

Enhanced Integrated Framework

Evaluation of the Enhanced Integrated Framework

Volume 2: In-depth and Summary Country Case Studies

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Submitted by

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IN-DEPTH COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

Bangladesh

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2010
Total budget	\$ 2,710,000 <i>of which \$1.910m disbursements to date</i>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC (Recommended for graduation by the UN Committee for Development Policy and Economic & Social Council, under consideration by General Assembly)
Key stakeholders	<p>NIU: Ministry of Commerce (MoC) Ministry of Finance (MoF) Bangladesh Tariff Commission (BTC) Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute (BFTI) Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) Bangladesh Association of Pharmaceutical Industries (BAPI) Bangladesh Agro-Processors' Association (BAPA) Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI) Bangladesh Association of Software and Information Services (BASIS) Bangladesh Organic Products Manufacturers Association (BOPMA) University of Dhaka World Bank</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide technical assistance and institutional support to facilitate the integration of Bangladesh into the global trading system, accompanied by a coordinated delivery of trade-related technical assistance and with a view of sustainable graduation from the LDC status • Strengthen national institutional capacity and develop human resources for trade mainstreaming • Support export diversification and the creation of skilled jobs, including in the sectors of ready-made garments and jute, the pharmaceutical industry, and agro-processed food <p>Alignment to TOC:</p> <p>The preparatory support project (Pre-DTIS) and two analytical support projects (DTIS & DTISU) have linkages to Outcome 1 (<i>Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i>)—Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks</i>), Output 2 (<i>Strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment</i>), and Output 3 (<i>Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation</i>).</p> <p>The Tier 1 project on supporting national implementation arrangements similarly has links to Outcome 1 and Outputs 1-3.</p> <p>The Tier 2 project on trade facilitation supports Outcome 2 (<i>Increased exports and access to international markets for the LDCs</i>)—Output 1</p>

	<i>(Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets).</i>
National projects	<p><u>Completed Projects (MIE)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Pre-Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS) [Phase 1, Tier 1] (<i>Ministry of Commerce</i>) (ii) DTIS [Phase 1, Tier 1] (<i>World Bank</i>) (iii) NIA Support: "Strengthening Institutional Capacity and Human Resource Development for Trade Promotion" [Phase 1 and Phase 2, Tier 1] (<i>Ministry of Commerce</i>) <p><u>Projects under implementation (MIE)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (iv) DTIS Update of Bangladesh and Trade Roadmap for Sustainable Graduation (Repackaged) [Phase 2, Tier 1] (<i>Ministry of Commerce</i>) (v) Export Diversification and Competitiveness Development Project [Phase 2, Tier 2] (<i>Ministry of Commerce</i>)
Regional projects	<p><u>Completed Projects (MIE)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Facilitating Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Least Developed Countries for Regional Integration and Sustainable Development (<i>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>) <p><u>Projects under implementation (MIE)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (ii) LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status (<i>WTO</i>) (iii) Capacity building for EIF countries on investment promotion within WAIPA activity (<i>World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies</i>) (iv) E-Commerce Capacity Building for women-led SMEs in South Asia Project (<i>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>)

2. Context

- The trade structure of Bangladesh is largely dominated by merchandise trade. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total merchandise trade exhibited a strong growth, driven by growth in both exports and imports. Whilst services trade accounts for a smaller share in the country's total trade, it exhibited a more robust growth than merchandise trade over the same period.
- FDI to Bangladesh has been generally on an upward trend since 2009 before experiencing a sharp contraction in 2019. Similarly, AfT disbursements have been increasing (albeit unsteadily) since 2009 before experiencing a moderate decrease in 2019. Since the start of EIF support in 2010, EIF disbursements accounted for 0.016% of total AfT disbursements in the country.
- Between 2015 and 2019, Bangladesh's performance moderately improved in terms of overall ease of doing business. However, it has been stagnant in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods. Its overall logistics performance similarly weakened between 2010 and 2018—and particularly in terms of timeliness and ease of arranging competitively priced shipments. Nevertheless, it has seen slight improvements in the competence and quality of logistics services and tracking and tracing consignments.
- In terms of overall competitiveness, it slightly improved since 2008. While the country made considerable strides in most dimensions including improving infrastructure, health and education, market size, macroeconomic environment, and technological readiness, performance weakened in terms of financial market development and labour market efficiency.

- The country has also been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which manifested economically through the slowdown of domestic economic activity; a sharp decline in exports, especially in ready-made garments; and a drop in international remittances, mostly from Bangladeshi migrants in Middle Eastern countries. On another note, the slow progress in resolving the Rohingya crisis has been considered as potentially exacerbating spending pressures and social tensions.
- Overall, the economic growth and structural transformation of Bangladesh has been mainly driven by the ready-made garment sector and strong domestic demand, with private consumption as a significant contributor. International remittances have also played an important role in promoting private consumption and external stability. Nonetheless, rising protectionism, sluggish global growth amid continued trade and political tensions, unsteady remittance inflows due to weak growth in migrant host countries, natural disasters, and the informal nature of a significant portion of the country's economy are among the risks to macroeconomic stability. Among others, export diversification (in terms of both product and market diversification) is seen as imperative to mitigate these risks and sustain the country's development progress.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	August–September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, Document and Data review, E-Survey, Key Informant Interviews, Economic analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewed 20+ documents (EIF programme documents and technical reporting; DTISs; policy and strategy documents, etc.) • Reviewed two e-survey responses (NIU Coordinator and Donor Contact) • 12 interviews; interviewed 12 informants (1 female): 4 from government ministries and agencies; 4 from private sector; 3 from academe/research institutions; 1 EIF ES. Interviews ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours. All done virtually. • <i>Portfolio Review</i> covering project types and subtypes; EIF phase involvement; project approval, start, and end dates; main implementing entities; total project costs and EIF and non-EIF contributions; regional projects where the country is a recipient • <i>Review of EIF databases</i>, i.e., the Results and DTIS Action Matrix databases, Management Information System • Used Value for Money Scorecard to summarise
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Variation in extent of reporting between project documents and EIF databases (both offline and online) resulting to difficulty in triangulating evidence • Delayed data collection due to difficulty of securing interviews given remote work conditions and holiday periods • Missing project documents (e.g., final progress report of Pre-DTIS project) • Limited documentary reporting of results on Tier 2 projects given short implementation period to date.

4. Findings

1.1. Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
The EIF programme and projects are well aligned with national needs and consistent with the government's economic and social strategies. The design and formulation of Tier 2 projects respond to the need to increase competitiveness/value addition of RMG exports and expand the country's export basket in pharmaceuticals and food-processing. Similarly, the DTISU identify country needs, with the Action Matrix reflecting the related country priorities as laid out in the national development plans and strategies, as well as sector policies and strategies.		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	1 (KII)
Private sector stakeholders interviewed in the evaluation process regarded the EIF programme as well aligned with their needs and relevant to the country's priorities from their perspective.		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	3	1 (KII)
Stakeholders reported that the EIF had adapted well to emerging priorities in Bangladesh through the design of the Tier 2 support for the Bangladesh Export Diversification & Competitiveness Programme.		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
As above. There is evidence that Tier 1 activities such as training have been switched to alternative delivery modalities due to Covid-19 risk management, and for Tier 2, the overall timetable for programme implementation has been extended to accommodate delays from Covid-19.		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
The DTIS report was endorsed in the Seventh Five Year Plan of Bangladesh. During the preparation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 project proposals, different ministries/ agencies actively considered the suggestions of the DTIS action matrix. DTIS's suggestions were the foundations for numerous policies, such as the Export Policy and the National Active Pharmaceuticals Ingredients (API) and Laboratory Reagents Production and Export Policy (2018), which Bangladesh was able to develop. The DTIS played a catalytic role in renewing the discussion on various trade-related constraints faced by Bangladesh. Some projects were developed and taken forward following the recommendations of the DTIS Action Matrix, for example the Bangladesh Regional Connectivity project is one of them. Under this project, a National Single Window under National Board of Revenue is being implemented with support from the World Bank. Also, within the project, the capacity of some land ports is being strengthened and a National Enquiry Point is being established to help Bangladesh implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Another sector specific project titled 'Export Competitiveness for Jobs' was taken following the recommendation of the DTIS.		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
This has been a major focus area for the EIF in Bangladesh, and stakeholders regarded this as one of the EIF's biggest contributions in the country. A large number of public sector officials have received training and capacity building from nearly 50 ministries, department and agencies, including the Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh Trade and Tariff Commission (BTTC) and Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute (BFTI).		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	3	2 (DR, S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Stakeholders reported that the EIF projects well-reflected the needs and priorities in the DTIS and AM, although these were adapted over time to reflect emerging opportunities and context. With EIF funding fairly modest at \$2.7m over the period since 2010, clearly there could not be complete coverage and some priority areas (such as trade facilitation) were left for other development partners to support outside of the EIF project framework.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	3	1 (DR, KII)
The preparation of the original DTIS (undertaken by the World Bank) was regarded as a fairly consultative process by Government and Private Sector stakeholders. For example, Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh Tariff Commission, National Board of Revenue, Finance Division, Port Authorities, Bangladesh Bank, and private sector trade associations (such as the BGMEA) were all consulted during the DTIS process. At the same time, Stakeholders reported that participation by civil society was much lower than public sector and private sector bodies in the original DTIS process.		

1.2. Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The preparatory support project (Pre-DTIS) and two analytical support projects (DTIS & DTISU) have linkages to EIF ToC/logframe Outcome 1 (<i>Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i>) — Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks</i>), Output 2 (<i>Strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment</i>), and Output 3 (<i>Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation</i>).</p> <p>The Tier 1 project on supporting national implementation arrangements similarly has links to EIF ToC/logframe Outcome 1 and Outputs 1-3.</p> <p>The Tier 2 project on export diversification supports EIF ToC/logframe Outcome 2 (<i>Increased exports and access to international markets for the LDCs</i>)—Output 1 (<i>Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets</i>).</p>		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
EIF delivery modalities are regarded as appropriate. Under Tier 1, modalities for institutional support and human capacity building in trade policy stand out as particularly well-regarded, whereas there were some concerns over ownership of the DTIS which have now been addressed for the DTIS-U. Tier 2 support projects has not progressed far, but the design of the Tier 2 Bangladesh Export Diversification Programme is regarded as appropriate although of a small size relative given the limited EIF resources.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	3	2 (DR, S, KII)
EIF support was well-coordinated with other relevant initiatives led by the World Bank, and with some other development partners on a project-by-project basis (e.g., USAID on product standards and testing). Stakeholders regarded the World Bank as the principal development partner supporting EIF implementation in Bangladesh, but they have not seen evidence of effective contributions by the Donor Facilitator mechanism in the country towards co-ordination of the EIF activities with other relevant activities in the trade sector supported by other development partners.		

1.3. Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	a) 4	2 (DR, S, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	b) 4	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	c) 3	
c) prioritised interventions	d) 3	
d) programming plan	e) 4	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The original DTIS made an important contribution to EIF outputs subsequently in the programme, although this has faded over time as the DTIS-U is now long overdue. The DTIS was incorporated into the Seventh Five Year Plan of Bangladesh, and helped to improve the overall knowledge base about trade and competitiveness issues.</p> <p>The DTIS certainly appears to have provided a foundation for a much-expanded programming engagement and lending operation in the trade sector by the World Bank in Bangladesh. However, there is limited evidence that the DTIS itself has been used as a programming tool for the EIF itself, given that long elapsed time between its completion and the start-up of the EIF's Tier 2 projects.</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	1 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The DTIS report was endorsed in the Seventh Five Year Plan of Bangladesh. During the preparation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 project proposals, different ministries/ agencies actively considered the suggestions of the DTIS action matrix.</p> <p>Some projects were developed and taken forward following the recommendations of the DTIS Action Matrix, for example the Bangladesh Regional Connectivity project is one of them. Under this project, a National Single Window under National Board of Revenue is being implemented with support from the World Bank. Also within the project, the capacity of some land ports is being strengthened and a National Enquiry Point is being established to help Bangladesh implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Another sector specific project titled 'Export Competitiveness for Jobs' was taken following the recommendation of the DTIS.</p> <p>Stakeholders reported that implementation rate of the DTIS AM to date is around 83%. However, concerns were raised about the length and pace of its implementation and limited effectiveness due to the lack of attention given to stakeholders' concerns and issues in the study (resulting in lack of contextualisation to the realities of local stakeholders), as well as lack of consideration to coordination among policies.</p>		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	N/A	N/A
The DTIS-U activity is still under implementation at the current time.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The original DTIS report was endorsed in the Seventh Five Year Plan of Bangladesh. During the preparation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 project proposals, different ministries/ agencies actively considered the suggestions of the DTIS action matrix.</p>		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
See above		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	3	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>Through EIF Tier 1 support, Bangladesh trade policy officials and private sector stakeholders have greater capacity to utilize WTO-compliant trade remedies and to use the WTO dispute settlement system.</p> <p>Indirectly, the original DTIS has helped to motivate expanded support from the World Bank for Bangladesh to implement its obligations under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.</p>		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	3	1 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The Bangladesh Regional Connectivity project, supported by the World Bank, was developed and taken forward following the recommendations of the DTIS Action Matrix. Other than that project, regional objectives has not been a major focus of the EIF in Bangladesh, as its major export markets are in the EU and the US.</p> <p>The country is a beneficiary of 4 EIF regional/multi-country projects around the areas of trade facilitation and digital trade, LDC graduation, investment promotion, and women's economic empowerment, with the first fairly contributing to regional objectives through the Asia Pacific Framework Agreement on paperless trade.</p>		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	2 (DR, S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
This has been a major focus area for the EIF in Bangladesh, and stakeholders regarded this as one of the EIF's biggest contributions in the country. A large number of public sector officials have received training and capacity building from nearly 50 ministries, department and agencies, including the Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh Trade and Tariff Commission (BTTC) and Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute (BFTI).		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	3	1 (DR, S, KII)
Tier 1 activities had made a moderate contribution to Information dissemination and awareness raising on trade related issues, such as WTO-compliant trade remedies and dispute settlement system.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	2	1 (DR, KII)
EIF Tier 2 support has been designed to contribute to results in three different export value chains: RMG, pharmaceuticals and processed foods. At the current time, implementation of Tier 2 projects is insufficiently advanced to provide evidence of substantial results.		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	2	1 (DR, KII)
See above.		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	3	1 (DR, KII)
EIF Tier 2 support has been designed to contribute to results in three different export value chains: RMG, pharmaceuticals and processed foods. Planned activities include training and skills development in each of the sectors. At the current time, implementation of Tier 2 projects is not far advanced and there is only basic monitoring reporting which does not provide strong evidence of substantial results being achieved at this stage.		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	1 (DR, KII)
The EIF ES and TFM have generally demonstrated adaptability to enhance the delivery of project activities and, to the extent possible, mitigate risks in-country. For instance, project extensions have been granted and workplans, budget plans or delivery modalities are adjusted where necessary and justified (e.g., due to complexities in in-country procedures/processes, COVID-19 impacts), allowing EIF in Bangladesh to bring interventions to completion or make progress.		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	1 (DR, KII)
Procurement processes follow the Government of Bangladesh's standards. There were expressed concerns that EIF funding could have been spent more efficiently. Overall, the NIU provided adequate leadership of EIF operational processes and support to governance structures. However, the parallel management and implementation of government interventions and other externally funded development programmes are a source of pressure in terms of institutional and human resource capacity. There is also a recognised need to better integrate the NIU and NSC into government systems.		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	1 (DR, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
There is evidence that EIF operational systems have been able to adapt delivery of Tier 1 and Tier 2 support in basic ways, such as switching to virtual modalities for training delivery and extending the timetable for supply-side support programme implementation.		

1.4. Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Efficiency of the EIF has had mixed performance in Bangladesh, although Tier 1 initiatives have generally performed better on this criteria than Tier 2. Key issues appear to have been largely centred around bureaucracy (large amounts of paperwork needing sign-off at different levels and organisations in the hierarchy), and the fact that Bangladeshi officials are involved in working on other duties, rather than being assigned to working on the EIF full time. COVID-19 has been the third factor causing disruption and delays since early 2020.</p> <p>Stakeholders reported that Tier 1 support for training activities has been efficiently delivered, with a large number of trainees and a wide curriculum, all achieved at low unit costs due to training modalities and partners.</p> <p>Most of the efficiency challenges were on the side of the Bangladeshi organisations. It is also well recognised that DTIS-U and NIA Support projects have different objectives/purposes. However, it was suggested that integrating the DTIS-U into a Tier 1 NIA Support project can potentially generate efficiencies, especially considering the internal bureaucracy of the country.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Tier 2 initiatives have been slow to take shape and to get underway, and utilisation of EIF funds has been challenging at times. Tier 2 support (the Bangladesh Export Diversification & Competitiveness Programme) did not commence until 2019, and at the current time, implementation of Tier 2 initiatives has not progressed sufficiently far to make a definitive assessment of operational efficiency.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Overall, the NIU provided adequate leadership of EIF operational processes and support to governance structures. However, the parallel management and implementation of government interventions and other externally funded development programmes are a source of pressure in terms of institutional and human resource capacity.</p> <p>This has impeded the performance of the EIF governance structures and fed through to somewhat disappointing delivery of results from a slow pace of implementation. There is also a recognised need to better integrate the NIU and NSC into government systems. The EIF DF mechanism has not functioned in Bangladesh as planned, and the country has not been able to benefit from this mechanism as expected for supporting co-ordination of EIF activities with those of other development partners in the trade sector.</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Stakeholders reported that Covid-19 has significantly disrupted EIF activities since the beginning of 2020. There is evidence that EIF operational systems have been able to adapt delivery of Tier 1 and Tier 2 support in basic ways, such as switching to virtual modalities for training delivery and extending the timetable for supply-side support programme implementation.</p>		

1.5. Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	2	1 (DR, KII)
<p>Through Tier 1 support, the EIF has made a moderate but useful contribution towards mainstreaming trade for sustainable development. Tier 1 support has facilitated identification of priority trade related policy reforms and better integration of trade-related issues and objectives into national policies and strategies. Tier 1 support has probably made the biggest contribution in terms of building human</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>capacity and skills for trade policy, for example in areas like trade remedies and WTO dispute settlement.</p> <p>At the same time, the delays in operationalising the implementation of a DTIS-U have limited the potential contribution that the EIF has been able to make over time. The EIF could have achieved more with the resources it had allocated in Bangladesh, but pace of delivery and slow start up of activities has held it back.</p> <p>Design of EIF Tier 2 support is also potentially impactful as key export sectors like RMG, pharmaceuticals and processed foods have been targeted with a focus on innovation and value addition. But again, a key limiting factor here has been the very slow start up of Tier 2 support.</p> <p>At the current time, implementation of Tier 2 projects is insufficiently advanced to provide more substantial evidence of the EIF's contribution to sustainable development through the building of supply-side capacities in Bangladesh.</p> <p>Stakeholders also reported that EIF support on services trade strategy, non-tariff measures, and LDC graduation are contributing to sustainable development strategy and trade integration. The actual impacts on sustainable development have yet to be realized.</p>		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	1 (DR, KII)
See above.		

1.6. Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	3	1 (DR, KII)
<p>EIF initiatives have been fairly well-integrated into government priorities, structures, and processes, but the delay in completing the DTIS-U has jeopardized this moving forward. Completing the DTIS-U will be key to renewing the integration of the EIF into government policy, programmes and structures.</p> <p>Sustainability of EIF initiatives has not been properly considered yet (as the focus is on speeding up delivery of Tier 2 project implementation and getting the DTIS-U process underway). Downside risks include competing work responsibilities for key Ministry of Commerce staff, lack of M&E capacity among relevant government agencies, non-functioning of Donor Facilitation mechanism, and the country's potential graduation from LDC status.</p>		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	1 (DR, KII)
<p>In general, there has been a good level of ownership of Tier 1 and Tier 2 initiatives in Bangladesh. Whilst the results of the EIF have been fairly modest since 2010, it has been regarded as a consistent, steady partner championing an increasingly critical agenda as Bangladesh approaches graduation from LDC status.</p> <p>Stakeholders report high levels of ownership of Tier 1 activities such as training programmes and the Tier 2 Export Diversification and Competitiveness Programme. On the other hand, it could be argued that high levels of ownership have come at the price of lower efficiency, delays in project start-up and a slow pace of delivery.</p> <p>One specific area where stakeholders reported a lack of ownership was the process for undertaking the original DTIS. There were a number of issues and differences of opinion with the DTIS (undertaken by the World Bank) which did present challenges for ownership by the Government. However, these have been taken on board by the EIF and the DTIS-U will now be nationally led which should ensure a high-level of ownership.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	3	1 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF has played an important role in helping to mainstream trade within national policy making and strategies, and also contributed to increasing public sector capacity for trade policy formulation and implementation across nearly 50 ministries, departments and agencies. It is likely that these contributions from the EIF will be continue.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
But the completion of the DTIS-U will be an important cross-roads and milestone for the EIF to have consolidated its initiatives in Bangladesh, so it is of critical importance that this process is undertaken in a timely and effective manner. Accordingly, the Government and the EIF should give high priority to the DTIS-U to ensure its success.		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	3	1 (DR, KII)
The EIF has been relatively well coordinated in Bangladesh with other government agencies in Tier 1 and the private sector in Tier 2. The co-ordination with other donors has been one of the weakest aspects of the EIF performance in Bangladesh, with stakeholders reporting that they have not seen evidence of effective contributions by the Donor Facilitator mechanism in the country towards co-ordination of the EIF activities with other relevant activities in the trade sector supported by other development partners.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	3	1 (DR, KII)
The EIF has made a modest contribution to leveraging finance and expertise in the trade sector in Bangladesh. EIF support was well-coordinated with other relevant initiatives led by the World Bank, and with some other development partners on a project-by-project basis (e.g. USAID on product standards and testing). Stakeholders regarded the World Bank as the principal development partner supporting EIF implementation in Bangladesh.		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	N/A	N/A
N/A		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and associated projects are aligned with the needs and national priorities of Bangladesh, including that of the private sector. The EIF in Bangladesh has also been able to adapt to the evolving development context of the country and maintain its relevance to emerging EIF global priorities and changing context, including the development and/or expansion of export value chains like RMG, pharmaceuticals and processed food. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted Bangladesh, and the EIF has adapted to the new context through virtual delivery of training activities and workplan adjustments, with grants of no cost extensions for Tier 2 activities.
- Coherence:** EIF national projects in Bangladesh are broadly aligned with the EIF programme's TOC and logframe. However, in-country coordination structures and mechanisms (particularly the Donor Facilitator) have not performed as planned, which has impacted on efficiency and effectiveness of the EIF as a whole.
- Effectiveness:** EIF Tier 1 interventions have been effective in building the institutional and human resource capacity of relevant government agencies, trade mainstreaming through the original DTIS and facilitating some policy reforms. The Tier 2 interventions are only now getting underway but are well focused on building capacity and innovation in export diversification and expansion of value chains in RMG, pharmaceuticals and food promising. Compared to some other LDCs, the EIF in Bangladesh has under-performed particularly on Tier 2 (long delays to design and start-up any Tier 2 projects) but also on Tier 1 (where it could have been expected that a DTIS-U would have been completed by this stage). The priority now needs to be expanding and accelerating delivery of potential results, principally through successful completion of implementation of Tier 2 projects and the DTIS-U.
- Efficiency:** Overall efficiency of EIF programme has been less than satisfactory in Bangladesh with shortcomings primarily regarding delays in EIF project approvals, slow pace of implementation and timely utilization of funds. Unit costs however have been satisfactory

and in some cases, have provided strong value for money (through using low cost training providers for example). Since 2020, there have also been disruptions and delays to project implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

- **Sustainability:** EIF initiatives are fairly well-integrated into government priorities, structures, and processes, with the country demonstrating a strong ownership of the initiatives. Sustainability of EIF initiatives has not been properly considered yet (as the focus is on speeding up delivery of Tier 2 project implementation and getting the DTIS-U process underway). Downside risks include competing work responsibilities for key Ministry of Commerce staff, lack of M&E capacity among relevant government agencies, non-functioning of Donor Facilitation mechanism, and the country's potential graduation from LDC status.
- **Impact:** As implementation of Tier 2 projects in Bangladesh has not advanced very far since approval in 2019, it is too early at this stage to assess evidence of impacts.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	Notwithstanding the existence of sample measures to ensure efficiency and value for money (e.g., time efficiency), there is no systematic reporting against VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	3	Procurement processes follow the Government of Bangladesh's standards. There were expressed concerns that EIF funding could have been spent more efficiently and effectively, including through utilising/maximising local resources and savings on travel funds for trainings.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	2	Overall, efficiency is a key area recognised as needing systematic improvement. In particular reference to the effectiveness of EIF leveraging additional resources, additional in-kind government contributions were mobilised, but private sector resources were not directly mobilised. Moreover, no additional donor funding was mobilised due to the less proactive role played by the donor facilitator. While other donors are active in-country, they continued to work on their own objectives and action plans, suggesting a lack of coordination and efficient use of resources.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	3	The relative integration of the NIU into government systems; existence of trade coordination mechanisms/structures between the government and donor and private sector; and some leveraging of additional resources (e.g., government human and financial resources, private sector funding) are cumulative indications of potential sustainability of EIF activities. However, there is scope for improvement, especially in strengthening governance and coordination structures and mechanisms (including improving the integration of the NIU and NSC into government systems), enhancing stakeholder consultations, and with the Government taking a more proactive role in policy implementation and delivery of development interventions including those supported by EIF.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance	3	Overall, the NIU provided adequate leadership of EIF operational processes and support to governance structures. However, the parallel management and implementation of government interventions and other externally funded

	Score	Narrative
arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)		development programmes are a source of pressure in terms of institutional and human resource capacity. There is also a recognised need to better integrate the NIU and NSC into government systems (see also above), which, in one way or another, can help facilitate more adequate and robust VfM processes.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	3	The EIF ES and TFM have generally demonstrated adaptability to enhance the delivery of project activities and, to the extent possible, mitigate risks in-country. For instance, project extensions have been granted and workplans, budget plans or delivery modalities are adjusted where necessary and justified (e.g., due to complexities in in-country procedures/processes, COVID-19 impacts), allowing EIF in Bangladesh to bring interventions to completion or make progress.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	The economic empowerment of women and MSMEs is not included as a cross-cutting priority of EIF interventions in-country. In the analytical and Tier 2 projects, for instance, there have only been broad and brief references on potential contributions to female labour force participation and gender equality. Moreover, in both Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects, the integration of gender in project design and implementation is quite limited to gender-disaggregated indicators of beneficiaries. On the other hand, private sector engagement features as a secondary objective, with some relevant indicators to track progress. The alignment of EIF projects in-country to the needs and priorities of the private sector, SMEs, women, and marginalised groups, as well as the inclusiveness of consultative processes has also been considered moderate. There were expressed concerns about the main purposes of projects (e.g., DTIS) having been undermined or their relevance compromised as a result of stakeholders' views, concerns or issues not given due attention (resulting to ineffective contextualisation and limited impact) and lack of coordination among policies and stakeholders.

