for Kiribati was initially validated but the Government has since expressed dissatisfaction and a revision is ongoing

¹⁷ IF/EIF activities have been on hold in Eritrea since 2003 and South Sudan acceded to the EIF programme only in June 2012.

The World Bank has been the principal agency charged with carrying out the diagnostics. The Bank carried out 32 of the 42 validated DTISs, and is working on three of the four currently on-going diagnostics (Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Haiti). UNDP was in charge of the diagnostics in nine countries (almost exclusively small island states) and has one on-going in Kiribati. USAID is the only other agency to have been tasked with a DTIS under the IF/EIF with the DTIS for Mozambique validated in 2004.

According to our information, the DTIS process has taken an average of just under 17 months from pre-mission to validation. About a third of countries manage to complete the diagnostic in 12 months, while others faced significant delays either due to delays by the implementing agency, political instability or other factors. Breaking down between IF and EIF, the average time for carrying out the diagnostic under the IF was 15 months compared to 23 months with the EIF (though as mentioned this only includes six validated DTISs, a relatively small sample size).

DTIS updates

Three countries have so far validated DTIS updates funded by the EIF (Burundi, Laos and Lesotho), and two have funded updates conducted outside of the EIF (Rwanda and Nepal). The Government of Cambodia validated a DTIS update under the IF window in 2007 and is currently planning an update through the EIF. Currently, 12 countries have updates ongoing and updates for several more are planned. In many cases, funding for the DTIS updates were automatically approved under Tier 1 budgets.

A growing number of governments have chosen to undertake the diagnostic update either on their own (Laos, Cambodia, and Cape Verde) or with agencies other than the World Bank. Whereas the World Bank was responsible for three-quarters of the initial DTISs, the Bank has been charged with only a third of the diagnostic updates so far. UNDP, often in collaboration with other partners, is carrying out or will soon begin updates in six countries, and UNCTAD has updates ongoing for Senegal and Gambia. In Lesotho, USAID's Southern Africa Trade Hub carried out the update which was validated in September 2012.


Tier 1

As of August 30, 2012, EIF Tier 1 projects have been approved in 30 countries. According to the data available, from project formulation to the time the NIU is operational takes an average of just over 20 months, though with significant variations.¹⁸ Five countries managed the process in less than one year, while at least eight countries needed at least two years or more for this process. Overall, the project formulation phase has appeared to be the most time consuming, averaging about 10 months. Again, there is a fair degree of heterogeneity, with some countries managing to prepare projects and present them to the Tier 1 Technical Advisory Committee (TAC1) in less than 6 months, while in other countries this process has gone on for upwards of 18 months. For example, in Malawi the project preparation phase took 26 months before a proposal was submitted for TAC1 approval. In this case, it appears delays were due, among other factors, to the need for substantive revision following the adoption of the EIF Tier 1 guidelines.

¹⁸ The MTR's findings in this area are largely consistent with the initial findings of the ES and TFM "Update on Factors Affecting Delivery of March 2011".

Figure 2: Tier 1 project cycle

(average indicated in red)




From TAC1 appraisal to submission to the Board has averaged about four months, though the average is pushed up slightly by a small number of outliers. For example, in Yemen this phase of the project cycle took 19 months, reportedly due again to revision of Tier 1 guidelines by the Interim Board. Two-thirds of countries completed this phase in four months or less. The Board approval phase itself appears to average less than a month. Only in one case has the process taken more than a month (Central African Republic which took 2 months). Similarly, disbursements on average have been relatively quick (usually between one to three months). In Burkina Faso, for instance, issues with financial procedures caused a delay of several months. In the last phase, from disbursement to the NIU being in operation, the average time has been four months. In some cases, there has been a similar unit within the Ministry of Trade from the IF period and hence turnaround times have been relatively fast.

Tier 2

Seven countries (Burundi, Cambodia, Gambia, Mali, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Uganda) have had Tier 2 projects approved by the EIF Board as of August 30, 2012. For these seven, the project preparation phase has averaged just over 6 months. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the project preparation phase took 9 months while in Nepal the process took 4 months. The second phase averaged just less than four months, though this figure was pushed up by delays in Burundi (12 months). Of the seven approved Tier 2 projects, four have had funds disbursed, on average three months following Board approval.

Figure 3: Tier 2 project cycle

(average indicated in red)

**The “pipeline” of EIF proposals**

Looking ahead, many stakeholders and informants have made references to the “pipeline” of proposed activities under the EIF, to be considered alongside the existing portfolio. The MTR Team has insisted on getting further clarity on the status and likely timing of such proposals before including them in this Review. Obtaining further information has been difficult because the ES is concerned about sensitivities in referring to proposals that have not yet been formally submitted to the Board. As an indicative and confidential input to the Review, the Team received on 3 October, 2012 the names of countries, proposal areas and in some cases indicative project budgets.

While on the basis of the information received the Team cannot vouch for the credibility of the expectation that these proposals will come to fruition as full-fledged proposals to the Board in the timeframes indicated, the totals are included here as a considered input from the ES:

- Support to National Implementation Arrangements (9 projects, 4 expected to be submitted to the Board in 2012)
- Tier 2 projects in the pipeline for Board submission in 2012 (12 projects)
- Tier 2 projects in the pipeline for Board submission later (18 projects)

4. SYNTHESIS: OVERALL MID TERM REVIEW FINDINGS**4.1 Detailed Findings and Evidence**

This chapter sets out systematically the Mid-Term Review’s findings on the agreed questions that have guided the whole exercise. It combines, cross-checks and synthesizes evidence from the different streams of statistical and documentary research and analysis where applicable, as well as the various survey inputs. It gives first place to the findings through the country case studies. They have allowed an experienced Team to see the country actors and assess the in-country action on the EIF “up-close”, in some 25% of the participating countries in the EIF, selected as agreed in the Inception Report by a number of

transparent and agreed criteria to get a good, representative cross-section. The picture of the EIF that emerges from these case studies is very different from the initial, headquarters'-based impressions and even questions that emerged for team members when they first met in Geneva to launch the Review. While the countries are quite varied in many respects, they all do share key characteristics as LDCs.

The EIF's key principle of country ownership comes immediately to the forefront. It is national structures and their leaders and staff who must lead the work to apply this programme to their needs, and the related rule that "no one size fits all" is blindingly clear. By the same token, the operation of the partnership in the programmes - between LDCs, the core agencies, and donors - is far less prominent than at the programme and Board levels. The presence of the core agencies, mostly of the donors, and of the Executive Secretariat and Trust Fund Manager is more distant and intermittent, while countries work to carry out their building tasks. Some of these distances are not necessarily a problem, but they do highlight the need for the Review to examine how this partnership is actually functioning on the ground, and how all partners can best fulfil their commitments to support the critical work in LDCs.

Using a common methodology across 12 case studies that were all completed successfully, the team has been able to come up with a powerful base of evidence on the operation of the EIF in this substantial and varied sample of countries. This delivery-level perspective has been synthesized in this report to generate the main findings of the Review on the effectiveness, efficiency, potential impact, sustainability and relevance of the EIF.

This chapter notes any substantial differences with the case study findings from other streams of evidence. It should be noted that not all surveys included all the same questions, but where they did they are cited. It may be that there is an element of bias in the voluntary non-case study survey responses, with good performers responding disproportionately. It is less clear what bias if any might exist in the self-selection of donor respondents.

Within the case study evidence the consolidated survey responses are presented as the most readily useable and quantifiable strand of answers, bearing in mind that these were not simply surveys but were able to be validated against other forms of evidence (including interviews and review of documentation received from the EIF ES and TFM and other sources) and independent observation by Team members. The synthesis has been subjected to review by the different team members to ensure that the in-depth findings from each case study country have been properly reflected.

To ensure the most faithful and orderly reflection of the results, the text will simply present each question, followed by the key findings. It should be noted that in many cases the simple yes/no or ranking answers provided by informants give a more positive tone than some of the qualifying comments. In order to increase the readability of the results only the most salient ratings have been presented here, and citations from different case studies are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Building on the grounding of the basic factual material and the findings of the case studies, the Review has integrated and cross-referred to the results of the survey on the EIF carried out in non-case study countries, the survey of EIF donors and that of present and past Board members. It should be stressed that these surveys were not just opinion surveys designed to obtain perceptions of these sets of stakeholders. In a programme this complex, even some important "facts" about how things operate are subject to different interpretations and perspectives, so that it is important to canvas a wide range of well-informed stakeholders. Moreover, the perceptions of these different groups of stakeholders actually affect how the programme now operates and might do so in future. Finally, the surveys asked for and received important judgments, concerns and suggestions of key stakeholders. As will be

seen, all of these streams of evidence have all been taken into careful account – side by side with the country findings – as the Team has come to its own consolidated assessments.

4.2 Effectiveness of EIF

1. Has the EIF contributed to significant change over the past 4 years in the country's capacity to formulate and implement trade strategies?

The answer to this question must be preceded by noting that many (positive) changes in these capacities have been taking place independently of the EIF, as confirmed by observation and the responses in surveys where this was specifically asked. Thus it would be over-reaching to attribute these changes to the effects of the EIF. Nonetheless, the Team found the informant rankings of the contributions in most case study countries on this question to be convincing.

Very important: 27% Important: 58% Not important or Irrelevant 14%

In countries such as Laos that achieved a concrete output such as a national trade policy or an effective coordination mechanism, EIF was perceived as making a significant contribution. Such countries also tended to have engaged in EIF and received Tier 1 funding earlier than most and benefited from the platform over a period of several years. The more recent Tier 1 beneficiaries (e.g. Cape Verde, Mozambique, Senegal, Chad, Togo) are perceived as only possessing potential for effectiveness and EIF is seen as an instrument that is not yet effective or in the assessments from the Solomon Islands, not well adapted to national needs.

Across the groups of survey respondents there was broad agreement with the case study countries' profile of quantitative rankings for the importance of the EIF contribution, with the donor respondents including the most sceptical minority (40%) who ranked it "not important."

2. How would you describe the country's current institutional and management capacity?

A. To formulate trade-related strategies and implementation plans.

Sufficient: 19%; Insufficient but improving fast: 54%; Insufficient but improving slowly: 24%

Informants' assessments in the case study countries confirmed the Team's observations that in spite of strengthening trends and positive EIF contribution there is still a long way to go in most countries. A fairly widespread concern is that staff transience undermines capacity development and there is also often an over-reliance on consultants. Laos is the first country having a national consultant as the lead author of its DTIS equivalent document in 2012. Though only at the beginning of its T1 implementation, Cape Verde is managing and recruiting for its DTIS, reportedly in the face of initial ES opposition.

B. To implement trade-related strategies and implementation plans

Sufficient: 10%; Insufficient but improving fast: 45%; Insufficient but improving slowly: 36%; Insufficient: 8%

In virtually all countries implementation capacity is clearly much weaker than formulation capacity. This is due to funding and human resource constraints, as well as internal institutional issues, where trade or commerce ministries often lack the clout in the competition for allocating priorities and resources for implementing major strategies and plans.

3. Specifically, how would you assess:

A. Is the EIF's programme management structure in country (the Focal Point & National Implementation Unit or equivalent body) sufficiently?

- a. Active? 89% on the positive side
- b. Capable? 87% on the positive side
- c. Influential? 59% on the positive side

On the whole the NIU's are ranked as active and capable, although with variations in the degree to which they combine both attributes, and noting that the NIU is not yet in place in Bangladesh and only at pre-start-up in Mozambique), while the record of the FPs is highly variable. For instance in early-stage Bangladesh the Focal Point is dynamic and in Laos is ranked as the key success factor of the EIF. Influence of the NIU beyond its immediate stakeholders is in general low due to institutional factors, although in Bangladesh, Laos, Uganda and Rwanda influence is rated as moderate to good in its level and its rate of improvement. The Donor and Board member surveys did not include these field-oriented questions.

B. Is the EIF's Steering Committee and Technical Advisory Committee/s in-country sufficiently:

- a. Active? 78% on the positive side
- b. Capable? 78% on the positive side
- c. Influential? 64% on the positive side

The rankings of Steering Committees' and Technical Advisory Committees' activity and capacity are more mixed, but influence is weaker than both these factors in a number of countries again due to wider institutional influences and limited convening and decision-making powers. In a country like Bangladesh, the sheer importance of trade gives the Steering Committee some relative profile and influence. Private sector and civil society knowledge and participation (especially on EIF as such) are generally limited, with a small number of exceptions. Ensuring incentives for participants in these roles remains a challenge in some cases.

C. Donor Facilitation arrangements

The other leg of the in-country partnership is supposed to be the arrangement for Donor Facilitation, so it will also be examined here. The country case study missions went into considerable depth on these issues, meeting with donor facilitators and their key counterparts and some of their constituents in each country. Beyond the case study authors' qualitative assessments they were also asked to provide aggregate ratings on the same scale that was used for national arrangements and in the non-case countries' survey for donor facilitation arrangements. First, in the responding non-case study countries, donor facilitator arrangements were ranked substantially lower than the national structures in terms of being active (just 47% on the positive side) capable (58%) and influential (50%). Among the case study countries, the Team members' aggregate ratings for DF arrangements were active (50% on the positive side) capable (50%) and influential (25%). This total should take into account that in one of the 12 countries, the EIF had really not commenced operations, but the DF was already in place and rated positively on all elements.

4. Is the DTIS Action Matrix sufficiently:

- In place? Yes: 86%;

- Up-to-date? No 59%:
- A reflection of country priorities? Yes: 89%;
- Well-known by key actors in trade, including private sector? Yes: 51%;
- Used to guide decisions? Yes: 72%;

The DTIS is generally accepted as a potentially valuable tool, especially the Action Matrix if sufficiently detailed and focused on practical issues. But in many cases the DTIS is out-dated and therefore found of little practical use until fully updated and with a clear focus on implementable actions. The DTIS is not particularly well known and its degree of influence on national strategy is very uneven across the sample. In Bangladesh, the largest trader, there is strong pressure to get a DTIS completed and frustration at delays attributed to the World Bank. The Action Matrix is eagerly and widely anticipated and seen as a critical tool to bring the focus on priorities, a need that is broadly recognised. In Laos, the DTIS update is considered as a good reference for government and donors. The consultation and validation process made it well-known to stakeholders, including the private sector. In Chad, Senegal, Mozambique and Cape Verde the update is ongoing or imminent, creating high expectations among stakeholders. In Sierra Leone, there are concerns over the delays in the DTIS update, which was expected to feed in and inform the ongoing preparation of the PRSP.

Among non-case study respondents, a majority of responses in all the 19 countries were that there is a DTIS Action Matrix in place. The other responses are very consistent with case study countries: 50% are rated up-to-date; 71% a reflection of country priorities; 77% well-known and 89% used to guide decisions.

5. Is the national trade strategy:

- In place? Yes: 60% in case studies; 58% in others
- Up-to-date? No: 52% in case studies; 58% in others
- Of satisfactory or better quality? 53% No in case studies; 50% Yes in others;
- Sufficiently well-known? No: 76% in case studies; 80% in others
- Being implemented/used to guide decisions? Yes; 50%; No: 50% in case studies; 57% no in others

A good number of the countries lack an authoritative trade strategy document and there is sometimes confusion over what constitutes such a strategy (Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone). Laos has a national trade strategy to 2020 but not of good quality.

6. How many EIF-funded projects and activities are achieving the expected results?

Tier 1 capacity-building activities? Most: 43%;

Tier 2 projects approved? Not applicable: 29%; All: 21%; Can't assess: 20%

7. Has the EIF contributed to significant change over the past 4 years in the mainstreaming of trade into national development strategies and plans?

Very important: 30%; Important: 50%, Not important: 10%, Irrelevant: 9%, Negative: 2

Countries with a longer and more active history under EIF (and with Tier 1 projects in place for some time) claim success in mainstreaming, while the newer countries see it as a challenge still to be addressed. In 90% of non-case countries the majority response was "yes" and the majority response in all rated the EIF contribution as either very important or important. Among responding donors, half saw significant change in mainstreaming and half

could not say. 30% of the case study respondents rated the EIF contribution to change as very important, and 50% as important.

Among Board respondents 72% saw change, and 86% rated the EIF contribution as important or very important.

8. Is the national trade strategy sufficiently well reflected in the PRSP and/or national development strategy?

- On paper: Yes; 64%; No: 23%; Can't say: 13%
- In practice: Yes: 42%; No: 43%; Can't say: 15%

Most countries lack a formal trade strategy, although all have trade as a theme at some level in the PRSP. For example in Sierra Leone it is being integrated into the PRSP3, but didn't feature in PRSP2. In at least three countries there is evidence that this acknowledgement is not necessarily accompanied with the resources to implement trade-related activities. In Bangladesh, trade is a major theme in the 6th Five Year Plan.

9. Do productive sector strategies for key sectors (e.g., agriculture, private sector development, etc.) sufficiently integrate the trade dimensions?

- On paper: Yes; 66%;
- In practice: Yes: 47%;

There is still a long way to go but also growing awareness of the need for stronger linkages to trade in the productive sectors. In Bangladesh there are several clear instances where trade is reasonably prominent. In Sierra Leone trade dimensions have been integrated in agricultural strategy (in producing and exporting fish and cocoa) as well as in private sector development strategy, tourism policy and the sustainable agriculture development programme. In Laos there is evidence in silk, wood handicrafts, and biotic coffee.

10. Are public/private consultation mechanisms around trade in national development strategies and plans

- Functioning regularly? Yes: 60%;
- Inclusive enough? Yes: 63%;
- Effective? No: 55%

These numbers reflect the assessment of generally insufficient performance, with some examples of good practice. In Bangladesh, it was reported that the Government consults a well-organized, trade-oriented private sector "about everything."

11. Has the EIF contributed to significant change over the past 4 years in the coordinated delivery of trade-related resources to implement country priorities?

The case studies rated this influence as follows:

Very important: 15%; Important: 50%; Not Important or Irrelevant: 33%; Negative: 3%

There is generally weak performance on coordinated delivery and little contribution attributed to EIF. This is a main pillar of the EIF approach and should be ensured by the Donor Facilitator and Steering Committee. In Laos, DTIS update action matrix is providing an important reference point and the NIU and Donors are working together through the Steering Committee to ensure assistance is aligned with national priorities.

From the non-case country survey it is noteworthy that this influence was rated substantially higher, with 75% rating it very important or important. That number was even higher among Board respondents at 81%. Among donors, meanwhile, 64% saw a significant change in coordinated delivery, but they were reluctant to rate the EIF contribution, although 89% saw the DTIS as an important tool in increasing the coordination of assistance

12. How could the EIF do a better job to help strengthen coordinated delivery of trade-related resources or are there better approaches altogether (i.e. different from the EIF approach)?

It was rightly pointed out in reaction to the wording of this question that the EIF cannot be expected to do this, but that all the actors have a responsibility to make it happen..

There was a wide range of suggestions in the case studies and other countries' survey responses in response to this question and representative selection is presented below:

- a. Make the donor facilitators accountable (multiple mentions) on how they execute their role (which may also need to be clarified).
- b. Ensure that more donors recognize, and align with, the DTIS, which becomes the main entry point for trade related TA.
- c. Ensure the development of a consolidated National Strategy for Trade that is export-oriented and addresses key sectors, products, markets and generic constraints through viable projects with clear results, positive engagement and interest by promoters / SMEs
- d. Mobilise dialogue and support among high level players (e.g. President level fora on trade), while strengthening public private partnership dialogue through regular interaction and effective coordination mechanisms
- e. Better engagement of the Finance Ministry to adopt a three year cyclical approach to fund prioritised projects from the Action Plan.
- f. Render EIF more visible and better able to articulate its role and agenda by strengthening information dissemination between NIU and stakeholders and communication with Geneva and among its donors and agencies
- g. Strengthen the capacity of NIU through additional staff
- h. Closer collaboration between the Ministry of Commerce and other lead Ministries, particularly Finance and Planning
- i. Develop country-level AfT strategies
- j. Outreach and capacity building for small traders, etc.
- k. Concentrate on Trade issues and avoid production-oriented activities.,

The respondents to the donor and Board surveys also had a wide range of suggestions around linking EIF activities with Government donor coordination mechanisms (even at Tier 1 and especially at Tier 2), strengthening both donor and government transparency, making the DTIS a "living online document" and getting buy in to the Action Matrix, and strengthening the national structures and the capacities and performance of Donor Facilitators (several mentions). Here too there was a sense that EIF Tier 2 projects are "disconnected" from the broad donor coordination processes.

13. Over the past 4 years, has the number and importance of joint donor initiatives in the trade area in this country (such as joint needs assessments; strategy formulations; programming; pooled funding; M&E; etc.) been:

Growing: 42%; About the same: 29%; Diminishing: 5%; Can't say: 24%

This is a mixed picture, with some good examples. E.g. The Laos: TDF (Trade Development Facility) multi donor trust fund administrated by WB, and supported by AusAID, EC, GIZ). In Sierra Leone at the other end of the scale there is no functioning coordination mechanism on trade (while donors are coordinating well in social sectors).

14. The number and importance of useful mechanisms for coordinated delivery of trade-related assistance has been?

Growing: 41%; About the same: 34%; Diminishing: 4%; Can't say: 21%

Once again there is a mixed picture, with some good examples, e.g. Laos: NIU (as the result of IF and EIF's capacity building) developed the shared Result Frameworks for every project under its coordination (EIF, TDF, JSDF, SECO (UN))

15. Does the Government maintain a sufficient overview integrating all trade-related government and donor-supported activities?

Yes: 74%; No: 26%

16. If so does it identify activities specifically addressing gender and the environment?

Yes: 71%; No: 29%

Gender is stronger than environment. In Bangladesh the labour force in export industries is 90% female and climate change could submerge large parts of the country – these issues are top of mind. In Laos, both gender and environment issues are captured in DTIS update, showing that government has identified activities addressing gender and environment. In Sierra Leone a major project is in. ecotourism

17. Are government-donor consultations on trade-related matters frequent enough?

Yes: 55%; No: 45%

Several of the countries have Consultation Group structures with sub-groups in areas like Trade and Private Sector development.

18. How productive do you think these consultations are?

Very productive; 22%; Somewhat productive: 53%; Not very productive: 18%

Generally the lack of productivity is put down to a lack of consistent support / attendance and a tendency to delegate to junior officials.

19. Has the EIF contributed to significant change over the past 4 years in the securing of resources to support trade-related priorities?

Yes: 75%; No: 25%

This assessment seems somewhat enthusiastic. Donor respondents were evenly divided between those who said yes and those who could not say, while Board respondents were 56% positive. On balance it appears a valuable but not very significant element due to autonomous interventions by other players and low level of EIF funding to exert leverage. In Sierra Leone, the Tier 2 project is seen as a good example of this leverage.

20. Have EIF activities contributed to changing the flows of other aid for trade resources to the country over the past 4 years?

Very important: 15%, Important: 50%, Not important or irrelevant: 33%, Can't say 3%

There is inconsistent evidence but some good examples in trade facilitation and standards from Uganda and Sierra Leone. The EIF's main input in Laos has been the updated action matrix; it drives the allocation of resources of donors towards the priorities identified in the matrix. NIU and SC's strengthened capacity is a factor attracting more funding from WB, AusAID, EC and GIZ to the trust fund coordinated by NIU.

In the non-case survey the response was 53% positive to this question. A number of donor responses stressed that EIF's part in this could be in ensuring that Tier 2 projects are strategic and build in the process of attracting further funds to support the identified priorities.

21. Is there an implementation plan integrating DTIS/Action Matrix priorities and indicating financing needs to be met through ODA?

Yes: 34%; No: 36%; Can't say: 30%

This is clearly a stage of planning that has not advanced very far in most of the study countries.

22. Over the past 4 years, how much have the donors been aligning their trade-related assistance more with priorities in the DTIS Action Matrix?

More: 35%; About the same: 24%; Less: 8%; Can't say: 34%

The rating of factors at work:

- The influence of the DTIS and Action Matrix? Very Important: 22%; Important: 59%; Not important or irrelevant: 18%
- Political leadership in the country insisting on respect for priorities? Very Important: 16%; Important: 64%; Not important or irrelevant: 19%
- Changes of policy by donors? Very Important: 8%; Important: 73%; Not important or irrelevant: 17%
- The efforts of "champions" in the national administration Very Important: 21%; Important: 60%; Not important or irrelevant: 17%
- The efforts of donor facilitators in country Very Important: 24%; Important: 57%; Not important or irrelevant: 19%
- Other possible factors? Very Important: 46%; Important: 31%; Not important or irrelevant: 23%

23. Does the Government have a sufficient budget for the implementation of its trade strategy?

Yes: 23%; No: 59%; Can't say: 19%

Laos: No. Almost all of the budget in Laos for trade strategy is for WTO accession. NIU depends on external funding.

Sierra Leone: No, and doubts about whether the government would have those funds. The ministry's budget lower than other sectors, although this has been improving.

24. Are the key elements of the monitoring and evaluation system for the EIF now in place to measure progress towards EIF objectives – e.g. data gathering instruments and regular use, methods of analysis?

Yes: 48%; No: 15%; Can't say: 36%

This set of positive responses seems somewhat at odds with limited evidence of results reporting to this point. There is some reported difficulty in reconciling among different donor and national Results Frameworks..

25. How worthwhile was

a) the work invested in developing the M&E frameworks (Project Logframes) for EIF projects in this country?

Very worthwhile: 28%; Worthwhile: 44%; Not very worthwhile: 3%; Can't say: 24%

Nearly 90% of non-case country responses were either very worthwhile or worthwhile. From the donor and Board perspectives the picture is more mixed: 64% of donor respondents rated them worthwhile or very worthwhile, and the same proportion of Board respondents, with many in both groups withholding judgements and concerns about the time and effort expended. Both these groups, when asked, were also critical of the dearth of useful monitoring and evaluation results seen so far, especially among donors. On a related question, 90% of donor respondents said that EIF results are not being effectively communicated to stakeholders, and more than 50% of Board members agreed.

b) (Question to LDCs only) How worthwhile were the training workshops on results-based management?