Burkina Faso

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2011
Total budget	\$9,388,792.34
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, landlocked
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat - Agence de Promotion des Produits Forestiers Non Ligneux - Interprofession Sésame - Interprofession Mangue - Interprofession Karité - Interprofession Anarcade - SNV - INADES Formation - UNCDF - Afrique verte - AfDB - Luxembourg Embassy - GIZ - UNCTAD - ITC
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen and sustain the capacity of trade-related institutions (especially MICA) to develop and implement evidence-based trade policies to strengthen the country's participation in regional and global markets and coordinate aid for trade (AfT). - Targeted support to enhance Burkina Faso's strategic value-chains, including promoting women's economic empowerment and strengthening cooperative development. <p>Alignment to ToC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Outcome 1: Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i> - <u>Output 1.</u> Improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Update (U) o National Implementation Arrangements (NIA) support (Ph1 & Ph2) o Sustainability support o Mainstreaming support o Élaboration d'une stratégie sectorielle de développement de la filière amandes de karité au Burkina Faso - <u>Output 2.</u> Strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o NIA support (Ph1 & Ph2) o Sustainability support - <u>Output 3.</u> Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support (Ph1) ○ Sustainability support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outcome 2: Increased exports and access to international markets - Output 1. Improved participation of EIF countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Projet de renforcement des capacités productives et commerciales de la filière du sésame au Burkina Faso (Sésame) ○ Projet d'appui à la commercialisation de la mangue séchée et de noix de cajou transformée (Mangue – Noix de cajou) ○ Projet d'appui à la compétitivité des produits de la filière Karité (PACFI-K) - Output 2. Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sésame ○ Mangue – Noix de cajou - Output 3. Support to EIF countries to leverage additional investments for productive capacity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support (Ph1 & Ph2) ○ Sustainability support ○ Sésame ○ Mangue – Noix de cajou ○ PACFI-K
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTIS Update - NIA Support (Ph1) - NIA Support (Ph2) - Sustainability Support - Mainstreaming Support, Technical assistance in the elaboration of a Medium-term Plan (MTP) for Burkina Faso - Projet de renforcement des capacités productives et commerciales de la filière du sésame au Burkina Faso - Projet d'appui à la commercialisation de la mangue séchée et de noix de cajou transformée - Élaboration d'une stratégie sectorielle de développement de la filière amandes de karité au Burkina Faso <p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Projet d'appui à la compétitivité des produits de la filière Karité (PACFI-K)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Programme régional d'appui au développement commercial inclusif de la filière karité (PRADCIFK) – GSA - LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status - Transferring technologies and know-how for the development of cotton by-products in eight pilot African LDCs - Facilitation du transit, du transport et des échanges en Afrique de l'Ouest pour une meilleure participation aux chaînes de valeur - <i>World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) on "Capacity Building for EIF countries on Investment Promotion" le projet TAF2+ (EIF co-funded)</i>

2. Context

- Burkina Faso is a low-income and landlocked country with limited natural resources, that shares its border with six countries (Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana and Ivory Coast). Over the last 15 years Burkina Faso has made significant progress in terms economic performance.
- Before the pandemic, the economy was performing well, over the period 2008-2019, Burkina Faso's real GDP grew 5.7% annually on average. This is mainly due to solid performances in the agricultural and extractive industries as well as telecommunication and financial services. Over the same period, merchandise and services exports respectively grew 17.4% and 18.7% per annum.
- However, since 2015 Burkina Faso has not made any progress in reducing time and cost of trading and overall ease of doing business. Burkina Faso's logistics performance index deteriorated from 2.64 (2014) to 2.62 (2018) and its doing business score stalled at 51.0 (2015-2019).
- Recently, the economy fell into recession due the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Real GDP contracted significantly due to an unprecedented deterioration in key sectors of the economy, namely trade, transport and tourism. Inflation has been rising, mainly due to higher food prices. Moreover, political crisis in 2014, terrorists attacks since 2016 and successive public sector workers' strikes from 2016 to 2019 have had severe impact on the economy.
- Presidential and legislative election were jointly held in November 2020, leading to the re-election of the incumbent president. The ruling party – People's Movement for Progress - secured a comfortable majority in the National Assembly.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June-2021 to Sept-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-Survey; Economic Analysis; KII's
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey (answers from the NIU)</p> <p>Documents reviewed across Burkina Faso's 9 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOUs (and MOU Amendments) - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budgets (and Budget Revisions) - Work Plans - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Burkina Faso's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Project Tiers (1 or 2) - Project Phase (1 or 2) - Main Implementing Entities - Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria

Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No response from EIF DF for e-survey but not essential as interview pretty comprehensive.
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4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score
Alignment with national priorities and needs	4	3 DR, S, RD, KII
<p>There is written evidence of alignment of EIF objectives with national priorities and strategies as well as evidence from interviews with various stakeholders, highlighting that the EIF is in line with the National Accelerated Growth Strategy (SCAD) and the National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES). The sectoral policy for industry, commerce and crafts and its action plan have been regularly updated with the support of the EIF. The interventions carried out by the NIU have enabled trade to be integrated into seven other sectoral strategies (Transport, mining, energy, agriculture, animal resources, environment, culture and tourism).</p> <p>One of the government's priorities was to increase the supply and quality of exported products which the EIF has addressed through the tier 2 interventions (for instance the sesame and shea projects were drawn from the National Rural Sector Program).</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	2 DR, S, KII
<p>The EIF projects are well aligned to the needs of the private sector targeting small production units, associations of producers, traders, etc. The private sector is part of the national EIF steering committee. However, it was highlighted that SMEs views have not been taken into account in one instance, and projects are less well aligned to the needs of civil society. Further clarification confirmed that the main beneficiaries of the sesame, mango, cashew and shea projects were MSMEs and the representatives participated in the sessions of the technical monitoring committee and the programme / project steering committee.</p> <p>There is evidence that private sector requests in the mango sector in terms of processing and marketing were taken into account during project development, however production was not well addressed. However, we note that EIF interventions targeted processing and marketing, while production was under ministry of agriculture and environment. Therefore, not taking into account the production component in the cashew / mango project was justified by the fact that production was not under the EIF remit. Notwithstanding this, the no-cost extension phase of the project eventually did focus on production-related activities due to demand from relevant production actors.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 DR, KII
<p>The EIF programme in BF covers many of the areas that have emerged as priorities for the EIF as per the below:</p> <p>Regional integration: The DTISU addresses regional integration and ways to improve transit facilitation and regional coordination on investment policy and also to help the country work with others as a coherent bloc in EPA negotiations with the EU. Under the Tier 1 project Burkina participated in a workshop dedicated to the Trade Facilitation Agreement organized by UNCTAD and the Reinforced Integrated Framework in Banjul, The Gambia, focused on inter-state transit issues and customs</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score
<p>procedures as well as their impacts on interregional and regional trade integration. BF is also included in EIF regional programmes as per section 1.</p> <p>Value chains: all of the Tier 2 interventions support the development of regional and global value chains in non-traditional sectors (including sesame, mango, shea, cashew) in order to diversify Burkina's economy from gold which accounted for more than 92 percent of total exports in 2012 vs 79% in 2005)</p> <p>Gender: is not specifically addressed as a stand-alone project area, women are very well represented in implementation. In the case of the shea project, many women worked in isolation and in rudimentary conditions in the villages. The EIF made it possible to organize them and provide them with semi-mechanized work tools; which had a strong impact in their yield and in the quality of the butter they produced. The EIF has also given significant support to the National Association of Sesame Processors of Burkina, which is made up of 91 women's groups. Most of these women have received training in hygiene, management, storage, marketing, etc. In addition, some of them have benefited from equipment (presses, bottles, etc.)</p> <p>Integration of environmental issues under the mango project was also referenced in the documentation, however no other evidence was found under other projects.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	3	2 DR, KII
<p>The terrorist attacks that have struck the country since 2016 have had a major impact on activities. In the mango sector for instance, the domestic market represents up to 50% of sales while some areas have become inaccessible (Djibo, Dori, Sebba, etc.)</p> <p>COVID-19 is also noted as having had a major impact on activities, in particular because of the closure of borders, the suspension of flights, curfews, etc. with mango exports taking a serious hit. As noted above, the economy has fallen into recession due the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP contracting significantly.</p> <p>The documentation notes that the execution of the shea project activities during 2020 was severely disrupted by the pandemic and insecurity situation. Several activities were stalled until the second semester. However, the end of 2020 documents suggest satisfactory levels of execution for each of the four expected results (execution rate higher than 85%), the execution rate of the AWPB 2020 being 87%). The year 2020 saw more than sixty actors in the shea sector trained in practices relating to value chains, the start of the process of providing actors with innovative equipment, the production of communication supports and the implementation of the marketing plan for the benefit of stakeholders and the development of ten business plans. The overall project implementation situation since the start in 2019 is 45%.</p> <p>The project team revised and submitted the AWPB 2020 to the Trade Program Review Committee which validated it. Thus, from an AWPB initially containing 46 activities 30, were moved to an updated 2020 AWPB. The activities no longer appearing in the updated 2020 AWPB were rescheduled for 2021. It should also be noted that the meetings of the Technical Monitoring Committee (CTS) responsible for monitoring and assessing the status of implementation of activities could not be held in the first half of the year. Two sessions took place in the month of September and December.</p> <p>The annual work plan and budget for 2021 is very ambitious, with the combined execution of 2021 and delayed 2020 activities. Solutions such as the organization of training activities in localities less affected by insecurity, the use of online methods (videoconferencing by zoom) and wearing of masks and use of hydro-alcoholic gel during meetings have been put in place.</p>		
DTIS		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	3	3 DR, KII
<p>The DTIS AM proposals are reported to have contributed to a number of results. Several actions of the matrix have been implemented not only by the Ministry of Commerce but also by the other ministerial departments, including Agriculture, Mining, and Transport. For the Trade Ministry there has been restructuring of the institutional arrangements of the Office of the national foreign trade (ONAC) which resulted in the creation of the Agency for the promotion of exports of Burkina (APEX-Burkina), the development of the National Strategy for the promotion of exports (SNE) which has been adopted by the Council of Ministers and the establishment of the national unity of implementation of the CIR</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score
(UNMOS/CIR). However, several issues, including trade in services and deeper transit facilitation, have not been fully addressed.		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	2 DR, KII
Several representatives of the Ministry of Commerce have seen their capacities strengthened as a result of the DTIS, which allows the ministry to carry out its activities with much more efficiency. They have developed a number of national policies based on the DTIS including the national export strategy, as well as the Medium-Term Plan for the integration of trade focused on two main axes namely (1) trade facilitation and (2) export diversification.		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	4	3 DR, S, KII
The DTIS drew heavily on policies already underway in the country, with its projects and action plan based on national and sectoral strategies. Tier 1 support is directly aligned to the DTIS and AM with several references found in the documentation. Exports of traditional and modern services as well as agricultural exports (rice, cashew nuts, mangoes, onions, gum arabic and shea) were identified in the 2015 DTIS as being sectors with high potential. This aligns with several EIF tier 2 projects related to sesame, dried mango, cashews and shea nuts under implementation. We note that the DTIS recommended that exports in these markets would increase if they benefited from direct support through specific programs both at the level of production <i>and</i> marketing. However, production has been comparatively less well addressed.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	3	2 DR, KII
All stakeholders were adequately consulted (private sector, civil society etc) during the development of the DTIS 2, however this was contradicted during consultations.		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	3 DR, KII
The project logframes are well aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe (see context section 1 for details on projects linked to specific outcomes). It was noted that the implementation unit reviews all tier 2 project logframes to ensure these are results oriented.		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	5	3 DR, KII
BF is among the countries which has benefited from the EIF in a very comprehensive manner (DTISU / Trade mainstreaming / Sustainability support) and among the few countries with three Tier 2 projects.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	4	3 DR, KII
Overall coordination with other initiatives seems strong. Following the DTIS recommendations, the Ministry of Commerce asked UNCTAD to support tier 1 interventions in order to propose operational recommendations for export diversification and trade facilitation. Under tier 2, the EIF has collaborated with GIZ, SNV. Within the framework of the shea project, there is a collaboration between UNCDF, GRET, AGKA, Afrique Verte etc. Collaborations also exist with the EU, Canada. At the national level the EIF also collaborates with other initiatives managed by the Agricultural Research (INERA), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Export Promotion Agency, the Chamber of Commerce and the Burkina Faso Standardisation Agency.		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	a) 3	a) 2
a) increasing knowledge	b) 2	b) 2
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	c) 3	c) 2
c) prioritised interventions	d) 3	d) 2
d) programming plan	e) 3	e) 2
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		DR, S, KII
<p>a) The DTIS contributed to increasing knowledge on trade within BF. The DTIS is a reference document for the department in charge of trade, and policies and strategies related to trade are still based on its recommendations.</p> <p>b) As noted in 1.1. evidence suggests the DTIS was used in the development on the PNDES. Both documents seem to identify similar areas (with sesame highlighted as a growth market for instance). However, the link between the 2 documents is implied rather than explicitly clear in terms of read across.</p> <p>c) The DTISU informed a World Bank Development Policy Operation (DPO) and prior actions for the next budget support operation. Findings of the DTISU were also to be integrated into revisions to the government's PRSP strategy.</p> <p>d) There are several trade-related programmes and projects including EIF tier 1 and tier 2 activities, that align to the actions proposed in the DTIS AM (also covers e).</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	3 DR, RD, KII
<p>As per the documentation for the DTSI update in 2014 the implementation of the results from the 2007 matrix were mixed. Since the 2007 report, there have been some significant reforms and some significant failed opportunities. On the positive side, the country has maintained macroeconomic stability, continued reforms to improve business and trade climate, and promoted growth poles as a way to attract FDI in Bagre and other areas. New price formulas for cotton producers and an input fund to help reduce fertilizer costs have been successfully implemented.</p> <p>However, there has not been the interagency coordination needed to help drive an export promotion policy, and there has not been the institutional capacity building that was needed to accelerate trade integration.</p> <p>Burkina Faso's narrow export base did not change notably since the first DTIS, and the discovery of more gold has dramatically altered Burkina's export basket. Exports are still dominated by three products, gold, cotton and oil seeds.</p>		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	3	3 DR, RD, KII
<p>A DTIS main report was prepared in 2007. The DTIS update team undertook a scoping mission in 2013, and a validation workshop took place in 2014. The update of the DTIS takes into account the changes in the economic, institutional and socio-political environment of Burkina Faso between 2007 and 2013. The current DTISU is out-of-date given the current BF context. At present, there is no ToR or concept note for a new DTIS update.</p> <p>It was highlighted that the DTIS needs to be updated to take into account new developments such as the restoration of diplomatic relations with China.</p>		
Tier 1 results		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	2 DR, KII
<p>Evidence suggest that trade mainstreaming – one of the three tier 1 projects - is one of the most successful intervention of the EIF in BF. It has achieved the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade is well integrated in the international development plan • Trade is integrated into sector strategies through analytical work of DTISU and sensitisation by the Ministry of Trade when working with other Ministries and private sector association • Institutional capacity – BF has several trade related committees (e.g. trade facilitations committee). These committee meetings were initially supported by EIF, BF then coordinated the meetings directly • Coordination with the private sector is another aspect of TM. Even though the sustainability support project is closed, coordination mechanisms are still in place and functioning. 		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	2 DR, KII
<p>Tier 1 programs have enabled trade to be well integrated in national policies (see also sections on DTIS). The objective of the trade mainstreaming project was to support BF in the development of a business strategy through several objectives which have achieved the following results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taking trade into account in national strategies: today, the strategy of accelerated and sustainable growth takes trade into account. • Integration of trade into sectoral policies: today, several ministries (transport, agriculture, etc.) take trade into account in their policies. <p>Capacity building of the Ministry of Commerce: a large number of ministry staff received support, training is still being organized by HR and a ministry capacity building plan has been developed.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	2 DR, KII
<p>Under the NIA Support (Ph2) it is noted that the NIU participated in eight (08) regional and international meetings on trade-related themes.</p> <p>The sustainability support also notes the participation of the MCIA (DGC and NIU) in three international meetings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the world trade forum for the development of LDCs • the "Commerce 2030" Public Forum • E-Commerce week organized in Nairobi 		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	4	2 DR, KII
<p>BF is part of a number of regional EIF initiatives including the trade facilitation programme for West Africa as per the context section. Additionally, EIF has supported attendance at regional and international meetings, including through national-level consultations ahead of meetings and negotiations. It has assisted BF to set up a number of committees including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National trade negotiation committee (set up in 2016) • Trade Facilitation Committee (established in 2017) • Sector Working Group, Trade Facilitation Committee, etc. • National Committee on the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), set up in 2017 		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	2 DR, S, KII
<p>Projects have resulted in increased capacity of a number of officials, building on capacity building efforts of other programs already underway in BF (e.g. JTAP Project).</p> <p>Training has focused on techniques for supporting cooperatives and professional craft organizations; commercial negotiation strategies and techniques; negotiating and monitoring public-private</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
partnerships (PPP); customs procedures etc; as well as general management and procurement training for NIU staff.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	3	1 DR
<p>The NIA support notes a number of information dissemination activities taking place under the project (estimating this result as 75% achieved in final report in 2017) this includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A website set up by the NIU, • Facebook pages of the Ministry in charge of trade and departments of the ministry such as APEX Burkina, ABNORM, AFP / PME etc ... • The monthly publication of the newspaper "the company" even publications were not consistently regular. 		
Tier 2 results		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	5	3 DR, S, RD, KII
<p>The value of Burkina's exports in 2012 was 2.5 times that achieved in 2005. Burkina Faso has been successful in expanding exports by diversifying away from cotton, which also gave rise to new trading partners as a result of EIF support. But while Burkina's export portfolio has altered, foreign trade continues to be concentrated not only on a few products but also in a few countries. BF is amongst the few countries with three sector specific Tier 2 projects. Results include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Holistic approach - In BF the sector specific capacity building adopts a very holistic approach, connecting different of the value chain (production, transformation, export and access to finance). • Organisation of the sectors – In 2015, sectors were not well organised. Tier 2 projects came up with interprofessional regulations and specific support to bring actors in different segment together and promote collaboration. This is an important achievement. • Product transformation – The level of product transformation increased across all the sectors, providing value addition. EIF support permitted a one-person enterprise specialised in sesame oil production to become a 10 people enterprise producing sesame oil (with a machine) and other sesame products (cookies, etc). Another evidence of higher product transformation is that unlike in 2014, in 2018 supermarkets had many more products processed in BF <p>Achievements in the sesame sector are included below: The sesame project led to the elaboration of an action plan for the national sesame producer's association. It also led to improvement of the quality of sesame and yields. In 2012, the annual production was 100,488,000 kg. By the end of the project the average annual production exceeded 150,000,000 Kg. 2014 was the peak year when production exceeded 300 0000 000 Kg. However, there is still a problem of competitiveness of sesame compared to other countries such as Ethiopia.</p> <p>In terms of the mango project there has been an increase in dried mango production from 700 tonnes in 2014 to 2,774 tonnes in 2018. There was also an increase in the number of employees which rose to 12,215 people, 91.6% of whom were women in the mango drying units. These employees have also seen significant changes in their daily lives (improved income) as of the 12,251 employees, 600 are permanent. The income obtained is used mainly for the financial needs of family members and the education of children.</p>		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	3	2 DR, KII
<p>The sesame project resulted in new storage stores and equipment (e.g. blower), and a safer use of pesticides.</p> <p>Under the mango project there has been an improvement of the mango drying process and certification of dried mango. In terms of equipment, 3025 crates with 60 stainless steel tables, 150 fire extinguishers, 1500 coats and scales were provided. In terms of tools, 100 mango drying guides, 20 business plans; and "YELEEN" management software was financed.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	3	2 DR, KII
<p>There is evidence of EIF delivering results in trade facilitation initiatives e.g. allowing the Burkina administration to have a good grasp of international trade rules, notably in light of cotton discussions at the WTO, producers benefiting from AGOA accreditation. Two knowledge sharing trips on trade facilitation took place in Ethiopia under the sesame project.</p>		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	4	3 DR, RD, KII
<p>There is extensive evidence of training in different value chains across the tier 2 projects, although full details on the substantive impacts of the trainings are lacking. Some examples are included below.</p> <p>Several training courses were organised under the sesame project including technical methods for increased sesame production, management of agricultural holdings, etc. Support was provided for a group of women processors of sesame throughout implementation. Under the shea project the documentation highlighted activities raising the awareness of 23 stakeholders, 57% of whom are women, on the concepts of environmental impact studies and waste management planning for the production of shea butter. With the support of the National Office of Environmental Assessments (BUNEE), the project enabled ten organizations to carry out their own environmental impact study.</p> <p>Producers, traders and processors had many challenges in terms of organization and technical capacities in shea. The EIF helped bridge this gap, setting up consultation frameworks at the regional level, to allow them to better take into account the concerns of members. Members then benefited from the capacity building programmes delivered by the EIF. It was noted that the language issue should be taken into account in the future implementation of projects. Most members do not speak French, although most of the training takes place in this language. There is a need for modules in local languages.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	3	2 DR, KII
<p>The EIF facilitated participation in fairs in Germany, Italy, France, Ethiopia (sesame producers), CI (cashew nuts), Togo, China. Some producers continue to attend using their own funds.</p> <p>The emphasis has been on trade rather than production. During many international sesame promotional trips, it was the traders who were sent rather than the producers.</p>		
EIF operational model		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	1 S
<p>The NIU agreed that the ES and TFM had provided good support in terms of the design of monitoring systems, as well as monitoring of progress and provision of guidance on reporting. They also agreed that payments were conducted in a timely way.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	3 DR, S, KII
<p>It was reported that country level management is inefficient due to many governance structures: Cabinet Council, Project and Program Session, Sectorial Project and Program Assembly, Review Committee, CASEM, Executive Secretariat, etc. that coexist.</p> <p>There is insufficient follow-up of the project or activities completed. The current NIU team is overwhelmed and would need more human resources to improve the following up of activities. For instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There has been no impact assessment for the two completed Tier 2 projects. Although not required by the EIF, such assessments are crucial to the monitoring of the effect of the intervention. 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Shea project – NIU should follow-up to see if beneficiary used the contacts and knowledge acquired during the trade fairs and trainings. NIU need to spare resources to materialize contact discussions with partners. <p>However, this was balanced by more positive evidence on the NIU role:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under the shea project it was felt that the PF and the NIU were carrying out their missions properly, and working in partnership with actors Under the mango project, the NIU fulfils its mission properly, the agents are technically good, concerns have always been taken into account and there are no particular difficulties or hiccups in the collaboration On the sesame programme some opinions were not taken into account (for example in the construction of infrastructure: a store built was built in a location contrary to the recommendations of the producers) 		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	2 DR, KII
See 1.1 section re: COVID 19 measures related to the Shea project. The EIF teams have demonstrated flexibility in response to COVID-19, reprogramming budgets and activities rescheduled to 2021.		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	3	3 DR, KII
<p>The support to the sustainability of EIF interventions project in Burkina Faso achieved its objectives at 95.5% with an overall disbursement rate of 87%.</p> <p>It is part funded through GFAS and the State of Burkina Faso. The expected amount was 300,000 USD, or 177,000,000 CFA francs. The total amount disbursed is 170,565,497 F CFA, or 96%. The non-absorption of the budget (6,434,503 F CFA) is linked to the fact that the disbursement procedures during the second phase are more complex than the previous phases. The disbursement of the annual budget is conditioned by the prior approval of the PTAB by the SE / CIR and GFAS. Approval by these two bodies is slow. This was the case of the budget for the year 2018 where the UNMO received the first disbursement of the year five (05) months later, thus impacting the process of implementing project activities. However, the nature of the activities and the mode of intervention (institutional support) made it possible to make up for the delay in carrying out activities by the beneficiary structures.</p> <p>The project also operated with a reduced staff marked by the respective departures of the first administrative assistant in March 2017 and of the first coordinator in June 2017, the vacancy of the position of the Expert in commercial policy since August 2017 (new coordinator), departures of the second administrative assistant in May 2018 and of the second coordinator in July 2018.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	3	3 DR, KII
<p>Overall initiatives have been delivered efficiently. However, the sesame project could not be completed on time due to the instability the country experienced in 2014-2015, and implementation of the Shea project has been slowed due to COVID-19. All projects receive in-kind contributions, which contributes to efficiency. Further details included for the shea project below.</p> <p>Shea: The project experienced a delay in implementation, first at start-up due to red tape and then due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Of the five (05) activities programmed in 2020, four (04) had been fully completed by December 31 and the only activity in progress had a very significant level of execution (80%). Activities related to the participation of actors in fairs and trade shows were notably affected at the international level.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Two Tier 2 projects were implemented by agencies (GIZ and SNV) and their procedures – for procurement for instance – are burdensome. Capacity support on the supply side (i.e level 2 projects, feasibility studies, project formulation support) was highlighted as problematic due to the presence of the intermediary executing agency.		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	2 DR, KII
<p>The country level structures related to the NIU are seen as somewhat inefficient (notably in terms follow-up of the project or activities completed) largely due to external contextual reasons. Recruitment delays have also impacted NIU efficiency.</p> <p>Overall, there is an inefficient management at programme level. The DF is reportedly over committed with other priorities and has a lack of clarity on its mission and role.</p> <p>In terms of donor coordination, at present, the coordination of BF projects was largely seen as inefficient, with staff in Geneva removed from realities on the ground. Procurement procedures are also overly cumbersome, notably with GIZ, SNV.</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	2 DR, KII
See above re: shea project.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	1 DR, KII
<p>The Tier 2 projects have contributed to increased quality of products, new employment opportunities, increased productivity etc).</p> <p>For instance, without the EIF shea would not have reached the level of commercialization that they have today. The EIF has enabled producer to be better organized and technically equipped to face the international market (notably labelling butter, improved quality thanks to semi-mechanization). New jobs have been created at all levels (production, marketing, processing).</p> <p>In the mango sector, the EIF has contributed to the following expected outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> reduced supply side constraints and increased processing; however productive capacities were excluded from the project improved economic opportunities e.g. new processing units appeared (from around fifty to around a hundred); and an increase from one export packing center to six. All of this has resulted in the creation of fairly substantial jobs (although most of them are seasonal) women's economic empowerment and inclusive trade given that in the mango sector, an overwhelming majority (over 80%) of actors are women increased exports from 5,000 tonnes of mango exported to around 10,000 tonnes before corona increased integration of regional and international markets through fairs in the sub-region (Abidjan, Dakar, etc.) and internationally, many exporters have been able to have clients with whom they continue to work today increased productivity in the sectors supported has been indirectly achieved through improved marketing and processing capacities which had a knock-on effect on production. 300,000 tonnes increase in sesame production 		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	1 DR, KII
EIF has contributed to BF's integration into global and regional trading systems. Burkina is one of the countries supported by the regional project: Facilitation of transit, transport and trade in West Africa for		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>better participation in value chains which has three components (transit roadmap; road transportation roadmap and single window). Limited documentary evidence was found on the result of the regional project.</p> <p>Under the sesame project EIF led to increased production, improved productivity and the quality products allowing Burkina to access new markets internationally.</p>		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes</p>	3	2 DR, KII
<p>The documentation on sustainability of the initiatives is mixed. This is seen as more positive with regards to general operational structures and tier 1 interventions. The sustainability support of the EIF project is funded by 347, 999 USD (53,7%) by the national budget, although some disbursement issues have been highlighted.</p> <p>The EIF is well integrated within the Ministry of Commerce and receives a mission letter from the Minister in the same way as the other projects and programs of this ministry. Its actions are therefore oriented towards the needs of the government.</p> <p>However, a lack of sustainability was highlighted for tier 2 interventions, notably in the cashew sector. While the EIF had produced results in terms of organization of actors in the sector and capacity building, the cashew body no longer benefits from support. A levy on exports of raw cashew nuts was introduced with a view to reinvigorating the sector, but this has had limited impact. No further support has been provided since the end of the EIF sesame project.</p>		
<p>Ownership of EIF initiatives</p>	3	2 DR, KII
<p>As highlighted above, the sustainability support of the EIF project is funded by 347, 999 USD (53,7%) by the national budget, although some disbursement issues have been highlighted. The EIF is well integrated within the Ministry of Commerce.</p>		
<p>Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support</p>	3	3 DR, KII
<p>As detailed Tier 1 interventions have been well integrated within government processes. While some results from the Tier 2 initiatives have continued without EIF support, a number of achievements have not continued.</p> <p>Whilst the sesame project ended in 2018 certain activities are still being carried out. This is largely restricted to attending fairs in the sub-region (Togo, Benin, etc.) given limited funds. As a result of capacity building and equipment received, processing units are managed independently. Additionally, the professional organizations set up were still functional after the project.</p> <p>However, production volumes started to decline from 2017. One potential explanation for this would be that the fall in the price of sesame no longer encourages production. Another explanation would be that the project focused mainly on the quantitative increase in production volumes without as much focus on standards and product quality. Substances unfit for consumption (pesticide), coming from the neighbouring cotton fields, were found in the sesame.</p> <p>While EIF resulted in improved seeds for sesame and allowed producers to have a better mastery of production techniques which led to increased yields, results have not been sustainable since the end of the programme. Producers have had difficulties in obtaining seeds for instance.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>Not all members have benefitted from the actions of the EIF. Some women's cooperatives were set up towards the end of the sesame project and their members were unable to benefit from training or equipment.</p> <p>In terms of shea, the interventions made it possible to strengthen the managerial capacities of companies. However, there needs to be a transitional period or even an extension of the EIF in order to strengthen the achievements</p> <p>As the mango project is a pilot project, a transitional phase would have been needed in order to consolidate achievements. Further support is required in the search for sustainable funding.</p>		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	3	2 DR, KII
In 2017, two sectoral dialogue frameworks were established chaired by the Ministry of Trade. They meet twice a year and bring together the sectors of commerce, transport, industry, mining and culture. In addition to technical and financial partners, actors from the private sector and civil society are invited to these meetings. These dialogue frameworks are chaired by the ministers from these sectors.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	4	3 DR, KII, S
<p>The EIF in BF successfully leveraged additional finance with three tier 2 projects financed or co-financed by other donors (ADB, STDF, Luxembourg).</p> <p>The AFDB financed the project to support the integrated development of the shea sector (PADIFK), Luxembourg cooperation and the CIR co-financed the Project to support the competitiveness of products in the shea sector (PACFIK). The maize sector has benefited from financing from the Fund for the application of standards and the development of trade (STDF) for the implementation of a project called: "Reduction of Contamination of Maize and by-products based on Maize by Aflatoxins in Burkina-Faso".</p> <p>The project allowed the formulation of more projects than expected, mobilizing resources from two new donors for the financing of two projects. This exceeded the set forecast to mobilize a single donor.</p>		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	3	2 DR, KII
According to the documentation, instability and terrorist attacks reduced mobility of actors during implementation which impacted results. It also highlighted challenges with regards to exports of products due to COVID-19 (i.e. shea) that were damaged due to the quarantine and had to be returned. Overall, the conditions that prevailed during the formulation of the shea project have been largely unchanged with regard to the sustainability of the intervention.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and in-country projects are aligned with the needs and national priorities of Burkina, including that of the private sector (excluding SMEs) and civil society. The EIF has experienced challenges due to a difficult security situation and evolving global context i.e. terrorist attacks and COVID-19 and which has affected implementation, however course corrections have allowed the programmes to stay broadly on track.
- Coherence:** EIF national projects in Burkina Faso are well aligned with the programme's TOC, and BF is among the countries which has benefited from the EIF in a very comprehensive manner both for Tier 1 and 2 interventions. Coordination with other initiatives is strong.