Very worthwhile: 27%; worthwhile: 35%; Not very worthwhile: 1%; Can't say: 37%

In case study countries and an even higher number (80%) in non-case countries found them worthwhile or very worthwhile. The MTR team asked for and checked the evaluation reports from those sessions which confirm the solid positive reactions. But it remains true that very little results reporting against these frameworks is yet being generated.

26. What are the key risks to the EIF achieving its objectives in the case study countries and more generally?

A broad list of risks was identified in the case studies as below:

- Complexity of the EIF programme and systems leading to poor understanding of its benefits
- Lack of national political will and ownership
- Weak coherence and coordination between national institutions and donors for the development of a coherent overall trade agenda (weak mainstreaming)
- Slow delivery of much awaited DTIS by the agency
- Weak government/institutional capacity to develop, fund and implement projects, especially at Ministries of Trade
- Low priority and insufficient funding from Government and donors for trade
- Loss of experienced and trained NIU staff
- Political and institutional instability, especially re the FP and NSC
- Political interference in identifying priorities and during implementation, especially of Tier 2 projects. Corruption.
- Lack of additional sources of funds beyond the EIF for the trade related agenda
- Lack of concrete and practicable exit strategies at country level
- Slow EIF project approval and procurements processes

- In non-case study countries there were overlapping and some different risks featured:
- Political instability
- Low donor presence, lack of donor facilitator
- Non extension of the EIF program is the main risk.
- Limited capacity of the implementing agency to manage and implement the program. No incentive when adding more workload and responsible to staffs.
- Weak political engagement,
- Rigid management procedures
- National regulations excluding incentive pay,
- Weak involvement of the agencies in accompanying countries,
- Restrictions on the support to private sector
- A reduction of the resources going to EIF or its lifespan

The Board Survey generated its own list of risks;

- Lack of ownership by LDCs
- Donors and LDCs lose interest if there are no concrete results being shown – lack of confidence in the programme
- Misunderstanding of the nature of the programme
- Lack of cooperation between donors on the ground
- Governance structure that includes too many interests to function effectively
- Mandate and ambitions too wider – EIF should have focussed on providing intellectual leadership (but the ES currently does not have that capacity)

Finally, donor responses were also quite full-on on the risks to the programme:

- Tier 2 projects undermining tier 1 project objectives rather than strengthening them.
- Not sufficiently leveraging other efforts in the wider delivery of the EIF objectives.
- Not relying on in-country donors to bring the agenda forward in dialogue with relevant stakeholders.
- Slow disbursement including LDC's absorption capacity,
- Quality of projects
- Weak NIAs
- Overly burdensome governance and implementation,
- Weak monitoring and management at country level,
- Need for more hands-on support for NIAs at country level.
- Global economic conditions (2) putting trade on the defensive);
- Lack of hands-on, in-country support to slower LDCs.
- Lack of political will and ownership by LDCs and donors
- Inadequate or conflicting articulation of strategic priorities - unreasonable expectations and misunderstanding of the nature of the programme, developing it in a way more suitable for negotiating trade agreements

- Donors running out of patience and at the same time continuing to rush processes requiring more time and wasting time by micromanaging
- Complex governance structure
- Inadequate communications network to support complex goals and objectives
- Poor communication of results
- Inadequate management support for intended objectives/results
- Lack of structures and resources in ES;
- Current trend towards more bilateralism in most donor countries
- Limited in-country ownership and sustainability after EIF.
- Bureaucracy

4.3 Efficiency

27. Compared to what you would have expected in 2007-08, would you say the EIF has delivered results for LDCs:

In terms of Speed: Faster: 10%; At about the expected pace: 52%; More Slowly: 17%; Can't say: 21%

In terms of Value: More economically: 10%; At about the expected cost: 53%; Less economically: 8%; Can't say: 29%

In non-case countries the responses were somewhat different:

In terms of Speed: Faster: 11%; At about the expected pace: 42%; More Slowly: 32%; Can't say: 6%

In terms of Value: More economically: 12%; At about the expected cost: 29%; Less economically: 6%; Can't say: 41%

In the donor responses, there are sharply different assessments:

In terms of Speed: Faster: 0; At about the expected pace: 0; More Slowly: 89 %; Can't say: 11%

In terms of Value: More economically: 0; At about the expected cost: 33%; Less economically: 56%; Can't say: 11%

Finally at the Board level the assessments were:

In terms of Speed: Faster: 7%; At about the expected pace: 21%; More Slowly: 71%;

In terms of Value: More economically: 13%; At about the expected cost: 38%; Less economically: 44%; Can't say: 6%

On these two overarching questions about expectations and current assessments of efficiency, there are substantial differences of perspective between different groups.

28. Please give your ratings on the efficiency (defined as the result obtained for the time, effort and money used) of the different stages of the EIF project cycle where you feel confident that you can assess. The analysis across different groups is summarized below, noting that some groups felt that they lacked adequate information

Stage	Case study countries		Non-case study countries*		Donors		Board	
	<i>Time</i>	<i>Cost/effort</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Cost/effort</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Cost/effort</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Cost/effort</i>
Project Identification								
Very good or good	74.5%	80.5%	77.8%	88.3%	41.7%	45.5%	12.5%	25%
Poor or very poor	25.5%	19.5%	22.2%	11.7%	58.3%	45.5%	75%	50%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	12.5%	25%
Formulation of Proposal								
Very good or good	52.9%	70.5%	72.2%	70.6%	25%	45.5%	12.5%	25%
Poor or very poor	47.1%	29.5%	22.2%	29.4%	75%	45.5%	75%	40%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	7.6%	0%	5.6%	0%	0%	9%	12.5%	25%
TAC Appraisals								
Very good or good	82.2%	82.9%	82.4%	87.6%	70%	60%	42.9%	14.3%
Poor or very poor	17.8%	17.1%	13.6%	6.2%	20%	30%	0%	42.9%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	0%	6.2%	10%	10%	57.5%	42.8%
ES project appraisals/assessments								
Very good or good	71.4%	78.4%	81.3%	75%	50%	50%	12.5%	25%
Poor or very poor	28.6%	21.6%	12.5%	12.5%	50%	50%	62.5%	50%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	12.5%	0%	0%	25%	25%
TFM project appraisals/assessments								
Very good or good	77.6%	83.3%	87.6%	66.6%	55.5%	50%	12.5%	25%

Poor or very poor	22.4%	16.6%	6.2%	20%	45.5%	50%	62.5%	50%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	13.4%	0%	0%	25%	25%
Project approval by EIF Board								
Very good or good	76%	84.6%	62.5%	66.6%	57.1%	58.3%	50%	33.3%
Poor or very poor	24%	15.4%	25%	26.7%	42.9%	41.7%	50%	66.6%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	12.5%	6.7%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Finalizing agreements								
Very good or good	77.8%	83.3%	68.8%	66.6%	72.7%	70%	12.5%	28.6%
Poor or very poor	22.2%	16.7%	18.7%	20%	18.2%	10%	62.5%	28.6%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	12.5%	13.4%	9.1%	20%	25%	42.8%
Disbursing funds								
Very good or good	93.9%	91.9%	47.1%	66.6%	80%	66.6%	25%	28.6%
Poor or very poor	6.1%	8.1%	41.2%	20%	10%	11.1%	37.5%	28.6%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	11.7%	13.4%	10%	22.2%	37.5%	42.8%
Implementation								
Very good or good	80.4%	75.7%	81.3%	66.6%	54.6%	50%	12.5%	28.6%
Poor or very poor	6.1%	24.3%	12.5%	20%	18.2%	30%	62.5%	42.9%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	13.4%	18.2%	20%	25%	28.6%
Facilitation/monitoring by ES								
Very good or good	56.3%	50%	75%	66.6%	36.4%	50%	12.5%	28.6%
Poor or very poor	43.8%	50%	18.8%	20%	45.4%	30%	62.5%	42.8%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	13.4%	18.2%	20%	25%	28.6%
Facilitation/monitoring by TFM								
Very good or good	71.4%	88.6%	68.8%	73.3%	60%	50%	50%	42.9%
Poor or very poor	28.6%	11.4%	25%	6.7%	20%	30%	25%	14.3%

Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	20%	20%	20%	25%	42.8%
Monitoring at the national level								
Very good or good	71.7%	78.9%	68.8%	66.6%	60%	66.6%	0%	14.3%
Poor or very poor	28.3%	21.1%	25%	20%	20%	11.1%	27.5%	28.6%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	6.2%	13.4%	20%	22.2%	62.5%	57.1%
Evaluation, if applicable								
Very good or good	65.4%	54.5%	81.8%	72.7%	0%	25%	0%	0%
Poor or very poor	34.6%	45.5%	9.1%	27.3%	33.3%	25%	28.6%	16.7%
Don't know or Country respondents divided	0%	0%	9.1%	0%	66.7%	50%	71.4%	83.3%

* Non-case country samples are adjusted for comparability purposes throughout the findings

29. Where there have been delays or high costs of time and effort in different stages of EIF preparation and implementation over the past 4 years, how would you assess the possible important causes?

Stage	Country Case	Non case	Board	Donor
Limited country capacity				
Very important or Important	26.8%	84.2%	73.3%	72.7%
Important	43.9%		20%	27.3%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	29.3%	5.3%	0%	0%
Country respondents divided	-	10.5%	-	-
EIF process requirements				
Very important	33.8%	84.2%	15.4%	20%
Important	50.6%		76.9%	80%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	15.6%	10.5%	7.7%	0%
Country respondents divided	-	10.5%	-	-
Limited ES support				

Very important	18.2%	68.4%	0%	10%
Important	50%		63.9%	80%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	28.8%	26.3%	30.8%	10%
Country respondents divided	-	5.3%	-	-
EIF fiduciary (financial) requirements				
Very important	24.2%	66.6%	0%	0%
Important	50%		61.5%	66.7%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	25.8%	16.7%	38.5%	33.3%
Country respondents divided	-	5.6%	-	-
Limited financial management support				
Very important	20.3%	66.6%	0%	0%
Important	28.8%		58.3%	62.5%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	50.9%	16.7%	41.7%	37.5%
Country respondents divided	-	5.6%	-	-
EIF Board approval process				
Very important	18.8%	55.6%	8.3%	0%
Important	43.8%		58.3%	30%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	37.5%	27.8%	41.7%	70%
Country respondents divided	-	16.6%	-	-
Limited political support in country				
Very important	25.9%	66.6%	35.7%	27.3%
Important	37.9%		42.9%	63.6%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	36.2%	22.3%	21.4%	9.1%
Country respondents divided	-	5.6%	-	-
Delivery of services by partner agencies				
Very important	31.1%	84.2%	35.7%	11.1%
Important	47.5%		26.4%	66.7%
Not important/ Irrelevant/Negative	21.3%	5.3%	35.7%	22.2%
Country respondents divided	-	10.5%	-	-

Written comments:

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>Limited country capacities:</p> <p>Changes in donor facilitator</p> <p>Political factors affecting preparation and implementation in line institutions</p> <p>Underutilization of the training and capacity building budget</p> <p>EIF process requirements are excessively complex and lead to delays.</p> <p>Busy schedules of senior national officials</p> <p>Insufficient capacity to conduct negotiations with various partners and maintain consistent inter-communication of all institutional stakeholders</p> <p>Limited ES support:</p> <p>Insufficient capacity at EIF to respond to the requirements of the Board approval process was a major cause of delays, now resolved</p> <p>Busy schedules of senior staff at the ES and TFM</p> <p>Lengthy development period of the compendium and the log frame M&E system – should have preceded implementation.</p> <p>Slow Board level processes.</p> <p>Other possible causes:</p> <p>Divergent objectives among donor representatives – need for commitment to trade from donor facilitator</p> <p>Lack of clear role definition among donors and institutional stakeholders caused delays.</p> <p>Partner agencies tend to delayed DTIS reviews</p> <p>Weak private sector capacity</p>	<p>Lack of face-to-face contact with the ES is seen as an obstacle.</p> <p>EIF has been impacted by changes at the national level (e.g. budget deficits, etc.)</p> <p>Processes (e.g. approval by the Board) seen as too long.</p>	<p>Donors raised the issue of linking EIF support to bilateral projects and programmes in-country. It was, however, also noted that in some cases donors have unrealistic expectations regarding the speed of disbursement that can be achieved.</p>	<p>Board felt that country capacities and political support were the main issues. The EIF governance structure, as well as the processes and requirements were seen to be heavy. Lack of communication between the EIF partners was seen as possibly leading to a situation where country factors were not adequately taken into account in the design of the intervention.</p>

30. What are your suggestions on where and how the efficiency of EIF processes could be improved or for more efficient ways of achieving the intended results in each of the key areas?

In the country case studies the respondents were asked to identify improvements under each of the EIF results areas, whereas the online surveys for donors, the Board and the non-case study countries included the same question without the results areas.

From the comments in the donor survey, issues related to heaviness of the EIF processes and requirements were brought up, but these were seen as important. A possible solution would be to increase the focus on country-specific design processes. The Board could provide more guidance on how the objectives could be achieved. In terms of the overall direction of the programme, linking the assistance to other ongoing assistance in the trade sectors is seen as important.

The Board saw linking the EIF to the broader AfT initiative as an important factor, particularly identifying areas where perhaps another AfT programme or approach would be more suited to the country context. Increasing communication between the Board members was also seen as an important factor. Other issues that were raised included managing and streamlining the project formulation process,

Non-case study countries felt that sharing experiences across the EIF family was seen to be important. Another issue that was brought up was in relation to the procedures, and it was felt that these needed to be streamlined. A stronger partnership between the EIF partners was mentioned as a key factor, as was the role of the donor facilitator in playing a part in strengthening the partnerships.

Written comments:

Outcome area	Comments
i. Strengthening the capacity to formulate and implement trade strategies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raise political awareness of Trade and the EIF and engage high level champions • Implement campaigns to mainstream trade into government processes politically, institutionally and among the development partners • Capacity building of the NIU and the MTI, NSC members, private sector and CSOs • Provide capacity building prior to T1 support to maximise its benefits from the T1 funds • EIF to provide certified expertise to help address weaknesses in technical knowhow on trade to support the formulation of strategies • Introduce management by results among key actors • Put emphasis on Tier 2 projects • Develop trade-related programmes and action plans tailored to the key economic ministries/government departments • Improve experience sharing with other countries • Take a regional approach to the EIF possibly using regional integration bodies instead of a country approach • Embed qualified professionals within ministry structures and ensure adequate remuneration with development partner support. • Design and facilitate staff training programmes at line ministries in strategic planning and result-based management for staff, including top managers in order to create champions for trade • Provision of equipment, and facilitation/transport including video-conferencing for trained staff to be effective • Build capacity in the private sector to prepare bankable projects and ensure greater private sector involvement in EIF • Work with development partners within the country to hire qualified professionals integrated within the ministry structures

ii. Mainstreaming trade into national development strategies and plans?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop one consolidated dynamic National trade strategy reflecting the country's priorities, clearly defined with wide stakeholder participation, which is responsive to changes in the country's trade and economic environment. • Increase collaboration and dialogue between Ministries of Commerce, National Planning and Finance to enable them to appreciate the significance of trade and increase its resource allocations Improve communication on the key priorities of the government. • PRSP drafts / national development strategies to be shared with NSC's through the NIU's to ensure DTIS alignment so that trade aspects have space in the final document • Greater private sector and civil society involvement in NIAs • Ensure the Financial sector has the tools to support trade in key sectors • Better dissemination of the EIF programme • Mainstreaming advocacy is a continuous and monitored process, facilitated beyond the Trade Ministries • EIF to sponsor annual trade mainstreaming surveys to show which countries are improving and which need improvement, long the lines of Doing Business and Competitiveness Indexes • Timeliness of the DTIS update a key factor
iii. Coordinating trade-related assistance and following country priorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidated trade strategy and (an updated) DTIS Action Matrix should be the guiding documents for all trade-related assistance • Increased inter-ministerial interface involving ministries along the trade chain (e.g. agriculture, mining, ministry of Finance) dialogue on the importance of trade and promotion of the trade strategy. • Increased donor/public & private sector interaction dialogue on trade issues • Timely involvement of the Ministry of Commerce during the national budget process so that its priorities are involved for financing in the national budget • Definition and clarification of roles along the programme chain (NIU, Steering Committee, Donor facilitator) • Develop a trade donor working group (possibly strengthening the DF capacity where necessary), and focus on trade related issues at a deeper level.
iv. Increasing assistance for country priorities in trade development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidated trade strategy to be the guiding document for the sector players, thus promoting buy-in from different stakeholders to relevant components of the strategy • Government increases budget allocations for trade to avoid dependency on donor funds • Re-alignment of donor countries' country cooperation strategies with the trade priorities identified • Regular Trade Working Group Meetings reflecting / updating the DTIS Action Matrix • Develop fully coordinated A4T strategies • Introduce into Tier 1 technical capacity building in trade issues of the planning institutions • Create national / regional donor round tables for trade sector-wide support • Annual government review / update of the National Development Plans

C. Sustainability

31. How well has the EIF achieved the agreed operating principles and achieved the two special enhanced outcomes intended:

	Case study countries	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
Effective use of trade as a development tool by LDCs				
Very well	10.5%	89.5%	20%	0%
Well	70.2%		70%	85.7%

Poorly	19.3%	10.5%	10%	14.3%
Very poorly	0.0%		0%	0%
LDC ownership of in-country programme, identification of priorities and management of trade development activities				
Very well	28.6%	94.7%	23.1%	11.1%
Well	41.4%		53.8%	55.6%
Poorly	12.9%	5.3%	23.1%	33.3%
Very poorly	0.0%		0%	0%
A partnership approach in which donors and agencies coordinate responses to needs of LDCs, manage for results, ensure LDC leadership, and accept mutual accountability				
Very well	8.6%	89.5%	0%	10%
Well	41.4%		53.8%	30%
Poorly	22.9%	10.5%	42.6%	60%
Very poorly	0.0%		0%	0%
Increased capacity-building support to LDCs through the process including by implementing bodies and through financial resources				
Very well	17.1%	78.9%	30.8%	12.5%
Well	41.4%		61.5%	75%
Poorly	21.4%	15.8%	7.7%	12.5%
Very poorly	0.0%		0%	0%
Country respondents divided	-	5.3%	-	-
Stronger governance of EIF including collective decisions making the EIF Board, ES and TFM and through clearly defined accountabilities and rigorous monitoring and evaluation				
Very well	15.7%	84.2%	9.1%	0%
Well	31.4%		54.5%	33.3%
Poorly	7.1%	15.8%	36.4%	66.7%
Very poorly	0.0%		0%	0%

Written Comments:

Operating principle/enhanced outcome	Case study countries	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
Effective use of trade as a development tool by LDCs	Overall, EIF has shown how trade can be used for economic growth, and governments are focusing more on trade issues, but many key stakeholders have not fully appreciated the relationship between trade and development	The non-case country responses were not grouped under the specific categories. One of the issues raised was that trade is not seen as a priority in some of the countries – and this is not linked directly to the EIF.	Mixed results for different countries.	Generally difficult to say how much the EIF has contributed
LDC ownership of in-	Overall, the principle of ownership has	The countries do The responses	Mixed results for different countries.	Varies significantly between countries.

country programme, identification of priorities and management of trade development activities	been established but effective management of trade development activities needs to improve.	reflect the need to the ES to be more active in responding to project proposals.		Very well in some, very poorly in others.
A partnership approach in which donors and agencies coordinate responses to needs of LDCs, manage for results, ensure LDC leadership, and accept mutual accountability	NSC is not an appropriate mechanism for partnership – one that works for donors and national actors still needs to be established		Well in the Geneva level, but not so well in the country level. Board should be more unified.	Depends a lot on country capacities. Generally, different actors don't always see each other as partners but as competitors.
Increased capacity-building support to LDCs through the process including by implementing bodies and through financial resources	Ample room for improvement		Mixed results for different countries.	Generally see this as going 'well'.
Stronger governance of EIF including collective decisions making the EIF Board, ES and TFM and through clearly defined accountabilities and rigorous monitoring and evaluation	Significant Improvement.			Stronger governance is needed. Board spends too little time discussing strategic issues. Also, too many diverse interests were seen as being represented.

32. Over the past 4 years, has the EIF helped to build more interest and engagement in measures to strengthen trade-capacity and performance beyond specialized trade officials in the country?

	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
Trade Officials				
Very important:	42.6%	94.7%	50%	16.7%
Important:	52.5%		33.3%	50%
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	4.9%		16.7%	33.3%
Country respondents divided across answers	-		-	-
Other key economic officials				
Very important:	29.8%	78.9%	20%	0%
Important:	40.4%		30%	20%
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	29.8%		10.6%	50%
Country respondents divided across answers	-	10.6%	-	-
Key politicians				
Very important:	25.5%	73.7%	8.3%	0%

Important:	47.3%		58.3%	50%
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	27.2%	21.2%	33.3%	50%
Country respondents divided across answers	-	5.3%	-	-
Private sector trade actors				
Very important:	30.2%	84.2%	16.7%	0%
Important:	52.8%		50%	16.7%
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	17%	15.9%	33.4%	80.7%
Country respondents divided across answers	-	0%	-	-
Agency representatives in country				
Very important:	31.1%	84.2%	-	-
Important:	57.8%		-	-
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	11.1%	15.9%	-	-
Country respondents divided across answers	-	0%	-	-
Donor representatives in country				
Very important:	34.6%	73.7%	-	-
Important:	53.8%		-	-
Not important/Irrelevant/negative	11.5%	21.2%	-	-
Country respondents divided across answers	-	5.3%	-	-

The Board members and the donors feel generally that those outside of the programme have very limited knowledge of the EIF, and that EIF should be building relationships outside the trade ministries. One of the potential tools for this could be the DTIS. It was also noted that this varies from country to country, but the donors feel that they are not in a position to evaluate this based on the information available to them.

The non-case countries see that engagement between the groups has increased, but there is still room for improvement. EIF should be more responsive to different needs in countries.

33. Have you seen evidence of EIF activities or priorities influencing other efforts?

Answers	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
Leveraging support from the private sector?				
Yes	40.0%	68.4%	41.7%	0%
No	24.3%	10.6%	41.7%	40%
Can't say or country respondents divided	35.7%	21.2%	16.7%	60%
Generating interest among individual enterprises or other organizations to identify projects that are self-financed?				
Yes	39.7%	57.9%	25%	0%

No	19.0%	26.3%	41.7%	50%
Can't say or country respondents divided	41.3%	15.9%	33.3%	50%
Stimulating support to link beneficiaries to income-generating trade?				
Yes	58.1%	84.2%	61.5%	30%
No	17.7%	0%	15.4%	10%
Can't say or country respondents divided	24.2%	15.8%	23.1%	60%
Stimulating support to enhance productivity?		%		
Yes	67.2%	89.5%	50%	30%
No	13.1%	5.3%	25%	20%
Can't say or country respondents divided	19.7%	5.3%	25%	50%
Raising interest by other organizations to support EIF priorities or imitate EIF				
Yes	47.6%	68.4%	75%	55.6%
No	28.6%	15.8%	16.7%	11.1%
Can't say or country respondents divided	23.8%	15.8%	8.3%	33.3%

Among donors, there have been a few occasions where the EIF has been seen to have influenced other efforts, particularly on raising interest by other organisations to support EIF priorities or imitate EIF (more than half of the respondents answered 'yes' to this question), and examples of this happening were given to a couple of countries led by bilateral donors or by other frameworks.

The Board members were most positive about the stimulating support to link beneficiaries to income-generating trade stimulating support to enhance productivity and raising interest of other organisations. Examples of this included both country and regional initiatives in Asia and Africa (led by donors and RECs).

In the non-case study countries, a few examples were cited where experiences on the EIF have been organised. The DTIS Action Matrix has been used in some countries to incorporate all trade related policy issues into one implementation framework.

Type of possible influence	Case study countries
Leveraging support from the private sector?	Relatively effective, but a mixed picture
Generating interest among individual enterprises or other organizations to identify projects that are self-financed?	Relatively effective, but a mixed picture
Stimulating support to link beneficiaries to income-generating trade?	Some positive examples (e.g. a project in the tourism sector is seen as potentially supporting small businesses)
Stimulating support to enhance productivity?	Some positive examples
Raising interest by other organizations to support EIF priorities or imitate EIF?	Depends on interpretation: inclusion in DTISAM does not mean EIF influence, but there are some concrete examples of EIF links to new initiatives
Other effects?	

34. How likely are the contributions so far of the EIF to reach its four intended outcomes to be sustainable by the government and other institutions in this country if EIF support were not available?

Stage	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
i. Stronger capacity to formulate and implement trade strategies?				
Yes	78.1%	73.7%	45.5%	22.2%
No	10.9%	10.6%	36.4%	22.2%
Can't say or country respondents divided	10.9%	15.9%	18.2%	56.5%
ii. Trade mainstreamed into national development strategies and plans				
Yes	86.6%	78.9%	72.7%	33.3%
No	7.5%	5.2%	18.2%	22.2%
Can't say or country respondents divided	6.0%	15.9%	9.1%	44.4%
iii. Trade-related assistance coordinated and following country priorities?				
Yes	69.4%	47.4%	27.3%	22.2%
No	14.5%	10.6%	18.2%	22.2%
Can't say or country respondents divided	16.1%	36.8%	54.6%	56.6%
iv. Assistance for country priorities in trade development increased?				
Yes	63.2%	94.7%	36.4%	22.2%
No	22.8%	0%	36.4%	33.3%
Can't say or country respondents divided	14.0%	5.3%	27.3%	44.4%

The donors did not identify any areas where they felt that the contributions would be sustainable, but the most common answer across the areas was 'can't say'.

The Board was slightly more optimistic, and majority of the respondents (over 70%) thought that sustainable contributions are likely at least in trade mainstreaming into national development plans.

Reasons (e.g. political and interest group support, strength of institutions built; mechanisms to follow DTIS and Action Matrix, dedicated staffing, funding, etc.)

Lack of evidence on the EIF's impact, and the extent to which the projects are linked to country priorities were the issues raised by the Board members. Isolation of the NIA structures was seen as another factor. It was also recognised that the situation varies from one country to another.

Donors felt that it was difficult to judge this question, but that the sustainability of the EIF supported institutions would depend on the extent to which they are built on existing country institutions. The NIU staff salary structure was seen as another potential reason undermining the sustainability. It is also recognised that the wider economic processes and political commitments (both those of donors and beneficiaries) have also got an important role.

EIF support should complement other ongoing support on trade issues. The non-case study countries also feel that a coordinated approach is key to ensuring sustainability.

Contributions in key areas	Case study countries	Non-Case study countries	Donors	Board
i. Stronger capacity to formulate and implement trade strategies?	Institutions need continued capacity building and closer integration of the NIU into government structures National resource allocations are insufficient to ensure continuation of EIF activities	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked
ii. Trade mainstreamed into national development strategies and plans?	The importance of trade is well-established but implementation of mainstreaming is incomplete	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked
iii. Trade-related assistance coordinated and following country priorities?	Without EIF support coordination will suffer	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked
iv. Assistance for country priorities in trade development increased?	Some optimism E.g. in terms of planning ahead how the DTIS updates will be used to encourage donors to support the areas identified.	Not asked	Not asked	Not asked

35. What are the main obstacles and challenges to making the contributions of EIF sustainable after the EIF and what could be done to increase the likelihood that they will be?

Respondent group	Responses
Case study countries	<p>Limited country capacity Need to speed up mainstreaming and strengthen understanding of how different elements in the country structures contribute to the EIF process</p> <p>The absence of stable focal persons and NIU staff weaken performance over time. The excessive turnover and mobility of specialised trade personnel is a threat to sustainability, as is weak funding for Trade generally</p> <p>EIF was not designed with sustainability in mind. It lacks an exit strategy</p> <p>The NIU and the Steering Committees are not sufficiently embedded in country institutional structures to sustain momentum after EIF ceases. NIU needs to report to a higher authority and membership of the steering committee to include actual private sectors practitioners not only the private sector unions/agencies. Capacity for implementation beyond Tier 2 projects is weak and requires forward planning to create stronger institutions</p> <p>The productive sector focus under T2 is too narrow: it should focus beyond commodity-specific supply constraints on generic competitiveness issues at a national level EIF does not adequately address infrastructural issues, e.g. roads and energy. These are critical to integrate LDCs into the economy. Limited involvement to boost private sector directly</p> <p>EIF programme processes need to be simplified and made more accessible and transparent so national entities can adopt them into their systems</p> <p>The private sector is getting stronger but is not yet able to take the lead due to capacity gaps and hence the government still needs to take the lead and create an enabling environment by developing policies and legal frameworks to support the private sector.</p>
Non case study countries	<p>The main obstacle is the lack of funding after the project is ended. One of the suggestions is to put in place a council on trade issues.</p>
Board	<p>Lack of political will in both LDCs and donor countries. Lack of alignment of donor support in country level is also seen as an obstacle. Sustainability in general, both in terms of the national structures, but also in terms of ensuring mainstreaming, and ensuring that the knowledge is retained in the institution.</p>
Donor	<p>The EIF should continue to deliver concrete and measurable results, and the process should be continued, preferably based on different stages. Greater country level support by in-country donors, also linking trade related assistance more strongly to other development assistance. Political support both by donors and LDCS to highlight the importance of trade. Support to capacity building, increasing country ownership and supporting transfer of knowledge within the institutions.</p>

4.4 Potential impact

36. Projecting from the record to date and current trends, how likely is it that the EIF will make significant contributions to the overall goal of “the integration of LDCs into the global trading system with a view to contributing to economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development”?

	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
Very likely	40%	47.3%	30.8%	0%
Likely	46%	42.2%	46.2%	40%
Unlikely	13%	0%	23.1%	60%
Very unlikely	2%	0%	0%	0%
Country respondents divided	-	10.5%	-	-

Case study countries feel that the EIF can play a catalytic role but is too small to make major contributions to the overall goal. At the same time, there are too many factors at play for EIF to make significant contributions in its remaining years but it is a step in the right direction. The case study countries also feel that the trend in many LDC economies is towards integration regardless of EIF. EIF can contribute to poverty alleviation through job creation if donors provide funds for the private sector to increase their production capacity and / or assist commercial banks to stimulate economic growth.

The non-case study countries feel that they do not have the resources and capacity to act unilaterally without the help of EIF resources. EIF resources are seen to help LDCs in the integration into the global trading system. The EIF has not been able to mobilise funds from bilateral donors.

The donors feel that it is likely that the EIF will make contributions to the overall goal, but it is expected to be slow, and uneven between countries. The donors also note that there are other factors that will be key in determining the progress towards the overall goal than just the EIF itself.

The Board responses echo those of the other groups. The EIF is seen to have the potential, and it is seen to be addressing the key issues in terms of limited capacity, but contribution is a challenge. The Board responses also highlight the issues of resources and level of commitment required, and note that a significant contribution could be made if the right kind of support was available for a long enough period. The management and governance structure were also seen as a possible factor undermining the possible impact.

37. Is the EIF likely to make contributions in:

	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
More direct effects on trade				
Trade facilitation?				
Likely	83.9%	94.7%	85.7%	70%
Unlikely	10.8%	0%	7.1%	10%
Can't say or country	5.4%	5.3%	7.1%	20%

respondents divided				
Market development?				
Likely	78.0%	77.7%	76.9%	50%
Unlikely	9.8%	11.1%	0%	20%
Can't say or country respondents divided	12.2%	11.1%	23.1%	30%
Enhancing productivity?				
Likely	81.3%	68.4%	69.2%	40%
Unlikely	12.0%	5.2%	15.4%	30%
Can't say or country respondents divided	6.7%	26.4%	15.4%	30%
Improving product quality?				
Likely	80.0%	94.4%	71.4%	40%
Unlikely	7.4%	5.6%	0%	10%
Can't say or country respondents divided	12.6%	0%	28.6%	50%
Addressing supply capacity constraints?				
Likely	64.0%	83.3%	85.7%	70%
Unlikely	21.3%	0%	0%	10%
Can't say or country respondents divided	14.7%	16.7%	14.3%	20%
Trade integration?				
Likely	78.8%	84.2%	92.9%	80%
Unlikely	7.5%	5.3%	0%	0%
Can't say or country respondents divided	13.8%	10.6%	7.1%	20%
Intended long term effects				
Economic growth?				
Likely	83.0%	84.2%	54.5%	55.6%
Unlikely	11.7%	15.8%	9.1%	11.1%
Can't say or country respondents divided	5.3%	0%	36.4%	33.3%
Poverty reduction?				
Likely	82.3%	84.2%	41.7%	33.3%
Unlikely	10.1%	5.3%	16.7%	11.1%
Can't say or country respondents divided	7.6%	10.6%	41.7%	55.6%
Sustainable development?				
Likely	75.6%	84.2%	25%	22.2%
Unlikely	10.3%	0%	16.7%	22.2%
Can't say or country respondents divided	14.1%	15.9%	58.3%	56.6%
Raising incomes?				
Likely	85.2%	77.7%	58.3%	44.4%
Unlikely	10.2%	0%	8.3%	0%
Can't say or country respondents divided	4.5%	22.3%	33.3%	56.6%

Written Comments:

	Case study countries	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
Trade facilitation?	<p>The contributions to trade facilitation and market development are very context specific.</p> <p>Productivity, product quality and supply side constraints were often addressed by Tier 2 projects.</p> <p>Consensus is affirmative regarding trade integration.</p> <p>As for the broader economic impact, it was felt that this was outside the EIF's scope.</p> <p>Sustainable development and raising incomes were seen to depend on specific nature of T2 projects, and effect on raising incomes was 'probable'</p>	<p>The non-case study countries felt the EIF is likely to make contributions if the adequate support and political will are in place, but that it is still early in the process to make a judgment.</p>	<p>Donors feel that there is a potential that the EIF makes a contribution e.g. through Tier 2 projects or the elaboration of a strategy for strengthening trade development.</p>	<p>The Board members note that the impact or contribution of the EIF may be difficult to track.</p> <p>Generally the Board responses show more confidence in the likely impact on areas that have a more direct impact on trade (e.g. trade facilitation, market development, etc.)</p>
Other areas?	Jobs creation and youth employment reduction			

38. Have there been any unintended effects in these areas (positive or negative) as a consequence of the EIF? Give examples.

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>Under Tier 2, government is anticipated to put in place infrastructure like roads to reach the Tier 2 project sites.</p> <p>Donors are beginning to work together</p> <p>Civil society and academia becoming more exposed to trade topics</p>	<p>Improved coordination among agencies and private sector.</p> <p>Positive impacts on trade facilitation.</p> <p>Delays in the approval process may give a false reputation of the EIF objectives.</p>	<p>Donors generally felt that they had insufficient information to respond to the question.</p> <p>One donor mentioned that they use the DTIS as the reference document in their support programmes.</p>	<p>Difficulty in establishing causality – the EIF has only been operational for 18 months, so too early to say.</p> <p>Some negative effects that were identified include the cumbersome EIF procedures. On the other hand, some examples were cited where the EIF has been</p>

<p>Ripple effect – replication of good practice from projects with an environmental management component</p> <p>Project proposals that exceed EIF Tier 2 ceiling are available for joint funding and will stimulate donor coordination.</p>			<p>critical in raising the profile of the trade agenda, galvanising the government and the private sector.</p>
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39. How could the EIF do a better job to help advance these objectives or are there better ways altogether (i.e. different from the EIF approach)?

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>Improve LDC participation at Board level</p> <p>Have a forum of NIUs so that they can share lessons and experience</p> <p>The donor facilitator should be accountable to effectively demonstrate the mutual accountability</p> <p>Act more quickly and directly, using direct contracting and avoid going through intermediary partner organisations</p> <p>Focus on a few strategic issues and be stricter with the country: if they don't get things done on time, cut funding</p> <p>EIF should engage more directly with the media and other communication channels</p>	<p>The non-case study countries cited examples of establishment of well-functioning mechanisms in countries (e.g. sector wide approaches).</p> <p>Donors should continue to support the programme as per their commitment made in 2005.</p> <p>The operating procedures should be simplified and aligned to those of other programmes.</p> <p>More lesson learning and sharing of experiences between countries.</p>	<p>The EIF has the potential to be used in all categories of Aft – being an element of a wider LDC trade strategy.</p> <p>EIF should also recognise that countries' need vary, and EIF ES/TFM presence in-country could address some of the issues. But it is recognised that the increased presence is not needed in all countries.</p> <p>The EIF support needs to be closely coordinated with the other ongoing activities.</p> <p>Better external communication, more productive partnerships at the national, regional and global level are needed.</p> <p>EIF should focus on Tier 1, and leave implementation to other actors.</p>	<p>The Board members felt that the EIF should have more flexibility to adapt to country contexts.</p> <p>The EIF should work closely with the wider Aft initiative</p>

4.5 Relevance of the EIF

40. How would you describe the level of knowledge in this country about the EIF and of what it is intended to?

	Case study Country	Non case study country	Board	Donor
Trade officials / specialists				
High	36.9%	100%	54.5%	0%
Reasonable	45.9%		27.3%	40%
Low or Very Low	10%	0%	18.2%	60%
Can't say or country respondents divided	7.2%	0%	0%	0%
Other key economic officials				
High	8.7%	72.2%	9.1%	0%
Reasonable	54.4%		63.6%	40%
Low or Very Low	31.1%	28.8%	27.3%	60%
Can't say or country respondents divided	5.8%	0%	0%	0%
Political representatives				
High	15.6%	50%	10%	0%
Reasonable	34.4%		40%	0%
Low	42.8%	33.3%	40%	100%
Can't say or country respondents divided	7.3%	16.7%	10%	0%
Private sector trade actors				
High	21.6%	55.6%	11.1%	0%
Reasonable	27.5%		22.2%	0%
Low or Very Low	46.1%	27.8%	55.5%	100%
Can't say or country respondents divided	4.9%	16.7%	11.1%	0%
Development experts				
High	-	-	33.3%	30%
Reasonable	-		50%	30%
Low or Very Low	-	-	8.3%	40%
Can't say or country respondents divided	-	-	8.3%	0%
Agency representatives in country				
High	22.2%	94.7%	-	-
Reasonable	38.4%		-	-
Low or Very Low	29.3%	5.6%	-	-
Can't say or country respondents divided	10.1%	0%	-	-
Donor representatives in country				
High	29.5%	78.9%	-	-
Reasonable	41.1%		-	-
Low or Very Low	20%	21.1%	-	-
Can't say or country respondents divided	9.5%	0%	-	-

Written Comments:

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>The level of knowledge was perceived to be high/reasonable among the trade officials, donor representatives and the donor agencies and lowest among the private sector, civil society, politicians and other economic officials.</p> <p>In the private sector, the Apex bodies are aware of EIF but not the active entrepreneurs.</p> <p>Knowledge of EIF is concentrated in the capitals</p> <p>The Programme lacks a communication strategy.</p> <p>The Programme name is too obscure and technical.</p> <p>By its nature the support provided is not visible</p> <p>The previous IF was better known than the EIF.</p>	<p>Donor presence is low, agencies could be more actively involved if they want to be informed of EIF goals.</p> <p>In one of the countries, the ministry is taking a leading role in raising the awareness on AfT in the country, including training on project formulation, etc.</p>	<p>Generally those who are not directly involved in the programme have limited knowledge. In some countries AfT agenda more broadly is not a focus area.</p> <p>There are also misunderstandings on the EIF and its link to in-country processes.</p>	<p>Generally only a small group know about the EIF in countries and in donor organisations. Private sector actors were rated as having the lowest level of knowledge among the groups, while trade specialists scored the highest.</p>

41. When you think about the current and emerging trade and economic priorities of the country, how would you assess the contributions to date of the EIF to the needed solutions? Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about the current relevance of EIF:

a. The EIF's strategic approach to date is

	Country case studies*	Non-case study countries*	Donors	Board
Relevant to these priorities and it is yielding the kinds of results that can reasonably be expected				
Agree	73.4%	83.3%	50%	12.5%
Disagree	26.6%	17.7%	50%	87.5%
Country respondents divided	-	0%	-	-
Relevant to these priorities but it is not (yet) yielding the kinds of results that can reasonably be expected				
Agree	68%	66.6%	75%	77.8%
Disagree	32%	13.4%	25%	22.2%
Country respondents divided	-	20%	-	-
Marginal or a small factor in responding to these priorities				
Agree	31.7%	20%	22.2%	28.6%

Disagree	68.3%	80%	77.8%	71.4%
Country respondents divided	-	0%	-	-

* For some reason, the first and second statements were clearly not read as mutually incompatible, so these results are hard to interpret.

b. Compared with the situation in 2007 the EIF’s strategic approach to date is of

Stage	Country Case	Non case	Board	Donor
Compared with the situation in 2007 the EIF’s strategic approach to date is of				
Greater	66.3%	82.4%	73.3%	77.8%
The same	26.7%	17.6%	26.7%	22.2%
Less	7%	0%	0%	0%

c. Other statement/s you would make on EIF’s relevance (e.g. how could it be made more relevant to the current and emerging trade and development priorities of the LDCs and your country/agency?)

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>Relevant to these priorities and it is yielding the kinds of results that can reasonably be expected.</p> <p>EIF created a much-needed framework for LDCs to explore their trade potential in the multilateral trading system</p> <p>Much depends on the quality and actuality of the DTIS</p> <p>Successful T2 projects can showcase development potential of trade interventions</p> <p>Relevant to these priorities but it is not (yet) yielding the kinds of results that can reasonably be expected.</p> <p>Very slow progress in many case study countries</p> <p>Trade mainstreaming is yet to take root in all circles</p> <p>Need to improve linkages between trade and other sectors.</p> <p>Marginal or a small factor in responding to these priorities.</p> <p>The contribution is</p>	<p>Donor presence is low, agencies could be more actively involved if they want to be informed of EIF goals.</p> <p>In one of the countries, the ministry is taking a leading role in raising the awareness on AfT in the country, including training on project formulation, etc.</p>	<p>EIF is seen as relevant, but it needs to be managed better to increase the effectiveness of delivery. In this vain, streamlining of process should be looked at.</p> <p>Better communication between the EIF and other organisations is needed for it to achieve its objectives.</p>	<p>The EIF’s aims and objectives are relevant for both LDCs and donors, but the processes need to be streamlined.</p> <p>The EFI would need to be used as a platform for TRTA, and have an overall more strategic approach.</p>

marginal because there are several players in the trade arena.			
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42. How could the EIF be made more relevant to the current and emerging trade and economic priorities of the country?

Country case studies	Non-case study countries	Donors	Board
<p>Undertake a proper, consultative process between the public and private sector when developing the national trade strategy and involve more ministries with synergies e.g. Min of Agriculture, Minerals etc. Consider formation of trade sector working group. Bring stakeholders together through activities such as debates and discussions on trade.</p> <p>Work more closely with the local donor community in trade issues</p> <p>Maintain an updated DTIS.</p> <p>Encourage Governments to develop plans to take over EIF-funded activities once donor assistance stops, including engaging more donors</p> <p>Extend the programme to also support trade in services, e.g. Tourism, financial services etc.</p> <p>Identify activities that maximise impact on overall objectives</p> <p>Work more closely with regional initiatives</p> <p>Popularise the programme and render its programmes more visible. Change its name to something more attractive and comprehensible.</p> <p>EIF ES staff should visit the country at least once a year</p> <p>EIF systems and objectives should be more closely aligned with LDC conditions</p> <p>Improve M & E at national level</p>	<p>The EIF needs to be responsive to individual country needs.</p> <p>The trade development projects need to be aligned with the national export strategies, DTIS and mainstreamed into the national development strategies.</p>	<p>The aim and objectives relevant, but better communication with other organization needed to enhance EIF's ability to work in partnership with others.</p>	<p>The EIF aim and objectives remain highly relevant to the LDCs and donors, but it needs to be managed more effectively.</p> <p>The EIF needs to be used by donors, agencies and LDCs as a platform for TRTA, and as a tool for mainstreaming and donor coordination.</p> <p>The process needs to be more linked with ongoing in-country projects and programmes.</p>

5. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

The following conclusions are synthesized directly from the analyses and findings set out in the previous sections, on both the overall EIF programme and portfolio and progress on the ground in LDCs. Consistent with the agreed prioritisation of sources of evidence in the Inception Report, wherever applicable the results of the country case studies are the main source for conclusions about progress. In every case, however, they have been checked against evidence on the same points from the other streams, and any significant variations have been built into the MTR Team's overall conclusion.

5.1 Clarifying expectations of the EIF mandate and partnership

Conclusion 1: One of the most important conclusions to emerge from this Mid Term Review is that the limited instrument of the EIF is in practice widely misunderstood, suffers from differing and often unrealistic expectations, and is not getting the concerted, constructive support from all its partners that is essential to its intended model of operation.

Often the EIF is taken by the LDCs, donors and some agencies to be another spending programme when it is just what its name says: a framework for coordination and integration. As such, its job is to mobilise and leverage resources (financial, institutional, political – in the higher sense) around the trade agenda of each country. But the EIF's more complex mission has not been strong enough to withstand the normal expectations of LDCs, donors and some of the agencies that it will perform and disburse like a 'normal' assistance programme. There is now a danger of trying unsuccessfully to be both, framework and programme, as demonstrated by the Tier 2 dilemma. How can you help build stronger national trade sectors (particularly in countries that trade heavily within their respective regions) through stand-alone, often piecemeal, projects (rather than integrated programmatic approaches)? What is needed is more capacity to support growth in trade, and that can only come from an integrated approach adopted by all stakeholders.

As to partnership, while many partner participants assess the EIF in the third person as though it were an independent entity, each set of partners - LDCs, donors and core agencies – is actually responsible for actively participating in a real partnership toward a set of clearly shared objectives.¹⁹ The EIF's governance and management arrangements are supposed to be tools to that end. In the LDCs themselves, where the primary focus must lie, the countries are all working from different starting-points and with varying commitment and organization to advance on the agreed objectives. For various reasons, the donors (with a few exceptions) are not yet fully playing their intended part to support the building of the country's capacity to strategize, mainstream and coordinate and increase support for trade development. The different core agencies play limited and sometimes unclear or unsatisfactory roles. For example, the preparation of the DTIS Action Matrix, usually commissioned to one of these agencies, is a vital pillar of the EIF model, but even completing it on time is often not given the priority that genuine agency partnership would imply.

In Geneva, the EIF Board as a whole has not yet succeeded in strengthening a working partnership, but has slipped into roles and a style of operation that are far removed from the priority needs and responsive operations needed for a capacity-development approach on the ground, and have complicated rather than facilitated the implementation of the mandate. The overarching Steering Committee is quite far in the background, although its ultimate role

¹⁹ As one possible indicator of a limited style of partnership on the Board, it is noteworthy that most members of the three different 'constituencies' are actually seated in separate groups at Board meetings.

in governance is presumably key. The Executive Secretariat, all based in Geneva, is hard-pressed to apply across dozens of far-flung LDCs the intricate requirements and procedures set by the Board, service the Board itself, creatively support and facilitate capacity development work in LDCs, and monitor and communicate results. By almost all accounts, and the Team's assessment, the financial management function has benefitted from the TFM's model of partial decentralization to ensure effective oversight, support and service, but its reporting has not yet secured the confidence of all that this is the case.

5.2 Relevance of the EIF²⁰

Conclusion 2: The MTR Team's overall assessment is that the basic objectives and strategic approach of the EIF (particularly in its capacity-building Tier 1 activities, which have been more developed and tested) are highly relevant to the current trade and economic priorities of the LDCs. Importantly, in all the main evidence streams on this issue – country case studies, other LDC, donor and Board surveys - overwhelming majorities of respondents agreed that “Compared with the situation in 2007 the EIF's strategic approach to date is of greater relevance to the LDCs'/country's trade and economic priorities.” Further, across all these same categories of respondents, more than three quarters disagreed with the proposition that “The EIF's strategic approach to date is a “marginal or a small factor in responding to these priorities.” A number of documented success stories give further tangible support to this conclusion.

Going the next step, however, the Review has found that there were different expectations about the pace at which the EIF's strategic approach could be reasonably expected to yield results to support the LDCs' priorities. To the proposition that “the EIF's strategic approach to date is relevant to LDC priorities and it is yielding the kinds of results that can reasonably be expected” 87.5% of donor respondents disagreed, while the assessments in the other groups of respondents were far more mixed.

Clearly there is a mismatch in terms of expectations about the kinds of results that could reasonably have been expected from the EIF to this point. It is possible that some respondents have based their interpretation of “reasonable expectations” from the point of the ‘de facto’ start up date of April 2010, while others dated their expectations to May 2007. Others may be factoring in major delays in some aspects of launching the activities while Geneva was preoccupied with preparing guidelines and the Compendium, or for many months negotiating over the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. For others the sheer challenges of organizing and working in LDCs or with multilateral agencies may be factored into their interpretations. In any event, the difference in expectations is a fact and it is highly material to the Review and the way it will be used.

5.3 Effectiveness of the EIF

Conclusion 3: Expectations about effectiveness: In assessing the history of the EIF from its formal inception, the MTR Team concludes that all stakeholders represented on the Steering Committee and Board share the responsibility for gaps that now exist between expectations for results at this stage and what has so far been achieved. The LDCs, who now express less disappointment, were also less responsible than others for creating delays, even with their more limited capacities than other partners. In the four years since the leadership of both the TFM and Executive Secretariat have been in place it is our assessment that a more forceful strategic direction and management could

²⁰ Consistent with the approach set out in the Inception Report, the work of the Review has treated the assessment of the current relevance of the EIF as best being built on and informed by a test of the other criteria first. At this conclusion stage, immediately after the presentation of findings above, we are comfortable in presenting this key assessment of relevance first.

have somewhat accelerated the results achieved but would have required successfully asserting a more appropriate relationship between senior management and a Board that had become accustomed to negotiating language and rules and regulations and micro-managing decisions, rather than focusing on strategic directions for a capacity development programme. The findings demonstrate important (and sometimes contradictory) differences in expectations, especially among some donors, about the role and responsibilities of governance as well as expectations about the results to be achieved and in what timeframes. Moreover, it is clear that for the nature of the EIF's mission its centre of gravity is far too much in Geneva and with the Board and Executive Secretariat and far too little in the LDCs and with partners and agencies active on the ground.

Overall, the approach to governing and managing this capacity-development programme seems to have been one of 'management by long-distance regulation' - with elaborate, formulaic standard requirements - (in the Compendium, guidelines, processes and steps) being applied from a distance in highly diverse contexts. This flies in the face of the "no one size fits all" slogan and the central principle of country ownership. It has resulted in documented debates and delays in at least one case-study country (around the insistence on a separate NIU), and in others too uniform (where more flexible recruiting of Focal Points would have enhanced EIF's influence).

Perhaps this highly-prescriptive style of operation was a reaction to perceived weaknesses in the predecessors of EIF, a mechanism for trying to manage a far-flung programme from Geneva, or a 'cultural' carryover from WTO's mainstream business style. But whatever the explanation, it is ill-suited to the flexible, responsive and often iterative management required in development work, especially capacity-development. This major conclusion has an important bearing on how the different partners take stock of progress to date and commit themselves for future activities, how the Board and management operate, and the role, location and responsibilities of different actors. These points are reflected in the MTR's Recommendations. See also the assessment on Governance and Management under "Sustainability" below.

A key factor in assessing the effectiveness of the EIF to date is to determine the timeframe over which that assessment can legitimately be made. In launching the EIF with a five-year term in May 2007 and an interim Board set up in July 2007, the three sets of founding partners reflected their sense of the importance and urgency of acting, and helped create an international expectation that this programme (almost on its own) could somehow generate substantial results over that period.