- **Effectiveness:** The EIF has helped BF with mainstreaming trade policy issues into national development planning and sectoral strategies, as well as supporting integration into regional and international trading systems. This has been achieved through a number of interventions under both tier 1 and tier 2, where EIF has contributed to results in different value-chains across a number of sectors.
- **Efficiency:** Inefficiencies with regards to EIF governance systems both at a programme and country levels have been flagged, related to NIU staff turnover and difficulties with intermediary executing agencies (e.g. GIZ, SNV) for instance, and this, coupled with instability in-country and effects of COVID-19, have slowed implementation.
- **Impact:** EIF interventions in Burkina Faso have contributed to sustainable development including increased quality of products, new employment opportunities and increased productivity during implementation. It has also supported the country's integration into global and regional trading systems through regional and national interventions.
- **Sustainability:** Sustainability of the initiatives has been mixed with good integration of EIF tier 1 projects into government processes, but evidence showing that some of the tier 2 project achievements have not continued beyond project end.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	Based on the evidence, there are no VfM metrics and therefore no systematic reporting against VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	2	Procurement process follows standard public procurement procedures in Burkina Faso and was not adjusted the EIF. They are on the whole not very efficient due to overly cumbersome procedures (notably with GIZ and SNV) and short project deadlines.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	4	<p>Overall, around 11% of the funds disbursed for country projects were provided by the government and 6 out of the 8 country projects were co-funded by the government.</p> <p>Synergies exist between EIF activities in Burkina Faso and projects from other institutions/agencies, notably:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Agency for Export Promotion (APEX) • Institute of Environment and Agricultural Research (INERA) • Ministry of Agriculture • Chambers of commerce • Burkinabe Agency for Standardisation, Metrology and Quality (ABNORM) <p>In terms of donor coordination, at present, the coordination of BF projects was largely seen as inefficient. In one instance it was reported that ES staff in Geneva were removed from realities on the ground, which had become more acute during COVID-19 as missions could not take place. However, EIF was successful in leveraging finance from donors either to co-finance EIF projects (e.g. Luxembourg cooperation and the CIR co-financed the Project to support the competitiveness of products in the shea sector - PACFIK) or</p>

	Score	Narrative
		to finance complementary projects (i.e. AFDB financed the project to support the integrated development of the shea sector - PADIFK).
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	<p>Overall, there are good prospects for sustainability for Tier 1 activities which have been well integrated in the government processes.</p> <p>However, while some results from the Tier 2 initiatives have continued without EIF support, the interviews with beneficiaries suggest that a number of the achievements have not lasted following project close. For instance, after the end of the sesame project in 2018 some beneficiaries have reported that they are able to manage processing units independently as a result of capacity building and equipment received. However, from 2017 production started to decline, partly due to a lack of focus on standards and product quality during the course of the project.</p>
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	3	<p>The management and governance structure has not changed since the program was set up even though it was reported that country level management is inefficient due to too many governance structures: Cabinet Council, Project and Program Session, Sectorial Project and Program Assembly, Review Committee, CASEM, Executive Secretariat, etc. that coexist. Also, recruitment delays have impacted on NIU efficiency. In practice, this inefficiency materialized by low level of follow-up of project or activities completed and cumbersome procurement procedures.</p>
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	3	<p>Overall there is an inefficient management at programme level. One respondent noted that the EIF Donor Facilitator (DF) does not carry out its mission properly or know its role very well. They seem to be overwhelmed and do not attach importance to their role and are ineffective.</p> <p>However, the EIF in Burkina Faso has been able to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., COVID-19, terrorist attack), amending work plans.</p>
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	4	<p>While gender is not specifically addressed as a stand-alone project area, women are very well represented in implementation. In the case of the shea project, many women worked in isolation and in rudimentary conditions in the villages. The EIF made it possible to organize them and provide them with semi-mechanized work tools, which had a strong impact in their yield and in the quality of the butter they produced. The EIF has also given significant support to the National Association of Sesame Processors of Burkina, which is made up of 91 women's groups. Most of these women have received training in hygiene, management, storage, marketing, etc. In addition, some of them have benefited from equipment (presses, bottles, etc.)</p>

Cambodia

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2010
Total budget	\$9,067,305 <i>of which \$8.103m disbursements to date</i>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	<p>NIU: Ministry of Commerce (Department of International Cooperation) (MoC)</p> <p><i>Development Partners and other implementing partners:</i> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) World Bank (International Finance Corporation) (WB/IFC) United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) International Trade Centre (ITC) Shift360 Foundation</p> <p><i>Other Members of the Sub-Steering Committee on Trade Development and Trade-related Investment (Ministry of Commerce as Chair)</i> Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF) Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) General Department of Customs and Excise (GDCE) Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MoIME) Ministry of Interior (MoI) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MoAFF) Ministry of Health (MoH) Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MoPWT)</p> <p><i>Others (including project beneficiaries)</i> AMRU Rice (Cambodia) Co. Ltd Cambodia Rice Federation (CRF) Cambodia Cassava Development Association (CCDA) Marine Fisheries Association (MFA) Cambodia Chamber of Commerce (CCC) Royal Academy of Culinary Arts (RACA) Trade Training and Research Institute (TTRA) Department of Private Sector Development and Department of Notifications and Legal Compliance, Ministry of Commerce Silk Development Committee (SDC) Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) Ministry of Environment (MoE) Ministry of Tourism (MoT) Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA)</p>

	Ministry of Planning (MoP) Council of Minister (OCM)
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop an updated trade integration strategy and identify priority areas for interventions that will ultimately feed into the country's national development agenda and contribute to sustainable development - Establish institutional mechanisms and enhance Cambodia's capacity to formulate, implement, manage, and monitor pro-poor trade strategies - Strengthen and diversify the country's export supply capacity in priority sectors, including milled rice, high value silk, fisheries, cassava, and hospitality <p>Alignment to TOC:</p> <p>The two analytical support projects (DTIS Updates) are linked to Outcome 1, particularly to Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment</i>).</p> <p>There are 3 Tier 1 projects: The project on supporting national implementation arrangements (NIAs) has linkages to Outcome 1—Output 1, Output 2 (<i>Strengthened institutional coordination for trade and development</i>), and Output 3 (<i>Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation</i>). The trade mainstreaming project (E-Commerce Strategy Formulation) supports Outcome 1—Output 1. The sustainability support project has linkages to Outcome 1—Outputs 1-3 and Outcome 2—Output 1 (<i>Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets</i>), Output 2 (<i>Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains</i>), and Output 3 [<i>Support to the EIF Countries to leverage (directly and indirectly) additional resources</i>].</p> <p>There are 8 Tier 2 projects: 1 (Go4eCAM) of which contributes to Outcome 2—Output 2, and the rest support Outcome 2—Output 2 and Outcome 1—Output 3.</p> <p>Overall, EIF interventions in Cambodia have contributed to both Outcome 1 and Outcome 2, with achievements across the identified results areas at the output level, driven by strong political commitment and national ownership, institutional capacity and national coordination structures conducive for trade development and AfT coordination, and a clear vision towards structural transformation.</p> <p><i>Note: For this case study, a sampling of projects was done due to large country project size and resource constraints from the evaluation team. Projects considered in this case study include all Tier 1 projects and the Tier 2 projects on Rice and Cassava.</i></p>
National projects	<p>Completed Projects</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies Update (2013) [Phase 1, Tier 1] (ii) Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies Update (2018) [Phase 2, Tier 1]

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (iii) NIA Support (Phase 1 & 2): “Strengthening Institutional Mechanisms for Formulating, Implementing, Managing, and Monitoring Cambodia’s Trade Integration Strategy [Phase 1, Tier 1] (iv) Sustainability Support [Phase 2, Tier 1] (v) E-Commerce Strategy Formulation [Phase 2, Tier 1] (vi) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) I - Rice Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (vii) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) II - Cassava Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (viii) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) II - Marine Fishery Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (ix) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) I - Silk Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (x) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) II - Academy of Culinary Arts of Cambodia (ACAC) Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (xi) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) I - Evaluation Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] (xii) Cambodia Export Diversification and Expansion Program (CEDEP) II - Evaluation Component [Phase 1, Tier 2] <p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (xiii) Go4eCAM [Phase 2, Tier 2]
Regional projects	<p><u>Completed Projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Facilitating Cross-Border Paperless Trade in Least Developed Countries for Regional Integration and Sustainable Development (Phase 1) <p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (ii) LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status (iii) Capacity building for EIF countries on investment promotion within WAIPA activity (iv) A New Trade Policy and Strategy for ASEAN LDCs on market access and related issues

2. Context

Trade and Aid for Trade Trends in Cambodia

	2008/10 avg.	2017/19 avg.	Δ:08/10-17/19
Merchandise trade	11,059	30,285	173.8%
Exports	4,682	12,934	176.2%
Imports	6,377	17,350	172.1%
Services trade	2,592	8,188	215.9%
Exports	1,720	5,222	203.7%
Imports	872	2,966	240.0%
FDI inflows	1,089	3,233	197.0%
Aid for Trade disbursements	161.2	351.2	117.9%
of which EIF net disbursements (2010 to date): 8.103			

Note: Amounts in levels are in USD \$ millions.

Sources: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics Database; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTADSTAT; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Creditor Reporting System; and Knowledge Hub.

- Cambodia's trade structure is dominated by merchandise trade. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total merchandise trade exhibited a strong growth, driven by growth in both exports and imports. Whilst services trade account for a smaller share in the country's total trade, it exhibited a more robust growth than merchandise trade over the same period. Cambodia accounted for 0.26% and 0.36% of Asia's total merchandise and services trade, respectively, over the period 2008-2019.
- FDI to Cambodia has been generally on an upward trend over the period 2008-2019. The country's share in Asia's total FDI inflows stood at 0.74% over the same period.
- Notwithstanding the significant drop in 2015, AfT disbursements to Cambodia has been generally on an increasing trend. Over the period 2008-2019, the country accounted for 1.7% of Asia's regional AfT disbursements and 0.8% of global AfT disbursements. Overall, AfT flows to Cambodia have mainly targeted economic infrastructure (53.5% of total AfT disbursements over 2008-2019) and building productive capacities (44.9%). Since the start of EIF support in 2010, EIF disbursements accounted for 0.28% of total AfT disbursements in the country. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, strengthening national implementation arrangements, trade mainstreaming, export diversification and expansion, sustainability support, trade policy and administrative management, and trade facilitation.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country's performance has been stagnant in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Its overall logistics performance has modestly improved between 2010 and 2018. While it has seen moderate progress in overall competitiveness (particularly in improving health and education, financial market development, and technological readiness), its performance weakened in terms of institutions and labour market efficiency.
- Over the past decades, Cambodia has seen a remarkable economic growth and structural transformation. However, there are a number of downside risks to its financial and macroeconomic stability, including an expected widening of current account deficit; financial sector vulnerabilities; the recent suspension of preferential trade access under the Everything but Arms scheme (stemming from the systematic concerns related to human rights and labour rights ascertained in the country); and the negative spillover effects of rising protectionism to exports and investor confidence.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June 2021–September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, Document and Data review, E-Survey, Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions, Economic analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewed 20+ documents (EIF programme documents and technical reporting; DTISs; policy and strategy documents, etc.) • Reviewed one e-survey response (NIU Coordinator) • 5 interviews and 4 focus group discussions; interviewed 18 informants (6 women): 9 from government ministries and agencies; 5 from private sector; 2 from development partners; 1 donor; 1 EIF ES. Done both virtually (Zoom and Teams) and physically. • <i>Portfolio Review</i> covering project types and subtypes; EIF phase involvement; project approval, start, and end dates; main

	<p>implementing entities; total project costs and EIF and non-EIF contributions; regional projects where the country is a recipient</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Review of EIF databases</i>, i.e., the Results and DTIS Action Matrix databases, Management Information System • Used Value for Money Scorecard to summarise
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Variation in extent of reporting between project documents and EIF databases (both offline and online) resulting to low probability/difficulty of triangulating evidence • DICO staff turnover and loss of institutional memory among retained staff due to projects having been completed years ago • Limitations/challenges in securing responses from EIF Donor Facilitator as well as from key DICO staff who had been involved in past EIF projects • Delayed data collection due to deferred start date of National Expert • Very large volume of documents affected comprehensiveness of review

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned with national needs and consistent with the government's economic and social strategies, including the Rectangular Strategy, National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP), and Industrial Development Policy (IDP) 2015-2025. For example, Tier 2 projects respond to the need to expand the country's export basket beyond garment and footwear to agriculture and agro-processing, tourism, and services. Similarly, the DTISUs identify country needs, with the Action Matrices reflecting the related country priorities as laid out in the national development plans and strategies, as well as sector policies and strategies. (DR, S, KII)</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned with the needs of the private sector. For instance, CEDEP I & II and Go4eCAM projects engaged with private sector stakeholders in the different industries covered in these projects. Particularly under the Go4eCAM project, an e-commerce marketplace was developed to create selling opportunities for SMEs, both in domestic and cross-border markets. Private sector consultations were also conducted in the DTISUs and E-commerce Strategy Formulation projects.</p> <p>On the other hand, there is no explicit, clear evidence on the alignment of the EIF programme and projects with the needs of the civil society. Nonetheless, evidence points to some EIF projects supporting trade-related needs of more marginalised and vulnerable groups, including women and youth.</p> <p>(DR, S, KII)</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The overall scope of EIF projects in Cambodia is reflective of an adaptation to emerging EIF priorities, especially the development and/or expansion of value chains, e-commerce/digital trade, and regional integration. (DR, KII)</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
There is written expression of EIF objectives/activities/outputs adapting to changing global context, particularly trade and technological developments at the national, regional, and global levels. Moreover, the EIF ES demonstrates openness to budget programming and revisions, as well as no-cost extensions, especially in response to emerging issues such as COVID-19. (DR)		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
The DTISUs have been used as reference to identify national priorities and develop specific government interventions. For instance, the priorities set in the DTISU 2013 (also known as the Cambodia Trade Integration Strategy 2014-2018) was mainstreamed in the 4 th NSDP and the Rectangular Strategy-III. The Trade Sector Wide Approach (TradeSWAp) was also updated based on the DTISU 2013. Cambodia's e-commerce/digital economy development strategy has also been based on the recommendations provided in the DTISU 2013. (A dedicated chapter on e-commerce was also included in the DTISU 2019/CTISU 2019-2023). (DR, KII)		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	2 (DR, KII)
Written and verbal evidence points to the EIF's contribution to public sector capacity building resulting in the development of future trade policies/action plans using local resources. In particular reference to the DTISUs, the government's role as the main implementing entity in the second DTISU and its strong role and ownership in the subsequent development/updating of national development plans and sector strategies are a prima facie evidence of the DTISU's contribution to the subject at hand. (DR, KII)		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	5	2 (DR, KII)
The Tier 1 non-DTIS and Tier 2 projects strongly reflect the needs and priorities laid out in the DTISUs and Action Matrices. (DR, KII)		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	3	2 (DR, S)
Along with the conduct of private sector consultations as cited above, the DTISU validation process points to the private sector's acknowledgment of/concurrence to key issues, needs, and policy actions set out in the DTISU reports. (DR, S)		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	4	1 (DR)
Results areas in project logframes and key outputs for the analytical support project are aligned with the EIF's TOC, with broad similarity on some indicators under Outcome 1 and Outcome 2. The pathway to change has been evident across outputs 1-3 of both Outcome 1 and Outcome 2. (DR)		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	2 (DR, KII)
EIF's in-country delivery modalities (analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals, particularly in terms of (i) mainstreaming trade into national development plans and sector strategies; (ii) setting up structures (aligned with country structures) to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance; (iii) building sustainable capacity to trade and addressing supply-side constraints; (iv) leveraging resources for the development of the country's trade; and (v) promoting inclusive trade. (DR, KII)		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
On another note, and from a donor's perspective, there is a question of non-coherence of EIF initiatives and governance structures in the country context. (KII)		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Written and verbal evidence on EIF collaboration and coordination with government and other AfT initiatives. For instance, the DTISU (2013) builds on the government's TradeSWAp [which was also developed in line with the DTIS (2007) implemented under the IF]. In general, the TradeSWAp facilitated the coordination of all AfT initiatives in the country. However, trade coordination mechanisms have weakened over time following the conclusion of the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Development Support Program under TradeSWAp.</p> <p>Additionally, from the donors' side (EU), there were risks of overlap with their own ongoing trade-related projects, and proposals to build on existing donor initiatives has not been well-received nor considered when raised by the EIF. It was strongly recommended that greater synergies and complementarities between EIF and donors be pursued to maximise efforts and gains on AfT support. Specifically for the EU, EIF's greater focus on trade and private sector development would be most useful and complementary to their own AfT initiatives. EIF should improve on facilitating more effective trade coordination mechanisms and linkages to other AfT initiatives. On another note, all EIF projects are also strongly interlinked.</p> <p>(DR, KII)</p>		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	(a) 5	3 (DR, S, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	(b) 5	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	(c) 5	
c) prioritised interventions	(d) 4	
d) programming plan	(e) 5	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		
<p>(a) The DTISUs contributed to increasing knowledge on Cambodia's trade-related constraints and opportunities. For instance, the first CTISU (2014-2018) has been instrumental in providing analytical assessment and policy recommendations around the areas of legal and institutional reforms for trade development, export diversification and competitiveness, and building institutional capacities for trade sector development and AfT management. The second CTISU (2019-2023) notably identified the significance of bilateral FTAs as one priority area to advance the government's trade policy agenda and to counter the possible deterioration of trade preferences due to Cambodia's economic development and potential graduation from LDC status. Another priority area that featured prominently is e-commerce strategy, which then resulted to subsequent government interventions. (DR, S, KII)</p> <p>(b) The DTISUs have been adopted as Cambodia's Trade Integration Strategies, with the Action Matrices adopted in parallel as the government's planning tools. The DTISUs are consistent with Cambodia's overarching development policies, including the Rectangular Strategy, NSDP, and IDP; policy objectives and priority areas identified in the DTISUs have been mainstreamed into these national development policies (please also see above section on Relevance). In addition to the above examples, the e-commerce and digital economy chapters of the second DTISU have formed parts of the Digital Economy and Society Policy Framework 2021-2035. The National Silk Strategy has also been developed and being implemented, informed by the DTISU. (DR, S)</p> <p><i>*Note:</i> Under the Integrated Framework, the first DTIS (2000) led to Cambodia's WTO accession; the second DTIS (2007) led to the development of the TradeSWAp, with the TradeSWAp Roadmap having been built on the DTIS Action Matrix priorities. The TradeSWAp Roadmap, which also sets forth AfT coordination structures, served as a prototype for trade development approaches in other countries. The Roadmap also led to the creation of a trust fund structure for Cambodia's own national trade</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
development and AfT framework. An indirect impact of these activities relates to capacity building in line ministries (e.g., improved capacities to formulate projects funded by other donors/development partners).		
(c) The DTISUs have been effective in identifying national priorities and the responsible implementing agencies and line ministries. DTISUs have been essentially utilised to develop follow-up government and/or AfT interventions. In addition to the aforementioned examples, the Go4eCAM project was formulated to implement the actions identified in the second DTISU's E-commerce and Digital Economy chapters. Other components of the Go4eCAM also seek to solve the issues of digital skills and access to finance—vital factors to build the country's strong e-commerce ecosystem. (DR, S)		
(d) After the launch of CTISU 2019-2023 (i.e., the second DTISU), a donor mapping process was done with the support of EU-funded ARISE+ Cambodia program. The donor mapping document was intended to be used as a resource mobilisation tool to support the implementation of the CTISU. However, with the COVID-19 outbreak resulting to government spending cuts and diverted attention from donors toward the pandemic response, the utilisation of the document has become difficult. Nonetheless, donors, such as UNDP and Australia have recently allocated financial support toward the implementation of certain parts of interest in the CTISU. (S)		
(e) The DTISUs contributed to the formulation of succeeding EIF projects. Additionally, some donors have taken interest in utilising the DTISUs and aligning their respective programmes/projects accordingly. For instance, the DTISUs have been influential in the development of the World Bank's paper on Cambodia's Future Jobs: Linking to the Economy of Tomorrow and their research into potential service sector for export, such as animation services. Similarly, ADB has recently expressed interest in supporting a study on FTA utilisation strategy to find ways for Cambodia to optimally exploit preferences under an FTA. Interventions on the silk sector were also provided by other development partners including CBI of the Netherlands which supported the export of home textile. (DR, S)		
Extent of implementation of the AM	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
Challenges in the implementation of the Action Matrices has been recognised. Evidence is lacking on the extent of implementation of the CTISU 2014-2018. As for the more recent CTISU 2019-2023, a survey has been developed and sent out to line ministries to update progress on the implementation of their respective actions. [However, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused delays in responses from line ministries and the development of CTIS implementation report. There is an expressed commitment from the Ministry of Commerce to finalise the CTIS2019-2023 mid-term implementation report by end of 2021.] (DR, S, KII)		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
There were two updates to the original Action Matrix (published under the Integrated Framework) under the EIF's DTIS Updates projects. (DR, S, KII)		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
[Please see above responses] Additionally, EIF support through the CEDEP projects has led to the conduct of value chain studies, which in turn, resulted to the development of sector strategies with clear trade-oriented targets.		
<i>*Note:</i> Under the Integrated Framework, the first DTIS (2000) led to Cambodia's WTO accession; the second DTIS (2007) led to the development of the TradeSWAp, with the TradeSWAp Roadmap having been built on the DTIS Action Matrix priorities. The TradeSWAP Roadmap, which also sets forth AfT coordination structures, served as a prototype for trade development approaches in other countries. The Roadmap also led to the creation of a trust fund structure for Cambodia's own national trade development and AfT framework. An indirect impact of these activities relates to capacity building in line ministries (e.g., improved capacities to formulate projects funded by other donors/development partners).		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	3 (DR, S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
[Please see above]		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	2 (DR, S)
The EIF supported the country's participation in international trade fora, including through the following and around the areas of: Cambodia's 2 nd Trade Policy Review, participation in the 11 th Ministerial Conference, e-commerce initiatives, regional workshops, and trade facilitation forums, among others.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	3	2 (DR, S)
Regional integration forms part of some of Cambodia's project-level objectives/outputs or thematic coverage (e.g., in the DTISUs, Sustainability Support, CEDEP-Rice and Cassava projects). The country is also a beneficiary of 4 EIF regional projects around the areas of cross-border paperless trade, LDC graduation, capacity building for EIF countries on investment promotion, and trade facilitation with focus on market access and related issues among ASEAN LDCs. (DR)		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	3	2 (KII, S)
Local and overseas training and workshops were conducted with participation from government officials of the NIU. The training activities include local training on English language, project management, M&E and communication; and overseas training on financial management and contract administration. To facilitate the engagement of line ministries in trade initiatives, the MoC has created a network of liaison officers from 7 line ministries and provided capacity-building support. (KII, S)		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	4	3
Written evidence on the existence of information dissemination activities/tools (e.g., ranging from traditional paper-based tools to digital ones), with 3 activities/tools marked as conforming to EIF branding guidelines. Additionally, there are 17 entries in the Trade for Development News, with evidence stories around the areas of agricultural trade, trade policy, MSMEs, youth and women empowerment, and e-commerce and trade facilitation through digital trade facilitation. (DR)		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	5	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EIF support through the CEDEP projects has led to the conduct of value chain studies, which in turn, resulted to the development of sector strategies with clear trade-oriented targets. (KII) EIF's support on sectoral export capacity is part of a bigger programme implemented by the IFC. Under the rice project for example, EIF's focus is on market development and rice miller capacity. The project is a success story, with the country's rice exports increasing by an estimated 150% over the course of the project. However, this success had also been met by challenges when the EU limited its volume of rice imports from Cambodia, following Italy's request to impose restrictions against Cambodian rice to protect against trade imbalances. A key factor to the success of the rice project was the targeted support based on the value chain analysis and public-private partnership intervention model. Similarly in the cassava project, the value chain approach was adopted, but more remains to be done to realise its success. Among others, these include increasing productivity in the sector and enhancing processing capacities. Key challenges include infrastructure constraints, price elasticities, and market conditions that are much more favourable to China's cassava production and exports. However, with an International Fund for Agriculture Development project supporting cassava development programme, UNDP (the development partner for the project) managed to secure a funding of \$150 million to conduct an impact investment (i.e., impact assessment) of Cambodia's cassava sector. (KII, DR) 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	4	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some of the key milestones in Cambodia's e-commerce agenda are the introduction of the e-commerce and consumer protection laws, as well as the development of its e-commerce and digital economy strategies. While e-commerce has certainly gained traction in government priorities, there is a question of attribution of positive gains to donors, including the EIF and the EU. [As from the donor's perspective (EU), there is an expressed concern of less visibility in the country with regard to e-commerce development initiatives and late involvement (part of their frustrations with the EIF).] (KII) Through the Go4eCAM project, EIF contributed to helping SMEs utilise e-commerce for domestic and cross-border sales, particularly through an online marketplace fully integrated with e-payment and logistics services. (S) 		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	3	1
Relevant activities supported by EIF include the conduct of a dissemination workshop on Trade Facilitation Agreement and Trade Progress in Regional and WTO Framework and an Export Facilitation Manual under another CEDEP project. (DR)		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	3	1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EIF has contributed to capacity-building efforts in sector-specific organisations supporting trade. In particular, it supported the creation of the Cambodia Rice Federation, the Silk Sector Promotion and Development Commission, the Cassava Development Association, fisheries associations, and e-commerce associations. (KII) In CEDEP I and II Tier 2 projects, core team members for each MIE were formulated, with members benefitting from training and capacity building programmes. For example, in CEDEP II-Casava component implemented by UNDP, the project team and core team members received training series on trade and development, Aft and SWAP, WTO and Cambodia, and value chain and export. (S) 		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	2	1 (DR)
Through the CEDEP-Cassava, Rice, and Silk projects, EIF supported a number of trade fairs, benefitting 40 people overall (24 of which women) and MSMEs, with data from a recent set of activities showing a total of 300 orders amounting to \$200,000. Location of trade of trade fairs include Germany, the US, France, Japan, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, China, Malaysia, and within the country. (DR)		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	3	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Written expression that the EIF ES and TFM have provided support on the (i) design of monitoring systems, including the logical framework and indicators for projects; (ii) regular monitoring of project progress, including guidance and feedback on reporting; (iii) financial management, including timely payments; (iv) audit; (v) global communications and outreach; (vi) capacity building and training; and to a lesser extent on (vii) management information system, (viii) risk management, and (ix) guidance and monitoring of value for money. (S) From a donor's perspective, EIF governance is not functioning quite well. Donors need to be involved in EIF projects at an early stage. There's a strong appeal for donors to be involved upstream in order to improve/better facilitate the implementation of EIF projects and overall Aft initiatives in-country. [Please also see related findings from other sections] (KII) 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	2
Written expression that EIF operational systems and processes at the country-level are supporting project design, project management and delivery, project and delivery, and (to a lesser extent) project oversight. Similar written expression that the EIF FP, NIU, NSC, and EIF are delivering their intended mandates and governance functions, albeit with the latter two at a less extent. (S)		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	1
The TFM supported the needs and changes of circumstances for project implementation, particularly through granting no-cost extensions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (S)		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	3	3
<p>In terms of time efficiency: All Tier 1 interventions experienced implementation delays, with reasons relating to changes in government arrangements at that time, parallel implementation of government and other EIF and non-EIF development projects, and the COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>In terms of resource use efficiency: Nearly 90% of total project cost were disbursed. There is written expression of leveraging technical support from others (e.g., development partners) to carry out project activities efficiently to the extent possible, but clear evidence from interviews is lacking. (DR)</p> <p>Interviews from non-national stakeholders also generally point to efficiency issues.</p> <p>Overall, despite implementation delays, most outputs were delivered as initially planned. (DR, KII)</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	3	3
<p>Similar to Tier 1, resource use efficiency is considered satisfactory but timeliness is unsatisfactory. Contributing factors to inefficiency include the need for additional capacity building and delays in operationalising the core teams, among others. Nonetheless, it was considered that the use of international organisations as MIEs for CEDEP sector projects with the MoC-DICO as NIU was an efficient use of technical and financial resources. (DR)</p> <p>Interviews from non-national stakeholders, however, note that, to date, inefficiency remains a key issue. For example, on support targeted to e-commerce for small and medium-sized enterprises, the field is a bit crowded with support coming from different stakeholders (the Government, UNDP, USAID, EIF). There is certainly a need for reactivate trade coordination mechanisms and better leverage resources to more efficiently implement project activities and achieve better results. (KII)</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	1
There is a general favourable response on the subject matter, but further details are lacking.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	1
Cambodia has been among the most affected countries by the pandemic. There have been a number of project implementation delays. For example, under the Go4eCAM project, delays relate to the identification and selection of participating SMEs, training activities, and stakeholder engagements. (S)		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	5	3
EIF support under both Tier 1 and Tier 2 interventions has led to improved economic participation of women, youth, and MSMEs, including in rural areas, including through job creation (over 800 jobs created, 99 for women under the CEDEP projects) and increased domestic and cross-border business activities. (DR)		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	5	3
EIF support has helped Cambodia to strengthen its participation in regional and global trading systems under both Tier 1 and Tier 2 interventions. (DR)		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
The DTISU/AM processes and priorities match in content and coincide with other regulatory and policy reform initiatives, especially on e-trade priorities. As to the integration of EIF initiatives into government systems, the NIU meets all of the five criteria: (i) it is physically housed in a government ministry (Ministry of Commerce); (ii) government officials form part of the NIU (27 government officials, 13 female, paid by the government); (iii) the NIU is formally in the ministry organigramme and/or there is a formal ministry government decision for the integration of the function and tasks of the NIU; (iv) the NIU has a role in coordinating technical assistance, and/or other roles for the ministry (including resource mobilisation and management, project implementation, and M&E of projects or trade-related technical assistance); and (v) the NIU team facilitates the coordination of inter-sectoral bodies related to trade. In addition, line ministries are encouraged to mainstream their project related activities into their annual budget plans. MoC has initiated the activity mapping exercise to integrate the activities for each of the departments in the line ministries into their respective work plans. (DR, S, KII)		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	5	3 (DR, KII)
The Cambodian Government takes ownership of the DTIS/AM. The Government also acts as the main implementing entity in 7 of the 13 national projects. The use of government systems and procedures (e.g., human resources, financial resources and management, procurement); the utilisation of local expertise for the execution of project activities; and the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders are also a reflection of national ownership. (DR, KII)		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	3	3 (S, KII)
<p>Evidence on the sustainability of EIF initiatives is mixed at best. For instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EIF has supported government capacity in the areas of trade policy formulation and implementation, trade policy making structures and processes, policy coordination, and developing the skills and competencies of staff—all of which contribute to the potential sustainability of EIF interventions and results. (S) • EIF has also supported the establishment of the Cambodia Trade Integration Strategy Steering Committee. After the validation of the last DTIS Update in 2019, the committee was turned into a CTIS Monitoring Committee and is still functioning up to this day. The Committee continues to review the implementation of the DTIS Action Matrix annually. It may be quite premature to assess its sustainability at this stage, but Cambodia's example on establishing such a committee is encouraged in other countries. The Committee has also replaced the structures under the TradeSWAp, which ended since the TDSP concluded. (Partly due to lack of donor funding since the end of TDSP, the TradeSWAp coordination structures did not prove to be sustainable.) (KII) • Gleaning from Tier 2 project results: The Rice component of CEDEP was a success story with joint support from different stakeholders/programmes, including the Government, the EIF, and the Trade Development Support Program (financed by the multi-donor trust fund administered by the World 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>Bank and funded by EU, Danida, and UNIDO). The project had been sustainable (both financially and technically) with substantial impacts to the country's rice sector. Strong advocacy and well-functioning stakeholder groups (including the private sector) were notable. [With regard to attribution of the project's success, it was emphasised that the project was a result of joint efforts from multiple stakeholders.] However, some Tier 2 projects proved to have weak sustainability (e.g., the ACAC component of CEDEP II). (KII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One significant downside risk to the sustainability of EIF and overall AfT interventions and results pertains to the country's infrastructure constraints. EIF support has largely focused on exports and productive capacities of sectors. However, infrastructure challenges continue to hamper the competitiveness of export sectors. The Government has to increase its infrastructure investments to shore up the competitiveness and productivity of sectors with great trade potential (beyond the sectors that EIF has supported thus far). (KII) • Another downside risk to the sustainability of AfT interventions and results is the lack of monitoring and evaluation capacity among relevant government entities. In the past, the DICO of the Ministry of Commerce has heavily relied on external consultants for M&E activities. The M&E capacity and functions of the Ministry itself and other line ministries have to be strengthened not only to better manage and carry out AfT activities but more so to implement the country's sector strategies and achieve its national trade and development targets. (KII) • Ultimately, if Cambodia meets the criteria for LDC graduation in the next few years, it needs to find other sources to keep its momentum on the trade development agenda. AfT flows to the country have declined over the years, whilst loans have become an increasing external source for its trade development. To boost the country's capacity on using external sources for its trade development agenda, it has to steer its focus on promoting FDI to productive sectors that have been supported by AfT, including by EIF. (KII) 		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	4	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Previously under the Ministry of Commerce's Trade Development Support Program (TDSP) and with EIF support, trade coordination mechanisms with development partners, donors, and the private sector had been performing quite well. However, the robustness of these high-level trade coordination structures has weakened since the conclusion of the TDSP. (KII) • To date, there are a few coordination mechanisms between government and donors. These include the Government Donor Partnership Forum, Government Donor Coordination Committee, and Technical Working Group in Cambodia/Government Donor Joint Technical Working group, which are led by Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) on behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia. (S, DR) • As for government-private sector coordination mechanisms, the Government Private Sector Forum (GPSF) was established, primarily to improve the business environment and promote private sector investment through a demand driven process, ideally with the private sector raising issues and recommending solutions. 10 private sector working groups have been formulated to meet at least once a year to identify and prioritise problems and propose solutions to government counterparts. One project-level example is with the Go4eCAM project where the project team works closely with e-commerce associations to assist them with capacity building and institutional support. (S) <p>Overall, there are expressed concerns from the EIF ES and donor about the weakened robustness and sustainability of the country's trade coordination mechanisms. (KII)</p>		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	4	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is written expression that the EIF has successfully leveraged additional resources such that results can continue beyond the current phase, including through government staff time or in-kind contribution, government budget, donor/development partner funding, donor technical assistance, and (to a lesser extent) private sector financing and philanthropic funding. (S) • EIF has served a catalytic role in securing further support for specific export sectors (e.g., cassava, rice) from different groups of stakeholders, including the private sector, government donors (e.g., the Netherlands), and other development organisations (e.g., Oxfam). Another example is in terms of obtaining support relating to the development of the country's e-commerce strategy including on 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
improving logistics services to facilitate e-commerce. (KII) Particularly under the Go4eCAM project, EIF has leveraged additional resources from the government, development partners (e.g., UNDP, Australia), and the private sector (e.g., Alibaba, Khmer Enterprise; albeit generally remaining limited for the private sector). For instance, a Financing Agreement between MoC and UNDP Cambodia has been signed to implement Track II of the project, which focuses on skills and entrepreneurship for e-commerce (SME eBiznest). Khmer Enterprise also formed part of this collaboration and contributed funds for the implementation of the project. Under this initiative, two programmes have been designed: the MSMEs incubation on Business Digitalization (launched in August 2021) and the Innovation Challenge on Business Digitalisation and E-Commerce Acceleration. The former aims to promote the adoption of digital technologies to support MSMEs' business models, particularly through skills, knowledge and attitude development toward e-commerce and digitalisation. The latter has been designed as a platform to provide MSMEs with the opportunity to challenge their innovative solutions for an award amounting to \$5,000 to finance moving part or whole of their business operations online, and/or entering into a cross-border e-commerce operation through dedicated e-marketplaces, including the MoC's "CambodiaTrade.com". The programme is intended to demonstrate the benefits gained by MSMEs through leveraging digital technology and e-commerce to achieve a broader reach of clientele in both national and international markets. The MoC has also been working with Swisscontact Cambodia on drafting an MoU on the support to interface the development of UNCTAD's and Universal Postal Union's Electronic Advance Data and upgrade of Cambodia Post based on its actual needs. The initiative is intended to contribute to ensuring synergies and complementarities in terms of Cambodia Post's readiness for system integration with and promoting provincial SMEs' readiness for their online presence on e-commerce platforms. Additionally, an MoU with logistics and payment solutions to fully integrate API systems into the Cambodia trade market has been adopted. (S, KII)		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	3	1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey response points to the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has undermined already achieved results from EIF support. However, further details are lacking how this came through/how is this so. (S) 		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and associated projects are aligned with the needs and national priorities of Cambodia, including that of the private sector. The EIF in Cambodia has also been able to adapt to the evolving development context of the country and maintain its relevance to emerging EIF global priorities and changing context, including the development and/or expansion of value chains, digital trade, and regional integration. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted Cambodia, and the EIF has adapted to the new context through budget programming and revisions, workplan adjustments, and grants of no cost extensions.
- Coherence:** EIF national projects in Cambodia are broadly aligned with the programme's TOC and seeking complementarities with other development interventions in-country. The country also serves as a best practice example of high complementarity between projects. However, the robustness of coordination structures and mechanisms for development interventions from foreign aid has weakened over time. There is a recognised need to reactivate these structures/mechanisms to facilitate greater synergies and complementarities and maximise gains from aid-for-trade.
- Effectiveness:** EIF interventions have been effective in building the institutional and human resource capacity of relevant government agencies, trade mainstreaming and facilitating policy reforms, increasing the country's participation in international trading system, export diversification and expansion of value chains, and enhancing the trade capacities of key beneficiaries and their participation in international markets (including MSMEs and women). EIF

operational systems and processes have also been relatively effective in supporting the Cambodia's achievement of results and in improving country performance. However, there is a call to improve governance structures and coordination mechanisms, particularly in order to involve donors and leverage resources more effectively. Overall, EIF interventions have been generally effective in Cambodia, but this cannot be solely attributed to EIF given that the EIF was only one investor alongside others.

- **Efficiency:** Overall efficiency of EIF interventions has been generally satisfactory with moderate shortcomings primarily regarding timely delivery of outputs. However, there were some disruptions to project implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- **Sustainability:** EIF initiatives are well-integrated into government priorities, structures, and processes, with the country demonstrating a strong ownership of the initiatives. Sustainability of EIF initiatives is mixed at best, with some downside risks including infrastructure constraints, lack of M&E capacity among relevant government agencies and the country's potential graduation from LDC status.
- **Impact:** EIF interventions have contributed to sustainable and inclusive development, as well as strengthening Cambodia's integration in international trading systems.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	Notwithstanding the existence of sample measures to ensure efficiency and value for money (e.g., time and resource use efficiency), there is no systematic reporting and monitoring against VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	3	Principles of competitiveness and transparency were followed by MIEs in some projects. In the CEDEP Cassava project for instance, UNDP procured goods and services through its Program and Operations Policies and Procedures and recruited staff in accordance with UNDPs recruitment and selection framework. For DICO-MIE-NIU, recruitment, procurement, approval of payments, and accounting followed the Cambodian Government's procurement and financial rules as stipulated in the Government's Procurement Manual. The rules and instruments agreed upon with UNOPS under EIF Tier 1 were also followed.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	3	Resource use efficiency has been considered generally satisfactory, with some evidence of effective leveraging of technical and financial resources. However, as the robustness of coordination mechanisms has declined in recent years, there is scope for minimising duplications and maximising synergies.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	3	The integration of NIU into the government system; existence of trade coordination mechanisms/structures between the government and donor and private sector; and successful leveraging of additional resources [e.g., government human and financial resources, donor/development partner funding, private sector financing (albeit remaining limited)] are cumulative indications of good prospect for sustainability of EIF activities.

	Score	Narrative
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	4	Overall, the NIU and FP provided good leadership on EIF operational processes and governance structures. Projects were relatively well managed and national ownership became more evident over time. Governance and project accountability processes were relatively clearly described and generally implemented properly, including via financial and progress reporting obligations to the EIF, albeit with delays in some cases.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	The EIF ES and TFM has generally demonstrated adaptability to enhance the delivery of project activities and, to the extent possible, mitigate risks in-country. For instance, project extensions have been granted and workplans, budget plans or delivery modalities are adjusted where necessary and justified (e.g., due to complexities in in-country procedures/processes, COVID-19 impacts), allowing EIF in Cambodia to bring interventions to completion. Risk assessments and mitigation strategies were also generally included in project designs, with many of such strategies incorporated into actual project activities.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	There is mixed evidence on the equity of program design and delivery. While the economic empowerment of women and MSMEs is included as a cross-cutting priority of some EIF interventions, the integration of gender in project design and implementation is quite limited to gender-disaggregated indicators of beneficiaries in other projects. On the other hand, for some projects, private sector engagement features more prominently as either one of the primary or secondary objectives with some relevant indicators to track progress.

Comoros

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2011
Total budget	\$7,259,153.78
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and 2
Context	LDC, Small-island state
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Trade - Comorian business movement (MODEC) - National Tourist Board (ONT)
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are four Tier 1 projects in Comoros which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, all four projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment', two projects have linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment', and two projects have linkages to output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are two (2) Tier 2 projects in Comoros which therefore align under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 2, both projects have strong linkages with output 1 'Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets' and output 2 'Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains'. Moreover, one project has linkages with output 3 'support to the EIF countries to leverage additional resources'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTIS Update - NIA Support (Ph1 & Ph2) - Sustainability Support - Mainstreaming Support to WTO Accession - Improving the competitiveness of exports in the vanilla, ylang ylang and clove sectors <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Valorisation and Sustainable Development of the Comorian Eco-Tourism Potential
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Context

- The Comoros archipelago is located in the Indian Ocean, north of the Mozambique Channel and north-east of Madagascar. It has a total land area of 1,861 km², with an estimated population of 869,595 inhabitants.
- Over the last decade, Comoros' trade balance has been constantly negative, and services (mostly tourism) have dominated the export structure, totalling \$104 million in 2018, up from \$56 million from 2008. By contrast, although merchandise exports experienced a 700% growth over the same period, they only totalled 41.2 million in 2019. Characterised by a

strong lack of diversification, Comoros product exports is mainly composed of three cash crops: cloves (44.2% in 2018), vanilla (16.3%), and ylang ylang (31.8%). Those products were supported by the EIF.