But they certainly did not explicitly factor in a delay of more than two years before the EIF could be set up and even minimally staffed and organized, or three and four years before financial agreements could be concluded with two core agencies, the UNDP and World Bank respectively. The EIF Board was constituted after three years. Tier 1 guidelines were approved by the interim Board two years from inception, and the User's Guide Compendium after four years, followed by the EIF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework in a further three months. A certain level of activities, including some carried over from the previous IF and some new, was maintained over this period, but the rhythm and capacity were limited, especially because essential staffing of the Executive Secretariat was also drawn out, apparently by a combination of Board limitations and recruiting and hiring procedures.

Conclusion 4: Seeing the EIF as a tool to accompany the LDCs on a journey, the direction of travel for all the 43 LDCs where the EIF is active is in the right direction, although for a dozen or more countries the advancement is still minimal. At the other end of the scale, a significant minority of at least 10 countries (from different starting points) is already well advanced in strengthening their capacities, taking control of the agenda, and effectively calling on EIF and other resources to meet their

requirements.²¹ The majority has made the initial steps, some are consolidating for the next stages and some are faced with internal and external hurdles (e.g. changes of key staff, waiting for DTIS or updates). Given the very strong findings about the key role of an up-to-date DTIS and Action Matrix in advancing the priority objectives of the EIF – and guiding the aid provide by donors and the design of Tier 2 projects – it is a major concern that only a quarter of intended beneficiary countries now have an up-to-date DTIS in place, with roughly another quarter in progress. The pace of travel is extremely varied among countries: some have progressed quite rapidly by any standard, the majority is moving gradually and sometimes fitfully, and again a small minority is stalled or close to stalling. The distance remaining to be travelled for the LDCs as a group has to be measured against the milestones that have been set on the road to the Goal of full trade integration and the higher-level “Purpose” results²². For this Mid Term assessment, the most important way-stations are the four main expected outcomes of EIF, which are assessed as key measures of effectiveness.

The EIF is not a simple contractual arrangement or even a conventional assistance programme. It is intended to provide a framework for a concerted international effort to accompany LDCs on their different journeys - usually long and difficult ones - to build their capacity to integrate into the international trading system and benefit from trade for their development. The Mid Term Review thus provides its conclusions and explanations about the progress made on that journey: first, the direction of travel; second, the pace of travel; and third, the distance remaining to the milestones that have been set. In all cases, it has to be reiterated that the EIF is an accompaniment, and never the prime driver of progress, which must always be found in the country itself. The Team’s analysis of the expectations and reasons for the general rate of progress is mainly found below under the headings of “Relevance” and “Efficiency”.

Conclusion 5: *Effectiveness of outcomes:* Even in the limited period that the EIF has really been in effect, we conclude that it has been used by different LDCs to make contributions (ranging from important to minor in different countries) to reinforcing and in some cases catalysing positive trends.

To gauge the EIF’s effectiveness in the Mid Term Review, the most important yardsticks used were the four main expected outcomes of EIF on: capacity for trade-related strategies and implementation plans, mainstreaming of trade into national development strategies and plans, coordinated delivery of trade-related assistance following country priorities, and securing resources to support initiatives addressing DTIS Action Matrix priorities. The conclusions on these points are summarized below. As planned in the Inception Report (with the caveat that this would be taken as far as the data permit) the Review Team has applied and thus tested the logframe indicators on these intended outcomes as a key part of its Evaluation Matrix, reflected in all the instruments used in the Review. The Matrix did supplement these indicators with a number of its own. A ‘Snapshot of available information against the logframe outcome indicators’ is found in Annex 8.

There is ample evidence that the EIF (building in some cases on IF foundations) has been an important support for close to 30 countries to strengthen their capacities to

²¹ The Mid Term Review ‘s own indicative list of well-advanced countries would largely coincide at this point with the list of those that are carrying out or preparing Tier 2 projects, although that should not necessarily be treated as the decisive indicator. The current list would include Burundi, Cambodia, Gambia, Mali, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Lao PDR, Lesotho, and Rwanda. From the Team’s information, probably another five countries would appear to be approaching a similar point. It must be stressed that this type of judgment is not definitive, the factors at work are diverse, as are the contributions of the EIF, cases could be made for further inclusions or exclusions, and rapid changes can occur. The Review will not identify other groups in part because of the dangers of encouraging simplistic interpretations of the reasons for slower progress.

²² As specified in the EIF Programme Logframe (Compendium p. 99 ff.)

formulate trade strategies and better recognize the place of trade in national development policies and programmes. The capacity is in some cases very dynamic and has already exerted tangible influence while in a few others it is still nascent and fragile, with the majority falling somewhere between. The DTIS and Action Matrix are seen to be potent tools to identify and assert national trade priorities and thus attract and steer trade related assistance. Even in Bangladesh, a major trading country that has not yet had its DTIS completed, this is seen as an urgent requirement to feed into a number of key development processes. It is still a matter of debate as to what actually constitutes a national trade strategy, and only in half of the Review's case study countries is a national trade strategy clearly in place. Some have probably met the quality threshold set in the Logframe and in other cases there would be further room for interpretation. The "mainstreaming" of trade in national development strategies is also often more formalistic than meaningful and often those broader strategies themselves are far from binding in reality.

In the coordinated planning and delivery of trade-related assistance to implement LDCs' priorities, there is evidence that the EIF has been used by countries to reinforce positive trends in some 70% of responding LDCs, especially where an updated DTIS action Matrix has been in place.

In the objective of securing resources to support initiatives addressing DTIS Action Matrix priorities, the assessment moves further into the territory designated for Tier 2 projects, but some of this effect may be achieved earlier. Overall, just over half of the non-case study responses attributed some success in this area to the EIF and the influence of the DTIS and Action Matrix in this direction is judged to be important or very important in 90% of the case study countries. But hardly anywhere is there yet organized data to respond to the logframe indicator 4.4. on the "number and value of projects funded by donors related to the DTIS Action Matrix."

As documented in the earlier section on "The Profile and Progress of the EIF Portfolio" experience on the Tier 2 front is still limited, but there are grounds for concern that in fact the design and the process for Tier 2 projects is so far only in a few cases reflecting the intended strategic, catalytic, "joined-up" and "crowding in" objectives for this Tier. In the understanding of the MTR Team, the move from the primary Tier 1 emphasis on capacity building to a Tier 2 resource mobilization focus in an LDC is supposed to involve a deliberate opening up and extension of the process, reaching out to different parts of government including sector ministries, agencies the private sector and donors, to build strategic and substantial project responses to the country's specified trade priorities. We have seen evidence of this kind of process so far in at least 9 countries, but some other Tier 2 project proposals or ideas elsewhere appear much narrower and focused wholly or mainly on EIF's own limited financial resources.

Under the heading of Effectiveness, the MTR Team included some assessment of the acceptance and use to date of the M&E Framework and Logframe throughout the EIF programme. The findings point to the conclusion that the system was unfamiliar to many, but that it is basically viewed as worthwhile by nearly 80% of LDC respondents (and the training on the system by some 70%, with a large number unable to judge.) At the same time, there is little evidence that the system is yet in use (or useable, given data constraints) at either the country or programme levels, as further evidenced in this Review's own Annex 8.

5.4 Efficiency of the EIF

Conclusion 6: By the most commonly-used, but crude and flawed, measures of efficiency in international assistance programmes - the cost relative to money transferred - the EIF has so far proved to be less efficient than a notional norm among

possible comparators.²³ Given the very nature of the programme, it will probably always look “expensive” by this rough test. The EIF is not at a stage where a deeper test (measured by the cost, time and effort expended relative to results achieved) can yet be definitively applied although there is substantial evidence in this Review. But it is also the assessment of the Team that efficiency (and effectiveness) could now be significantly improved through streamlining of procedures and steps (fully dissected in this report) some decentralizing of ES coordination staff, better preparing for the transition to “Tier 2” projects and better engaging partner agencies and active donors in the work of the programme.

In its start-up phase, the EIF has been slow to get underway, and expensive to run relative to its overall expenditure. One reason is that start-up almost always costs more than once a programme reaches cruising altitude. A second reason is that this is always likely to be a relatively “high cost” programme to run because of the exceptionally wide range and complexity of issues, relationships and building tasks involved while intentionally targeting relatively limited financial assistance. A third reason is that the Board has selected a complex, elaborate and expensive system of governance and management for the programme, with a hands-on Board, staffing and accommodation through the WTO, and separate arrangements for programme and financial management.

5.5 Sustainability of the EIF’s work

Conclusion 7: What is important to sustain is not the EIF as an institution or even a programme. Instead it is the contributions that the EIF has begun to make and can further make to the capacities of LDCs themselves to target and maximize the resources directed to their most important needs in trade and development. In our assessment, the EIF should not and cannot try to compete as a “retail brand” or a major source of financing with some far larger programmes of trade-related technical assistance and massive aid for trade resources. Instead it must strengthen and sustain its special “honest broker” position and its potentials for leverage and convening these bigger players to permanently reinforce to ability of the LDCs to carry on this work.

The fairly substantial evidence is reassuring that many if not most of the capacity-building contributions of the EIF would leave some lasting benefits in the absence of the programme - a claim that many such programmes could not support. At the same time these gains are far from entrenched as yet, and the completion of an effective five-year term, with other reinforcements of the types recommended, should make a further positive difference.

The Review examined the achievements against the EIF’s core principles as key pillars of sustainability. It found that the EIF has started well in supporting the use of trade for development, country ownership and capacity building support. It has done less well so far in helping spur donors and agencies to coordinate their responses and in finding the right balance between stronger and responsive governance and management of a complex capacity-building programme. More detail on this assessment is provided below.

Since the move to its enhanced form, the EIF has been committed to applying a set of agreed core principles and enhanced outcomes for its work. The Review has treated these as criteria of sustainability since they reflected lessons from earlier experience. The overall conclusions on these criteria are summarized below.

²³ At the same time it must be noted that simply moving money is often a flawed test, and even as far as these measures go they are notoriously difficult to document and frequently suspect.

The use of trade as a development tool: Working with wider trends internationally, the EIF has already added to awareness of this need in the large majority of LDCs and helped at least half to take concrete steps to act on this awareness. The evidence suggests that in these countries this progress would have been much less without the tool of the EIF.

LDC ownership, prioritisation and management: This has been a solid underpinning of the ethos of the EIF and has made evident, and distinctive, contributions to strengthening LDC ownership in almost all of the nearly 40 countries where it has worked. Loosening and adapting the current standardised approach and management of the EIF would further enhance country ownership. The record of the countries showing the strongest ownership and leadership – not attributable to the EIF – shows how this is usually the key to better performance. Applying this principle has sometimes had a price. Especially when combined with other constraints, it has slowed disbursement and some activities, but it is still recognised and valued by the LDCs in particular. By the nature of Tier 1 activities, this ownership has also involved resisting dependence on outside agencies or donor programmes, and it now needs to be strong enough for a more pro-active collaborative mode under Tier 2.

A partnership approach: This has not yet taken proper shape in the functioning of the EIF and now urgently needs to do so. Even in the early capacity-building phases of Tier 1 activities, core agencies have been expected (and contracted) to carry out critical functions such as the preparation of the DTIS, but the time taken to complete this step – an average of 18 months, with some stretching much longer – does not suggest that high priority is being given to completing this work.²⁴ So far, donors have mostly not been playing their full part in the EIF's operations, even through the specific mechanism of the Donor Facilitator role, deliberately built in as a pillar of the activities in countries, to work with the PP and NIA. The Team's systematic assessment of the current state of this function in the 12 case study countries reveals a weaker position on average than for the national structures. Almost all DFs were found to be interested and informed on EIF and more than half to be clearly committed, while one appeared to be actively hostile to the EIF. Significantly, DFs from the same donor agencies in different countries showed different levels of engagement, testifying to the importance of individual expertise and commitment. There is a serious systemic issue for donor agencies to tackle around the incentives for donor representatives to carry out these responsibilities. The full range of donors and agencies active in the trade field is not necessarily well-represented in all LDCs, but even where they are interest and engagement in EIF is uneven. As more countries move into Tier 2 activities, these gaps will need to be bridged from both sides.

Table 2: Assessment of the donor facilitators

Criterion	Sufficient	Insufficient but improving fast	Insufficient but improving slowly	Insufficient and not improving or deteriorating
Activity	3	3	3	3
Capability	2	4	4	2
Influence	2	1	6	3

Managing for results: This 'principle' is included as part of the partnership package and MTR's findings on this topic merit a conclusion here. The main approach to managing the EIF for results has been centred on the performance management system summarized in the logical-frameworks approved in July 2011, and set out in the Compendium of EIF

²⁴ This assessment is made with due recognition that the proper preparation of a DTIS, including its consultation and validation stages is a complex undertaking. It is also worth noting, though admittedly with a small sample of EIF DTISs, that the average time being taken is so far longer than under the IF.

Documents. As part of its mandate, the MTR explicitly set out to test the use and value of that Framework at the programme (including goal and purpose) level as well as assessing the stage of understanding and application of the system at country level. A key fact is that this system was only approved, after an extended period of preparation and negotiation in the Board itself. Regional workshops to help country participants to understand and use it were only completed in mid-2012. Reporting systems have only just begun to call for monitoring against the relevant indicators and in many if not most cases the relevant data are not yet available.

With such a recent introduction of the framework, and the unfamiliarity of this type of tool to so many, it is not surprising that it does not yet show more results. Moreover, there needs to be a clear, shared understanding of the role and limits of such tools in carrying out the principle of managing for results. In this programme, as in many others, there is a tendency for donor representatives to attempt to impose on LDC governments much more elaborate and detailed systems and reporting requirements than they would ever be able to meet meaningfully within their own much better equipped organizations. As such systems go, it is our conclusion is that the design of EIF's monitoring framework is comparatively reasonable and potentially useful. Like all such systems, however, it will have to work its way into practice gradually, mainly by proving that it is genuinely useful as a management tool and not by imposing a kind of artificial compliance ritual, which may even be counter-productive.

Increased capacity-building support: Allowing for the notorious difficulty for any assistance activity to advance this goal in sustainable ways, especially in LDCs, the EIF itself has already made significant contributions, in some cases substantial ones, and the majority are likely to have enduring value. The financial contributions have been relatively modest but targeted to this building task. There is little evidence that the implementing bodies have so far made appreciable contributions in this area, especially under Tier 1, but this will be essential under Tier 2.

Stronger governance of the EIF: The three-pillared partnership between LDCs, core agencies and supporting donors is inevitably complex, especially given the imbalances between their respective presences in countries and at the WTO base in Geneva. All subscribe in principle to the idea that what happens in the countries is most important, but their dispersion and the communications challenges make it very difficult to continuously capture and convey that to all at the programme level. Moreover, this complex partnership, the drawn-out process of agreeing on changes from the IF model, and guiding approaches to the EIF one have led to some abnormal and unhelpful governance practices of micro-management and loss of a strategic grasp, although the Board appears to play other roles well.

For the EIF to be successful, its governance cannot remain a matter of constant negotiation and debate about the drafting of rules and guidelines, or of project proposals or monitoring reports, and its management cannot be primarily about ensuring compliance with agreed texts.²⁵ Project approvals in programmes of this kind are the normal responsibility of senior expert programme managers held accountable to the Board. The successful functioning of this relationship depends on mutual confidence – for the Board to empower senior managers to carry out the programme and be held accountable for doing so, and for senior managers to secure the necessary expertise and provide the Board with salient and straightforward performance and financial information appropriate for strategic oversight. Neither

²⁵ The nature of the work of a long-term capacity development programme in LDCs requires a set of specialized skills and practices almost totally different from most of the work that goes on in the WTO. This calls for a radical cultural shift for this operation housed in its midst and strongly endorsed by its leadership.

condition is now properly fulfilled and these gaps need to be rectified to provide a new basis for mutual confidence in this programme.

Alongside the need for the Board (and Geneva) to “let go” to a greater extent, two specific examples of the need for reciprocal confidence-building by Management and Board have come to our attention. We cannot see any reason why the regular financial reports should not routinely include reporting at the same summary level as is found in the original proposals rather than single line project spending reports, which are clearly inadequate as management information. If the expectation were for line-by-line accounting for all detailed expenditures, this would clearly be unreasonable and too heavy to be strategically relevant. It can of course be provided if needed in particular cases, as can audit assurance. The second issue is over the management costs of the programme. Rather than becoming a focus of defensive reactions to perceived fault-finding questions, clarifying this situation should be treated as a shared concern of Board and management to be worked through transparently and constructively.

The MTR Team does not have any reliable base for comparison with the pre-EIF arrangements, so has made fresh assessments on these points drawing on inputs from all its evidence streams and supplementing this with the results of a special survey of present and past Board members on some standard criteria around governance, management and administration. The results of that survey have been summarised in Annex 11 and the main findings have been reflected in these conclusions.

5.6 Potential impact of the EIF

As the findings and conclusions on Effectiveness have shown, there is a significant number of areas where there is evidence of likely contributions (and even actual ones) by the EIF in the directly trade-related impacts identified for the Review. These are in trade facilitation, market development, enhancing productivity, improving product quality, addressing supply capacity constraints, and trade integration. It is a significant finding that large proportions of participants in the programme from different responsibilities share the conviction and commitment that this impact can be achieved. Even contributions to the higher level impacts of economic growth, raising incomes, poverty reduction and sustainable development represent results that significantly guide and motivate this work.

From the outset of the Review (and indeed in the EIF’s own M&E Framework) it has been stressed that the EIF can only be one of many instrumental contributors to the Goal and Purpose level outcomes of the programme. This caution holds even more true at the mid-point stage. Nonetheless the MTR did assess the extent to which the EIF itself and the actions and measures undertaken by its participants are guided by an overall orientation of contributing to those ultimate results, in line with the principle of managing for results at its higher level. Without in any way implying any claims or assumptions about any causal role of the EIF, as part of its work, the MTR Team assembled a status report on the longer-term higher level results, attached as Annex 7 “Where LDCs stand vis-à-vis EIF goals and purpose.” To some extent, this paper is evidence of the difficulty of even setting baselines but may be of some help in doing so.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The MTR has formulated a small number of strategic recommendations to build on the successes of the EIF to date and make some important improvements and mid-course corrections where there are evident needs. Each recommendation is clearly built on the evidence, findings and conclusions in the body of this Report and supporting materials. As requested by the EIF Board when the draft Report was presented, the Team has added possible ideas for implementation where it finds a basis for doing so.

The Board and, as appropriate, the Steering Committee of the EIF should:

1. Recognise the effective starting date of the EIF term as April 2010, when the EIF Board was constituted and there was a functioning base of staff, policies and partner agreements and an imminent agreement on the financial management contract. Thus a five-year term for the programme would extend to mid-2015. Resist pressures for growing disbursement in favour of the more difficult tasks of maximising strategic leverage. Agree on realistic strategic expectations for the second half of this term in the light of this Review and the responses to it.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. Recognising that the effective assessment period for the EIF's operations to date is only half of the five years projected, all the partners on the Board and Steering Committee need to accept their shared responsibility for that fact and form their own assessments of the record of past performance and the future of the Framework accordingly,
 - ii. On the basis of these assessments, at the end of the original five-year term in 2013, the partners have three options: a) to renew for a further five year term or longer, b) to extend by a further two and a half years to complete an effective five-year testing period, or c) discontinue the activities. On the strength of its findings, the MTR would recommend that if some of the other key changes proposed in this Report were made, the distinctive contributions of the EIF so far and its future potential would merit extension by a substantial period. A short and operational strategic plan for the period chosen could be triggered by the responses of the Board and Steering Committee to this Mid Term Review, ideally with independent facilitation to expedite the process in this complex partnership.
 - iii. With the current resources and patterns of expenditure, decisions on further major replenishment of the EIF's resources could logically await performance reporting *on* a further period as the activities in the current pipeline mature.
2. Gear up, through a serious re-examination by all EIF partners – especially donors and agencies, from the top to the field level - to re-commit to full implementation of their responsibilities as EIF partners in the crucial second half of this term. This will be particularly critical as the focus begins to shift from capacity-building to greater coordination and mobilisation of trade-related resources. These recommendations would imply some modest changes in the ways each of these actors do business, a reasonable demand in relation to the stakes for LDCs and the promises made to them.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. Given their shared conviction of the continuing relevance of the EIF, all partners – especially donors and agencies - need to make their own serious

assessment of the performance of the partnership and of their own part in it (from HQ to country offices), drawing on the results of this Mid Term Review and other inputs.

- ii. On this basis the partners should decide on the commitments and changes that they are prepared to make in order for the Framework to achieve its potential benefits for LDCs in its next phases. The core agencies need to update their undertakings to integrate active collaboration with EIF in the core priorities of their respective workplans, to provide needed expertise and to ensure timely delivery of high-quality services (such as DTIS and Updates) when they work with EIF in that capacity. Donors need to ensure pro-active cooperation with EIF-supported capacities in LDCs, especially through motivated, supported and accountable Donor Facilitators, providing expertise and actively promoting and backing Aid for Trade programmes based on DTIS priorities. As a first step, willing and enthusiastic Donor Facilitators should be tasked to work with National Implementation Units to produce and maintain inventories of Trade-related technical assistance and Aid for Trade in each country. LDCs need to maintain or step up the momentum of their efforts to ensure trade capacity and integration and lead in defining and pursuing Aid for Trade support in priority areas.
 - iii. A high-profile meeting at Ministerial/ Heads of agency level could provide the needed platform for the re-commitment and changes to be implemented and to give confidence to LDCs, donors and agencies of political support and a reasonable timeframe to achieve the intended results.
 - iv. Geneva based Donors and Agencies should formally and regularly link up with their in country representatives to keep both parties adequately informed on EIF activities, progress and challenges.
3. Recognise that the basic objectives and strategic approach of the EIF (particularly in its capacity-building Tier 1 activities, which have been more developed and tested) are highly relevant and important to the current trade and economic priorities of the LDCs, and are seen to be so by all sets of partners. Seeing the EIF as a tool to accompany the LDCs on a journey, the EIF needs to customise support to the individual requirements of the countries at different levels of progress, including the consolidation and catch-up of capacity-building where it has not yet taken hold. To reduce the gaps of communication and support between the LDCs and the Executive Secretariat, it should move rapidly to mirror the TFM's successful model of partial de-centralisation, if possible economising and building synergies by co-locating the services in regional offices. Given the nature of their respective tasks, regional offices of the Executive Secretariat would need more staff on the ground than the TFM.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. WTO and the Executive Secretariat of EIF need to adopt a more flexible, 'developmental' mode in the management of the EIF, moving away from the rules and compliance-based emphasis up to now. The EIF cannot be run from Geneva with a rulebook. More detailing of rules will not improve effectiveness or accountability. An appropriate degree of standardization is needed, but the main work has to be flexibly adapted at the country level.
- ii. The centre of gravity should shift to LDCs themselves and enough regionally-based ES staff need to be deployed to provide closer accompanying support to those LDCs in most need of it. National Implementation Units could be

helped to maintain inventories of trade-related assistance, and perhaps develop their own strategies for moving ahead. Work with other LDCs should be increasingly targeted to the particular needs and challenges at their stage of trade development. In all cases, the Secretariat should not attempt to carry out all these support roles on its own (an impossible task) but draw in expertise from other LDCs, agencies, donors and elsewhere, with an eye always to widening engagement and possible aid for trade support.

- iii. NIAs should be structured to fit with national practices that are seen by the country to be effective. The uniform prescription for an NIA (national steering committee, National Coordinator and Focal point) could be reconfigured to suit the particularities of each national context and allow for experimentation in the whole EIF. In any new reconfiguration, the objective of trade mainstreaming in the particular country should determine the structure most suited for achieving it.
4. In the interest of efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the EIF, start afresh at this turning point with clarified and revamped relationships between the Steering Committee, Board, Executive Secretariat and Trust Fund Manager. The Board has mandated a whole management process and ethos that is over-centralised, rigid, and unnecessarily complex – the rapid approval of final submissions to the Board is highly misleading as to its role. Return the Board to a strategic guidance function, removing it from detailed regulatory, compliance and project approval functions. Empower and hold accountable the Secretariat for the normal functions of executive direction of a capacity building program, with more regular, and thorough reporting including strategic directions, programme performance and financial reporting to the Board at the appropriate management information level. The distinct rationale, functions and potential contributions of the additional layer of governance in the Steering Committee are not readily evident and need to be clarified or rationalised.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. In the next phase of the EIF, the strategic function of Board members should be transformed to monitoring and promoting the engagement of the institutions they represent and others in active collaboration in LDCs through EIF activities and the support of trade related technical assistance and aid for trade. The Board should de-emphasise the current differentiation of its members into constituency blocs, and focus on its shared objectives, using mixed committees or task forces to pursue strategic or technical issues of special interest.
- ii. Building on the findings in this Mid Term Review and emerging evaluations and other experience, the Board could provide and promote an ongoing forum on factors for success and possible pitfalls in trade development for continuous sharing among all partners, perhaps through short briefs in a regular EIF newsletter or if possible, in a more interactive way, such as using 'webinars' (seminars on the web) to strengthen the consultation process and experience sharing among all stakeholders.
- iii. A key strategic dimension that needs to be explored is how to work effectively with the regional and sub-regional institutions and trade relationships that are key to the prospects of so many LDCs. This could be a suitable topic on which a Board task force could reach out to regional institutions and others and prepare proposals for action.