- On another note, FDI inflows have experienced a strong decrease in 2012/2013 and have since then been trending up slowly. In 2019, FDI inflows amounted to \$7.8 million, down from \$23 million in 2011.
- In 2019, aid for trade (AfT) disbursements accounted for 2.9% of the country's GDP, or 1.3% on average over the period 2008-2019. From an annual average of \$9 million in 2008-2016, AfT disbursements more than tripled, reaching an average of \$31 million in 2017-2019. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements to Comoros accounted for 0.1% of Africa's regional AfT disbursements. The EIF has assisted Comoros since 2011, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$7.2 million and accounting for 4.4% of total AfT disbursements since 2011. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, trade facilitation, institutional capacity support and support to supply chains.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country's performance has only increased slightly in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Comoros is now around 33 percentage points away from the global best regulatory performance in trading across borders. In terms of the overall ease of doing business, similar progress has been made (an increase of 2 percentage points) which remains far from the best regulatory performance (i.e., 52 percentage points away from the best performance).
- The Comoros economy was hit hard by the adverse effects of COVID-19 in 2020 after being hit hard in 2019 by Cyclone Kenneth. The country has chosen a non-confinement strategy, but has closed its borders and introduced a curfew. The archipelago's economic isolation has led to a decline in real GDP of 0.9%, compared to 2% growth in 2019, due to a decline in cash crop exports and tourism.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	1 August 2021 to 30 September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-Survey; Economic Analysis.
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-Survey (answers from the NIU) Documents reviewed across Comoros' 8 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOUs (and MOU Amendments) - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budgets (and Budget Revisions) - Work Plans - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Comoros' Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Project Tiers (1 or 2) - Project Phase (1 or 2) - Main Implementing Entities <p>Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria</p>

Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low response rate on e-survey, - Limited availability of data and documents, - Discrepancies between EIF results in framework data and country-level project data.
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4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	2 (DR, S)
<p>The objectives of the EIF are fully aligned with the national development plan, whether with the SCA2D, the DSRP (2010-2014), the medium-term plan for trade integration (2012-2015) or the Comoros Emerging Plan (PCE), more particularly in Catalyst 4 “Structural reforms for a competitive environment”, Objective 4.1 “Foster the advent of a dynamic and competitive domestic private sector and attract foreign direct investment”.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	2 (DR, S)
<p>The EIF projects are well aligned to the needs of the private sector targeting small production units, associations of producers, traders, etc. The Tier 2 Agribusiness initiative provides strong evidence of such alignment. Results include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The organisation of producers into 19 cooperatives and a union of ylang ylang cooperatives and the strengthening of their management and negotiation capacities, - The improvement of production and preparation techniques in the three sectors, and - The design of a financial product adapted to the capacities of these new structures and to the configuration of the Comorian market. <p>Moreover, in line with outcome 1 of the EIF theory of change “improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth”, the Government has implemented many reforms such as the establishment of the Commercial Court in February 2020 and a platform for public-private dialogue in August 2020.</p> <p>Lastly, in 2021, the Government affirmed its willingness to support the emerging of a robust private sector by the creation of the Export Promotion Support Service (CAPEX) by The Union of Chambers of Commerce of Industry and Agriculture of Comoros (UCCIA). It should provide support and accompaniment services for the benefit of Comorian producers and exporters, throughout the value chain, from production to processing, export and, marketing of products exported to the regional and international market.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF contributed to the development of environmentally friendly trade practices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Within the context of the Tier 2 Agribusiness project, the NIU supported the adoption of environmentally friendly approaches to production, with emphasis on a shift towards organic agricultural practices. - Under the ongoing Tier 2 project for the promotion of ecotourism in Comoros, activities were developed to promote waste treatment and marketing of recycled products for the preservation of the ecotourism environment. The young winners of the competition organized for the start-up on the occasion of the sustainable tourism week that the EIF financed, benefited from a financing of 21 000 USD to start their projects. These young people were able to start their activity thanks to these funds and the assistance of ANPI. 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The EIF contributed to the support of producer associations in specific value chains.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Within the Context of the project on Improving the Export Competitiveness of the Vanilla, Ylang-Ylang and Clove sector in Comoros, the NIU supported the establishment of 19 cooperatives and 1 union of ylang ylang producers. Their capacities were also built on cooperatives and union management and on negotiation of their products. <p>The EIF supported the country's regional integration.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In March 2018, the Government received support in the regional negotiations for the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) leading to the signature of the Agreement by the Head of State. <p>However, despite strong participation of women in various EIF-supported training, actual economic empowerment of women is not established.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The coronavirus pandemic substantially impacted the Tier 2 eco-tourism project. The project is bearing the brunt of the consequences of the pandemic. The global situation and the preventive measures taken at the national level have a substantial impact on the implementation of the project. These include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exchange rate fluctuations that impacted project budget, - Difficulties in meeting the WP and the budget - Disruption of the logical framework results in chain - Non-compliance with delivery deadlines for contracted contracts - Increased costs related to services or deliverables - The problem of technical validation bringing together an audience - The impossibility of undertaking activities requiring international expertise <p>The disruption of the Government's agenda by the crisis impacting the supervision of the project, For the implementation of measures to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 on the execution of the project, response actions mainly focused on the reallocation of funds on activities aimed at strengthening local and national tourism in the center.</p> <p>Mitigation measures have therefore been sought by the NIU. It requested and obtained the readjusting of the activities as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The reorientation of specific activities by focusing on the local market in terms of skills and opportunities. - Redefining performance indicators. - The inclusion of buffers in budget estimates and indication of areas where expenditure could be reduced. - Adjusting procurement rules by taking into account the unforeseeable nature of the pandemic - Revision of the timing of the purchase plan - The main objective is to support the ONTC in organizing the sustainable tourism week. <p>In July 2021, it was reported that \$563,510 had been spent out of the \$1,500,000 planned budget, corresponding to an execution rate of 37.57%. However, at the same period, the implementation rate was of 70.36% despite the consequences of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This is evidence of adaptation. Overall, one could say that mitigation measures have helped maintain, if not increase, the pace of the implementation.</p>		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	4	3

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The DTIS and its action matrix have been integrated into the DSCR developed in 2009 and covering 2010-2014.</p> <p>The Government was also able to highlight the 18 priority projects for trade integration through the preparation of its Medium-Term Plan for Trade Integration (2012-2015), and its accelerated mobilization strategy for aid for Trade, to which a document identifying priority needs in terms of institutional capacity building has been attached. These actions have enabled the Government of the Union of Comoros to make tangible progress in modernizing its economy.</p> <p>The Government of Comoros developed a Trade policy paper in 2013, with the support of UNCTAD and UNDP. A roadmap accompanies the document out of the various trade policy tools available to Comoros in pursuit of poverty reduction and regional integration.</p> <p>The Government of Comoros developed the Agricultural strategy in 2016. The EIF supported technically through NIU staff expertise during the elaboration of the strategy. Trade is included in the strategy in its Axis 2 "Intensify production and increase the competitiveness of the sectors".</p> <p>The Government of Comoros developed the Industrial strategy in 2017. The EIF contributed financially by supporting the draft version of the strategy used for the validation workshop. To enact this strategy, appropriate export and investment development programs are necessary. To this end, two strategic interventions have been programmed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Intervention 7: Strengthening Export and Investment Promotion - Strategic Intervention 8: Promoting Regional Integration in the Industrialization Process <p>The Government of Comoros has developed the National Tourism Strategy (2019-2035). The EIF supported technically in the elaboration of the strategy. The strategy should make it possible to remove the constraints and improve the destination's attractiveness and the revenues from tourism.</p>		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	3
See answer above.		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	3	1
<p>All EIF Tier 1 and Tier 2 project effectively reflect the needs and priorities in DITS. The 2007 DTIS was prepared in a context marked by recurrent political instability, a sluggish economy, and a significant lack of interest in TFPs for Comoros. The DTIS 2007 proposed a series of actions, which, if put in place, could have revitalized the economy, accelerated Trade, and, ultimately, reduced poverty in a sustainable way. Unfortunately, many actions were based on the assumption that priority projects would be carried out at the same time on the basis of individual and institutional capacities that were lacking. While the 2007 DTIS was recognized as a "trigger" for the TFP's focus on supporting the productive sector and Trade, it would have been helpful to take account of the fundamental capacities of national actors in its implementation. The response of the Government and technical and financial partners since 2008 to the integration of Trade into development policies and partnership strategies is an undeniable factor of success, particularly under the impetus of the EIF program in Comoros.</p>		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>At the national level, there is always a need for ongoing dialogue with all development stakeholders.</p> <p>The National Steering Committee (CDN), a body for the programming of the activities of the Annual Work Plan, is composed of representatives of civil society (FCC), the Chamber of Commerce (UCCIA),</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>the General Planning Commission (CGP), Executives of the Ministry in charge of Trade, the Representative of the Facilitating Countries and all sectoral beneficiaries of the Program.</p> <p>Interviews observed that the EIF in-country actions usually include sectoral dialogue groups and consultation with the Comorian Business Movement (MODEC), the principal private sector organization.</p> <p>Stakeholders consulted during the DTIS process include civil society organizations such as Comoros Union of Chambers of Commerce (UCCIA), the national fishing company, COMPECHE, producers' associations (SNAC, FNAC, young farmers), exporters (VANIA COM, CVP, BIO COM, YAHANA SARL), consumers' associations, the FSFC. Discussions revolved around the marketing strategy. The association of banks and the central bank of the Comoros were consulted to address export financing and competitiveness. Logistics and investment facilitation were also the subject of a meeting with the ASYCUDA service, the Ministry of Transport, the company Boloré, SORNAV, ANPI and the Diaspora Commission.</p>		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	1 (DR)
The project logframes are well aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe (see context section 1 for details on projects linked to specific outcomes).		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	2
<p>Comoros is among the countries which has benefited from the EIF in a very comprehensive manner:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analytical support (DTISU) - Institutional capacity support (NIA Support Ph1 & Ph2) - Sustainability support - Trade Mainstreaming (Mainstreaming support to WTO Accession) - Supply-side capacity support (1. Improving the competitiveness of exports in the vanilla, ylang ylang and clove sectors; 2. Valorisation and Sustainable Development of the Comorian Eco-Tourism Potential) <p>Having two Tier 2 projects implemented/ongoing is additional evidence of good delivery of the EIF.</p>		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	4	2
<p>In Comoros, the NIU's mandate includes coordination with development partners in the implementation and mobilization of resources for joint projects. In this regard, the NIU has been able to concretize several projects.</p> <p>UNIDO is currently developing and implementing an EU-funded project in Comoros (APILE- Support Program for Production, Industrialization and Free Trade in Comoros). The EU mandates EIF to coordinate the different programme components locally with the technical support of UNIDO and ITC. For instance, the mobilization of € 6,000,000 for the establishment of an entrepreneurship incubator; the Promotion of Public-Private Dialogue and the Promotion of quality and the "Made in Comoros" brand. During project development, EIF assisted and supported UNIDO in the information collection and logistical support for organizing the local workshops and validation meetings with national stakeholders.</p> <p>The NIU also supported the development of a project to enhance the value of annuity products, as part of the implementation of the UK-EPA with the ITC by mobilizing \$1,266,117.</p> <p>The EIF is engaged with Meck Moroni and the Embassy of France to finance and implement the SUBUTI business creation support program. The funding and action partnership between THE MECK-Moroni (Project Management) and the Reinforced Integrated Framework (financial partner and member of the support committee) for the establishment of a support system to promote the creation</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>of a company dedicated to agro-processing, to boost the local productive fabric of the Union of Comoros and promote job creation.</p> <p>The SUBUTI program! ("Ose!", in shikomori) is designed to set up a partnership fund associating a second financial partner (the Embassy of France to the Union of Comoros), to allow the release by the MECK of a line of credit intended to promote the support of an entrepreneurial project with the mobilization of 120,000 Euros of which The EIF has paid the Partner Bank a subsidy of 30,000 EUR for guarantee fund intended to cover 25% of the capital losses on the credits supported by the project. In the context of this program, three government-donor coordination meetings were held in 2020.</p> <p>Lastly, and as mentioned in 1.3 Effectiveness, the DTIS leveraged funding. As a result, the following projects build on the 2015 DTIS AM.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WTO project on standards and trade development facility (SPS), - ADB-financed project on institutional capacity building (tax department, public procurement and regulatory agency), - AFD project to finance cash crop sectors, - COMESA project (EU-finance) for the implementation of the electronic window at the customs level (also with the customs). 		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs: a) increasing knowledge b) increased mainstreaming of trade c) prioritised interventions d) programming plan e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM	a) 4 b) 4 c) 4 d) 4 e) N/A	2 (DR, KII)
<p>a) The DTIS prepared in 2007 is the first attempt to have a strategic and technical framework to develop the country's trade capacity, propose the structural reforms that the sector needed and draw the attention of technical and financial partners (TFPs) to the considerable potential available to Comoros. DTIS 2007 was produced under the supervision of the Trade and Human Development Section of the UNDP Geneva office. It called on multiple skills (UN agencies, international and national consultants) to draw up a document rich in recommendations and avenues for development and trade integration.</p> <p>b) The response of the Government and technical and financial partners since 2008 to the integration of Trade into development policies and partnership strategies is an undeniable factor of success, particularly under the impetus of the EIF program in Comoros. The DTIS and its action matrix have been integrated into the DSCRDP developed in 2009 and covering the period 2010-2014, in the two cycles of the SCA2D 2015 - 2021 and the PCE 2020 - 2030. This shows the importance of the lessons learned from both DTIS.</p> <p>c) The DTISU 2015 links various sectors, government departments and disparate strategies and action plans within a common framework and has a results framework attached to it (with pillars, and outcomes). The DTISU 2015 also includes roadmaps broken down into objectives, outputs and actions proposing a prioritisation of actions and measures, with indications of responsibilities and timetable for action.</p> <p>d) Concerning the integration of Trade into the country's national development strategies and plans, technical and advocacy notes for the integration of the trade dimension in the SCA2D, as well as support for the development of Priority Action Plans (PAPs). Diagnostic studies relating</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
to the Private, Tourism, and Fisheries sectors have been developed to feed into the Private Sector Chapter, which is part of the updating of the DTIS. e) N/A		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The Comoros Tier 1 EIF project started in April 2011 for 3 years. The total amount of the project is \$1,385,400. It was initially implemented by UNDP before moving to the Ministry in charge of Trade as the primary implementing entity, supported by UNMO, now integrated into the Directorate-General for Economy and Foreign Trade.</p> <p>Documentary evidence points to several projects aligned with the 2015 DTIS AM. For instance, the Trade Mainstreaming project is aligned with Outcome 5, the Tier 2 Agribusiness project is aligned with Outcome 11 and the Tier 2 Eco-tourism project is aligned with Outcome 13.</p> <p>Moreover, other donors/development partners also built their projects on the 2015 DTIS AM.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WTO project on standards and trade development facility (SPS), - ADB-financed project on institutional capacity building (tax department, public procurement and regulatory agency), - AFD project to finance cash crop sectors, - COMESA project (EU-finance) for the implementation of the electronic window at the customs level (also with the customs). <p>Precise data on the extent of implementation of the AM is lacking.</p>		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>A DTIS main report was prepared in 2007. The DTIS update team undertook a scoping mission in 2014 which led to the validation of the concept note in April 2015.</p> <p>The update of the DTIS takes into account the changes in the economic, institutional and socio-political environment of Comoros between 2007 and 2015. It also takes into account the remaining implementation constraints identified during this period. This update is fully aligned with the SCA2D and the PCE.</p> <p>The current DTISU was set to cover the period 2015-2019 and is thus out-of-date. At present, there is no ToR or concept note for a new DTIS update.</p>		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Having started at the end of 2017, the project quickly proved indispensable in conducting Comoros' accession process to the WTO. In the period, the overall project enabled (i) to conduct awareness-raising sessions and document sharing related to the process at the island level; (ii) organize regular meetings of the National Trade Negotiations Committee and (iii) participate in the 4th meeting of the Working Group.</p> <p>As a result of the EIF and DTIS process, trade was mainstreamed in several national policies. (See 'New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU' in 1.1 Relevance)</p>		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF has contributed to the elaboration of multiple reforms such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Law on Competition - Food and Plant Protection Act - Maritime Code, EIF financial support - Tourism Code - Comoros Trade Policy Document - Draft law governing foreign trade (in the process of adoption) 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
- Draft law on the revision of the investment code (in the process of adoption)		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Under EIF interventions in Comoros, numerous activities were conducted in support of the country's participation in international trade fora.</p> <p>In particular, under the Tier 1 project "Mainstreaming Trade for WTO Accession", the following activities were conducted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to WTO accession negotiation, - Technical work needed to assist the government in its negotiations was provided (analytical documents, workshops, seminars, etc.), - Assistance provided to the Geneva-based Permanent Mission which enabled it to better coordinate activities related to the process with the WTO Secretariat, - Assist the government in reporting on the status of the negotiations to the constituencies in the different islands of the country, - Two studies were conducted: (i) Impact study on the accession of Comoros to the WTO taking into account the cost of post-accession adjustment; (ii) Study on the implementation of a VAT regime in Comoros. <p>The WTO website noted in 2018 that "the accession of Comoros continues to be one of the most active accession processes in the WTO". However, although negotiations were set to end in 2018 they are still ongoing. The project final evaluation noted that the recurrent change of governments and lack of political will affected the performance of the project.</p> <p>The following activities were also conducted in terms of contribution to participation to international trade fora:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to the negotiations of the EU EPA in 2017 which led to the ratification of the Interim EPA in February 2019 and the grant of a 6 million € envelope by the EU, - Support to the Government in the regional negotiations for the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in 2018 which led to the signature by the head of state, - The EIF supported the Tourism Office and the Ministry of Tourism at the 11th edition of the Tourism Forum on Investments and Business Opportunities in Africa (INVESTOUR) in 2020, - Participation in the 3rd session of Trade Advocacy Fund in England supported by the EIF in 2016. 		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>In addition to the above support to regional negotiations (WTO, EU EPA, AfCFTA, COMESA), Comoros is part a regional EIF initiative "LDC Graduation and the WTO".</p> <p>The EIF also provided the following support to the Tourism Agency (ONT) for a mission in Mauritius.</p> <p>Officials received training on the administration the website of the electronic commerce platform (comorce.comores.org)</p>		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>There is documentary evidence of training of public officials in investment and trade-related areas. In 2016 it was reported that 55 officials (40% of which are women) received training under NIA Support project.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Series of information workshops/seminars, awareness raising training on trade policy frameworks. At project completion, it was reported that institutional and human capacities were still weak. - Mission to raise awareness among private sector actors and to support the formation of bankable projects in Moheli and Anjouan. - Organisation of working sessions and training on the revision of technical notes related to the accession to the WTO of the Union of Comoros. - Support for the participation in the Interconnecting Cisco training programme at Demos in France of a Customs officer, Service Sydonia++. 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>In 2020, 40 officials (87.5% of which are women) assisted in a sensitization seminar on tourism development and promotion.</p> <p>Overall, data is lacking on the outcome of these trainings.</p>		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Due to the limited resources, it has not been possible to systematize communication interventions in the form of a specific and dedicated program. Interventions remained ad hoc in connection with particular activities.</p> <p>However, a monthly newsletter reporting on the activities carried out has been distributed to the national steering committee members. The support of the Secretariat's communications service in Geneva on the occasion of the Cotonou regional forum and workshop enabled the development of tools and materials communicating results. The NIU supported the edition of the Economic a monthly magazine that provided monthly information on all economic and Trade issues, including those relating to the EIF programme. An electronic platform is set up to inform on trade issues. The NIU now has an electronic newsletter published monthly since 2019, EIF-INFOS.</p> <p>In addition to the above, there is documentary evidence of the following communications inputs from 2015 to 2020.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A communication strategy was put in place in 2015 - Throughout the EIF intervention in Comoros, sensitization activities on TV, radio and print were organized. - Social networks (facebook) were also used to communicate on the EIF activities. <p>Finally, in the context of the Tier 2 eco-tourism project, the EIF supported the development of video clips for the Tourism Week Event. The sustainable tourism week organized by EIF and ONT had 1000 visitors, 152 exhibitors, 300 participants in the tourism caravans, 150 participants in the conference debates and 400 participants in the official ceremony. ANPI has included EIF in the Global Entrepreneurship stakeholder chart.</p>		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>1) The sustainability support project has contributed to the emergence of processing/valorization units for primary products of the Comorian terroir such as coconut oil, moringa leaves, essential oils such as ylang-ylang, the production of organic broiler for catering. These interventions have benefited women graduates in support of their own efforts and contributed to scaling up, strengthening quality, packaging, accessing certification and registration of the brands thus created.</p> <p>The support provided within the processing units' framework has helped generate about fifty permanent jobs and strengthen indirect jobs in the product value chain.</p> <p>Products respect international buyers' requirements, and the domestic market is increasing. In total, there are four companies on the export market: COMOROS MORINGA, COCO MOON, BIOZEN, and NECTA LAB. Three flagship products are processed: moringa leaves (Nutritional supplements), essential oils, coconut oil (Cosmetics and well-being). Some of these promoters have had international awards.</p> <p>Under the youth entrepreneurship support program a microfinance company has committed to provide € 120,000 of credit to young people with productive projects. The first deliberation of the Programme resulted in access to financing Natura-Com is a farm whose objective is agricultural production. At present, the company has a farm for the production of milk and its derivatives. They received 60,000,000 KMF, of which 40,000,000 have already been disbursed to date.</p> <p>(2) The ACEFER project financed from EIF Category 2 funds responded to the following concerns and needs identified at the income product level to improve the competitiveness of exports in the vanilla,</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>ylang-ylang, and clove sectors. The project was implemented jointly by two EIF partners, namely UNDP and ICT, and a project team was set up whose coordination was based in Anjouan with the following financial contribution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EIF \$3,527,131; - \$100,000 from UNDP; - \$100,000 from ITC. - \$200,000 in kind from the Government <p>The EIF team conducted negotiations with microfinance institutions at the level of the three islands to identify cooperative-specific financial products and preferential rates. Establish a team of consultants in Anjouan and Ngazidja to support the development of documents for access to finance. Five cooperative societies based in Anjouan were able to access financing totalling KMF 260,000,000 from SANDUK.</p> <p>Overall, through the Tier 2 Agribusiness and sustainability support projects, cash crop value chains (vanilla, clove, ylan ylang) received valuable support: access to financing, new production facility, training on quality, packaging and certification. Moreover, cooperatives were created as a result of the EIF in-country interventions. However, evidence of increased production and exports are still limited. This finding is supported by interviews.</p> <p>(3) It was reported that the overall EIF intervention participated to the country's export diversification, with specific focus on the moringa or coco value chains. However, no Tier 2 project specifically addressed those value chains.</p>		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF helped to finance the creation of a website to promote the Comoros Destination also to strengthen the capacities in terms of technology, digital with the provision of industrial equipment such as computers, printers, drones, cameras.</p> <p>The computer equipment provided by the EIF project to the NTO has enabled it to assist women entrepreneurs during the difficult period of COVID-19 to communicate through the Platform WIYA.</p> <p>The National Tourist Office has also been able to organize a campaign to promote local tourism potential through online promotional video spots entitled "le Bon coin" (the Good Corner), which aims to promote the hotel and restaurant tourism industry as well as the natural heritage of the islands.</p>		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>With the project ACEFER, 18 cooperatives benefited from capacity building and exchanges in different regions of high production of vanilla, cloves, and Ylang-ylang in Madagascar. This allowed cooperatives to improve the production, collection, and export of products. They also underscored the need to diversify activities by working on more than one product.</p> <p>With the support of the EIF, the National Committee on Trade Facilitation was established. This committee monitors both regional and multilateral commitments in the area of trade facilitation and the identification of needs.</p> <p>The EIF also supported the preparation of an action plan on trade facilitation indicating the steps to be taken to achieve compliance with national practices and the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (WTO TFA). This action plan was used in the context of the ongoing negotiations for Comoros' accession to the WTO.</p>		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	3	2 (DR, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>Through the ACEFER project, operators in the three vanilla, ylang-ylang, and clove sectors were trained</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of trainers who will constitute the team in charge of informing and sensitize producers on the benefits that can be derived by organizing themselves into cooperatives. - The organization of awareness tours with 1178 producers of the three sectors throughout the territory. - 19 Cooperative Societies were supported in the preparation of the essential documents (Statutes, Rules of Procedure, MINUTE's Creation and liquidation of companies). - Support for the establishment of cooperative registers at the level of each island at the opening and operationalization of registry offices (rehabilitation of the Offices of Mohéli and Ngazidja). The establishment of this register was in response to a commitment by the Government to OHADA. - Organization of a training of trainers on the mode of operation of cooperatives. - Support for the organization of general meetings of cooperatives - Support for the development of 3-year action plans for all cooperative societies. - To meet a need expressed by the Vanilla cooperatives and at the steering committee's request, the project organized the training of 30 cooperatives per island on the establishment of nurseries and on the techniques of production of seedlings and vines. <p>However, evidence of outcomes of training received by value-chain stakeholders is still limited.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	2	1 (DR)
<p>There is evidence of contribution to participation to one trade fair (in Paris) in the context of the Tier 2 Agribusiness project. However, the NIU has not received a mission report to assess the number of potential clients identified.</p>		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The relationship between NIU with EIF ES and the GFAS is positive. The Country Coordinator of EIF ES and the representative of the GFAS ensure follow-up. Since COVID-19, a WhatsApp group has been created to share experience and good practices between coordinators and Focal Points of the EIF beneficiary countries.</p> <p>The NIU also benefited from training on different aspects of monitoring and evaluation or coordination of C1 and C2 projects. The EIF ES also played a key role in the partnership with ITFC, AFTIAS, and the EU. The central Implementation Entity (PEMO), the Ministry in charge of Economic and Trade, regularly monitors and requests information notes on the programme.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The NIU is fully integrated as a technical support unit within the Ministry of Trade and counts 10 staff. The Executive Secretariat (SE) coordinates the implementation of the objectives, programs, and processes of the EIF and is located at the World Trade Organization (WTO); UNOPS, as Trust Fund Manager, acts on behalf of the EIF and follows the EIF Board's instructions, as delegated by the SE.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The coronavirus pandemic substantially impacted the Tier 2 eco-tourism project. However, the EIF operational systems were able to mitigate these (See 'Adaptation to changing global context, including Covid-19' in 4.1 Relevance).</p> <p>Meeting minutes from the National Steering Committee meeting held on June 20th 2020 were shared with the evaluation team. The minutes relate to the revision of the workplan of the Tier 2 Eco-tourism project, highlight the inclusiveness of the process and overall reflect positively on the operational systems' ability to respond to COVID-19</p>		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Overall, final evaluation for Tier 1 projects note good results in term of efficiency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Under NIA Support most of the planned activities were delivered and a little over 100% of planned funds were disbursed. However, the project experienced delays and required two no-cost extensions, one of which was directly linked to a late project start. - Under the Trade Mainstreaming project, results were largely achieved and disbursement corresponded to 99.79% of planned funds. Again, two no-cost extensions were awarded to cope with difficulties in mobilising international technical expertise. <p>Under Sustainability support, results were largely achieved, 99.69% of funds were disbursed and activities were conducted within planned schedule.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>To date, only one Tier 2 project has been completed (Agribusiness). Under this project, the final evaluation notes a budget execution rate of 99%. There is a large discrepancy between this rate and the level of technical implementation of the project, which is 60.45%, since a large proportion of the activities have not been carried out. The initial planned duration of the project is 3 years, however due to the accumulation of delays in the completion of some activities, at the request of the government, it has been extended by one year.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The UNDP procurement procedures followed by the NIU-EIF – while UNDP was MIE – are known as being fairly cumbersome procedures. Specifically, key expert interviews revealed overall slow decision making and unclear process especially as to who is taking the decision. After these three years, Programme Management moved from UNDP to the Government through the Ministry of Trade. Today the NIU is fully integrated within the Directorate General of Economy and Trade.</p> <p>For instance, during the World SDG Week funded by the EIF, the activities carried out by the Tourist Office were only paid for by NIU on-site on presentation of an invoice.</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The coronavirus pandemic substantially impacted the Tier 2 eco-tourism project. However, the EIF operational systems were able to react well (See 'Adaptation to changing global context, including Covid-19' in 4.1 Relevance).</p>		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	5	3
<p>The updated 2015 – 2019 DTIS is fully aligned with the SCA2D and the revised SCA2D covering the same period aligned with the 2030 Agenda.</p> <p>The EIF has a considerable impact on the performance of the SDGs, mainly through the support of several organizations, associations, companies that create economic and social added value through job creation and socio-economic impact.</p> <p>In line with SDG 4, capacity-building activities were conducted for EIF project beneficiaries (Agricultural Cooperatives, Entrepreneurs, Traders), including training on value chain, OHADA standards, sustainable tourism, and entrepreneurship.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
In line with SDG 8, employment was created through the support and financing of cooperative projects in Anjouan, companies like Cocoomoon working on the Cocoa value chain, and primarily through the SUBUUTI project, which supported the Natura Com project on the value chain of cow farming (60,000,000 KMF).		
In line with SDG 13, 14 and 15, the National Tourist Office received support through the Ecotourism Village project, which builds ecotourism bungalows supporting sustainable tourism. Others actions include:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Within the context of the Export Competitiveness of Ylang Ylang and Cloves, the NIU supported the adoption of environmentally friendly approached to production, with emphasis on a shift towards organic agricultural practices. - Waste treatment and marketing of recycled products for the preservation of the ecotourism environment - Preparation and marketing of medicinal plants for the preservation of the tourist environment. 		
In line with SDG 17, one of the primary missions of the EIF is the mobilization of resources to support the implementation of projects in favor of internal and external Trade. This has been achieved by mobilizing several technical and financial partners, including the EU, the IDB, the ITC, UNIDO, AFD, the French cooperation, the Meck Moroni, the UCCIA, the IUT, and others for jointly organized projects and actions.		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	1
Overall, there is limited evidence of increased exports as a result of EIF interventions. However, as noted in 1.3 Effectiveness, the EIF supported numerous actions in order to improve Comoros' participation in international trade fora. In particular, Comoros has been able to advance its WTO accession, it received support for the signature of the AfCFTA and received support for the EU-SADC EPA negotiations. This support is essential to Comoros' integration into global and regional trading systems. Comoros is also supported by the LDC Graduation regional project.		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	2
DTIS/AM processes reflect national development ambitions. The sustainability approach is reflected in the implementation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects.		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	4	2
The NIU in Comoros meets the five criteria for integration in government processes: (1) the NIU is physically housed in a government ministry/on government premises, (2) government officials form part of the NIU, (3) the NIU is formally in the ministry organigramme and/or there is a formal ministry government decision for the integration of the functions and tasks of the NIU, (4) the NIU has a role in coordinating technical assistance, and/or other roles for the ministry, and (5) the NIU team facilitates the coordination of inter-sectoral bodies related to trade. The integration of the NIU as an entity of the Minister allows ownership of the EIF process. Better communication of the EIF's interventions allows for greater visibility of the EIF's actions and recognition of the EIF program's contributions to the implementation of the Comoros Emergent Plan (CEP).		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The Government has contributed to the EIF project in the long term by providing office space, a service vehicle, electricity and water services in the office, a telephone line and internet connection. The government also contributes to the cost of certain missions abroad and to the provision of administrative resources in certain areas of expertise.</p> <p>The 2019 Budget Act includes an operating grant to the NIU (additional GFAS allowances, acquisition of operating assets) to ensure that the flow of benefits associated with the project is maintained after completion.</p> <p>Moreover, trade is well integrated in the national development strategy (SCA2D).</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	5	2
<p>Given the strong integration of the NIU in government processes and the demonstrated ability to leverage finance and coordinate with other development partners, there are good prospects for continuation of EIF activities. This finding is reinforced by the increase in AfT disbursements received by Comoros in recent years.</p>		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Coordination is positive. For instance, a Project Committee is established in charge of piloting the "SUBUTII!" program to develop the specifications of the beneficiaries, the selection procedures, and the monitoring of the implementation of the program, excluding credit-granting decisions.</p> <p>The Project Committee is composed of one (01) representative of the Partner Bank, one representative of Union of the Meck, one (01) representative of the Embassy of France, one (01) representative of the Reinforced Integrated Framework, one (01) representative of the University of Comoros or the University Institute of Technology (IUT), and (1) experienced entrepreneur with a proven track record in the Union of Comoros.</p> <p>This structure allows an effective follow-up and ensures the sustainability of the partnership. If SUBUTII! is terminated, the bank will provide a mechanism for the continuity of the project.</p>		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Mobilization of resources for the implementation of the industrial strategy: a financing agreement for a project to support production and industrialization (APILE) was countersigned on 24 December 2020 by the European Union and the Union of the Comoros for an amount of 6 million euros</p>		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
See sections above.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** In the case of Comoros, the EIF programs and projects through the DITS are fully aligned with the ambitions and needs of the various stakeholders (Government, private sector, civil society, and other development partners). It should also be noted that the DTSIU has allowed integration of lessons learned and an alignment with the National Development Strategy. Also, with the arrival of COVID 19, EIF Comoros has been able to adapt to the context of the pandemic.
- Coherence:** EIF interventions in Comoros are overall coherent. Alignment with the EIF TOC has been noted and delivery modalities are appropriate. There is a strong collaboration with other relevant initiatives. The ITC, UNIDO, the French Cooperation, Meck Moroni, and UCCIA were able to identify priorities and launch their respective projects with the support of the NIU. However, the NIU team would need to be better staffed to support technical work.

- **Effectiveness:** The EIF has contributed to trade mainstreaming by providing capacity building to the government and raising awareness and support for the country accession process to the WTO. EIF actions has supported the elaboration of many laws and reforms related to commerce, tourism, and different values chains. The coordination mechanisms between donors, private sector and government are effective for Tier 1 projects. Tier 2 projects have contributed to increased competitiveness and improved market access for young entrepreneurs. In addition, numerous beneficiaries benefited from training, however it is unclear whether outcomes will carry through after project end. Value chains have also been reinforced; however, evidence of increased productivity or exports is still limited.
- **Efficiency:** The NIU has cumbersome procedures given the programme was originally implemented by UNDP. The NIU is now fully integrated within the Directorate General of Economy and Trade. It has shown strong ability to leverage resources and coordinate with other initiatives and partners.
- **Impact:** Overall, it is difficult to measure the impact of the EIF in Comoros, due in part to the lack of monitoring and evaluation after project completion. Although not required under EIF procedures, project follow-up by the NIU is essential to assess the impact of EIF intervention. However, it should be noted that the EIF was successful in setting up activities in line with numerous SDGs. In terms of integration into the global trading system, Comoros received important support for WTO accession negotiations, EU-EPA negotiations and AfCFTA signature. These are essential steps to future increased exports.
- **Sustainability:** The NIU is integrated into government systems, and a range of mechanisms and resources, including partnerships with banks, have been put in place to support the continuation of the ongoing Tier 2 project after the end of the EIF support. Collaboration with other governments agencies and development partners will also help to ensure sustainability of some EIF activities. For the next DTIS, it is important factor in the evolving contexts i.e. the effects of the pandemic and potential natural disasters given the island nation status.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	4	Project implementation respect the VfM frameworks set out in project documentation.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	3	Procurement processes are on the whole efficient and follow international good practice (open competition, encouraging multiple bids, thorough bid assessment processes, etc.). However, since the NIU is part of the Government, decision-making re: budgetary allocations often causes delays given the need to obtain agreement from across government as well as donors.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	4	At the national level, a mechanism for coordinating partners has been set up by the government through the General Planning Commission. Dialogue is ongoing with various partners, whether with the IDB, AFD, French Cooperation, the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union. However, efforts must be made to optimize interventions and ensure complementarity.

	Score	Narrative
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	Overall, there are good prospects for sustainability for Tier 1 and 2 activities (see Section 1.6 Sustainability)
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	4	Government coordination in the implementation of EIF program is strong. As the NIU is included in the Ministry as a directorate, it participates in cabinet meetings, and the Minister is sighted on actions related to the EIF.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	The EIF ES and TFM, on the whole, have demonstrated significant flexibility. Overall, the EIF in Comoros has been able to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., COVID-19), amending work plans and delivery modalities when needed and adequately justified.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	4	Many of the Tier 2 projects target women and youth as the main beneficiaries. All business entrepreneurship support by the EIF in Comoros was led by women and youth.

The Gambia

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	07-Jan-2010
Total budget	<p>Total budget: \$8,982,516</p> <p>Of which:</p> <p>Total EIF contribution: \$7,567,423</p> <p>Total Government contribution: \$415,093</p> <p>Total Development Partners contribution: \$1,000,000</p>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and 2
Context	LDC, Fragile
Key stakeholders	<p>Government of The Gambia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Ministry of Fisheries <p>UNCTAD</p> <p>ITC</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u></p> <p>There are 7 Tier 1 EIF projects in The Gambia. Some of the key objectives of these projects include: elaboration of National Trade Strategy and National Industrial Policy Documents; active participation of local SMEs in trade and the digital economy; strengthen The Gambia's in-country arrangements to increase trade-related technical assistance (TRTA). These objectives align well to the EIF TOC Outcome 1, especially output 1 'policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'institutional coordination'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u></p> <p>There are 3 Tier 2 EIF projects in The Gambia. Some of the key objectives of these projects include: strengthen sector competitiveness of cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame; improve value-addition; promote opportunities in domestic, regional & international markets; generate additional income and employment. These objectives align to the EIF TOC Outcome 2, in particular with output 1 'improved participation in value chains for increased connectivity to markets'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <p>NIA Support (Phase 1 and 2, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of The Gambia- Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Start date: 07-Jan-2010 - End date: 30-Sept-2016 <p>DTIS Update (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNCTAD - Start date: 07-Dec-2011 - End date: 28-Feb-2013

	<p>Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project (Phase 1, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: ITC - Start date: 05-March-2012 - End date: 31-March-2016 <p>Trade Facilitation (Airport) (Phase 1, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of The Gambia- Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Start date: 06-May-2013 - End date: 31-Dec-2016 <p>Trade Mainstreaming (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNCTAD - Start date: 04-Nov-2015 - End date: 28-Feb-2018 <p>Aflatoxin Mitigation Programme (Phase 2, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of The Gambia- Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Start date: 21-June-2018 - End date: 30-June-2020 <p>Sustainability Support (Phase 2, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of The Gambia- Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Start date: 27-June-2017 - End date: 31-Oct-2020 <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <p>Trade and Digital Economy Assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of The Gambia- Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) - Start date: 13-Nov-2020 - End date: 12-Nov-2021 <p>SheTrades Gambia (Phase 2, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: ITC - Start date: 22-Feb-2019 - End date: 31-Dec-2021 <p>COVID Recovery- Market access for women horticulture products (Phase 2, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: ITC - Start: 15-April-2021 - End date: 14-April-2023
Regional projects	None

2. Context

- The Gambia is situated on the western coast Africa and has one bordering country- Senegal. It is the smallest country in mainland Africa. The Gambia has a population of 2.4 million people (2020) and a GDP per capita of \$787 (2020).
- The Gambia has a Human Development Index (HDI) score of 0.496 (2019).
- The Gambia belongs to the West Africa Competitiveness Programme (WACOMP), the West Africa Competitiveness and Quality Infrastructure Programme (WACQIP), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
- During the period 2008-2019, The Gambia's real GDP grew by 3.2% a year, which is higher than Africa's real GDP growth of 2.9%.
- From 2008-2019, The Gambia's total merchandise and services exports was \$3,017 million, while its total merchandise and services imports was almost 3 times higher, at \$9,159. Hence, with respect to merchandise and service trade, it has a trade deficit.
- From 2008-2019, The Gambia received, on average, FDI inflows of \$29 million a year.
- From 2008-2019, The Gambia received a total of \$635 million in Aid for Trade disbursements. Of this, 73% was spent on economic infrastructure, 26% was spent on building productive capacity and less than 1% was spent on trade policy and regulations.
- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), The Gambia ranked 155th out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', it scored 75 percentage points in 2012, which decreased to 68 percentage points in 2019, hence there has been weaker performance over time.
- The Gambia's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) has remained constant at 2.4 in 2010 and 2.4 in 2018. By LPI indicators, timeliness and shipments score the highest, while infrastructure scores the lowest.
- The Gambia's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) has decreased overtime, from 3.9 in 2010 to 3.6 in 2017. By indicators, labour market efficiency scores the highest, while market size scores the lowest.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	15 June 2021 to 30 September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Key Informant Interviews; Economic Analysis.

Methods used (data and document review)	<p><u>Key informant interviews (KIIs)</u></p> <p>11 interviews in total</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- EIF Executive Secretary (1)- NIU (2)- Department of Fisheries (1)- The Gambia Standards Bureau (1)- Jawneh Cashew (1)- Beneficiaries (2): Go Fresh Ltd and Gambia Horticultural Enterprise- Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (2)- ITC (1) <p>Interviews by gender:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- 10 male- 1 female <p><u>Documents reviewed across The Gambia's 10 EIF projects:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- MOU- TORs
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budget - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p><u>The Gambia's Portfolio Review:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities - Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most of the interviewees were busy and it was rather difficult to schedule interviews with them. - Internet connection has been a major challenge to conduct meaningful zoom meeting. In some instances, the interviewee resorted to telephone calls. - Limited institutional knowledge at the Ministry of Trade about the implementation of the EIF project due to staff turnover at senior level. The Permanent Secretary who was the EIF Focal Point retired few years ago and since then the position has changed hands about three times. - Difficulty to obtain data to back up the augments of the interviewees. For instance, beneficiaries concluded that EIF has led to expansions in their businesses, but they are unable to quantify the extent of the impact in terms of empirical data/evidence. This could be explained by the fact that many MSMEs are informal with limited levels of literacy and do not keep records of their transactions. - Most of the beneficiaries interviewed do not seem to understand the strategic objectives of EIF and the key elements to focus on in terms of sustaining the achievements of the project. For instance, five companies achieved HACCP certification through EIF support. However, none of them renewed the certification after it expired. - Neither the NIU nor the DF answered the e-survey.

4. Findings

1.1. Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	3 (DR, S, KII)

The EIF Project was designed to strengthen The Gambia's participation in regional and global markets. It started in The Gambia in 2010 and it was implemented in two phases. Tier 1 focused on Analytical Support and Institutional Capacity Support programmes while Tier 2 focused on Supply-side Capacity Support. The overall objective of the project was aligned with The Gambia's National Development Strategies. Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE) Pillar 1 (Accelerating and Sustaining Economic Growth) with key focus areas on trade facilitation, improvement of the investment climate and quality control systems, and in sub-Pillar 3 (Improving Competitiveness) of the country's economy.

By working together with local stakeholders and development partners, EIF supported The Gambia to develop and implement a national trade strategy that aims to strengthen the country's participation in regional and global markets. The project was designed to build the foundation for improved value addition and processing in key sectors of the economy such as fisheries, aquaculture, agriculture, transportation, telecommunication, and tourism.

Furthermore, EIF assisted the implementation of the Action Matrix, which laid the ground for MOTIE to deal with trade policy development and implementation effectively and efficiently. With the development of the DTIS/DTIS update and Action Matrix, Ministry of Trade Industry and Employment (MOTIE) was able to mainstream trade policy/strategies and facilitation and align them with the National Development Plan (NDP). Mainstreaming trade in the National Development Plan 2018-21 helped the consideration of relevant sector policies, strategies and plans as beneficiaries and stakeholders were involved at all stages of project implementation.

Evidently, a country devoid of natural resources, unlike other West African, the service sector, especially boosting trade facilitation is one of the major priorities of Government.

Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects were aligned with and supportive of the needs of the private sector. The project supported sector-specific study and helped developed pertinent strategies to facilitate growth of these sector. For example, the Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project (SCEDP). SCEDP aims at responding to some of the trade related development priorities identified in the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) of the Gambia by providing agriculture sector specific support for cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame through finding new export opportunities and product diversification.</p> <p>The project also helped private sector enterprises to support enterprises to enhance productivity and also increase access to market e.g., in partnership with The Gambia Bureau of Standards, EIF supported businesses operating within the agricultural value chain to achieve HACCP stands. Furthermore, the project created platform for private sector actors to network. For instance, EIF provided capacity building and technical support to Gambia Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association and the Cashew Alliance of The Gambia.</p> <p>The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI) which represents the voice of the private sector has been a close collaborator with NIU. The GCCCI has been a member of the steering committee. However, in terms of support to the civil societies, there is not much evidence to confirm alignment and support to the non-state actors.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	5	(2 DR, KII)
<p>Gender- SheTrades Gambia is the pinnacle of Gambia's recognition of gender as an emerging priority. The objective of this project is 'to enable Gambian women to benefit from economic participation in agricultural, textiles and garments value chains.' There is another gender-specific project, 'COVID-19 recovery through digitalisation and market access for women horticulture producers', with an objective of 'Increased income of women farmers and entrepreneurs in the horticulture value chain through digital inclusion and improved value chain efficiencies.'</p> <p>Value chains- Through both the 'SheTrades' and 'COVID-19... women horticulture producers' projects (see above), there is an increased focus on agricultural, horticulture and textiles value chains. In addition, EIF support has trained beneficiaries in produce quality processed cashew (along with labelling and packaging), which has helped beneficiaries expand into domestic and EU export markets.</p> <p>Regional- Tier 2 projects state the need to 'ensure visibility at the regional level' through communication and outreach activities. The Ministry of Trade, Industry, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE) is involved in all consultative processes.</p> <p>Climate change- The project 'COVID-19... women horticulture producers', implemented by ITC, states 'The project will contribute to environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation by promoting</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
sustainable and climate resilient agricultural practices through its capacity strengthening programmes for farmers.'		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
The project "COVID-19 recovery through digitalisation and market access for women horticulture producers in The Gambia" reflects The Gambia's adaptation to both COVID-19 and the global shift towards digitalization.		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF programmes, particularly under Tier 2 contributed to some policy reforms and the development of several sector-specific strategies. It has led to the mainstreaming of trade facilitation support within MOTIE.</p> <p>Under the trade mainstreaming window, EIF supported the development of the National Trade Policy, Industrial and Trade Strategy, and the Cashew Sector Development and Export Strategy (2014-19). There are linkages between the DTIS-U (2013) recommendations and trade policies since 2017, for example the fisheries regulations and the adoption of five-band ECOWAS CET.</p> <p>Under the Sectoral Quality Framework and Standards, EIF also helped to introduce Gambian business enterprises to HACCP certification. It also helped The Gambia Standards Bureau to develop business plan (2022-26), which helped give the Bureau a sense of direction. Accurate and up-to-date trade information is being provided by MOTIE. EIF also helped MOTIE to develop trade information portal internally for policy decision making.</p> <p>The Gambia Standards Bureau has developed and published the first 10 national standards, including one on groundnuts and another one on general principles of food hygiene. Draft regulations on control of pre-packages have been developed and list of equipment recommended for the Weights and Measures Department.</p>		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Institutional Capacity Building for Trade support Institutions was a key component of the EIF Tier 1. project. MOTIE, Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG), Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA) and NIU among others enjoyed various capacity building programmes and technical support from EIF. Their staff were sent on various short-term training courses and workshops. Total of 499 people were trained - out of which 222 were female.</p> <p>However, due to high staff turnover at MOTIE, the ministry is still facing huge capacity constraints.</p>		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	5	3 (DR, KII)
The EIF projects and programmes are highly aligned with the DTIS/DTIS update and Action Matrix.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The consultative approach taken to develop the DTIS/DTIS update and Action Matrix ensures that stakeholder priorities are adequately considered. This made it easy for all sub-grant interventions from the programme guided by the development of project documents from stakeholders and sectors to ensure that national policies and plans are aligned with needs and priorities.</p> <p>There was comprehensive representation of the views of the private sector. The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCCI) which represents the voice of the private sector has been a close</p>		

collaborator with NIU. The GCCI has been a member of the steering committee and support has been given to build its capacity.

With regards to civil society inclusion, the NIU has provided written confirmation that 'The Association of Non-Governmental Organisations' (TANGO), along with the associations of industrial artisanal finishing companies, and the cashew alliance, were included in trade-related activities.

1.2. Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	3	1 (DR, KII)
<p>The project log-frames are aligned with the programme-level results chains and log-frame. Tier 1 and 2 projects are very well-aligned with the results areas (all outcomes and outputs).</p> <p>The log-frame for the EIF phase two programme include baselines or milestones achieved at the end of the Sustainability Support Phase. Accordingly, MOTIE should built on results achieved under Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects and align them with national trade development agenda.</p>		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF delivery modalities (preparatory, analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's goals and objectives. The necessary governance structures were created in terms of NIU, the focal point, National Steering Committee, EIF board, and developing of DTIS/U through consultation.</p>		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Overall, the coordination on AFT at the policy dialogue and intervention level is very good and the NIU, governance structure and DTIS/DTISU have helped deliver complementarities between projects (EIF and non-EIF), especially with the mainstreaming of trade within MOTIE. The DTISU was used to integrate related issues into the PAGE and NDP 2018-21. These two documents are the reference points for all national development initiatives.</p> <p>The NIU was the entry point for formulating all AFT projects and has helped identify areas that need support, encouraging complementarities between projects. In addition, the EIF-supported governance structure has helped foster coordination and facilitate complementarities.</p>		