- iv. The recommended facilitated preparation of a medium term strategic plan for the next phase (to be periodically reviewed and updated) would provide an agreed basis for strategic monitoring of progress by the Board. This would be supported by more normal performance and financial reporting to be provided by the Executive Secretariat and Trust Fund Manager, allowing for the appropriate exercise of oversight and accountability functions.
 - v. Because exercises like this Mid Term Review can only take place at fairly long intervals, the Board should consider instituting regular performance reviews against the strategic plan (say semi-annually) perhaps prepared by a representative strategic review committee of the Board or perhaps the Steering Committee. In addition to assessing the performance of the ES and TFM, such reviews should reflect the multi-partner character of the EIF by including “peer reviews” of the performance of the member institutions in LDCs’ trade development, against a number of key commitments and indicators. This is good practice in other types of partnership. It would entail a more strategic information-gathering and analytical role for the Board and perhaps equip it to become a convening hub of stronger international aid for trade coordination among the partners represented.
5. To strengthen substantive support and quality assurance around project design and approval - particularly as the programme moves more into Tier 2 activities – greatly reinforce the role and makeup of Technical Advisory Panels, in countries and at the programme level. Set up rosters of recognised experts from core, donor, and other agencies and sources to be called upon short term at design and/or approval stages to serve on these panels according to the nature of the project in question. Relying on these resources more, radically prune the current numerous and drawn-out procedures for the consideration and approval of activities.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. This recommendation is definitely not intended to introduce another layer or hurdle in the preparation, consideration or approval of activities. It is quite the contrary. In the place of current processes that see frequent back-and-forth steps and resulting delays, the vision is of a country-centred process in which the Focal Point and National Implementation Unit, with close support from the EIF secretariat, can call upon the requisite expertise from many sources to develop on the ground proposals that will not require the many steps that are now the pattern. In the interest of efficiency as well as quality, these expert panels could well replace the present role of standing Technical Advisory Committees, which are not seen to play a prominent role and have a membership that largely overlaps with the national Steering Committees which would continue to have an approval role.
 - ii. This idea would directly address the project formulation stage, widely identified as the most serious bottleneck in EIF processes, together with the delays in producing DTISs and Updates. Other steps and procedures could undoubtedly also be shortened by country officials and EIF staff if the primary emphasis is placed on empowering and encouraging delivery and less on rigid compliance with formalities and centralised control.
6. To ensure appropriate preparation for high-quality, resource-mobilizing Tier 2 projects of the kind envisaged in the EIF design, introduce and fund a new “transitional support” phase in the programme between Tiers 1 and 2 in countries where necessary. This would be designed to make the mainstreaming of trade real and literally help to ‘frame’ strategic and catalytic programmes. It would support and

promote opening up and extending engagement of the process, reaching out to different parts of government including sector ministries, agencies, donors, and private sector and regional actors. It could promote and support trade fora and engagement in consultative groups and round tables, sectoral consultative arrangements, or even look toward new trade and/or private sector SWAPs or similar arrangements, all to help build strategic and substantial project responses to the country's specified trade priorities. It will also provide the resources for effective management support to Tier 2 projects, an area in which the NIAs cannot be expected to have developed the necessary capacity.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. This idea is based on the finding that in some countries there is a perceived pressure to move to Tier 2 projects without having in place all the requisite capacities listed above that would make these projects truly catalytic of wider engagement and additional Aid for Trade resources. Capacity building in project management could also be provided under this new stage, which would assist in completing the work of Tier 1 and properly prepare for Tier 2. It has been suggested that the existing (but so far little used) EIF provision for extended funding of Tier 1 activities could meet this need. If it is flexible enough to be deployed now and not limited by constricting rules, this would be a very helpful step. If not, a new transitional support phase should be introduced.
7. Recognise that the M&E system for the EIF, while a promising tool for the longer term, will have to work its way into practice gradually, mainly by proving that it is genuinely useable and useful as a management tool and not by imposing a kind of artificial compliance ritual, which may even be counter-productive.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. The strategic plan for the next phase of the EIF needs to include realistic expectations and schedules for the operationalisation of the programme and country logframes and monitoring systems, with appropriate support to ensure that they are genuinely valid and useful for management and accountability purposes. Meanwhile, more evaluations are beginning to be generated which should provide important continuing input for strategic review.
8. At this milestone of a Mid-Term Review and a growing movement toward transitional and Tier 2 activities, take special initiatives to communicate better the distinctive and targeted mission of the EIF in order to manage expectations and reduce misconceptions. Particularly with the advent of Tier 2 these messages should now be aimed at helping Focal Points, Steering Committees and NIAs to reach out, in an open partnership mode, to wider parts of government, private sector and other national stakeholders, donors and agencies who will collectively be more responsible for the resources and programmatic partnership in future. If the EIF itself consolidates its enabling function in countries that still require further Tier 1 assistance and builds on it to serve appropriate enabling functions in this wider resource mobilisation phase, it will have served its unique purpose well.

Possible ideas for implementation

- i. Even apart from its ungainly name, the EIF itself is not and should not try to be a widely-known "brand" in development cooperation – its medium term aim should be to become integrated into normal structures and aid relationships

after strengthening their trade orientation. It needs to be known and used by targeted and relatively narrow groups of decision-makers and opinion leaders, both in LDCs and among donors and agencies. As in other respects, customisation to the conditions and needs of the individual LDCs is vital. This calls for dissemination/communication strategies that target the communication needs of each.

- ii. A legitimate part of EIF's work can be in helping trade advocates in LDCs to make the development case for trade and thus help mobilise the capacities and integration that the EIF aims for, as well as leveraging more resources from larger aid programmes and other sources. Bringing in high profile visits from high-performing LDCs and international experts and 'role models' could be a new tool to promote progress in countries progressing more slowly.
- iii. The EIF's successes will often be indirect and unseen, apart from monitoring and evaluation results, but the partners and sponsors in the programme will need to be able to appreciate and support such contributions.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MID-TERM REVIEW (MTR) OF THE ENHANCED INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

Aid for trade (AfT) provides a framework that links trade assistance activities, from capacity-building training to trade policy and strategy development, within a coherent national development plan. Least developed countries (LDCs), however, face supply-side constraints that severely limit their ability to benefit from trading opportunities. They face trade integration obstacles in technical and hard infrastructure capacity, human resources, as well as managing adjustment and transition costs. To overcome these constraints and realize the benefits from trade, LDCs must build awareness of such opportunities, overcome their supply-side constraints and create an enabling environment to benefit from global trade. In recognition of these challenges, the Integrated Framework (IF) was established in 1997 as an international initiative to promote trade in LDCs by mainstreaming trade into their national development plans and to coordinate delivery of aid to them. Following a series of evaluations²⁶ a Task Force recommended strengthening the delivery process of the IF by linking the activities and results at programme and project levels. This led to a revamping of the IF in 2007 into the present Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF). The EIF programme, which became operational in October 2008, aims at creating a strong and effective results-oriented partnership among all EIF stakeholders. This involves close cooperation amongst the LDCs, the current 23 donors, six core agencies, one observer agency, the Executive Secretariat for the EIF (ES), the Trust Fund Manager (TFM) and other development partners who are supporting the LDCs' own drive to achieve the EIF objectives:

- Mainstream trade into national development strategies;
- Set up structures needed to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance; and
- Build capacity to trade, which also includes addressing critical supply side constraints.

The EIF process aims to strengthen donors' support to a country's trade agenda. LDCs can use the EIF as a vehicle to assist in coordinating donors' support and to leverage more AfT resources, whereas donors can sign up to the EIF as a vehicle to deliver on their AfT commitments.

An EIF programme logframe has been elaborated, identifying the programme's goal, purpose and four outcomes; indicators have been defined and targets set at the outcome level.²⁷ Progress against the targets will be monitored at the EIF country level and outcomes aggregated at the programme level. The EIF programme logframe is attached

Goal

The goal of the EIF is to support the LDCs' integration into the global trading system with a view to contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Purpose

The purpose of the EIF is to enable EIF countries to become fully integrated and active players in, and beneficiaries of, the global trading system through mainstreaming trade.

Outcomes²⁸

Four specific outcomes have been identified:

- I. EIF countries mainstream trade into their national development strategies and plans;

²⁶ Evaluation of the Revamped Integrated Framework For Trade-related Technical Assistance to the Least-Developed Countries. Capra-TFOC Consortium, November 2003 and Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs, Case Study Manmohan Agarwal and Jozefina Cutura, 2004.

²⁷ No targets have been defined for indicators at the goal and purpose levels because other factors besides the EIF programme may contribute to determine whether the EIF targets were achieved.

²⁸ A number of indicators have been identified for each of the four outcomes (see the logframe for details).

- II. Coordinated delivery of trade- related resources (funding, technical assistance, etc.) by donors and implementing agencies to implement country priorities following the adoption of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Action Matrix;
- III. EIF countries secure resources in support of initiatives that address DTIS Action Matrix priorities; and
- IV. Sufficient institutional and management capacity built in EIF countries to formulate and implement trade- related strategies and implementation plans.

The EIF funds projects through two modalities. The first modality, known as Tier 1, involves the preparation of a DTIS, which assesses the competitiveness of the country's economy and identifies barriers to effective integration into the global economy; an Action Matrix developed with a view to feeding trade- related priorities into country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and donors' financing for a; and establishing an EIF National Implementation Unit (NIU), including capacity building. The second modality, referred to as Tier 2, comprises trade-related projects identified in the DTIS Action Matrix that are of priority to beneficiary countries.²⁹

Currently, the EIF is active in 36 LDCs. There are 29 Tier 1 support projects to EIF National Implementation Arrangements (NIAs) under way, as well as three pre- DTIS and three DTIS. In addition, one Tier 2 project has been approved and about 20 others are in the pipeline.

These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for undertaking a mid- term review of the EIF. The review will focus on providing feedback, sharing lessons learned and promoting accountability in programme delivery and management through a global assessment of the EIF processes and operations in an effort to improve and strengthen the EIF for its future implementation. ³

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

Rationale

The MTR is foreseen in the EIF programme documents (the Compendium of EIF documents), requested by the EIF Donors and endorsed by the EIF Board. It is seen as an integral part of programme implementation and a necessary phase in the programme cycle. Accordingly, the results- based management nature of the programme requires that it is reviewed at mid- term for efficient programme planning and implementation and as input into the way forward in aid for trade programming for LDCs.

Objectives

The main purpose of the MTR is to undertake an independent evaluation of whether the programme is performing in such a way as to achieve the objectives, identify issues and recommend programme adjustments as necessary. The MTR will assess progress made against project (i.e. country level) outcomes and how these are contributing to the achievement of the overall programme outcomes and the programme purpose. The review will also aim to identify challenges and opportunities and capture success stories and lessons learned from implementing the EIF for future strategic programming.

The specific objectives of the MTR are:

1. To assess the progress made against the programme's goal, purpose and outcomes based on the programme- level logframe;
2. To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of the EIF programme at the global (programme) level, country (project) level and the intersection between project and programme levels, including a full evaluation of the EIF's operation systems and structures, as well as project and financial management processes;
 - To assess the constraints and opportunities facing EIF implementation at the country and programme levels;
 - To assess the strategic direction of the EIF and make recommendations for any adjustments.

²⁹ More information on the EIF can be found by visiting the programme website at: <http://www.enhancedif.org/> as well as consulting the EIF Compendium found at: http://www.enhancedif.org/documents/EIF%20toolbox/EIF_User_Guide_Compendium.pdf.

- implementation process, if deemed necessary, as well as measures necessary to enhance the programme's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability; and
- To promote accountability, lesson-learning, feedback and knowledge-sharing among all the EIF partners, as basis for achieving the programme objectives and purpose.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Scope

The MTR will assess all elements of the programme design, implementation, management and administration at each of the levels of the EIF – global programme level, country project level and alignment/intersection between the two. The MTR will cover the processes and operations of the EIF programme. The review of processes will assess the effectiveness of the management and governance of the EIF. In so doing, it will situate the EIF in the context of the wider AfT Initiative. The review will involve the review of administrative processes related to programme delivery, the project approval process and delays in the project cycle, while considering roles, responsibilities and decision-making processes. The review of operations will look at the overall contribution of the EIF to the performance of LDC countries through the results chain in the programme-level logframe and assess the extent to which results have been achieved, the potential of achieving the EIF objectives and the improvements required. In addition, the broader role of the EIF in supporting the identification of priorities and mobilization of resources for AfT can be analyzed based on data collected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is worth noting that through trade mainstreaming, the EIF is intended to be catalytic and to stimulate investment by the country, development partners and the private sector and therefore lead to an improvement in the enabling climate for trade and private sector development.

The MTR is expected to lead to detailed recommendations and lessons learned for future programming. The review will cover the period from the beginning of operations in 2008 to the present and be global in scope. The review will start in July 2012 and is projected to end in November 2012, with a draft report presented to the EIF Board and stakeholders in October 2012.

A consultancy team/firm will be selected through a competitive bidding exercise to conduct the MTR and will elaborate on its proposed methodology, including data collection and analysis through desk reviews, interviews both in Geneva and in the field with EIF partners, donors, countries and stakeholders, questionnaires and any other means deemed necessary. The MTR process will be coordinated by the ES, with assistance from the TFM, and guided by the EIF Board. Throughout the MTR process, the EIF Board will provide advice and feedback to the consultancy team/firm.

Methodology

The review will be conducted through a participatory approach involving EIF stakeholders at the country and programme levels using the OECD- Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for development effectiveness (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). The information will be of both quantitative and qualitative nature, involving perceptions of the stakeholders. The review will be guided by these TOR and an inception report, which will specify the detailed evaluation questions and methodology. The inception report will be approved by the EIF Board. The review will consist of a mix of desk-based review and fieldwork. It should include, but not be limited to:

Document review

Familiarization with key documents (published and unpublished in English and French) including documents reviewing the IF and establishing the EIF, the ES/TFM progress reports, the Compendium of EIF Documents that includes guidelines on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 project preparation and the programme-level Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) logframes, internal ES/TFM operational documents, processes and templates, and other relevant EIF documents

(capacity- building modules, outreach and counsel materials, proceedings of EIF meetings, workshops, conferences and policy documents). A list of the documents and copies will be made available to the consultants.

Portfolio review

This will involve an analysis of Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects that are being implemented since the first rollout of projects in July 2009. The analysis will involve a study of the project proposals and corresponding ES/TFM appraisals, ES/TFM recommendations to the EIF Board, project progress reports and ES/TFM mission reports. *Stakeholder interviews* It will involve consultations and interviews with members of the EIF governance structure at both the global level (including but not limited to donor constituencies and EIF Board members, LDC constituencies and EIF Board members, EIF core and partner agencies (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and the WTO), and those with observer status at the EIF Board (UNIDO), the Chairman of the EIF Board, the ES and the TFM and the country level.

Country Review

The MTR will include review of EIF activities in selected countries, guided by the same criteria as the overall MTR (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability and looking at coordination with/links to other TRA in the countries). This will entail consultation and interviews with selected members of the EIF governance structure at the country level, including donor facilitator and relevant ES/TFM staff, providing an in- depth analysis of project activities, results obtained or likely to be obtained in selected EIF beneficiary countries. The validated logical framework at the programme and country levels, including agreed outcomes and indicators, and the baseline data will be used as essential building blocks.

Criteria for selecting of countries

The selection of countries (maximum of ten countries) will be based on desk reviews and influenced by the stage of implementation of the projects, geographic distribution, different development factors, such as land- locked economies or small island developing states. These will include:

- Countries in which project implementation is on target or close to target, both in substantive/normative terms and in financial terms and identified with high potential of success in the portfolio review;
- Countries with implementation difficulties or longer delays in implementation and that may be considered as "at risk" projects;
- Countries that may fall between the above two categories;
- Countries that are slow to access the EIF trust fund; and
- In addition, cases may be selected based on regional distribution and languages.

The proposed selection of countries for the country case studies will be included in the inception report, clearly documenting the criteria for this proposed selection.

MTR QUESTIONS

As objectively and methodically as possible, the MTR will address questions that determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, potential impact and sustainability of the EIF. Although the consultants will define the precise questions through the inception report, indicative evaluation questions that the MTR team should use as a starting point are set out below.

Relevance

- How relevant is the EIF to the contemporary context of the AfT Initiative in LDCs?
- To what extent have new multilateral and bilateral trade initiatives impacted the relevance of the EIF to LDCs?

- To what extent is the EIF relevant to the needs of LDCs and what changes need to be made to ensure its continued relevance?

Efficiency

- To what extent has the implementation of the EIF made effective use of time and resources toward achieving results?
- What factors are affecting timely delivery? What changes at a programme and project level could be made to improve delivery?
- Is EIF implementation supported by sufficient staffing resources in the ES and TFM?
- How has the TFM maximized the efficient use of EIF resources, and how can this be further enhanced in the future?
- What significant financial amendments have been made during EIF implementation and to what extent was value for money taken into account in making such amendments?
- Has management of the EIF (through the EIF Governance structure) been responsive to changing needs? If not, why not, and how can this be remedied in future?
- What are the key risks to the EIF achieving its objectives? Are risks managed appropriately through EIF implementation?

Effectiveness

- To what extent are EIF objectives being achieved? What changes need to be made to ensure that EIF objectives are met?
- What role have external factors played?
- Is an M&E system in place and how effective is it in measuring progress towards achieving EIF objectives?

Potential impact

- How likely is it that the EIF will make significant contribution to the overall national goal of economic growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction, and to the broader and longer- term goal of global trade integration of LDCs?
- Can observed changes (capacities, institutions, etc.) at country level be linked to the contribution of the EIF?
- Can any unintended positive or negative effects be observed as a consequence of the EIF?

Sustainability

- How effective have LDCs been in establishing national ownership?
- Do LDCs have the capacity and resources to prepare an exit plan to ensure a proper hand- over to the national government and institutions after the EIF support ceases/ends?
- Are LDCs able, willing and committed to continue with the project?
- Are project results likely to be sustainable? Are there any differences in the sustainability of Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects?
- Has mainstreaming of trade into strategies been implemented but not followed up with concrete action and resources?
- What actions could be taken to increase the likelihood that the EIF will be sustainable?

The consultants are encouraged to adopt the scope and flexibility necessary for developing thematic areas and questions to be presented in the inception report, in collaboration with the ES/TFM. For instance, in the area of programme delivery, there may be aspects of the programme that are not working well and where the whole EIF management and governance structure wish to gain more insight. Equally, there may be a desire to examine a subset of measures, qualitative themes or particular implementation issues in some detail. The consultants are also encouraged to examine cross- cutting issues not covered in the above questions, including gender equality, in the context of EIF implementation. The questions should also

examine implications for any future programming and the extent to which changes in programme strategy and delivery will be required in order to maximize the global trade integration of EIF beneficiary countries. Taking into account the large constituencies of the EIF programme at both global and country level, the consultants are required to elaborate questionnaires to be sent to different focus groups involved in the EIF process.

OVERVIEW OF TASKS

1. Develop an inception report that would include the following elements:
 - Objectives and scope of the review.
 - Description and justification of proposed methodology.
 - Key stakeholders to be consulted/interviewed in the review process.
 - Review questions.
 - Issues to be studied at the three levels (global (programme), country level and the intersection between the two) and, proposed structure of the final MTR report
 - Plan of work.
 - Timetable.
 - Reporting.
 - Annexes.
2. Review published and unpublished EIF materials, including proceedings of EIF meetings, workshops, conferences, capacity- development modules and reports (see annex 1 for list of documents);
3. Review programme logical frameworks, including agreed outcomes and indicators, and the baseline data as essential building blocks;
4. Conduct a desk review of the portfolio of all EIF projects (including pre- DTIS, DTIS, Tier 1 and Tier 2) where implementation may have begun;
5. Conduct consultation meetings and interviews with selected members of the EIF governance structure, partner agencies and representatives of EIF- supported LDCs.
6. Undertake field visits to a maximum of ten countries for case studies and an in- depth analysis of project delivery and management;
7. Present a mid- term progress report to the EIF Board so progress and quality of the MTR is discussed.
8. Conduct overall analytical work of the MTR to develop and write a draft final report covering programme management and delivery, best practice, lessons learned and recommendations for delivering EIF activities in a results- based management approach;
9. Present the draft final report to the EIF Board and stakeholders for comments; and
10. Revise and finalize the MTR report.

These tasks are indicative for understanding the MTR. They will be adjusted and elaborated in the consultants' inception report and as agreed upon by the EIF Board.

MANAGING THE MTR

Role of the EIF Board

As the decision- making body for operation and financial oversight and policy direction, the EIF Board has overall responsibility for the MTR. The consultants will report directly to the Board for overall direction on the substance and content of evaluation. The EIF Board will advise on the context and content of the MTR, and oversee the work of the consultants. Oversight will take place through: Board approval of the Inception Report, including the evaluation questions; commenting on the midterm report in order to assess progress against the assignment; receipt of

the final draft Review report; and submission of comments to the consultants on the final draft Review report.

Role of the Executive Secretariat

The MTR will be task- managed by the Executive Secretariat in collaboration with the TFM. This role includes managing the administrative aspects of the MTR process: ensuring the consultants deliver agreed outputs by the given timelines; following up with consultants to ensure the Board's instructions/views/comments are acted upon; acting as the main point of contact for the consultants for providing background information, documents, contacts and if necessary, coordinating trips, setting up meetings as required and other logistical support. The ES will also prepare for Board discussions of the MTR process.

TIME- FRAME AND MTR DELIVERABLES

Time- frame

The MTR is projected for a period of five months starting in July 2012 and ending in November 2012.

MTR deliverables

The MTR deliverables should include:

- Inception report (13 July 2012);
- Mid- term progress update (30 August 2012);
- Draft final report for discussion (17 October 2012);
- Final report(15 November 2012);

In order to ensure that the final report considers the views of the parties concerned and is properly understood, it is required that:

- A mid- term progress update to verify progress and quality of the MTR be submitted to the EIF Board through the ES by the end of August 2012.
- The draft report, especially the main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned of the review be presented to, and discussed with the EIF Board through the ES and EIF stakeholders in October 2012;
- Comments made by all parties during the presentation and discussion be duly considered for incorporation into the final report;
- The consultants keep track of the comments during the reporting period and prepare a matrix of all comments and solutions applied as an annex to the final report;
- It is essential that the final report is succinct and focuses on analysis rather than lengthy descriptions. It should provide clear, justified conclusions and recommendations and be written in a clear and understandable manner; and
- The final report be submitted electronically to the EIF Board through the Executive Secretariat within two weeks after the presentation and after receiving all comments.

MTR CONSULTANCY TEAM AND COMPETENCIES

The MTR will require the services of a team of consultants, led a by a distinguished and experienced team leader. The team will have the following experience and skills:

- Extensive M&E experience of trade- related issues and programmes in the area of AfT programming;
- In- depth knowledge of programme formulation, delivery and coordination processes and issues;
- Proven experience with, and institutional knowledge of, multi- donor and multi- country programming;
- In- depth understanding of the situations of LDCs in relation to AfT, and in relation to programme implementation;

- In- depth knowledge of inter- agency mechanism at field level;
- Experience in participatory approaches to data collection, including consultation, in-depth interviews and focus group discussion involving a wide range of organizations and participants;
- Proven experience in high- level data and information analysis techniques; and
- Excellent writing and communication skills in English and working level in French for field visits and interviews are essential; Portuguese is an advantage.

Team Leader

In accordance with these TOR and the inception report (to be produced by the winning team), the Team Leader, a senior AfT expert with significant experience in M&E and working with LDCs, will be responsible for the overall conduct of the evaluation, including representing the MTR team in meetings and submitting/presenting all MTR deliverables in a timely manner. He/she will have the following skills:

- Extensive monitoring and evaluation expertise and experience (at least 15 years) including leading global programme evaluations;
- Evaluation experience in AfT contexts and familiarity with AfT programme issues;
- Extensive experience working with and in LDCs, whether in M&E or programme management/implementation;
- Knowledge of institutional issues related to development programming (including funding and administration and the role of the donors, UN agencies and partnerships);
- Experience working with multi- donor/partner/beneficiary initiatives, including understanding of the political and diplomatic dimensions, and managing a complex evaluation process in that context; and
- Team leadership and management, interpersonal/communication skills.

Team Member(s)

- Knowledge in trade and development issues of LDCs, including different programmes of support to LDCs trade and development agenda at global, regional and country levels;
- Strong data collection skills with focus on trade issues;
- Demonstrated skill in conducting evaluations of AfT and/or development programmes in LDCs;
- Considerable and demonstrated experience working with and in LDCs in programme management and implementation;
- English and French language skills essential; Portuguese is an advantage;
- Team work and interpersonal communication skills and strong commitment to undertake the MTR; and
- The team composition should adequately reflect the constituencies of the EIF.

SUBMITTING PROPOSAL SELECTION PROCESS

Please refer to the instructions set forth in the letter of invitation part I. A Administrative procedure- Submissions of proposals.

Technical proposals should contain the following elements:

- Introduction (which must demonstrate a clear understanding of the EIF and the general expectations of the MTR);

- Interpretation and understanding of the detailed requirements of the MTR (which must demonstrate a clear understanding of the ToR);
- Proposed approach and methodology for the MTR, focusing on all identified objectives, including the “non-tangible” objective of promoting accountability, lesson-learning, feedback and knowledge-sharing among EIF stakeholders (taking into account that details will only be worked out during the inception state for documentation in the inception report) ;
- proposed workplan for the MTR (start and end dates; proposed dates for important meetings, processes and deliverables; division of days per task and consultant);
- Detailed profile of the service provider, highlighting expertise and experience relevant to the MTR of the EIF (statement of capability);
- Details of the proposed team for the MTR and the division of roles, responsibilities (short profiles highlighting relevant qualifications, expertise and experience – Full CVs should be attached as annexes).

After the selection of the consultants, they will be briefed and asked to provide an *inception report* within two weeks of signing the contract. The *inception report* should provide information on the precise objectives of the MTR, the scope, audiences and methodology of the MTR. The inception report will then be reviewed by the ES/TFM and submitted for approval by the Board. Once agreement has been reached on the inception report, the MTR team will be asked to begin its implementation.