1.3. Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:		2 (DR, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	a) 3	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	b) 3	
c) prioritised interventions	c) 4	
d) programming plan	d) 3	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM	e) 4	
<p>a) The DTIS enabled EIF to better understand the priorities and resource needs for the target groups of the project. It provided guidance in the prioritization of objectives and the direction of national and donor-community energy and resources.</p> <p>b) DTIS also helped the project to mainstream trade policy and facilitation in the national development strategy and within MOTIE. Despite several challenges in terms of staff turnover which created knowledge transfer issues. Trade has been in the National Development Plan (2018-21); trade sector strategies were developed to support the productive and export base of the economy and</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
public-private dialogue. Secondly, the DTIS Update was useful in launching the Sustainability Phase of EIF.		
c) DTIS/DTISU and the action matrix were very helpful tools used to identify key areas of intervention for the EIF project since they were developed in consultation with stakeholders.		
d) The DTIS 2007 and DTISU 2013 included a detailed programming plan of proposed intervention areas and included a mapping of responsible action parties, linkage to PAGE, MSME and the monitoring indicators.		
e) The Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project (SCEDP) aimed at responding to some of the trade related development priorities identified in the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) by providing agriculture sector specific support for cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame through finding new export opportunities and product diversification. Specifically, two of The Gambia's Tier 2 projects implemented are <i>Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project</i> (SCEDP) was approved by the EIF Board in January 2012 and has been under implementation since June 2012 by ITC and the <i>Trade Facilitation through increased logistics infrastructure and services at the Banjul International Airport</i> , which was approved by the EIF Board in April 2013.		
Extent of implementation of the AM	4	2 (DR, KII)
EIF implementation in The Gambia progressed with great deal of success in the following major achievements:		
a) Sufficient institutional and management capacity built in The Gambia to formulate and implement trade-related strategies and implementation plans.		
b) Mainstreams trade into its national development strategies and plans Outcome 2 indicators Baseline.		
c) Coordinated delivery of trade-related resources (funding, TA, etc.) by donors and implementing agencies to implement The Gambia's priorities following the adoption of the DTIS Action Matrix		
d) Secures resources in support of initiatives that address DTIS Action Matrix priorities Outcome 4 indicators Baseline '10 '11 '12		
e) Sustainability is a major challenge that should be considered		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	1	1 (DR)
Since the DTISU was developed in 2012, it is now due for further review, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (DR, KII)
EIF certainly facilitated the process of streamlining trade. However, challenges at MOTIE remain due to high staff turnover even at senior level. Officers at MOTIE remain struggling to conduct their core functions with EIF related activities. 2016 – The EIF contributed towards the mainstreaming of trade in Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment funded two working sessions through MOTIE for stakeholder institutions to elaborate a comprehensive submission on the issues relating to trade. As a follow-up the MOTIE/NIU participated in a 6-day drafting session of PAGE. 2018/2019/2020/2021 – Gambia's NDP 2018-2021 has mainstreamed trade Strategic Priority 8 on Making the private Sector the Engine for Growth, Transformation and Job Creation as one of its main outcomes.		
EIF contribution to policy reform	5	1 (DR, KII)
EIF supported MOTIE to develop the National Trade Policy and mainstream trade into the national development strategies like the PAGE and NDP 2018-21. Also, EIF support the development of several sector-specific strategies such as the Cashew Sector Strategy (2014-19).		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	3 (D, KII)
EIF supported participants in international trade fora. Including the following in 2016, - 3 NIU staff trained in Communications and M&E during the EIF Regional MEL workshop; - 10 staff trained in trade data		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
analysis and simulation at the African Institute of Management Science; - 3 Staff trained in metrology and calibration at the Ghana Standard Authority; In 2019, among others, EIF sponsored participants to the Regional Trade policy Review and Project Development workshop, and the EIF Regional Workshops.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	3	3 (DR, KII)
EIF attempted to address the Trade Facilitation Agreement in the context of regional trade integration and transit trade in identifying a possible role for the Enhanced Integrated Framework. The project in 2014 reviewed transit and trade-facilitation related problems, identified as key challenges during the DTIS update of selected West African countries, and their implications for regional integration and regional trade.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	5	3 (KII and DR)
EIF organised various training programmes as part of SCEPD project. Seven companies underwent capacity and skills building in food safety and quality control and successfully completed the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) implementation process, a preventative system to address food safety through the analysis and control of biological, chemical and physical hazards. Furthermore, the companies benefitted from training in new packaging techniques (Packaging machines, new consumer packages with zip lock and informative labels with bar codes). This enabled these companies to access the European market due to good quality standards.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	5	3 (KII, RB)
<p>The EIF NIU developed a communication strategy which was implemented. In 2016, various information dissemination exercises were carried out such as sensitisation materials (e.g., flyers, brochures) were developed, printed and distributed to sensitised stakeholders;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - elaboration and distribution of procedures for the development of standards in Gambia; virtual web-based platform, namely The Gambia Trade Information Network, established to facilitate information sharing and exchange; the Gender Champions E-Breakfast “Procurement as a Crisis Response” online advocacy event. <p>In 2020, more sensitization campaigns were launched e.g., various digital flyers & share pictures for social media; ITC Gambia newsletter; Success stories on intracen.org, SheTrades.com; Project website; videos featuring SheTrades Gambia Gender Champions.</p> <p>The purpose is to enhance the level of ownership and commitment by government and stakeholders to continue the implementation of the communication strategy depends on effective implementation. It appears these initiatives were very impactful.</p> <p>NIU staff trained in Communications and M&E during the EIF Regional MEL workshop.</p>		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	5	3 (DR, KII, RB)
<p>SCEDP enhanced the production and export capacity of the private sector players which led to increase employment and turnover. Jawneh & Family Cashew Enterprise</p> <p>Is one such enterprise whose output improved by over two-fold because of EIF. They also employed over 50 staff partnering with YEP.</p> <p>Additionally, EIF helped achieve following results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved ability to grow higher quality cashew nuts, groundnuts and sesame through the Farmer Field School. 1300 farmers were trained. • 3 cashew processors (including Jawneh & Family Enterprise) adopted new packaging technologies (packaging machines, new consumer packages with Ziploc and informative labels with bar codes) that allow them to sell to local supermarkets and hotels. 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Successfully completed the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) implementation process, a preventative system to address food safety through the analysis and control of biological, chemical and physical hazards. 7 companies were supported <p>To enhance yield for rice farmers, extension workers from the National Agriculture Research Institute (NARI) were trained on rice seed multiplication techniques.</p>		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	4	3 (KII, DR, RB)
<p>There is evidence that EIF helped to enhance the hygiene and safety of food processing businesses and supported them to be HACCP certified. Workshops were organised to enhance capacity.</p> <p>EIF also provided technical support to businesses (including Jawneh & Family Enterprise) to adopt new packaging technologies (packaging machines, new consumer packages with Ziploc and informative labels with bar codes) that allow them to sell to local supermarkets, hotels and penetrate international markets.</p> <p>With the emergence of COVID-19 and the lockdown measures national governments took, the importance of digital economy became paramount and crucial to facilitate recovery measures in post COVID-19, EIF commissioned a Digital Readiness Project to study the readiness of the Gambian economy in terms of digitalization.</p>		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	5	3 (KII, DR, RB)
<p>Tier 1 programmes of EIF focused on institutional capacity building and trade facilitation. Trade has been mainstreamed into the Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE 2012-2015), which succeeded the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II (PRSP II). Specifically, trade is included in PAGE Pillar 1 (Accelerating and Sustaining Economic Growth) with key focus areas on trade facilitation, improvement of the investment climate and quality control systems, and in sub-Pillar 3 (Improving Competitiveness). These Pillars have been harmonized with the National Trade Policy (NTP) and the MTP to ensure a consistent strategic focus throughout the Government agenda.</p> <p>The SCEDP and the Trade Facilitation projects enhanced the capacity of Gambian businesses to access international markets. For instance, the support given by EIF to selected agribusiness enterprises to achieve HACCP standards helped these businesses to gain access to the international markets.</p>		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	4	3 (KII, DR, RB)
<p>The project provided capacity building and technical support to farmers in partnership with the Gambia Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association and the Cashew Alliance of The Gambia.</p> <p>EIF supported setting up CAG Secretariat by providing computers, furniture and paid the salary of the Executive Secretary for two years. The project also provided inputs i.e., seeds, resource persons, to horticultural farmers.</p> <p>EIF project signed an MOU with these two associations to help strengthen the capacity of farmers and create networking opportunities farmers in North Bank and West Coast regions.</p> <p>Additionally, other trainings conducted include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As part of the HACCP certification process, extensive training on food safety and hygiene was given to the beneficiaries to enhance their global competitiveness. - 24 members from the Gambia Technical Committee of Priority Sectors TGSB trained on the elaboration and adoption of technical regulations and standards - 26 staff from the TGSB trained on Development of Packaging Standards 		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	5	3 (KII, DR)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The EIF provided support to youth and women business enterprises to participate in national and international trade fairs. For instance, the EIF had participated and financed some women entrepreneurs to participate in trade fairs organised by the GCCI.</p> <p>In collaboration with the Gambia Women's Chamber of Commerce, the project facilitated a women's pavilion at the Youth Agribusiness and tourism Expo in The Gambia. As part of the pavilion, 27 women entrepreneurs participated in the trade fair.</p> <p>The EIF NIU considered trade fairs as useful platforms to communicate and promote the objectives and activities of the EIF. After close of the current phase, it is expected that MOTIE should drive the process and continue using trade fairs as a means of promoting EIF agenda.</p>		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The Programme had a very effective oversight provision with the vigilance of UNOPS as Trust Fund Manager in ensuring that timely submission of reports is adhered to.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	4	3 (KII)
<p>The governance structure of the EIF was well structured in terms of steering committee representation. The steering committee has helped the NIU in approving work plans of the programme.</p> <p>The Focal point and the NIU were supportive during project design and implementation. The Focal Point collaborates very well the NIU.</p> <p>The Focal point and the NIU were successful in leveraging financial resources from EU and ADB to finance two Tier 2 projects namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification - The Trade Facilitation (Cargo complex) Project <p>The operational systems and procedures were effective by ensuring that government, private sector, civil society and the donor facilitator are always present in meeting to support trade policy and strategy brought before them.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	4	1 (DR)
<p>In response to COVID, a new project "COVID-19 recovery through digitalisation and market access for women horticulture producers in The Gambia" was introduced.</p> <p>The technical report for the Sustainability Support Project (SSP) January- June 2020 highlights the COVID-19 pandemic as a challenge/ risk. As a mitigation to this challenge/ risk, there has been an "amendment of the work-plan to reprioritise and implement activities that could be conducted during this period. Another Mitigation measure is the use of technology by using the zoom application to conduct meetings remotely amid Covid-19." In terms of learning and adaptation, the report states, "due to the effects of the restrictions as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Project Implementation Team has revised the EIF-SSP work-plan and budget to respond to current needs".</p> <p>In response to COVID-19, the SheTrade project shifted its focus from the international market to promoting domestic market linkages. In the technical report January- June 2021, COVID-19 has been well integrated into the risk matrix. This technical report entails SheTrades Impact Stories, which shows that in response to COVID-19, women were manufacturing fabric face masks to help limit the spread of the virus.</p>		

1.4. Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The Gambia's Tier 1 EIF project, <i>Support to National Implementation Arrangements (NIAs)</i> was initiated in 2010 and the objective was to build the capacity of the National Implementation Unit (NIU) and trade-related institutions to assist in the implementation of the DTIS Action Matrix.</p> <p>The project deliverables were largely accomplished within the stipulated project timelines and budget. The project was rated satisfactory during the mid-term review, which led to its extension to Phase 2.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	3	2 (KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Tier 2 is used to finance concrete technical cooperation activities in the country. Specifically, the "Sector Competitiveness and Export Diversification Project" (SCEDP) and the "Trade Facilitation through increased logistics infrastructure and services at the Banjul International Airport" implemented under Tier 2. While the later was a success and efficiently implemented according to most stakeholders interviewed, the former is not as efficient or being fully utilized.		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	4	3 (KII)
Very satisfactory. The NSC and the EIF FP had strong oversight over the operations of the project. NIU team members were focusing mainly on ensuring that project deliverables were met.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	1	3 (KII, DR)
COVID-19 indeed massively disrupted the EIF activities in the country. The global pandemic affected the supply-chain and the overall world economy. Export of horticultural to Europe by the main players in the Gambia (e.g. GHE, Radville Farms, etc) were severely affected. Likewise, agribusiness enterprises such as Jawneh & Family Cashew Enterprise that received HACCP accreditation and expertise in new techniques of packaging and accessed European market has challenges to export their products. Also, EIF grant beneficiaries that needed to import machines from China experienced delays in getting their goods. Also, because of the pandemic, prices for cashew plummeted Indian and Vietnamese buyers were not available in the country to buy the produce. Thus, COVID-19 massively disrupted trade and businesses in the country. The beneficiaries could have maximised the benefits of EIF technical support received to a greater extent without the pandemic.		

1.5. Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects supported the sustainable development drive of Government. EIF contributed to sustainable development of The Gambia in terms of creating jobs, enhancing income of businesses, increasing the capacity and skills of staff (both public and private sector institutions) through EIF sponsored training, enhancing market access for SMEs, improving the yield for rice groundnut, and cashew, and harnessing export potential of the country to participate in international trade. All these factors will help The Gambia achieve the sustainable development goals.</p> <p>All the businesses that were supported under the SCEDP initiative acknowledge increased production capacity and employment creation. Jawneh & Family Cashew, in partnership with YEP employs over 50 young people. The company all provide training to the youths in cashew processing.</p>		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>To some extent, the EIF support helped The Gambia to strengthen the country's participation in regional and global trade networks. Enterprises that were supported through SCEDP acknowledged that fact. EIF supported Gambia agro-processing companies to achieve HACCP accreditation, training in food quality control, and training farmers in better and quality seed in order to enhance the global competitiveness of the farmers and integrate the country into the global trading system.</p> <p>Projects such as WACQIP and WACOMP are regional initiatives building the competitiveness of West African states.</p> <p>However, the country remains rather uncompetitive because of the small size of the economy. More training, technical support and investment is needed to take the country to the next level.</p>		

1.6. Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The NES, the NTP and the MTP were elaborated with support from the EIF NIU and validated in 2012 to improve the business environment, trade facilitation and quality control, and to attract private investment in the productive sectors for an export-led growth. Additionally, the AfT Ministerial Committee was established with support from the EIF NIU to coordinate and mobilize AfT resources for the implementation of trade related policies and activities in the PAGE, DTIS, NES, NTP and MTP.</p> <p>Under the EIF Sustainability Phase, EIF processes and activities were streamlined into MOTIE. This is meant to build on the successes achieved in Tier 1 programmes which focused on institutional capacity building of the NIU, MOTIE and trade related institutions. However, due to high staff turnover at MOTIE, there is an inability to assign EIF tasks due to the pressure and demand of the core Ministry's work.</p>		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	1 (KII)
<p>Since the mainstreaming of key EIF activities within MOTIE, Government of The Gambia is funding some of their activities from local funds. However, this is not adequate considering the resource constraints the government is facing.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Despite EIF conducting some training needs assessment to ensure that relevant capacity building and skills development is delivered to all the key stakeholder trade support institutions, without EIF support the governance structures needed are defunct for all practical purposes.</p> <p>In 2018 and 2019, the four most experienced staff on EIF matters were posted in Geneva, which meant that there was lower capacity to coordinate the EIF. Fortunately, since 2020, two of the four experienced staff have returned and stabilized EIF coordination at the national level. In addition, the Trade Directorate has recruited four new staff since 2018, all of whom have been trained on EIF matters. It should be noted that the NIU has been fully mainstreamed into the Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Trade (MOTIE) and that since 2017, all EIF activities have been coordinated by the Trade Directorate.</p> <p>It can therefore be concluded that although the objective of Tier 1 is to build institutional capacity of the NIU, MOTIE and trade related institutions, due to low staff presence and the inability to assign EIF tasks due to the pressure and demand of the core Ministry's work, adequate capacity to handle coordinating function of the EIF could not be built. Therefore, there is still insufficient capacity at MOTIE to undertake coordination and financial management of projects.</p> <p>While big achievements were accomplished in both Tier 1 and 2 initiatives in terms of creating awareness, building capacity of beneficiaries, and constructing infrastructure for specific sectors, long term success is questionable for some initiatives. For instance, the cargo handling facility at the Banjul International Airport is not optimally utilized as the exporters already have their own storage. Also, the 5 enterprises that achieved HACCP standards did not renew the certification without project support.</p> <p>With regards to the continuation of EIF initiatives at Banjul International Airport, the Gambia International Airlines (GIA) was enhancing the utilization of the export wing and engaging with MSMEs, however, because COVID-19 hit the MSMEs (who are the main potential users of this export facility), the cargo handling facility has not been optimally utilized yet. It is noted that improving trade facilitation infrastructure at the airport, and enhancing the capacity of MSMEs, are ongoing and cannot be realized in a short timeframe.</p>		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>To some extent, EIF has enhanced coordination among various stakeholders like government agencies, donors, the private sector, and civil society actors.</p>		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	4	2 (DR, KII)

The EIF is a multi-donor programme, which supports Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to be more active players in the global trading system by helping them tackle supply-side constraints to trade. In Gambia Tier 2 projects i.e., – Sector Competitiveness and Export Development Project, at the tune of 2.4 million dollars and Trade Facilitation Project, which amounts to 2.4 million dollars. Other projects – Inclusive Tourism Development, Strengthening Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Capacity in The Gambia, Sustainable Fisheries Development and Sector Development Strategies for Cashew and Sesame.

Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19

2

2 (DR, KII)

EIF Gambia has not been very proactive to the COVID-19 pandemic. The activities relating to EIF have greatly slowed down. It is important that projects receive no cost extensions to ensure they reach the level of maturation (e.g., capacity built and embedded; practices adopted/adapted) needed for results to continue and possibly scale-up post-project.

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** The EIF programmes, activities and objectives identified in the DTIS/DTISU are aligned with The Gambia's development aspirations. Overall, the project outcomes were linked to the priorities in the PAGE and the NDP (2018-21) to make the private Sector the Engine for Growth, Transformation and Job Creation as one of its main outcomes, leveraging trade and investment.
- **Coherence:** The Gambia EIF implementation was properly conceived taking onboard the perspectives of stakeholders. Appropriate governance structures (e.g., NSC, NIU, focal point officer, project teams) and project management instruments (e.g., DTIS/DTISU) were in place to ensure coordination.
- **Effectiveness:** The governance structures (e.g., NSC, NIU, Focal Point, etc) of the project provided critical supportive roles that were helpful to achieve the overall objectives of EIF programmes. The structures helped the mainstreaming of EIF activities into MOTIE although sustainability is questionable without further resources. The DTIS/DTISU and the Action Matrix were very useful instruments that helped to identify the priorities of the country in terms of trade and sustainable development. The documents helped the mainstreaming of trade into the national development policies and strategies such as PAGE and NDP 2018-21.

There is evidence of effectiveness across Tier 2 projects that enhance the competitiveness of the Gambian economy, especially the SCEDP programme. However, the Trade Facilitation (Cargo complex) Project implemented at Banjul International Airport are not being optimally utilised. EIF should have done better consultations before implementing this project.

- **Efficiency:** Under tier 1 the project deliverables were largely accomplished within the stipulated project timelines and budget. There is mixed evidence related to Tier 2, with one of the projects efficiently implemented, and the other not being fully utilized.
- **Impact:** EIF certainly had positive impact on the sustainable development agenda of the Gambia. It helped to build the capacity and skills of trade support institutions in trade negotiation and facilitation; the EIF technical support helped SMEs (mainly youths and women) to have greater market access; trained farmers growing rice, cashew and sesame to improve farming techniques; facilitate job creation and helped increased regional integration through initiatives and partnership with ECOWAS.
- **Sustainability:** More resources should be provided from both national budget and donor funding sources to ensure long term sustainability of tier 1 initiatives. Training, capacity building and skills development must be continuously provided to trade support institutions. Capacity and skills gaps still exist at MOTIE.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	3	There are several cases indicating that VfM is achieved, and that the processes and procedures are efficient and effective, there are no formal metrics on VfM. Therefore, there is no systematic reporting on VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	4	The selected MIEs are ITC, UNCTAD and the Government of Gambia. The procurement processes were done strictly observing the Gambia Public Procurement Authority (GPPA) procurement rules and regulations. The process is transparent and efficient.

	Score	Narrative
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	4	EIF Gambia attempted to ensure efficient donor coordination in the country and create synergy in mobilizing and utilizing resources. The NIU used to hold periodic briefings with the donor facilitator. This helped to avoid duplication and sought complementarities.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	Good effort was made to ensure sustainability of EIF activities – both Tier 1 and Tier 2, in terms of building the capacity and skills of trade support institutions and mainstreaming the EIF activities into the core functions of MOTIE. However, there are still massive challenges – due to high staff turnover at MOTIE, staff do not have institutional memory and capacity, and more resources should be allocated to efficiently continue with EIF activities.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	5	The governance structures (NSC, NIU, and Focal Point) provided excellent leadership for EIF operations to flow efficiently and effectively i.e., on time, managing and monitoring progress and following up on challenges and risks, making timely decisions, etc. Workplans as approved by the NCS implementation and monitoring by NIU.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	The NIU demonstrated flexibility in the implementation of the project. Workplans are approved by the NSC, amending work plans and delivery modalities when needed and adequately justified.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	4	The primary beneficiaries of EIF Tier 2 activities were women and youths. This enhanced the participation of these vulnerable categories of society in the economy of the country, thus promoting equity. Equity is the bedrock of the project design and implementation.

Guinea-Bissau

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	20-Dec-2010
Total budget	<p>Total budget= \$4,173,563</p> <p>Of which EIF Total budget= \$3,705,045 Government budget= \$468,518</p>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and 2
Context	LDC, high institutional and social fragility
Key stakeholders	<p>Government of Guinea Bissau</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Artisanship - Ministry of Trade, Industry, Tourism and Handicrafts (MTITH) <p>UNDP UNIDO</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> Guinea Bissau's three Tier 1 EIF projects align to the EIF TOC Outcome 1. Under Outcome 1, there are strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination', and output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation'. This can be seen through the following key objectives: 'strengthen the institutional framework of the MTITH by facilitating the establishment and reinforcement of (i) the institutional infrastructure; (ii) integrate trade into development and poverty reduction strategies; (iii) improve donor coordination on trade-related issues; (iv) strengthen institutions and train personnel on the link between trade and development; and (v) increase supply-side capacities.'</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> Guinea Bissau's three Tier 1 EIF projects align to the EIF TOC Outcome 2. Under Outcome 2, there are strong linkages to output 1 'improved participation in value chains for increased connectivity to markets.' This is demonstrated in the following key objective, for example, 'strengthening the export capacity of the artisanal fisheries sub-sector.'</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <p>DTISU (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNDP - Start date: 03-Sept-2014 - End date: 31-Oct-2017 <p>NIA Support Phase 1 and 2 (Phase 1 and 2, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Guinea Bissau- Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Artisanship - Start date: 20-Dec-2010

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - End date: 31-Oct-2017 <p>NIA Support through ITA (Phase 1, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNDP - Start date: 19-Dec-2014 - End date: 31-Dec-2017 <p>Sustainability Support (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Guinea Bissau- Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Artisanry - Start date: 09-Mar-2018 - End date: 08-Mar-2020 <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <p>Development of Artisanal Fisheries (Phase 2, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNIDO - Start date: 28-Jul-2021 - End date: 31-Dec-2023
Regional projects	LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status.

2. Context

- Guinea-Bissau is situated in Western Africa with a coastline that borders the Atlantic Ocean. Its two bordering countries are Senegal and Guinea. Guinea-Bissau has a population of 1.9 million people (2020) with a GDP per capita of \$727 (2020).
- Guinea-Bissau's Human Development Index (HDI) score is 0.48 (2019).
- Guinea-Bissau is one of the most coup-prone and politically unstable countries in the world. The last elections, held in December 2019, led to a political crisis as the election results were challenged before the Supreme Court to be fraudulent. However, both ECOWAS and the EU recognise Umaro Sissoco Embaló as the President. Political instability threatens the already difficult business environment.
- Growth has been supported by higher cashew output and higher electricity production due to newly installed power generation capacity. While tax revenue increased marginally from 8.8% of GDP in 2018 to 9.1% in 2019, due to the pickup in economic activity, this was largely offset by weaknesses in customs and non-tax revenue.
- From 2008-2019, Guinea-Bissau's real GDP growth was 4.1% a year, which is higher than Africa's 2.9% real GDP growth a year.
- Guinea-Bissau received a total of \$277 million in Aid for Trade disbursements from 2008-2019. Of this, 55% was spent on economic infrastructure, 44% was spent on building productive capacity, and 1% was spent on trade and policy regulation.
- During the period 2008-2019, Guinea-Bissau received FDI inflows of \$20 million a year on average.
- From 2008-2019, Guinea-Bissau's total merchandise and services exports was \$2,951 million, while its total merchandise and services was \$4,101 million, hence Guinea-Bissau has a merchandise and services trade deficit.
- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), Guinea-Bissau ranked 174th out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', Guinea-Bissau scored 68 percentage points in 2012, which decreased to 60 percentage points in 2019.
- Guinea-Bissau's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) was 2.1 in 2010 and has increased to 2.4 in 2018. By LPI indicators, its highest scoring LPI was timeliness and its lowest scoring LPI was infrastructure.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June-2021 to Sep-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Key Informant Interviews (KIIs); e-survey; Economic Analysis.
Methods used (data and document review)	<p><u>E-survey</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NIU <p><u>Key informant interviews</u> 12 interviews in total</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNIDO (1) - UNDP (2) - FAO/ Ministry of Agriculture (1) - Ministry of Finance/ DG Customs (1) - NIU (2) - FP (1) - TFM (1) - EU DF (1) - EIF Country Coordinator (1) - Chamber of Commerce (1) <p><u>By gender:</u> (please note that some of the interviews were Focus Group Discussions with more than one person attending, which is why there are a total of 12 interviews and 22 interviewees)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Male (18) - Female (4) <p><u>Documents reviewed across Guinea-Bissau's 5 EIF projects:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOU - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budget - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p><u>Guinea-Bissau's Portfolio Review:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The month of August is an unsuitable time to conduct a mission of this type in Guinea-Bissau. It is the month with the heaviest rainfall and most of the international staff working in the country are on holiday. Although national institutions do not close during August, the staff work at a slower pace and there is increased absenteeism, which resulted in last-minute cancellations of scheduled interviews. - The poor quality of the phone network and the lack of widespread internet coverage have impeded the ability to conduct some interviews with respondents that were not available in person. The increased degradation of the road due to the rainfall, together with