Conflict of Interest

The firm leading the MTR will be independent and will respect ethical standards with respect to conflict of interest, confidentiality and transparency. Consultants or consulting firms having worked with the EIF programme are kindly requested not to submit a proposal. This is applicable regardless of whether the work was on M&E, project development or other strategic activities.

Annex 1

List of Documents for the MTR

- 1 UNOPS bid
- 2 ES and TFM progress reports to the Board
- 3 Capacity Assessment Reports (as submitted to the EIF Board)
- 4 Sampling of TFM Mission Reports (Start- up facilitation phase, supervision)
- 5 EIF TFM financial reports, pledges
- 6 Sample of reports received from LDCs (financial, narrative, audit reports)
- 7 Template legal agreement with LDCs and sample agreement and annexes
- 8 Partnership agreements with EIF agencies
- 9 Template contribution agreement and standard provisions with EIF donors
- 10 EIF Compendium and new EIF policies (i.e. on M&E, Tier 1 extension, Feasibility studies,
- 12 EIF Board meeting minutes
- 13 EIF Steering Committee meeting minutes
- 14 ES Recommendations Memoranda
- 16 Other evaluation reports (i.e. Norad, 2003 Evaluation, UNDP IF Reports - overall and country specific)
- 17 Approved EIF project documents (Pre- DTIS, Tier 1, Tier2, DTIS and DTIS updates)
- 18 DTIS/DTISU RELATED DOCUMENTATION
- 19 EIF Workshop reports
- 20 ES Mission reports/Back to Office Reports

- 21 ES Communications documents (EIF press releases, external press releases and articles, brochures, Country Profiles, ES Statements, and Presentations etc.)
- 22 Official statements by LDCs/Donors on EIF as part of international meetings (i.e. LDC meetings, Ministerial meetings, etc)
- 23 Current Country TIER 1 logframes
- 24 EIF Strategic Action Plan
- 25 EIF Board Chairman's report to the EIF Steering Committee
- 26 Aft EIF case stories, evaluations from EIF regional workshops, EIF references in Istanbul Programme of Action and Political Declaration as well as Ministerial Decisions from MC8
- 27 EIF briefings for Committee on Trade and Development, LDC sub- committee, WTO annual reports, donor and agency and LDC bilateral meeting briefs (2010- 2012)
- 28 EIF film ('Trade works' – short and long versions)
- 29 EIF concept notes, programme, communiqués and EIF statements of high- level events including UN LDC- IV, Aft Global Review, MC8, UNCTAD XIII (and EIF gallery and LDC trade exhibition info)
- 30 EIF Trading Stories material under production: 8 country book and film chapters – including audio- visual interviews with key stakeholders (early versions to follow in coming months)
- 31 Draft EIF communications strategy; pilot EIF communications training outline and training materials including sample responses on EIF country communications strategies
- 32 Sample of EIF communications strategies developed; sample of EIF country publications (newsletters, trade magazines, brochures, websites); sample of EIF communications survey responses)
- 33 six EIF country profiles, EIF global and national press releases (including samples of national media coverage of EIF – print and audio- visual), articles, EIF brochures and flyers
- 34 Consultancy reports
- 35 M&E Small Group reports
- 36 EIF website (contains overview and useful links to key documents)
- 37 Capacity building documents
- 38 Documents relating to partnership activities
- 39 Task force report
- 40 A Situation Report of the Enhance Integrated Framework Second Year of Operation

ANNEX 2: PROCESS, INPUTS AND METHODS

Date/s	Activity
12-13 July	Mission to Geneva by the Team Leader and UK based members of the team – initial meetings with around 30 stakeholders in Geneva
13 July	Submission of the inception report to EIF ES
27 July	Presentation of the Inception Report to the EIF Board by the Team Leader via videoconference
16 th August	Comments on the Evaluation Matrix from the LDC group, responding and reporting on action taken on comments
27 August – 1 September 2012	<p>August mission to Geneva included a full Team meeting of the seven members of the team, semi-structured interviews/meetings at programme level (with Chair, LDC Group (25 participating), available donor representatives (7 participating), and available agency representatives.</p> <p>Opportunity to elaborate on team approach and draw out special interests and priorities for the Review from different perspectives. Intensive interviews with ES and TFM executives and staff on overall programme and the status and key developments in individual country programmes.</p> <p>Clarifying with ES and TFM base of key programme facts, milestones, and financial reporting and management systems.</p> <p>Meeting with the Board Chair to update on progress.</p> <p>Preparation and submission of the Mid-Term progress update, submission to the EIF ES on 30th August.</p>
27 August – 1 September 2012	Preparation and rapid test of country interview guide. Applying sequence and content of the Working Matrix
30 th August	Submission of Mid-Term Progress Update
3 rd September	Country missions to Senegal and Cape Verde
	Rapid test and conduct of surveys for donors, non case study countries and Board members
w/c 10 th September	Country missions: Zambia, Rwanda
w/c 17 th September	Country missions: Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands
17 th September – 5 th October	<p>Survey to non case study countries:</p> <p>Internal test of the survey: 14 – 18th September</p> <p>17th September – letter sent by EIF ES to introduce the team and the survey</p> <p>Date invitation sent: 20th September</p> <p>Sent to all non case study countries NIU coordinators (a total of 140 people for 34 countries) on 20th September. These were asked to forward on the message to all EIF country-specific stakeholders.</p> <p>Follow-up steps</p>

Date/s	Activity
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These were sent a reminder on 26th September asking them to complete the survey by 28th September • A final reminder was sent on the 28th September asking respondents to complete their surveys by the 3rd October • 124 responses were received by from 18 countries. Of these 54 completed the survey (43.5%)
21 st September - 4 th October	Prepare summary update and analysis of the wider context of aid for trade and trade-related technical assistance with specific reference to the implications for LDCs and for the EIF
w/c 24 th September	Country missions: Togo, Uganda
21 st September – 5 th October	<p>The survey to donors was sent out on the 21st September and respondents were asked to complete it by 5th October. 73 people were emailed.</p> <p>A reminder was sent out on 26th October with the same deadline, and the EIF Donor Coordinator subsequently solicited donor responses personally.</p> <p>A final reminder was sent by the MTR team on the 8th October extending the deadline to 9th October.</p> <p>The survey had 15 respondents representing 11 different donors. Of these, 11 respondents completed the survey. (73.33%)</p>
25 th September – 5 th October 2012	<p>Survey to Board Members (past and present Board members, including core agencies) was emailed on the 25th September, and respondents were asked to complete it by 5th October. A reminder was sent on the 28th September.</p> <p>14 responses received by deadline (2 current or previous LDC representatives 3 current or previous core agency representatives, 4 current or previous donor representatives, Board Chair, 2 ex officio members, 1 observer, 2 others). All respondents completed the on-line survey.</p> <p>Further telephone interviews were organised with 6 countries, and three agencies were interviewed in Geneva.</p>
24-28 September 2012	The team performed a basic portfolio analysis, pulling together the facts from the country checklists and team inputs from the Aug briefings into a short profile paper on the overall portfolio. The analysis aimed at bringing out facts to see emerging patterns in the time taken to reach different milestones.
w/c 1 st October 2012	Country missions: Chad, Lao PDR
1-3 October 2012	Two team members undertook a mission to Geneva, which allowed the team to undertake structured interviews with the EIF ES and TFM staff, donors, agencies and the Board chair. The mission also included a briefing for the Steering Committee Chair.
w/c 3 Oct 2012	Non case study countries: Aggregate the survey responses and ratings into an overall quantitative report and assemble qualitative inputs (comments, questions, etc.) from these surveys identifying sources and patterns as possible
w/c 5 Oct 2012	Set up and complete interviews with Board members on the basis of their survey responses

Date/s	Activity
w/c 3 Oct 2012	Country case study reports: on a rolling basis, aggregate the survey responses and ratings from into an overall quantitative report and assemble qualitative inputs (comments, questions, etc.) from these surveys identifying sources and patterns as possible
w/c 5 Oct 2012	Donor responses: Aggregation of the survey responses and ratings into an overall quantitative report and assemble qualitative inputs (comments, questions, etc.) from these surveys identifying sources and patterns as possible
w/c 8 th October	Country mission: Bangladesh
8-12 October	Telephone interviews with Board members (three donors and three LDC representatives)
17 th October 2012	Submission of the Draft Mid-Term Review report

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

LDC Group			
Afghanistan	Safir Sahor	Lesotho	Mpho Masupha
Afghanistan	Ashrat Zaki	Madagascar	Julien Rakotomalala
Bangladesh	Nzarul Islan	Madagascar	Sadiah Razafimanbimby
Bhutan	Tenzine Chode	Mali	Checik Omar Camara
Burkina Faso	Sawadogo Fotimata	Mauritania	Mohamed el Mostafa
CAR	Delalune Kobo	Mauritania	Keita Moharedou
CAR	Gan-Sele Gbadin	Mozambique	Olga Mungreambe
CAR	Jacques Désiré Mboligassie	Nepal	Toya Narayan Gyawali
Chad	M Djimasbeye Ndade	Nepal	Achyut Raj Sharma
Ethiopia	Azanaw T Abreha	Samoa	Justin Lima
Haiti	Marie Helene Calvin	Samoa	Henry Tunupopo
Haiti	Amb. Georges Barberousse	Sudan	Mohammed Elmutaz Ismaiel
ITTC	Vilyaphone Xindarong	Togo	Petchezi Ensohanan
ITTC	Zongo Emmanuel	Uganda	Peter Elyetu Elimu
Lao PDR	Bountheung Douangsavanh	Yemen	Abdu Alhudaifi
Lesotho	Amb. Mothae Maruping	Zambia	Lillian Bwalye

Donor representatives			
Australia	Marcus Bartley Johns	Germany	Annette Chammas
Belgium	Marie-Charlotte Annez	Norway	Benedicte Fleischer
Canada	Sarah Pye	Saudi Arabia	Fahad al Nawaiser
Denmark	Sophie Hermann Flensburg	Switzerland	Christian Sieber
European Union	Lars Gronvald	UK	Kebur Azabaha
Finland	Amb. Päivi Kairamo-Hella	UK	Adaeze Igboemeka
Finland	Sari Laaksonen	UK	Edward Brown (former)
Finland	Matti Nissinen	USAID	Kim Easter

EIF Executive Secretariat, Trust Fund Manager and Core Agencies

Bernhard Schlacter	Executive Director	TFM / UNOPS
Jean-François Delteil	Programme Officer	TFM / UNOPS
Clara Mathieu Gotch	TFM Legal Officer	TFM / UNOPS
Mohammad Nasser	Finance Officer	TFM / UNOPS
Eric-Olivier Benoliel	Regional Portfolio Manager	TFM / UNOPS
Yosra Ben Mbarek	Portfolio Assistant	TFM / UNOPS
Dorothy Tembo	Executive Director	EIF ES
Christiane Kraus	Chief Coordinator,	EIF ES
James Edwin	M&E Coordinator	EIF ES
Mbaye Ndiaye	Coordinator	EIF ES
Jonathan Werner	Coordinator	EIF ES
Hang T.T. Tran	Coordinator	EIF ES
Simon Hess	Coordinator	EIF ES
Elena Immambocus	Trade and Communications Advisor	EIF ES
Justine Namara	Communications Officer	EIF ES
Constanze Schulz	Secretary	EIF ES
Liliana Núñez Giordano	Secretary	EIF ES
Francesco Geoffroy	Senior adviser	ITC
Tobias Schiedermaier	Associate Expert, Resources and Partnerships	ITC
Stefano Inama	OIC for EIF	UNCTAD
Mombert Hoppe	Economist	World Bank
Selina Jackson	Special representative to the WTO and UN	World Bank
Annet Blank	Head of LDC Unit	WTO
Michael Roberts	Aid for Trade Coordinator	WTO

Country case study: Bangladesh

Mr. Amitava Chakraborty	Director General	WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce
Mr. Mohammad Mashooqur Rahman Sikder	Assistant Director	WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce
Mr. Zakir Hossain	Deputy Director	WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce
Mr. Ghulam Muhammed Quader	Hon'ble Minister for Commerce	Ministry of Commerce
Mr. Zahid Hussain	Senior Economist	The World Bank
Mr. Nadeem Rizwan	Economic analyst	The World Bank
Ms. Rubayat Jesmin	Senior Program Officer	Economic development and TRTA EUD
J-C Malongo	Attache	PSD and Trade, EUD
AKM Fazlur Rahman	Secretary	FBCCI
Md. Mazibur Rahman	Joint Secretary (International Organization)	FBCCI
Md. Alamgir Siddiquee	Deputy Director	Export Promotion Bureau(EPB)
Mr. Salahuddin Mahmud	Director General	Export Promotion Bureau(EPB)
Mr. Shubhashish Bose	Vice Chairman(VC)	Export Promotion Bureau(EPB)
Mr. Sanjay Kathuria		World Bank, Washington DC
Meriam Malouche		World Bank, Washington DC
Dr. Mostafa Abid Khan	Member	Bangladesh Tariff Commission
Md. Azharul Haque	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Agriculture
Dr. Narayan Chadra Nath	Research Fellow	Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies(BIDS)
Dr. Md. Mozibur Rahman	CEO	Bangladesh Institute of Foreign Trade(BFTI)
Mr. Md. Ghulam Hussain	Secretary	Ministry of Commerce

Country case study: Chad

Abakar Ousmane Sougui	International Trade Expert	EIF NIU (SMORCIT)
Adoumbe Maoura	M&E Specialist	EIF NIU
Ahmat Ali Moussa	Président	Fédération nationale des bouchers du Tchad(FNBT)
Alamine Moukhtar	Sécretaire general	L'association tchadienne pour la promotion de la gomme arabique (ATPGA)
Alkali Gassi	Private Sector	L'association tchadienne pour la filière cuir (ATFC)
Amine Adame	Controleur	L'association tchadienne pour la promotion de la gomme arabique (ATPGA)
Béyalem Ndadjiba	Président	L'association tchadienne pour la filière cuir (ATFC)

Boubacar Mbodj	Conseiller en Commerce	NIU/ITA (UNOPS)
Daniel Grotino	Attache: Secteur Sociaux. Bonne Gouvernance et Economie	EU
DEDE Hassan Adoum	Bénéficiaire	Association Chaddine de la Filiere Cuire (AFTC)
Djamal Mahamat Sali	NSC	Ministry of Economic Planning and International Cooperation
Djimadoumbaye Madibay	EIF Focal Point	Ministry of Trade
Dr Vet. Ramadane Ouaddai	Consultant	La fédération nationale des bouchers du Tchad (FNBT)
Ginnette Mondongou Camara	Economic Advisor (Donor Facilitator)	UNDP
Gonga Koyang Féouda	Directeur des etudes	la legislation et des statistiques au Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie (MCI)
Izadine Ali	NSC	CCIAMA
Luisa Bernal	Agency	UNDP
Madjiadoum Mbaigoubet	Finance Officer	EIF
Madjinessem Marie-Anne	Admin Assistant/Secretary	EIF
Mahamat Hamid	Trésorier adjoint	L'association tchadienne pour la promotion de la gomme arabique(ATPGA)
Mahamat Touka Saleh	Coordinator	EIF
Mara Christian	NSC	CCIAMA
Moudalbaye N. Appoline	NSC	L'Association des femmes chef d'entreprise
Nguirade Lamian	Conseiller	La federation nationale des bouchers du Tchad (FNBT)
Renaud Dinguemnaial	NSC	PATRONAT (formerly with CCIAMA)
Tchorouma Matalama	NSC	DCCP
Tedebaye Titimbaye	NSC	Chef de division
Youssef Tahirou Djoraou	Private Sector	Association de Boucher (SCCL)

Country case study: Cape Verde

Filomena Victoria Fialho	EIF Focal Point	General Director of Industry and Trade (GDIT)
Georgina Benrós de Melho	PIU Coordinator	
Frank Hess	Councillor	EU Delegation
Dr. Mário Lúcio Sousa	Minister	Minister of Culture
Jose Duarte	President and CEO	Cape Verde Investments
Francisco Lima Fortes	Executive Board member	Agency for Entrepreneurial Development & Innovation
Idalina Freire		Cape Verde Women Organisation (OMCV)

Avelino Bonifacio Lopes	Manager	IAO (former Minister of Economy)
Paulo Fortes	Lecturer and journalist	University of Cabo Verde
Luciano Dias de Fonseca	Resident Representative	FAO
Petra Lantz	Resident Representative	UNDP
Heloisa Marone	Economist	UNDP
Narjess Saidana	Economist	UNDP
Rui Levy		UNIDO
National Steering Committee – Public sector representatives (Foreign Affairs, Centre for Strategic Policies at the Prime Minister’s Office, Customs, Ministry of Rural Development & the General Director of Industry and Trade, who chairs the Committee)		
Trade Association of the Northern of Santiago Island -ACAISA, Assomada		

Country case study: Lao PDR

Khemmani Pholsena	Focal Point-	Vice Minister, MOIC
Phouvieng Phongsa	Director of ODA Division/NIU	Planning and Cooperation Department/NIU, MOIC
Sengphanomchone Inthasane	NIU project staff	Planning and Cooperation Department, MOIC
Vilayvanh Vounleuth	M&E Focal Point – NIU government staff	Planning and Cooperation Department, MOIC
Suripaphone Meys	NIU project staff	NIU
Somsanith Ninthavong	Head of Finance	NIU
Latthana Douangboupaha	Director of Trade Facilitation Division	Department of Import and Export, MOIC Trade Portal project funded by TDF
Bounpone Bouapheng	Deputy Director General	Department for Standardization and Metrology (DSM) - Ministry of Science and Technology - Tier 2 potential
Ms. Nistth	Tier 2 potential	DSM
Amphaphone Thongsawath	Procurement Officer	NIU
Sengxay Phousinghoa	Lead Author of DTIS update/PSD Advisor	NIU
Sirisamphanh Vorachith	Director General	Department of Planning and Cooperation, MOIC
Borivon Phafong	Director EIF observer	Garment Skills Development Center (TDF project, coordinated by NIU)
Frank Caussin	International Project Coordinator EIF observer	“Enhancing sustainable tourism, clean production and export capacity in Lao PDR” Project, funded by Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity (UN)
Konesawang Nghardsaysone	EIF observer/Trade Analyst	WB
Khankeo Moonvong	Rep of Donor Facilitator	EU
Phanthakone Champasith	Rep of former Donor Facilitator	Development Cooperation Section, AusAID

Arounyadeth Rasphone	EIF's capacity building beneficiary, EIF's stakeholder in MPI	Aid Effectiveness Division, Department of International Cooperation, MPI
Buavanh Vilavong	EIF's capacity building beneficiary, in charge of WTO Accession	Multilateral Trade Policy Division, Foreign Trade Policy Department, MOIC
Armin Hofmann	TDF's donor/NIU's partner	Sustainable Economic Development, GIZ
Richard Record	Trade Specialist	WB
Litdaphone Silavong	EIF Coordinator	NIU

Country case study: Mozambique

Calado da Silva	EIF Focal Point	Ministry of Industry and Trade
Agonias Antonio Macia	Trade expert	Ministry of Industry and Trade
Stefan Grammling	Trade Advisor	GIZ
Myriam Sekkat	Private Sector Specialist	EU Delegation
Carlos Rafa Mate	Private Sector Specialist	Norwegian Embassy
Michael Tröster	Donor facilitator	German Embassy
Rosário Marapusse	Task Manager	USAID/SPEED Project
Jaime Comiche	Head of operations in country	UNIDO
John McMahan	Advisor	USAID
Victorino Xavier	Senior Advisor	Ministry of Commerce
Sr Amilcar	Senior Advisor	Ministry of Planning
Private sector working group (hosted by Norwegian Embassy)		

Country case study: Rwanda

François Kanimba	Minister	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Emmanuel Hategeka	Permanent Secretary and EIF Focal Point	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Maximilien Usengumuremyi	M&E Expert, SPIU	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Stevenson Nzaramba	Sector Specialist Trade Mainstreaming & Infrastructure Development, SPIU	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Leonard Mungarulire	Program Manager, Trade and Investment Climate, SPIU	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Jean Louis Uwitonze	Director General Planning, M&E	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Kaliza Karuretwa	Director General, Trade and Investment General Directorate	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Raphael Rurangwa	Director General of Planning and	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal

	Programme Coordination	Resources
Bob Mugisha	Sector Specialist, Project Management and Monitoring Unit	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Eusèbe Muhikira	Ag. Head, Trade and Manufacturing Department	Rwanda Development Board (RDB)
Ngamije Festo	Researcher	Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
Prudence Sebahizi	National Coordinator	Rwanda Civil Society Platform, East African Civil Society Organisations Forum (EACSOFF) Rwanda
Denis Mukama	Head of Research	Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)
Hashim Mulangwa	Private Sector Development Adviser	DFID
Rachel Perrin	Senior Economic Adviser	DFID
Peace Basemera	External Trade Unit	MINICOM
Christian Shingiro	Head of Poverty Reduction	UNDP
Evard Havugimana	Research Associate Strategy and Policy Unit	UNDP
Ngamije Festo	Researcher	IPAR

Country case study: Senegal

Cheikh Saadbouh Seck	Focal Point	Directeur du Commerce Extérieur
Mamadou Sarr	NIU Coordinator	Ministry of Trade
Phillip English	Private Sector Head	World Bank
Ibrahima Aïdara	Private Sector development	UNDP
Alain Pierre Bernard	Advisor	UNDP
Ousmane NDIAYE	Trade Specialist	Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière / Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances
Sandrine Beauchamp	Private Sector development	EU Delegation
Mata Sy Diallo	Ministre	Ministre du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat
Bonaventure Traoré	Regional portfolio manager	UNOPS
Sonia Varga	Trade Specialist	UNOPS
Baladi BA	Administration	UNOPS

Country case study: Sierra Leone

Dr. Richard Konteh	Minister	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Sanah Johnsen Mara	Permanent Secretary/Focal Point	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ahmed Akar Ahmed	Chief Director and Professional Head	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Abdul Kamara	Coordinator	NIU
Edison Borbor	Economist	NIU
Grace Macauley	Programme Assistant	NIU
Matilda Dumbuya	Finance Officer	NIU
Susan Kayonde	Trade Policy Analyst (Hubs and Spokes), Policy, Planning and Research Division	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Cecil J. Williams	General Manager	National Tourist Board Sierra Leone
Barba B. Fortune	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Tourism & Cultural Affairs
Cyrus P. Talati	Senior Economist	Africa Region, World Bank
Yusuf Bob Foday	Country Economist	World Bank Sierra Leone Office
John Paul Kaisam	National Technical Coordinator, West Africa Quality Programme	UNIDO
Patricia Cavanagh	Head of section – Economic, trade and regional cooperation	European Union
Mohamed Abchir	Deputy Country Director (Programmes)	UNDP
Benjamin Maturu	Economics Advisor	UNDP
Dr. Shamsu Mustapha	Consultant, Tier 1 Evaluation	Ecofin Consultants
Franklin Bendu	Senior Economist, Economic Policy and Research Unit	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Amadu Jogor Bah	Deputy Director	Sierra Leone Standards Bureau
Syl-Brians Kamara	Deputy Director	Environmental Protection Agency
Wilfred Fomakoni Martyn	Senior Environmental Health Officer	Ministry of Health and Sanitation
Admire S Ganda	Deputy Secretary	Ministry of Trade and Industry
Kadijatu Jalloh	Senior Fisheries Officer	Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Abu Whyte Fofanah	Executive Secretary	Sierra Leone Importers Association
Mark Mahmoud Kalokoh	Admin Officer	Civil Society Movement, Sierra Leone
Franklyn Williams	Deputy Director	Sierra Leone Business Forum
Daisy Scott-Boyle	Executive Secretary	Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
Juliet Anderson	President	Bambara Town Women Organisation

Victor M Rogers	Member	Every Child Matters Sierra Leone
Mornya Sillah	Member	Every Child Matters Sierra Leone
Haja Mariama Kamara	President	National Council of Muslim Women Organisation
Abdul H. B. Gillen	Western Area Secretary General	Men in Action

Country case study: Solomon Islands

Eoghan Walsh	Charge' d' Affaires	EU
Eric Johnson	Senior Operation Officer/Acting Rep	World Bank
Shiv Raj Bhatt	EIF Technincal Advisor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade
Robert Sisilo	Trade Negotiation Envoy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade
Leliana Daoana Firisua	Representative of private sector) in NSC	Chair SME Council (private sector)/Consulate of the State of Israel in SI
Hence Vaekesa (Heinz)	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration (MCILI)
Antonio Lee (Taiwaness original) - No report	Business Owner	SOLFISH Ltd.(private sector)
Francis Tsatsia	Director	Agriculture Quarantine Services (Ministry of Agriculture and Livelihoods - MAL)
Debbie Reschke	Senior Development Program Specialist	RAMSI Policy and Coordination Unit (AusAID)
Katherine Tuck	Senior Adviser	Australian Economic Reform Unit in Ministry of Finance and Treasury
Jack O'oi	Acting Director/Principal Trade Officer	Department of External Trade (DET), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade (MFAET)
Carlos Orton Romero	Chief Economic Officer	Economic Reform Unit, Ministry of Finance and Treasury (MoFT)
Haylay Keuto	Financial Officer	MOF
Mr. Barnabas Bago	Director (Ag) Economic and Productive Sector	Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination (MDPAC)
Ms. Tracey Choko	Assistant NIU Coordinator	DET, MFAET
Mr. George Tuti	Chief Trade Officer and NIU Coordinator	DET, MFAET
Mr. Damien Kylah	Trade Policy Analyst /ODI Fellow	DET, MFAET

Country case study: Togo

Abe Talime	Focal Point	Ministère du Commerce et de la Promotion du Secteur Privé
Abete Kibalou	NSC	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances/Direction de l'Economie
Alpha Amadou Diallo	Potential Donor	La Francophonie (BRAO)
Bamana Baroma M.	National Coordinator	EIF-NIU
Djenda Aristide	NSC	Union des ONG du Togo (UONGTO)
Gadagbui Kossi Zikpi	Finance Officer	EIF-NIU
Goka Kodjo Edem	NSC	Ministère de la Planification
Kiti Yao	M&E Expert	EIF-NIU
Kodjo Edèm Goka	NSC	Direction du Commerce Extérieur
Koka Bassolawoè	NSC	Direction du Commerce Intérieur et de la Concurrence
Kounoutchi Kokouvi	NSC	Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Elevage et de la Pêche
Mme Batale Véronique	Administrative Assistant	EIF-NIU
Mme SALLA M. Kanko	NSC	Ministère de l'industrie, de la zone franche et des Innovations technologiques
Monedji Jacob	NSC	Conseil National du Patronat
Nicolas Kazahdi	Principal economist	UNDP
Ouro-Sama Mohamed Sad	NSC	MCPSP
Simliwa Eglou	NSC	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances/Direction Générale des Douanes
Yakpey Comlan N.	NSC	Chambre du Commerce et d'Industrie du Togo

Country case study: Uganda

Alex Mukuluma	Programme Officer, TRACE II/EIF	EIF NIU, Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives
Alex Nakajjo	Operations Officer, Trade and Regional Integration and Donor facilitator	European Union Delegation, Uganda
Ambassador Julius Onen	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
Ambassador Patrick Mugoya	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities
Ambassador Nathan Erumba	Executive Director	SEATINI UGANDA (Civil Society Organisation concerned with Trade)
Amosi Tindyebwa	Lead Consultant, TRACE II Mid-term Review	High Tides Consultants Ltd
Brenda Kabasinguzi	Administrative Assistant, EIF NIU	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
Charles Mukama	Senior Veterinary Inspector	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and

		Fisheries
Grace Awulo	Director, Tourism Development	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities
Henry Nyakoojo	Programme Advisor TRACEII/EIF	EIF NIU
James Muganza	Jinja District Commercial Officer	Jinja District
Moses Ogwal	Director, Trade Development	Private Sector Foundation Uganda
Oscar Olaro	Industrial Officer	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
Peter Elimu	Focal Point, TRACE II/EIF	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
Rosemary Kobutangi	Commissioner, Tourism Development	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities
Silver Ojakol	Commissioner , External Trade	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
Warwick Thompson	Growth Team Coordinator, Private Sector Support and Development	Royal Danish Embassy
Wilson Kwamya	Assistant Resident Representative	UNDP

Country case study: Zambia

Ajesh Patel	Managing Director	Invesco Limited and Chairman Steering Committee
Akapelwa Imwiko	Chief Economist	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
Anastasia Mtonga Muleya	Entreprise Development Officer	Zambia Development Agency
Asuman Guloba	Economist	World Bank
Augustine Mkandawire	Senior Researcher	Policy Monitoring and Research Centre (PMRC)
Felix Kaitisha	Ag. Manager, Export Promotion	Zambia Development Authority
Glyne Michelo	Director, Export Promotion and Market Development	Zambia Development Agency
Healey Mweemba	Team Leader, EIF NIU	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Humphrey Katotoka	Economist	Zambia National Farmers Union
Janet Simwanza Chilufya	National Trade Expert , EIF NIU	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Johnstone Tembo	Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSRDP)/EIF Accountant	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Kelvin Kamayoyo	National Trade Expert , EIF NIU	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Martha Tembo	Administrative Assistant, EIF NIU Office	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Mateyo C. Kaluba	Chief Planner	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Moses Simemba	Export and Market Development Expert	Zambia Development Authority

Muyambango Nkwemu	Ag. Chief Economist, Domestic Trade	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Simon Ng'ona	Centre Coordinator	CUTS (Civil Society Organisation)
Suzanne Parkin	Private Sector Development Advisor	DFID
Miyoba Lubemba	Manager, Export Market Development	Zambia Development Authority
Ville Luukkanen	Counsellor-Economic Growth, Private Sector Development and Donor Facilitator	Finnish Embassy in Lusaka
Yamba Yamba (Dr).	Deputy Director for Livestock Development	Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock
Yvonne Chilese	Focal Point for the EIF and Ag. Director Foreign Trade	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

EIF documentation

- UNOPS bid
- ES and TFM progress reports to the Board
- Capacity Assessment Reports (as submitted to the EIF Board)
- Sampling of TFM Mission Reports (Start- up facilitation phase, supervision)
- EIF TFM financial reports, pledges
- Sample of reports received from LDCs (financial, narrative, audit reports)
- Template legal agreement with LDCs and sample agreement and annexes
- Partnership agreements with EIF agencies
- Template contribution agreement and standard provisions with EIF donors
- EIF Compendium and new EIF policies (i.e. on M&E, Tier extension, Feasibility studies,
- EIF Board meeting minutes
- EIF Steering Committee meeting minutes
- ES Recommendations Memoranda
- Other evaluation reports (i.e. Norad, Evaluation, UNDP IF Reports - overall and country specific)
- Approved EIF project documents (Pre- DTIS, Tier , Tier, DTIS and DTIS updates)
- DTIS/DTISU related documentation
- EIF Workshop reports
- ES Mission reports/Back to Office Reports
- ES Communications documents (EIF press releases, external press releases and articles, brochures, Country Profiles, ES Statements, and Presentations etc.)
- Official statements by LDCs/Donors on EIF as part of international meetings (i.e. LDC meetings, Ministerial meetings, etc.)
- Current Country Tier Logframes
- EIF Strategic Action Plan
- EIF Board Chairman's report to the EIF Steering Committee
- AfT EIF case stories, evaluations from EIF regional workshops, EIF references in Istanbul


- Programme of Action and Political Declaration as well as Ministerial Decisions from MC
- EIF briefings for Committee on Trade and Development, LDC sub- committee, WTO annual reports, donor and agency and LDC bilateral meeting briefs
- EIF film ('Trade works' – short and long versions)
- EIF concept notes, programme, communiqués and EIF statements of high- level events including UN LDC- IV, Aft Global Review, MC, UNCTAD XIII (and EIF gallery and LDC trade exhibition info)
- EIF Trading Stories material under production: country book and film chapters – including audio- visual interviews with key stakeholders (early versions to follow in coming months)
- Draft EIF communications strategy; pilot EIF communications training outline and training materials including sample responses on EIF country communications strategies
- Sample of EIF communications strategies developed; sample of EIF country publications (newsletters, trade magazines, brochures, websites); sample of EIF communications survey responses)
- Six EIF country profiles, EIF global and national press releases (including samples of national media coverage of EIF – print and audio- visual), articles, EIF brochures and flyers
- Consultancy reports
- M&E Small Group reports
- EIF website (contains overview and useful links to key documents)
- Capacity building documents
- Documents relating to partnership activities
- Task force report
- A Situation Report of the Enhance Integrated Framework Second Year of Operation

Other sources consulted

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ANNEX 5: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF EIF



Source: EIF Compendium, p. 20

ANNEX 6: ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL PROGRESSION IN PROJECT CYCLE

Region	Country	DTIS				Tier 1						Tier 2				DTIS update		
		Year of DTIS	IF vs EIF	DTIS (from pre-mission to validation)	Agency	Project proposal prepared to TAC1 appraisal	TAC 1 appraisal to submission to board	Submitted to board to approval	approval to first disbursement	to NIU in operation	Total	Project proposal prepared to TAC2 appraisal	TAC2 appraisal to submission to board	Submitted to board to approval	approval to first disbursement	Steps 1 to 3	DTIS update	Agency
Africa	Angola	2005	IF	22	WB						NA							
Africa	Benin	2004	IF	21	WB	11	4	1	0.5	1	17.5	*						
Africa	Burkina Faso	2005	IF	12	WB	7	1	1	6	7	22	6	2					
Africa	Burundi	2003	IF	Completed	WB	NA	2	0.5	5	1	NA	7	12	1	1	20	Ongoing	WB
Africa	Cape Verde	2007	IF	15	UNDP	5	2	1	1	2	11						Approved	GoCV
Africa	CAR	2006	IF	19	WB	2	4	2	2	0	10	12	6				Ongoing	UNDP
Africa	Chad	2004	IF	20	WB	5	7	1	1	2	16						Ongoing	UNDP
Africa	Comoros	2007	IF	11	UNDP	17	3	1	2	2	25						Planned	UNDP
Africa	Djibouti	2004	IF	Completed	UNDP	18	*	1	4	4	27							
Africa	DRC	2008	EIF	25	WB	20	7	1	2	0.5	30.5							
Africa	Eritrea			None							NA							
Africa	Ethiopia	2002	IF	12	WB						NA							
Africa	Guinea	2002	IF	12	WB	6	5	1	1	6	19							
Africa	Guinea Bissau	2008	EIF	19	WB	4	2	1	1	1	9							
Africa	Lesotho	2001	IF	16	WB	3	1	1	6	6	17	11					16	USAID
Africa	Liberia	2007	IF	12	WB	7	10	1	1	11	30						Ongoing	WB
Africa	Madagascar	2003	IF	Completed	WB						NA							
Africa	Malawi	2002-3	IF	Completed	WB	26	0.5	1	3	10	40.5						Ongoing	WB
Africa	Mali	2003	IF	20	WB	11	1	1	1	2	16	7	0.5	3	Pending	10.5		
Africa	Mauritania	2001	IF	Completed	WB						NA							

Africa	Mozambique	2003-4	IF	Completed	USAID	20	2	1	2	2	27								
Africa	Niger	2006	IF	14	WB	6	1	1	4	7	19								
Africa	Rwanda	2004	IF	15	WB	NA	12	1	1	2	NA						Validated	ITC	
Africa	São Tomé e Príncipe	2004	IF	19	WB						NA						Ongoing	WB	
Africa	Senegal	2002	IF	12	WB	3	4	1	2	1	11						Ongoing	UNCTAD	
Africa	Sierra Leone	2005	IF	16	WB	10	7	0.5	1	0.5	19	9	1	6	4		16	Ongoing	WB
Africa	South Sudan			None							NA								
Africa	Sudan	2006-8	IF	Completed	WB						NA								
Africa	Tanzania	2004	IF	16	WB						NA								
Africa	The Gambia	2006	IF	12	WB	17	1	1	1	1	21	6	4	1	3		11	Ongoing	UNCTAD
Africa	Togo	2008	EIF	24	WB	4	4	1	3	5	17								
Africa	Uganda	2005	IF	17	WB	NA	2	1	1	2	NA		1	1	7		9	Ongoing	WB
Africa	Zambia	2004	IF	14	WB	11	2	0.5	6	10	29.5							Ongoing	WB

Region	Country	Comments
Africa	Angola	
Africa	Benin	Prepared initially in 2008 - expected to be approved Sept 2012
Africa	Burkina Faso	Tier 2 submitted to board 6.7.2012
Africa	Burundi	During the period between TAC2 appraisal and submission to the Board changes to the document needed to be undertaken to satisfy the programmatic requirements from the ES and the fiduciary ones from TFM.
Africa	Cape Verde	Note that after graduation, Cape Verde had lost its IF/EIF beneficiary status; together with Samoa and Maldives, two other countries that were facing graduation, Cape Verde made a case to the EIF Board to extend EIF benefits for a limited time for graduated countries; this was approved by the EIF Board in June 2010.
Africa	CAR	
Africa	Chad	Chad is among the EIF beneficiary countries where an International Trade Adviser is recruited to assist the NIU team in the implementation of the project, with the view to building expertise and transferring skills. Since resources beyond the USD900,000 were required to fund the ITA, the ES and TFM had to engage the Board in consultations prior to submission of the project for Board approval. This explains that 6 months passed between TAC appraisal and submission to the Board.
Africa	Comoros	The appraisal raised important questions as to the implementation modalities of the project, i.e. whether it should be implemented by UNDP or by ITC or both. Resolving these issues is likely to take a while.
Africa	Djibouti	* 18mths for T1 proposal to submission
Africa	DRC	
Africa	Eritrea	
Africa	Ethiopia	In January '10 the Government had received - upon request - support for the development of a Tier 1 proposal, but commitment to the EIF has so far not been sufficient to bring the development of the proposal to closure. During regular consultations between the ES and Ethiopia, the ES has always offered full support, but such support has so far not been requested.
Africa	Guinea	
Africa	Guinea Bissau	Staffing, in particular selection for the Coordinator and experts, is a challenge in Guinea-Bissau owing to the limited human capacity in the country. A coordinator has been recruited in 2011, but experts have not yet been recruited; in the meantime, ministry staff seconded to the NIU are being trained by external local consultants.
Africa	Lesotho	
Africa	Liberia	
Africa	Madagascar	At a meeting between the Delegation from Madagascar and the ES/TFM at the margins of the December 2011 WTO Ministerial, steps to familiarize the stakeholders in Madagascar with the EIF and prepare for a DTISU were discussed.
Africa	Malawi	* 26mths for T1 proposal to submission
Africa	Mali	

Africa	Mauritania	Despite regular engagement with the Focal Point for the time being, the country seems not interested in seeking funding from the EIF. Mauritania is the only country in West Africa which has not submitted a Tier 1 project document.
Africa	Mozambique	Mozambique is one of the countries where capacity to implement the EIF Tier 1 project is low, and the Board has thus approved that for one year the NIU will be supported by an ITA; the recruitment for the ITA is under way, and the NIU will be selected upon his arrival so he can help in the selection.
Africa	Niger	A Tier 2 draft on Hide and Skins is being formulated by the NIU and is expected to be sent to the Executive Secretariat and the TFM in September 2012.
Africa	Rwanda	A DTIS Update was undertaken in co-operation with ITC (and fully funded by ITC) and validated in 2011.
Africa	São Tomé e Príncipe	
Africa	Senegal	
Africa	Sierra Leone	
Africa	South Sudan	South Sudan acceded to the EIF Programme on 13 June 2012 after technical Review undertaken by UNDP was approved by the EIF Board and the Government was notified. The ES will consult the Government of South Sudan to agree on period to organize a Familiarization mission in cooperation with the EIF Partner agencies.
Africa	Sudan	Sudan has not received funding yet from the EIF Programme. Following the creation of South Sudan, Sudan prepared a Tier 1 draft proposal which received extensive comments from the ES and TFM. A revised version was sent but still very weak. . There is no National Implementing Unit, only the Focal Point is appointed. The Focal point is working with the World Bank to prepare the TORs for a DTIS Update.
Africa	Tanzania	
Africa	The Gambia	
Africa	Togo	Following a competitive recruitment process according to national procedures, the NIU was established on 9.7.12.
Africa	Uganda	There have been significant delays in the DTIS Update process from the World Bank.
Africa	Zambia	Opening a bank account for the NIU took a long time and delayed the implementation of the project activities.

Region	Country	DTIS				Tier 1						Tier 2				DTIS update		
		Year of DTIS	IF vs EIF	DTIS (from pre-mission to validation)	Agency	Project proposal prepared to TAC1 appraisal	TAC 1 appraisal to submission to board	Submitted to board to board approval	approval to first disbursement	to NIU in operation	Total	Project proposal prepared to TAC2 appraisal	TAC2 appraisal to submission to board	Submitted to board to approval	approval to first disbursement	Steps 1 to 3	DTIS update	Agency
Asia	Afghanistan	2009	EIF	Ongoing	WB						NA							
Asia	Bangladesh	2011	EIF	Ongoing	WB						NA							
Asia	Bhutan	2011	EIF	8	UNDP						NA							
Asia	Cambodia	2001	IF	Completed	WB	11	0.5	1	8	7	27.5	6	2	1	Pending	9	12	GoC / UNDP
Asia	Lao PDR	2005	IF	12	WB	9	1	1	3	3	17						Ongoing	GoL
Asia	Maldives	2005	IF	16	UNDP	8	0.5	1	1	1	11.5	1						
Asia	Nepal	2002	IF	Completed	WB	10	3	0.5	0.5	0.5	14.5	4	7	1	1	12	Validated	UNDP / Others
Asia	Yemen	2003	IF	Completed	WB	7	19	0.5	1	4	31.5	24					Planned	UNDP
Caribbean	Haiti	2011	EIF	Ongoing	WB						NA							
Pacific	Kiribati		EIF	Ongoing	UNDP						NA							
Pacific	Samoa	2008	EIF	34	UNDP	3					NA							
Pacific	Solomon Islands	2008	IF	9	UNDP	13	3	1	1	NA	NA							
Pacific	Timor Leste	2008	EIF	29	WB						NA							
Pacific	Tuvalu	2008	IF	24	UNDP						NA							
Pacific	Vanuatu	2006	IF	13	UNDP						NA							

Region	Country	Comments
Asia	Afghanistan	Significant delays in pre-DTIS and DTIS, validation workshop scheduled for Q4 2012
Asia	Bangladesh	The MOU for the DTIS was signed on 19.5.11; first disbursement shortly thereafter. MOU must have been extended since the DTIS project is expected to close in Q1 2013 at the latest information.
Asia	Bhutan	ES and TFM received first draft of Tier 1 proposal from Bhutan in 7.2012
Asia	Cambodia	Cambodia completed a DTIS update ("CTIS") in 2007, but another update is planned
Asia	Lao PDR	A consultant funded by Trade Development Facility programme (WB) is working on a Tier 2 project proposal on Strengthening National Quality Infrastructure.
Asia	Maldives	
Asia	Nepal	Nepal had a NIU in place funded under the IFTF and after expiration of the IF funds a UNDP programme continued funding the NIU which was in place to continue with the EIF funding; a special feature of the Nepal programme is that the NIU is a mixture of EIF funded experts (in particular a National Programme Manager) and members of government entities delegated to NIU functions.
Asia	Yemen	Delay in TAC2 appraisal due to deteriorating security situation
Caribbean	Haiti	preliminary discussions for the DTIS had started prior to the earthquake in January '10 and were rekindled in late '10; concrete TOR and budget were submitted in March '11
Pacific	Kiribati	Despite having an almost complete DTIS, the Government of Kiribati has hesitated in carrying out its validation. The Government of Kiribati has expressed dissatisfaction over some of the assessments carried out in the DTIS. The process has been stalled, but the expectation is that within 2Q2012 the process is reinitiated with the DTIS validation. A proposal for Tier 1 process would follow thereafter.
Pacific	Samoa	
Pacific	Solomon Islands	Because of very limited capacity at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, the project proposal was submitted by the Government as is First Phase Tier 1 project for one year to build initial capacity at the NIU with the support of an International Technical Adviser. The main objective being among another coordination with and sensitization of relevant stakeholders to develop a multiyear Tier 1 project proposal. The proposal was developed and submitted to the ES and TFM and is being processed accordingly for submission to the EIF Board.
Pacific	Timor Leste	Comments on the first draft have been submitted by the ES and TFM and the country is currently working on a new draft; the ES and TFM are following up to provide support as necessary.
Pacific	Tuvalu	Tier 1 project proposal being formulated with the assistance of UNDP at the request of the Government
Pacific	Vanuatu	In 2010, Vanuatu had finalized a Tier 1 project proposal but shortly before its submission to the EIF Board, the Government decided to withdraw the proposal, probably because of the tension around the WTO Accession process. In April 2011, the Government decided to implement the project with UNDP as MIE and UNDP is now supporting the government in preparing a new proposal.

ANNEX 7: WHERE LDCs STAND VIS-À-VIS EIF GOAL AND PURPOSE

Note: This status report by the MTR Team does not imply any claims or assumptions about any causal role of the EIF, sharing the Logframe's caution that the EIF can only be one contributor among many to such longer-term higher level results.

Goal (EIF Compendium pg. 99)

G1. LDC Members of WTO who have completed the accession process

- 34 of the 47 EIF countries are members of the WTO, with Samoa and Vanuatu being the only two to complete the accession process in the last five years.
- Comoros, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sao Tome e Principe, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, and Yemen are currently in differing phases of the accession process.
- Eritrea, Kiribati, Timor Leste and Tuvalu are the only countries not currently members or engaged in talks.

G2. Per cent share of international non-oil trade from LDCs

According to UN COMTRADE figures, the share of global non-oil exports contributed by the EIF LDCs has shown a consistently positive trend over the last five years. It is important to note that non-oil exports include other natural resource exports (minerals, timber, etc.)

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
0.40%	0.43%	0.50%	0.52%	0.55%

G3. Poverty headcount

Data on poverty headcounts (proportion of population living on USD1.25 per day) is very limited and does not allow for meaningful comparisons across time.

G4. Per capita income growth

The IMF provides annual data on GDP per capita adjusted for PPP, allowing for a calculation of growth in per capita income. 2007 saw strong growth in per capita incomes across the regions, though slowing down (and in some cases turning negative) with the onset of the financial crisis. The vast majority of countries have seen a rebound in per capita income growth in 2011 compared to the baseline 2009.

Figure 1: Per Capita GDP Growth Rates for EIF countries (PPP, international \$)

	2007	2009	2011
Africa	6.1%	1.9%	4.9%
Asia	10.1%	6.1%	4.1%
Pacific	7.7%	-1.0%	6.1%

Caribbean (Haiti)	4.6%	-3.7% (2010)	6.1%
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Source: Author's calculations based on IMF data

G5. Gini coefficients

Data on inequality is relatively limited. Only a handful of the LDCs have any data from the last five years.

Purpose (EIF Compendium pg. 100)

P1. Value of non-oil goods traded

Using COMTRADE data on oil exports (HS 27: "Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation") and total exports allows for a calculation of non-oil exports. It is important to note that a) the measure of non-oil exports will include export of precious metals and other non-oil natural resources b) there are some data issues but findings are useful for broad trends. Comparing to the baseline (three-year average 2007-9), the LDCs increased their non-oil exports by an estimated USD 55 billion.

- The majority of African LDCs saw increased non-oil exports over the baseline, with several countries seeing significant jumps (e.g. Mauritania, Uganda, Zambia). Angola and Liberia saw relative steep declines though this may be due to data issues.
- The Asian LDCs performed well over the period, with Bangladesh increasing its non-oil exports by 61% over the baseline to USD 24 billion in 2012 (making it by far the largest non-oil exporter overall)
- The Pacific countries also saw a significant jump in non-oil exports. Haiti saw an increase of 31% over the baseline.

P2. Non-oil goods trade diversification

Two indices are available for assessing the diversification of a country's exports. The Concentration Index (i.e. Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index) measures the market share among products while the Diversification Index measures the structure of the country's exports against the world structure. For both indices, a value closer to 0 implies greater diversification and a value closer to 1 implies greater concentration. In general, LDCs' exports are significantly less diversified than the average for all developing countries. In terms of regions, African LDCs tend to be the least diversified.

P3. Logistics Performance Index

The World Bank's LPI measures logistics efficiency using data on customs clearance time, quality of transport infrastructure, price and availability of logistics services and the reliability of shipments. The index rates performance on a scale from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).

- In Africa, the average score increased by a mere 0.06 points from the 2007 LPI to the 2012 score reflecting mixed results, with 13 countries seeing a drop in their performance while the other 13 saw improvements (Niger and Tanzania improved their scores by an impressive 0.72 and 0.57, respectively)
- Of the Asian LDCs, all six countries except Nepal saw improvements in their scores (an average of 0.38 points). Afghanistan almost doubled its score from 1.21 in 2007 to 2.3 in 2012.

- Data is available only for the Solomon Islands in the Pacific region (improved by 0.33 points). Haiti saw a slight decline in its score over the five-year period.

P4. World Bank Doing Business – trading across borders

Many of the LDCs have significantly improved the environment for exporting firms. Looking at the “number of days to export” indicator.

- African LDCs reduced the number of days to export by an average of 12% compared to the baseline (an average drop of 4.3 days). Angola, Mali and Rwanda have shown the most significant improvements (dropping the number of days by 30 to 50% in the last several years). Senegal has the best track record, with only 11 days to export in 2011.
- Asian LDCs saw a drop in the average number of days of 9%. This region shows significant variation, with Afghanistan having 74 days while Cambodia having only 22 days according to the 2011 data.
- The Pacific countries perform relatively well overall, with an average of 23 days to export in 2011.
- Haiti has shown significant progress, reducing the number of days from the baseline of 41 to 33 days in 2011.

P5. Employment in non-traditional export sectors

Data availability limited.

P6. SMEs registered for import and export trades

Data availability limited.

ANNEX 8: A SNAPSHOT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AGAINST LOGFRAME OUTCOME INDICATORS

This annex looks to provide a snapshot of the evidence on the progress of EIF countries on the Outcome indicators identified in the Logframe. Our country case mission findings provide the evidence for the 12 case study countries and Executive Secretariat progress reports for non-case countries.

Indicator	Case study countries	Non-case countries
O1.1. Tier 1 'Support to NIAs' project completed or under implementation?		21 of 36 countries have Tier 1 projects under implementation or completed
Effective and influential programme mgt. structures, steering ctees., TACs	<u>NIA:</u>	
	Sufficiently active: 46%	
	Capable: 38%	
	Influential: 27%	
	<u>Steering committee/TAC:</u>	
	Active: 32%	
	Capable: 32%	
	Influential: 21%	
O1.2. Complete, up-to-date (less than three years old) validated DTIS Action Matrix?	Complete: 86%	10 of 36 countries and 6 more with updates ongoing
	Up-to-date: 41%	
	Reflection of country priorities: 89%	
O1.3. Level of capacity of the NIU to perform fiduciary programme management function for Tier 1 'Support to NIAs' project.	Satisfactory	
O1.4. Up-to-date (not older than five years) trade strategy in place?	In place: 60%	6 of 36 have up to date trade strategies (data availability)
	up-to-date: 48%	
O1.5. Quality trade strategy in place?	Of good quality: 47%	
O1.6. Quality trade strategy implemented.		5%
O1.7. Number of EIF-funded projects achieving the expected results.	Tier 1:	
	All: 14%	
	Tier 2:	
	All: 21%	
(As far as now supported by data)		
O2.1. Trade in PRSP and/or national development strategies.	On paper: 66%	15 of 36 countries
	In practise: 42%	
O2.2. Existence of productive sector strategies for key sectors, integrating the trade dimension.	On paper: 66%	9 of 36 countries
	In practise: 47%	
O2.3. Functioning public/private consultation mechanism.	Regular: 60%	12 of 36, though using rather generous definition
	Inclusive: 63%	
	Effective: 45%	

Indicator	Case study countries	Non-case countries
Number/trend of mechanisms for coordinated delivery?		
O3.1. Availability of an annual rolling implementation overview integrating all trade-related government and donor-supported activities (where applicable, identifying activities specifically addressing gender and the environment).	Yes: 74%	Only two countries identified
O3.2. Frequency of government and donor consultations on trade-related matters.	Sufficient: 53%	9 countries identified to hold trade-specific consultations, some monthly some quarterly some biannual.
	Productive: 21%	
O3.4. Number of countries with joint donor initiatives in the trade area (such as needs assessments; strategy formulations; programming; pooled funding; M&E; etc.).	Growing: 39%	Only one country identified
	Same: 38%	
(as far as now supported by data)		
Moved/moving to tier 2 projects (since?)	Approved	
	7 (by 7 August)	
	Pipeline (Oct 2012)	
	12 projects in the pipeline for approval in 2012 (in 11 countries)	
	18 projects in the pipeline for later (in 14 countries)	
O4.1. Number of EIF countries with implementation plan integrating DTIS/Action Matrix priorities and indicating financing needs to be met through ODA.	Yes: 34%	Only one country identified
Evidence of use? (Donor alignment)	More: 35%	
	Same 24%	
	Less: 8%	
Influence of DTIS Action Matrix	Very important: 22%	
	Important: 59%	
O4.2. Number of EIF countries where a government budget exists for the implementation of its trade strategy.	Yes: 23%	Only one country identified
	No: 59%	
O4.3. AfT flows to EIF countries.	DATA FROM ANNEX	
Number/trend of donor facilitators appointed. Evidence of effectiveness, e.g. more alignment of priorities.	Efforts of facilitators:	
	Very important: 24%	
	Important: 57%	
Plausible evidence of influence of EIF on planning and prioritization of AfT in partner cooperation plans?		
O4.4. Number and value of projects funded by donors related to the DTIS Action Matrix.		12 countries identified to have ongoing/upcoming projects using Action Matrix.

Indicator	Case study countries	Non-case countries
		(e.g. Comoros had 19 projects\$16m, Mali had 7 projects worth \$47m and Niger two projects worth \$60m)
Note: 4.3 & 4.4 to be tested for plausible evidence/ examples of “leveraging” from EIF (As far as now supported by data)		
Timing, efficiency and perceived usefulness of the processes of training for, working out, and using M&E frameworks (Project Logframes)	Very worthwhile: 28%	
	Worthwhile: 44%	
What monitoring and evaluation is underway or has been completed? (Reports) Possible indicators: key elements of the M&E system in place - data gathering instruments and frequency of data gathering, methods of analysis.	Tier 1 evaluations completed in 2 countries, underway in [x]	
	Systems in place: 48%	
Any evidence so far of the use of key insights emanating from M&E system?	Too early to say	

ANNEX 9: REVENUES AND BUDGET OF EIF

Table 9.1: EIF Trust Fund: Contributions and interest income

(as of June 30, 2012, USD)

Donor	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
IF UNDP Transfer, Co-mingled Funds	23,501,360			6,957,122		30,458,483
Government of Norway	4,063,743	5,464,262	5,570,530	5,053,453		20,151,988
Government of Canada		3,682,040	3,662,375	4,031,919	7,733,360	19,109,695
Government of Sweden		6,900,475	3,645,225	3,753,475		14,299,175
Government of United Kingdom	12,274,690					12,274,690
Government of Denmark	5,928,854		5,444,646			11,373,500
Government of Finland	2,863,875		2,721,081	2,933,326		8,518,283
European Commission	4,145,078			3,229,243		7,374,320
Federal Republic of Germany	1,943,005	2,259,028	1,626,423	1,367,982		7,196,438
Government of the Kingdom of Spain		4,184,089	1,338,681	1,430,608		6,953,378
Government of French Republic		2,909,897	1,308,894	1,364,249		5,583,040
Government of Luxembourg	2,145,919		2,801,113			4,947,032
Republic of Ireland	3,238,339					3,238,339
Government of Belgium	647,659	739,637	655,301	713,267		2,755,864
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia			750,000	750,000	750,000	2,250,000
Government of Australia				2,146,200		2,146,200
Government of the Republic of Korea	1,000,000					1,000,000
Government of the Republic of Turkey			1,000,000			1,000,000
Government of Japan	169,492	461,537	55,400	47,096		733,525
Interest EIF Income 2011				706,402		706,402
Interest EIF Income 2009		624,402				624,402
Government of United States			200,000	400,000		600,000
Interest EIF Income 2008	478,842					478,842
Government of Republic of Hungary	400,000					400,000
Interest EIF Income 2010			392,144			392,144
Government of Iceland			200,000			200,000
Government of the Swiss Confederation		162,789				162,789
Republic of Estonia	33,108	19,247	17,105	18,891		88,351
Interest IF UNDP Holding Account	76,779					76,779
Interest IF Finland Sub Trust Fund	15,280					15,280
Total	62,926,023	27,407,403	31,388,918	34,903,233	8,483,360	165,108,937

Source: EIF Trust Fund Manager, 2012

Table 9.2: EIF Trust Fund: Board approved budget and expenditure by project

(as of June 30, 2012, USD)

Implementing Entity Type	Board Approved Budget 2008-12	UNOPS Legal Commitments	Expenditure					
			2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Governments	38,625,546	38,625,546	-	1,088,787	2,803,131	5,032,763	5,149,684	14,074,365
WTO	12,029,003	12,029,003	-	1,925,129	2,579,028	2,655,268	3,184,611	10,344,035
UNOPS	9,466,631	9,466,631	295,914	1,886,281	1,858,126	2,349,065	1,119,807	7,509,193
WB	5,235,000	5,235,000	-	600,000	400,000	4,035,000	-	5,035,000
Global Activities	4,195,939	4,195,939	-	346,499	602,473	1,504,205	1,222,808	3,675,985
UNDP	2,572,520	2,572,520	-	-	-	1,150,000	1,016,520	2,166,520
FAO	711,550	711,550	-	-	-	-	465,450	465,450
UNCTAD	197,950	197,950	-	-	-	158,360	-	158,360
NIA Support through International Technical Advisor	454,410	454,410	-	-	-	-	7,567	7,567
Government (MIE TBD)	1,715,000	1,715,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Project Cost	75,203,549	75,203,549	295,914	5,846,695	8,242,758	16,884,661	12,166,446	43,436,475
Trust Fund Management Fee 0.75%	564,027	564,027	2,219	43,850	61,821	126,635	91,248	325,774
Grand Total	75,767,575	75,767,575	298,134	5,890,545	8,304,579	17,011,296	12,257,695	43,762,248

Source: EIF TFM

ANNEX 10: AID FOR TRADE TO LDCS

Table 10.1: Total Aid for Trade to individual LDCs (Disbursements, USD millions)

		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
1	Afghanistan	2,456.00	3,028.46	3,545.04	4,726.13	1,831.82	15,587.45
2	Ethiopia	1,496.98	1,942.84	1,975.96	2,743.26	2,333.50	10,492.53
3	Tanzania	1,367.03	1,509.72	1,702.68	1,881.04	453.21	6,913.68
4	Mozambique	1,136.65	1,211.34	1,318.44	1,382.77	1,061.00	6,110.21
5	Bangladesh	1,162.49	1,344.10	1,733.21	1,289.18	575.04	6,104.03
6	Uganda	1,042.62	1,284.65	1,190.11	1,435.92	261.55	5,214.85
7	Congo, Dem. Rep.	903.57	772.91	1,137.21	1,457.61	222.77	4,494.07
8	Zambia	683.77	702.43	830.84	730.25	1,412.43	4,359.73
9	Sudan	556.89	649.55	908.35	1,004.40	274.38	3,393.56
10	Senegal	773.86	695.25	807.98	773.27	122.81	3,173.17
11	Madagascar	616.59	676.71	615.29	367.91	894.64	3,171.13
12	Mali	637.16	753.23	759.53	819.10	49.51	3,018.54
13	Cambodia	498.44	560.27	574.52	604.78	744.66	2,982.66
14	Burkina Faso	638.97	681.81	674.49	740.18	93.56	2,829.01
15	Bhutan	96.84	83.95	68.79	88.31	2,431.50	2,769.39
16	Nepal	413.13	442.59	525.99	669.84	669.56	2,721.11
17	Malawi	454.16	548.16	591.23	627.44	410.30	2,631.29
18	Niger	366.93	369.17	407.57	351.47	1,133.84	2,628.98
19	Rwanda	441.46	519.86	714.92	710.59	120.13	2,506.95
20	Timor-Leste	219.83	260.98	247.38	203.10	1,351.40	2,282.68
21	Haiti	383.38	416.77	486.71	787.97	21.01	2,095.84
22	Cape Verde	141.28	139.03	187.38	174.98	1,451.90	2,094.58
23	Laos	296.25	315.01	301.94	320.80	750.16	1,984.16
24	Yemen	343.31	319.39	458.89	467.42	302.89	1,891.91
25	Benin	310.25	372.37	492.90	517.51	87.40	1,780.43
26	Liberia	124.37	600.63	223.24	308.68	265.94	1,522.86
27	Mauritania	187.65	261.38	344.23	306.85	411.60	1,511.71
28	Solomon Islands	244.30	280.16	248.41	245.20	419.36	1,437.44
29	Lesotho	78.02	98.16	135.09	124.99	870.94	1,307.21
30	Burundi	239.41	288.94	302.48	348.21	127.72	1,306.77
31	Angola	263.70	335.33	321.74	276.18	7.39	1,204.33
32	Djibouti	69.66	66.40	67.02	96.57	854.02	1,153.66
33	Vanuatu	57.93	61.07	96.20	109.54	793.93	1,118.67
34	Sierra Leone	214.61	222.10	266.00	313.90	89.43	1,106.04
35	Chad	197.74	179.08	222.77	239.24	219.56	1,058.40
36	Eritrea	83.77	109.08	92.46	91.78	584.50	961.59
37	Guinea	194.01	197.35	213.82	178.25	132.84	916.26
38	Gambia	58.45	77.27	63.02	84.74	627.21	910.68
39	Togo	78.91	113.06	259.96	166.86	253.33	872.12

40	Guinea-Bissau	74.40	96.31	101.56	97.29	442.12	811.68
41	Central African Rep.	170.48	94.94	128.83	117.88	194.02	706.15
42	Myanmar (Burma)	111.54	140.52	164.29	177.43	100.05	693.83
43	Samoa	51.42	43.06	42.03	59.26	309.41	505.19
44	Kiribati	30.60	30.53	29.06	23.48	344.70	458.37
45	Maldives	14.54	22.50	22.92	25.48	151.07	236.51
46	Comoros	29.49	38.98	31.48	27.41	100.13	227.49
47	Sao Tome & Principe	27.20	30.37	35.55	24.35		117.47
	TOTAL	20,040.00	22,987.79	25,669.52	28,318.83	26,360.24	123,376.37

Source: OECD CRS Database, Accessed September 2012

Table 10.2: Aid for trade policy and regulations to individual LDCs (Disbursements, USD millions)

		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
1	Afghanistan	18.86	23.82	51.14	22.67	28.54	145.04
2	Sudan	0.09	10.77	2.84	17.47	47.86	79.02
3	Bangladesh	1.98	14.94	28.90	5.80	15.07	66.70
4	Burundi	0.07	37.02	0.31	6.40	7.06	50.86
5	Tanzania	2.90	16.43	6.86	1.10	8.63	35.92
6	Mozambique	9.41	8.08	4.66	12.62	1.07	35.84
7	Congo, Dem. Rep.	1.05	0.76	0.63	26.18	6.09	34.71
8	Cambodia	4.12	7.40	8.34	3.82	8.11	31.80
9	Uganda	1.35	14.77	2.46	4.37	7.68	30.64
10	Senegal	0.92	5.07	13.61	1.76	9.07	30.44
11	Laos	1.03	1.81	6.38	4.30	8.83	22.36
12	Mali	0.96	0.14	6.56	7.18	3.50	18.35
13	Burkina Faso	2.22	10.71	0.20	1.51	3.09	17.74
14	Rwanda	0.09	0.08	0.09	12.33	3.06	15.66
15	Sierra Leone	2.41	2.89	4.33	4.17	1.37	15.18
16	Zambia	2.40	2.40	1.03	4.13	3.11	13.07
17	Ethiopia	0.61	0.39	0.94	4.10	2.87	8.91
18	Togo	0.01	0.04	5.84	0.16	0.19	6.23
19	Mauritania	0.07	5.23	0.09	0.08	0.61	6.08
20	Yemen	1.67	1.39	1.77	0.79	0.25	5.87
21	Malawi	1.14	1.26	0.97	0.42	0.96	4.74
22	Madagascar	0.29	0.57	1.04	1.25	0.35	3.50
23	Haiti	..	0.05	1.14	1.22	1.01	3.41
24	Benin	1.55	0.61	0.24	0.30	0.50	3.19
25	Solomon Islands	0.07	0.14	0.71	1.40	0.75	3.08
26	Nepal	0.05	0.92	0.24	0.50	0.52	2.23
27	Angola	0.07	1.05	0.08	0.95	0.02	2.17
28	Guinea	0.20	0.21	0.92	0.63	0.11	2.07

29	Central African Rep.	0.07	..	0.19	0.87	0.90	2.03
30	Chad	0.07	..	0.02	0.54	1.27	1.89
31	Gambia	0.19	0.01	0.02	1.59	0.02	1.82
32	Lesotho	0.50	0.19	0.69	0.11	0.15	1.65
33	Bhutan	0.45	0.40	0.52	0.13	0.03	1.53
34	Guinea-Bissau	0.04	0.03	0.39	0.56	0.16	1.17
35	Timor-Leste	0.00	0.01	0.32	0.43	0.23	0.99
36	Djibouti	0.07	..	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.40
37	Vanuatu	0.03	0.12	0.04	0.14	0.05	0.38
38	Niger	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.17	0.03	0.35
39	Liberia	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.28
40	Samoa	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.28
41	Cape Verde	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.26
42	Eritrea	0.09	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.25
43	Sao Tome & Principe	..	0.01	0.06	0.16	0.02	0.25
44	Maldives	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.02	0.24
45	Tuvalu	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.09	0.24
46	Kiribati	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.05	0.20
47	Comoros	0.07	..	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.18
	TOTAL	57.63	170.10	155.19	153.60	174.81	711.33

Source: OECD CRS Database, Accessed September 2012

ANNEX 11: GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Note: a total of 17 respondents answered the questionnaire.

Board responsibilities

Overall the Board responses felt that the Board addresses its various roles and responsibilities well.

All respondents thought that the Board was overseeing the reporting 'very well' or 'well'. On the other hand, overseeing the senior management performance got the most diverse responses.

The main issues where the members felt that the Board was conducting these roles 'poorly' or 'very poorly' were around 'avoiding micromanaging' – 78% of respondents felt that the Board was doing this 'poorly' or 'very poorly'. Another area that scored low was on 'overseeing, approving and monitoring of the strategic direction, taking opportunities and risks into account' (56% responded 'poorly' or 'very poorly').

Overall, 80% of the respondents felt that the Board is 'adequately addressing its overall role and responsibility'.

How well does the Board address the following roles and responsibilities?

Answer Options	Very well	Well	Poorly	Very poorly	Can't say	Response Count
1. Ensures adherence to Steering Committee mandate and transparent communication to SC.	26.7%	66.7%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	15
2. Examines EIF objectives and mandate to ensure continuing service.	26.7%	46.7%	20.0%	6.7%	0.0%	15
3. Brings together the interests of the LDC and donor constituencies and core agencies around the shared EIF objectives	13.3%	60.0%	20.0%	6.7%	0.0%	15
4. Oversees, approves and monitors the strategic direction, taking opportunities and risks into account.	25.0%	18.8%	50.0%	6.3%	0.0%	16
5. Avoids micro-managing - the right level of issues come to the Board for decision.	14.3%	7.1%	35.7%	42.9%	0.0%	14
6. Identifies and assesses the principal business risks.	14.3%	35.7%	35.7%	7.1%	7.1%	14
7. Ensures that systems are in place to manage risks.	14.3%	57.1%	21.4%	7.1%	0.0%	14
8. Guards against potential conflicts of interest (e.g. in governance and paid implementation roles of agencies, recusal of representatives on their countries' own proposals).	28.6%	57.1%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	14
9. Oversees the reporting of the organization's finances and monitors against the approved plan.	33.3%	60.0%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	15
10. Oversees and evaluates senior management performance.	7.7%	46.2%	7.7%	23.1%	15.4%	13
11. Generally, is the Board adequately addressing its overall role and responsibility?	7.7%	69.2%	15.4%	7.7%	0.0%	13

Comments/ explanations/ suggestions for improvement:

- Board meetings should be focussing more on overall strategic issues and overarching decisions
- Reporting on financial information – not adequate level of reporting which makes decision making difficult
- No senior management performance evaluations in place
- Micromanagement (due to various interests of the Board members) – leads to lack of strategic oversight
- Unbalance between Board members – lack of understanding on the part of the LDCs
- Clear ToR needed for the Board – accountability issues are not clear
- High turnover (particularly donors)
- Good to have a mix of representatives

Board meetings

Overall, the Board meetings were seen to be ensuring **open communication, meaningful discussion** and **independence from management**. The issue that was raised is the **‘timely resolution of issues’** where half of the respondents felt that this was done ‘sometimes’, and one fifth ‘rarely’.

Are Board meetings conducted in a manner which ensures:

Answer Options	Always	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Response Count
a) open communication	53.3%	46.7%	0%	0%	15
b) meaningful discussion	26.7%	53.3%	13.3%	6.7%	15
c) timely resolution of issues	13.3%	46.7%	40.0%	0%	15
d) independence from management	45.5%	45.5%	9.1%	0%	11
<i>answered question</i>					15
<i>skipped question</i>					2

The **number of Board meetings was considered appropriate by more than half of the respondents**. The **length of presentations** at the meetings was considered appropriate ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ by all respondents. Majority rated time available as appropriate ‘sometimes’. The **content of the meetings** got more mixed scores, and more than 50% responding ‘sometimes’, 25% ‘always’ and 25% ‘rarely’.

Are Board meetings appropriate in terms of:

Answer Options	Always	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Response Count
a) number	53.8%	38.5%	7.7%	0%	13
b) length of presentations	61.5%	38.5%	0%	0%	13
c) time available for discussion	21.4%	71.4%	0%	7.1%	14
d) content	25%	50%	25%	0%	12
<i>answered question</i>					14
<i>skipped question</i>					3

Pre-meeting material was seen useful, timely, efficiently presented and presenting the right amount of detail on average 'sometimes' by majority of respondents. Overall, the usefulness attracted the most positive ratings, while timeliness received slightly lower scores slightly, and 30% rated this as 'rarely'.

Is pre-meeting material appropriate and					
Answer Options	Always	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Response Count
a) useful?	30.8%	69.2%	0%	0%	13
b) timely?	23.1%	46.2%	30.8%	0%	13
c) in an efficient format?	15.4%	61.5%	23.1%	0%	13
d) in the right amount of detail?	25%	50%	25%	0%	12
<i>answered question</i>					13
<i>skipped question</i>					4

Just under 70% of the respondents felt that the Board members have 'always' an adequate opportunity to participate. A slightly higher share (77%) of the respondents felt that the members can 'always' express their point of view, and 23.1% said 'sometimes'.

Answer Options	Do Board members have adequate opportunity to participate?		Are Board members with dissenting points of view given ample opportunity to express their point of view?	
	Response Percent	Response Count	Response Percent	Response Count
Always	69.2%	9	76.9%	10
Sometimes	30.8%	4	23.1%	3
Rarely	0%	0	0%	0
Never	0%	0	0%	0

Comments/ explanations/ suggestions for improvement:

- Board members feel that they do not have adequate information on the progress of the projects at the country level
- More time needed for meaningful, strategic discussion – currently substantive discussions poor. There are too many, too diverse interest represented. Accountability issues are not clear between the ES, WTO, TFM and the Board
- Content of the meetings needs to be more on strategic issues, risks and finance
- Timeliness of pre-meeting material improving compared to the situation before
- Format and detail of financial reports needs to be improved
- Access to documentation needs to be improved
- Lack of understanding of the management by the LDC members – having them fly into the meetings means that they rarely engage directly with the ES and TFM. LDC's should be able to decide themselves how they want to be represented on the Board
- Board dynamics – ES/TFM and donors dominate at Board meetings, while LDCs are more passive. The agencies generally are not actively engaged in the discussion.
- Board micromanaging – but this has been improving
- The Board should have a more balanced mix of trade and development experts.
- Lack of in-country reporting on implementation - ES reporting – not adequate at the

country level

- Roles of the partners not clear – and there is lack of coherent interest to move in the same direction

EIF Management

Generally the respondents felt that the EIF management met the requirements ‘very well’ or ‘well’ (70% of respondents scored this on the positive side).

The lowest average score was given to the allocation of responsibilities between management and the Board was seen to be done ‘Poorly’ by 40% and ‘very poorly’ by 26.7%.

On the other hand, the Board feels free to challenge the CEO or TFM where appropriate and the accessibility of senior management were seen to be done ‘very well’ or ‘well’ by all respondents. The working relationship with senior management was also assessed positively by over 80% of respondents.

How well does EIF management meet the following requirements?						
Answer Options	Very well	Well	Poorly	Very poorly	Can't say	Response Count
1. Board members are kept sufficiently informed by the Executive Director on material issues.	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%	0	14.3%	14
2. Board members are kept sufficiently informed by the TFM on material issues.	38.5%	30.8%	15.4%	0	15.4%	13
3. The quality of management presentations meets expectations.	15.4%	61.5%	15.4%	0	7.7%	13
4. The allocation of responsibilities between management and the Board is appropriate and well understood.	13.3%	20%	40%	26.7%	0	15
5. Management is responsive to appropriate advice and counsel from the Board.	41.5%	41.7%	8.3%	0	8.3%	12
6. The allocation of responsibilities between the Executive Secretariat and the Trust Fund Manager is appropriate and well understood.	33.3%	46.7%	20%	0	0	15
7. The Executive Director as CEO is held accountable to achieve corporate objectives.	30.8%	38.5%	23.1%	7.7%	0	13
8. The TFM is held accountable to achieve financial management objectives.	28.6%	50%	14.3%	0	7.1%	14
9. The Board feels free to challenge the CEO or TFM where appropriate.	53.8%	38.5%	0	0	7.7%	13
10. Senior management is appropriately accessible to individual Board Members	66.7%	33.3%	0	0	0	12
11. The Board is appropriately informed about internal management policies, practices and costs.	23.1%	38.5%	23.1%	15.4%	0	13
12. Generally, the Board has a	27.3%	54.5%	9.1%	0	9.1%	11

good working relationship with management.

answered question 15
skipped question 2

Comments/ explanations/ suggestions for improvement:

- Lack of trust between the different members of the Board. Donors often meet before Board meetings to discuss the issues at hand, but interact very little with the LDCs between meetings. Informal and open ended discussions could improve the dialogue and atmosphere at the Board meetings.
- Format and agenda of the Board meetings do not provide time for a meaningful discussions
- Management sometimes takes a long time to respond to advice from the Board (e.g. financial information)
- Budget reporting not adequate (particularly the issue of administrative costs was raised by a number of Board members)
- ED accountability on the process not adequate – the ED hired under the WTO contract and the Board cannot revoke the contract.
- Effectiveness of project appraisal – weak quality – lack of follow up information once a project has been approved by the Board. “Governance structure not conducive to assess projects within a reasonable timescale”
- Performance assessment of the ED currently missing
- ToR of the Board is not clear – too much time spent on the process, too little on the strategic issues

Administrative issues

The issue that raised the most variance in the responses were the one regarding having the ES and TFM administratively and physically separated – each of the response categories from ‘very well’ to ‘very poorly’ received equal shares of responses.

The de-centralised units of the TFM were mainly seen as a positive this, and 58.7% of the respondents said it was working ‘very well’ and 25% ‘well’.

The ES staff based in Geneva was seen as mainly working ‘well’ – but many of the comments raised this issue and suggested that an alternative arrangement would need to be sought as the current structure was not ideal in terms of efficiency of the project.

How well do the following administrative arrangements work?

Answer Options	Very well	Well	Poorly	Very poorly	Can't say	Response Count
1. Having the EIF Executive Secretariat situated in the WTO administrative system and premises?	35.7%	42.9%	14.3%	7.2%	0	14
2. Having the full Executive Secretariat staff based in Geneva?	27.3%	36.4%	15.4%	0	9.1%	11
3. UNOPS administrative system as Trust Fund Manager?	38.5%	38.5%	15.4%	0%	7.7%	13
4. Having de-centralised regional units of the TFM?	58.3%	25%	0	0	26.7%	12
5. Having the Executive	23.1%	23.1%	23.1%	23.1%	7.7%	13

Secretariat and Trust Fund
Manager administratively and
physically separated?

answered question 14
skipped question 3

Comments/ explanations/ suggestions for improvement:

- Cost of the current administrative structure high
- The WTO is seen as a desirable host for the ES by some, but a number of the respondents wanted to have the TFM in the same premises, as it was seen that this could increase efficiency. Separation is seen to slow down the process.
- ES and TFM governed by two sets of rules (WTO financial procedures while TFM uses UNOPS policies), joint working hasn't always worked well. Need for better transparency, communication, between financial management at regional level and the Board.
- Level of engagement at the country level not ideal – as the ES is based in Geneva, and has to cover all the EIF countries. There is not always the intense engagement required at country level to develop strong proposals, to allow a deep understanding of country context issues, and good coordination with country level stakeholders, including donors.