	<p>time and budget constraints, made it impossible to travel to the regions to conduct them either.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is a structural issue limiting the possibility to conduct a long-term evaluation of the EIF in Guinea-Bissau, namely the high turnover among stakeholders and beneficiaries' employees. This is especially true for international employees of technical and financial partners. It was difficult to find people who had been living in Guinea Bissau for more than four years. - Regarding the EU Donor Facilitator, the DF that was interviewed had only been in Guinea-Bissau since 2018 and the person who worked as DF had left the country – and indeed had not yet been replaced after one year.
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4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The DTIS is the main alignment tool. It identifies the needs and priorities, defining key economic sectors for trade interventions and activities. It sets out the orientations provided by the Terra Ranka national development plan. The new development plan, Hora Chiga, has taken over the outline of Terra Ranka, hence the DTIS recommendations have been actioned.</p> <p>In the three strategic documents analysed (Terra Ranka, PNIA, and PEDP) the trade dimension of economic activity was integrated. Although in Terra Ranka trade is linked to the sectors of cashew, rice and livestock, the sectoral strategies highlight the importance of supporting artisanal fishery, tubers, and roots to integrate into commercial regional value chains. Phase 2 Tier 2 projects focused on these latter products. Terra Ranka included a project to create an Agency for export promotion, which has been later established with the support of the EIF NIU.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	2 (S, KII)
<p>The private sector is represented in the decision-making structures of the EIF in GNB through the participation of Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Services (CCIAS) in the NSC. However, this assumes that the Chamber of Commerce is representative of the private sector. In reality, it is to a large extent a government institution. Moreover, in a country like GNB, the bulk of the private sector is informal and not integrated in the CCIAS. Similarly, there are ad hoc associations representing the civil society in the EIF NSC. The National Development Plan Terra Ranka integrated the recommendations of the DTIS, for which the private sector and the most vulnerable segments of the population were consulted.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The artisanal fishery development project reflects the EIF priorities that have arisen throughout the years. There is a focus on supporting female operators and gender disaggregated indicators. The project itself takes into consideration environmental risk and foresees mitigating factors. It acts along the entire value chain, from production of inputs and equipment to commercialization, and includes actions to foster the integration of the sector in the regional commercial unit.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>UNMO's sustainability support project MOU expired on the 31/03/2020, when the NIU stopped receiving funds from the EIF. However, the NIU had made commitments that could not be concluded before the MOU expiry date, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They have progressively implemented the postponed</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
activities as the situation began to normalise. At the date of expiration of the MOU, performance indicators shows that results were accomplished at 33% of overall targets. The NIU argued at a later moment, 11/08/2021, that EIF projects and operations have been able to adapt well to counter the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the significant negative impact it had on projects and operations in GNB.		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
Only 20% of the DTISU recommendations had been implemented by the end of the Sustainability Project. The NIU argued that the poor implementation rate is due to political instability. UN agencies also expressed their concerns in terms of implementation gap. The EIF has supported the country in the development of tools, policies, and strategies but the lack of funding impedes the jump to the implementation phase.		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
In GNB, capacity building projects recruit consultants to work with the local staff. The theory of change behind this is that the local staff will learn by demonstration. The weakness, however, is that it does not consider two issues. First, most of the time the local staff are not interested in these new working dynamics under the conditions that they are offered so they do not take ownership of the innovations that the international staff brings. Secondly, the salary gap between the international and the national staff leads to the latter not holding themselves responsible for the work to be done and leaving all the work to the former. It fosters laziness. 133 Bissau-Guinean public servants have been trained in different areas; 4 trade policies were formulated in Guinea-Bissau with EIF support; and 4 sectoral strategies have integrated the trade dimension in Guinea-Bissau.		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
All the projects that have been implemented with the EIF support since the publication of the DTISU reflect the priorities established by it. The EIF and the DTIS are perfectly aligned by design. The difficulties are linked to delays and gaps in the implementation of the projects, as well as in the lack of funding.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	5	2 (S, KII)
According to government representatives, all EIF activities are carried out after a broad and inclusive consultation process with the relevant Ministries' representatives, the technical and financial partners, and the private sector and civil society. Among some of the stakeholders consulted KII mentioned the CCIAS, the Civil Society National Movement, UNDP, WB, Lusofona University, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Fisheries, etc. The private sector and civil society stakeholders that were interviewed confirmed that they were consulted during the DTIS process.		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
Nine key performance indicators related to the outcomes and outputs set by the logframe do not align with any action implemented or were impossible to calculate, out of a total of 34 foreseen actions. However, of the 25 that were possible to calculate, they show that Guinea-Bissau performs better than Cape Verde, a country that can be considered an exigent benchmark.		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>There are complementarities and synergies between the three delivery modalities in the achievement of the EIF goals and objectives. However, not even their combined effect is completely suited to achieve them at 100% capacity, due to the lack of resources. The analytical tools provide the country with a plan, but do not provide the resources to implement it. The institutional capacity support provides training to the NIU and other stakeholders, but the lack of supervision led to people not taking the learning process seriously. It creates the condition to develop the capacity at the country level but there are no mechanisms to ensure that the resources are used for their intended purposes. Supply-side capacity support projects are formulated by having financial resources for their implementation.</p> <p>The ITA technical assistance led to the formulation of policies and the planning of strategies, largely contributing to the implementation of the annual working plans of the NIU. However, very few of the formulated policies were implemented and almost none of the strategic guidelines were followed.</p>		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The artisanal fishery development project incorporates many lessons learnt and aims to implement recommendations coming from the Fishery Development Strategic Plan (PEDP), like the need to build more fish refrigeration and storage facilities. It also foresees to support and strengthen many initiatives started by other technical and financial partners, starting by mapping all those that are currently ongoing. For example, it will support the Artisanal Fishery Center of Cacine, that was built with funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency and build a fish drying and packaging unit for the Cacheu female's cooperative. This latter initiative presents a high degree of complementarity with the UEMOA project for co-managing the fishery activity in the rivers of Guinea-Bissau (Buba, Cacine and Cacheu). Other ongoing or completed project with which the "Artisanal fishery development project" coordinates and creates synergies are the "Support to the valorization and sustainable management of artisanal fishing products (FAO)" project and the "Alto Bandim fishing harbor (AfDB)".</p> <p>The EU delegation staff acknowledge that there is potential for complementarities and synergies between EIF interventions and their own. However, they also mentioned that they do not materialise, to a large extent, due to the lack of policy dialogue and coordination among technical and financial partners. They attribute that to the lack of leadership from the side of the government, which results in duplicities. For example, once the EU and FAO commissioned practically the same diagnostic study. On a more positive note, regarding the "Artisanal Fishery Development Project" it was the EIF at the program level that facilitated the communication between the EU DF and the NIU. The EU DF has proposed to integrate this project into their program framework that supports the fishery sector, and which has a budget of 4 million euro per year.</p>		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	a) 5	3 (DR, S, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	b) 4	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	c) 4	
c) prioritised interventions	d) 4	
d) programming plan	e) 4	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		
<p>a) The DTIS and the DTISU are the only trade specific studies with a cross sector approach that have been carried out in GNB during recent years. They identified key economic sectors that should be supported and bottlenecks that should be removed to integrate the country into the global and regional trade system. During its elaboration and validation, the NIU was able to sensitise private and public stakeholders on the importance of using trade as an engine for national development.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>b) The follow up on the implementation of the DTIS recommendations, together with the integration of its action matrix with the Terra Ranka action matrix, has led to a closer mainstreaming of trade.</p> <p>c) Each sector has taken advantage of the DTIS action matrix recommendation as much as possible. The recommendations were clear and realistic. However, the level of overall implementation has been low.</p> <p>d) The Ministry of Trade and the NIU produced short, medium, and long-term plans following the DTISU recommendation. The EU supported the elaboration of a multiannual investment plan to ease the deployment of the Terra Ranka, where the trade agenda was integrated thanks to the DTISU. However, the scarcity of financial and material resources has resulted in a poor implementation of those plans.</p> <p>e) In theory, since the DTISU and the Terra Ranka action matrix are aligned, the development projects that have been implemented since 2016 should be aligned with the DTIS AM. Some examples could be the EU Fishery Sector Support Program (EU), the project for the construction of the port of Alto-Bandim (EU), and the project to enhance the technical capacity of the national laboratory to carry out quality control of fishery products (FAO). Nevertheless, again the poor project implementation and performance is a structural issue in the country.</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>Only 20% of the DTISU recommendations had been implemented by the end of the Sustainability Project.</p> <p>The NIU argued that the poor implementation rate is due to political instability.</p> <p>UN agencies also expressed their concerns in terms of implementation gap. The EIF has supported the country in the development of tools, policies, and strategies but the lack of funding impedes the jump to the implementation phase.</p>		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The first DTIS was carried out by the World Bank and published in 2010. The DTIS update was carried out by UNDP and published in 2016, covering a period from 2016 to 2021. No preparatory work has been started yet to update the DTIS for the next 5 years horizon.</p>		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The Sustainability Phase Project included in its working plan updating the national trade strategy, the establishment of an inter-ministerial trade committee, following up in the implementation of the DTISU, and the integration of the trade dimension into national and sectoral development plans. Different documents proved that those actions were at least formulated. However, gaps in the implementation affects most of them. The implementation of the DTISU recommendations remains below the 20% and the inter-ministerial trade committee does not appear to be operational, despite having legal existence. Moreover, the national trade strategy was also elaborated, but none of the Key Informants could verify if its implementation was ongoing. The trade dimension was included into the national and sectoral development plans that we have consulted (Terra Ranka, PNIA, PEDP) but the degree of implementation of those plans is also questionable, especially on their trade dimension.</p>		
EIF contribution to policy reform	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The Sustainability Phase Project included in its working plan updating and producing legal and regulatory documents in the trade area. Several laws and policies were formulated by the NIU with the ITA assistance (cashew commercialization, products inspection, competition, and handicrafts). Only the law regarding cashew commercialisation was approved. The NIU argued that the EIF really enhanced their capacity to formulate policies and management reforms, but the lack of financial resources challenges their implementation.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The Sustainability Phase Project budgeted a total of \$35,765.29 for missions to participate in international and sub-regional trade fora, along a period of two years. Different Key Informants confirmed the participation of the NIU's staff in trade fora in Dakar, Buenos Aires and Geneva.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to regional objectives	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
Same as above section on international trade fora.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
The Sustainability Phase Project work plan included the organization of 12 training activities. Different Key Informants confirmed their participation in those training activities, for example, "MSMEs management" and "Custom and non-Custom trade procedures" among others. However, they also complained because they were not paid any attendance-subsides or complained that they need more training.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	3	2 (DR, KII)
The Sustainability Phase Project work plan included the set up and maintenance of price information system and a website for dissemination of EIF activities. The NIU has reported that while it did create this website, it was then transferred to the Ministry of Trade who did not know how to manage it. We did have the opportunity to see that price information system and gather some files related to it. There is no data in the system beyond 2015, as the responsible person was away on mission, although in 2018 the NIU requested UNCTAD to continue the partnership that was providing them with the data.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
Two phase 2 tier 2 projects have been formulated in Guinea-Bissau but only one of them, the "Artisanal Fishery Development Project", has already obtained funding. The project has suffered a long delay and it did not receive the first disbursement of \$700,000, until the 30/07/2021. Therefore, it is too soon to assess the real implications of its implementation in terms of results and effectiveness. However, it is true that the project logframe and work plan includes indicators and activities related to this topic.		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
Same as above		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
Same as above		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	2	3 (DR, S, KII)
Same as above		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	2	2 (DR, KII)
Same as above		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (S, KII)
<p>The EIF ES and TFM put a lot of energy for the approval of the artisanal fishery development project. Getting EIF projects underway is complicated since there are many formal requirements. However, since the EIF projects in GNB are financially small scale, there is not too large a production of documents. They took the lead in coordinating the different stakeholders for the approval of the artisanal fishery development project. The EU delegation acknowledges that without them, there would not have been communication channels between the EU and the NIU.</p> <p>The TFM receives and carefully verifies/validates quarterly financial reports. The EIF executive secretariat accompanies the implementation of the planned activities from Geneva and checks terms of reference. Supervision missions are, however, exceptional for his taste. Moreover, there are not substantial risks in GNB because the scale of the financial facilities is small.</p> <p>They encouraged to hire an M&E officer in the NIU through budget provisions. They also commission</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>mid-term and project closure evaluations. Thanks to the mid-term evaluations they can know if the projects are in the good track or, otherwise, take correct measures to ensure that objectives are achieved. They went from an initial approach where the projects belonged to the government, that would use its own systems to carry out these tasks, to a more standardized approach where the M&E systems should ensure that the gathered data match the log frame requirements.</p> <p>The key informant interviews indicate that the EIF ES and the TFM give more focus to countries where the EIF footprint is larger, and that not enough feedback is given. The interviews also revealed that there has been a lack of physical presence of the central structures on the ground to control the implementation. The last presential mission was in 2018 and the mission scheduled for 2019 was cancelled. However, in general all the Key Informants stated their high satisfaction with the effectiveness of the EIF ES and TFM in achieving the program results. UNIDO highlighted their patience and support to get the approval of the artisanal fishery development project.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p><u>NIU and FP</u></p> <p>Many Key Informants highlighted that the EIF NIU and FP show a mediocre effectiveness in delivering results and fulfilling their mandate. However, they also acknowledge that the country political and economic context is really challenging and that the EIF NIU and FP did the best they could with very limited financial resources and capacity constraints. Indeed, the general impression is that along the EIF implementation in GNB, the staff of the NIU and the FP have by large developed their skills and knowledge. That was especially significant during the ITA assistance, which managed to completely accomplish 46 out of the 57 activities in the NIU work plan, with the remaining 10 activities at an advanced stage of implementation. Moreover, the programmatic and significant importance of those activities and products should be noted.</p> <p><u>NSC</u></p> <p>The interviews carried out with Key Informants show that the NSC is a key institution in the architecture of the EIF in GNB, acting as the only operational and effective coordination mechanism on trade issues between the government, the technical and financial partners, the civil society, and the private sector. However, the degree to which it manages to deliver its mission is questionable. Indeed, its operability has been fading off since 2018, moment when the EU and UNDP - for example - stopped attending the regular meetings. Moreover, since the COVID-19 outbreak, meetings have not been held. It seems that several factors explain the progressive decline of the NSC. The most important would be the lack of funding for its current expenses - mainly subsidizing the attendance of its members -, the lack of leadership of the government, lack of control mechanisms for members' attendance, and the need to receive technical assistance to bridge capacity gaps.</p> <p><u>DF</u></p> <p>The Donor Facilitator has poorly carried out its mandate. Apart from giving the approval and some recommendations for the artisanal fishery development project, it did not engage with the other EIF institutions in GNB. The EU staff interviewed for the case study had very little knowledge of the EIF and they acknowledged that is was not of their interest until they hear about the fishery project. The constant turnover of the person acting as Donor Facilitator, a role that has been vacant since September 2020, has undermined the effectiveness of the institution. The EU delegation staff said that they had not been playing their role as donor coordinator because the NIU was not supporting that task and the government did not show any leadership in summoning the technical and financial partners. The only donor resource mobilization initiative that they supported was in 2015 in the context of the Terra Ranka launch, but this was not specifically for the EIF. A multi-annual plan of 1.6 billion euro was designed but not implemented due to the resurgence of political instability. Most of the Key Informants interviewed argued that when the Spanish Embassy was playing the role of donor facilitator, the institution was more effective. However, it must be remembered that the interviewer was a Spanish citizen, and that might have created some inherent bias.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	4	3 (DR, S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Most of the activities and results that should have been attained by the Sustainability Project suffered some delay because of the COVID-19 outbreak. However, they were mainly accomplished after the deadline established in the Memorandum of Understanding. In particular, the NIU worked remotely during the pandemic as a mitigation measure.		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Tier 1 projects have achieved the outcome of improving the trade environment and delivered against all outputs established in the logframe, within the allocated budget. However, implementation of activities and actions has happened with delays and no significant savings in financial resources was identified, with a final saving of only 1.07% of the net budget.</p> <p>The ITA assistance achieved important results in the areas of trade mainstreaming, policy formulation and implementation, and capacity building within the budget and without major delays. Only one activity out of 54 was not implemented because it was not budgeted. Savings were significant in the ITA assistance project, representing 9.34% of the originally estimated budget.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>It is challenging to assess the efficiency of Tier 2 projects since their implementation is at a very early stage. Indeed, the inputs that can be used to assess such efficiency indicate that the performance in that field has been very poor. In this sense, one of the projects was not even approved by the EIF board, while the approved one is being implemented with a considerable delay. However, for the latter there might be some financial savings respects to the originally estimated 1.5-million-euro budget and a shorter than planned implementation phase, according to Key Informants.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p><u>NIU and FP</u></p> <p>Considering that government financial counterparts are rarely paid and that the EIF FP and NIU had delivered their mandate without going out of budget, despite minor delays, their efficiency can be rated as high. In general, the structures work following their design, but they need more financial and technical assistant. The power is too much concentrated in the Ministry of Trade. The NIU's budget is small and little adjusted to the real market prices in GNB, resulting in lower than desired quality. They have to negotiate with suppliers to make them meet their quality requirements for the price that they can pay. In order to ensure efficiency, the NIU follows a progressive discarding process for the candidatures/bids received. They have taken actions to improve their performance in this sense, by creating time buffers to anticipate delays and having back up plans. They have increased their bargaining capacity, but the small size of the market put a limit to what they can achieve in terms of efficiency.</p> <p><u>NSC</u></p> <p>The NSC went from having quarterly meetings and subsidizing the attendance of their members with around \$90 per session, to not having covered its functioning expenses and stop holding meetings. On the one hand, considering that public servants only get \$45 per diem for missions out of the capital such subsidy was excessive. On the other hand, FAO and Ministry of Agriculture Key Informant said that the members of the NSC worked very efficiently and in a coordinated fashion, especially those coming from the private sector. Thus, the performance of the NSC in term of efficiency can be rated as mediocre.</p> <p><u>DF</u></p> <p>Considering that, at least in recent times, the DF has not been playing its role and it has not mobilized any funding for EIF projects, its efficiency can be rated as poor. The EU acknowledge that there are duplicities in technical and financial partners' actions.</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>COVID-19 has had a negative impact on the functioning of all the public institutions. The EIF NIU was willing to carry out its mission, but the pandemic related restrictions hindered its capacity to achieve its goals. On another note, regarding the "Artisanal Fishery Development Project", UNIDO had planned a</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
mission to evaluate the cost and other financial aspects of the project. The border lockdown, due to the COVID-19, impeded the ability to conduct the mission, so they adopted a conservative approach for the project's cost.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF has had some impact on fostering sustainable development in Guinea-Bissau. The focus in this sense was put on strengthening institutions and policy mechanisms. Although trade is not a priority for the country yet, it has been integrated in development strategies. Also, despite rampant corruption being still a national plague, the EIF has created some safeguards against it and built the capacity of civil servants. The EIF also has had some positive impact in the areas of creating economic opportunities, empowering women and promoting inclusive trade. 285 people, out of which 179 women and 24 youth, received training in investment and trade related areas and 44, out of which 33 women, received training in market research, food hygiene practices, marketing, and other topics. Key Informant interviews highlight the positive impact that those capacity building activities had on private sector and civil society stakeholders. For example, 20 MSMEs participating in a business management training now process and file most documents electronically. However, the national context characterized by political instability, a hostile business environment, and the scarce development and buy in from the private sector has caused an implementation gap that is largely responsible for the little impact generated in comparison with the potential.</p>		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Also, it has had a positive impact in the integration of Guinea-Bissau into the global and regional trading systems. This has been done essentially through eliminating bottlenecks in trade policy and regulation, supporting the participation of the country in regional and international trade fora, and providing value chain training to the private sector and the civil society. For example, the DTISU identified the need to extend the one-stop custom shop for cashew exports to other sectors and imports. This was implemented with the support of the EIF NIU. Indeed, merchandise exports value has more than doubled from 2008-2009 to 2018-2019, according to UNCTAD (State of commodity dependence, 2021). However, the implementation gap is even more acute in this area. The only Tier 2 project that has obtained approval and funding is still at early implementation stage, being this category of project the main tool to achieve the integration into the world and regional trading system. Merchandise exports have concentrated even more in the period 2008-2009 to 2018-2019, as well as the dependency of the country from commodity exports, mainly row cashew nuts, which increase its vulnerability to international price shocks as the recent disruption created by the COVID-19 pandemic proved.</p>		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF national structures and processes have been integrated into the government to a large extent. The FP and the NIU staff are public servants affected to the Ministry of Trade and Industry and there are representatives of the relevant government agencies at the NSC. Although, the DF is not integrated into the government, it is integrated in the NSC that is a government led institution. Therefore, it is indirectly integrated into the government structures, but many Key Informants contested that. Focusing on the NIU, 4 government officials form part of the NIU, which is hosted at the Ministry of Trade. The NIU is included in the organigramme of the Ministry of Trade, by the decree No 2016-339 of the Council of Minister of February 2017, where it has different functions and tasks like representing the Ministry in trade fora, participating in the development of its work plan, and coordinating several trade-related working groups and committees. Moreover, the NIU coordinates the technical assistance for trade.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>Integration was largely promoted thanks to the sustainability project, but the lack of internal resources poses a risk to its correct functioning in the future.</p> <p>Other project based EIF initiatives are not as clearly integrated into the government priorities and activities. In this sense, while Tier 1 activities related to trade mainstreaming, policy formulation and implementation, and capacity building have been integrated into the Ministry of Trade through the NIU. The current 2021 annual working plan of the Ministry of Trade and Industry includes several activities that have their origin in EIF interventions. Lot of the activities come from the DTISU action matrix like the approval of the competition law, the training of the civil servants affected to the one stop custom shop or supporting the transposition of UEMOA directives into the national law, among others. However, the DTIS update as a process has not been integrated into the Ministry's priorities, processes, and activities.</p> <p>Tier 2 projects are at least formally integrated into the State Budget under the patronage of the Ministry of Trade, however given that its implementation has barely started, it is difficult to evaluate the reality of this.</p>		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The 2021 State Budget included budget lines for the EIF projects that are in implementation or in the pipeline. The "Artisanal Fishery Development Project" counts with a grant of around \$1.35 million, while the "Tuber and Roots Value Chain Development Project" with another one of around \$1.42 million. Moreover, \$9,000 in internal resources have been budgeted to support EIF already consolidated initiatives and activities. All those funds have been allocated to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Moreover, it should be noted that none of those projects/lines were included in the 2020 State Budget. On the other hand, the execution rate of internal resources allocated to capital expenditure was 0% in 2019 and 2020. On the other hand, the NIU staff and FP stated that their salaries are now paid by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The government does fulfill its commitments related to the payment for public servant salaries, where the execution rate of internal resources achieved the 93.3% in 2019 and 83.6% in 2020. Other current expenditures associated to the functioning of EIF national structures, like the NIU, are not covered by the government according to Key Informants. Key Informant highlighted that political instability has hindered the process of ownership of EIF initiatives by the national government. The DTIS and its action matrix are not largely owned by the government and other relevant stakeholders. This is seen across other Tier 1 initiatives.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Continuity can be guaranteed by a combination of national and other donors' resources. Key Informants argued that the institutions that will drive this post-sustainability phase will be the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Fishery, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, ECOWAS, WAEMU, China or the EU.</p> <p>The current 2021 annual working plan of the Ministry of Trade and Industry includes several activities that have their origin in EIF interventions. Lot of the activities come from the DTIS-U action matrix like the approval of the competition law, the training of the civil servants affected to the one stop custom shop, or supporting the transposition of UEMOA directives into the national law, among others. However, the feasibility of the plan is questionable in financial terms since its implementation cost is estimated in \$1.14 million approximately while the budget of the Ministry of Trade is \$3.9 million, of which only \$9,000 is allocated to EIF Tier 1 initiatives.</p> <p>The NIU, although the staff have been integrated and assumed a position within the Ministry, still act as a unit. Several structures and processes are still in place, like different committees that were created by the EIF. However, other structures are less operational at the moment like the DF, the NSC or the inter-ministerial trade committee.</p> <p>It is unlikely that the next DTIS update could be done without external financial and technical support, although the NIU staff has the capacity to oversee and organize that work. The EIF FP thinks that the DTIS might be updated in the future by the government and its processes and activities will continue, but for that the government should include it in the State budget. This is unlikely to happen given the lack of fiscal space and the significant cost of carrying out a DTIS. Other Tier 1 activities (trade mainstreaming, policy formulation and implementation, and capacity building) will continue</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
independently of external donor support since they are low or no cost initiatives that the NIU can deliver on its own with the level of financial support currently provided by the State budget.		
It is too soon to know if any of the Tier 2 initiatives continue once the EIF support ends. UNIDO's idea is that the private sector will take the lead in continuing the "Artisanal Fishery Development Project" if they manage to make it financially self-sustainable.		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
The coordination between the NIU - now integrated in the Ministry of Trade -, other government agencies, the private sector and the civil society will continue. With or without the EIF the government is going to keep liaising on trade facilitation with the donors, the private sector, and the civil society on trade issues, since GNB has signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and the AfCFTA. However, the government still needs the EIF to be at the same level than other countries participating on those agreements. It is not clear at this point how such coordination will happen since there are several structures that could serve this purpose, like the NSC, the inter-ministerial trade committee, or the Economic Dialogue Forum. The problem is that none of them seems to be operational at this moment. Indeed, such coordination might continue in a more informal and unstructured fashion. The biggest challenge is around coordination with donors. The EU delegation argued that the NSC should be reactivated to ensure the continuity of the coordination among different trade stakeholders.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
The EIF has managed to leverage some financing from other technical and financial partners, although very little. They were mainly contributions in-kind from UNDP to support the NIU with equipment and materials. The main contribution in this area had been done in term of expertise coming again from UNDP, UNIDO and, perhaps in the future, FAO. The ITA assistance is the most valuable in this sense. Nevertheless, although the technical assistance leveraged expertise and allowed the local staff to develop their skills and knowledge, the continuity of such expertise is limited to the capacity of the Guinea-Bissau government to retain the staff that were exposed to those experiences. Key Informants highlighted that GNB still requires the EIF contribution to leverage finance and expertise. The government still has to develop an exit strategy in line with its own financial capacity and clear national priorities. Indeed, although the government has a trade strategy, it does not have enough resources to cover the operational costs of all EIF initiatives. There is a risk of staff turnaround at the NIU.		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
No Key Informant has manifested any concern about the negative effect of the COVID-19 on the sustainability of the results achieved by the EIF. Although, the COVID-19 has hindered the implementation of EIF projects and reverse some of the positive outcomes achieved, like the decrease in cashew value exports, its effect is temporary, and progress will be recovered as the pandemic fade off. All the Key Informants have highlighted the EIF's contribution to sustainable poverty reduction and improvements in livelihoods for targeted beneficiaries. For example, the private sector argued that the improvements in value chains and the support to crop diversification fostered by the EIF has led to an increase in production levels. Training provided has increased the employability of the labour force contributed to poverty reduction and employment creation. The FP said that if the traditional fishery development project was well executed, it would endure food self-reliance and the different agents in the value chain would see an improvement in their living conditions, including female traders.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** The EIF is very relevant for GNB. It is aligned with national priorities and needs through the integration of the DTIS and its action matrix into national development plans, like Terra Ranka, and sector strategies and plans, like the PEDP and PNIA. Although the

alignment with the new national development plan currently in place, Hora Tchiga, has not taken place yet, this should happen during the next update of the DTIS. The EIF is aligned with the private sector's and civil society's priorities and needs through the DTIS, for which they were included in consultative processes. The artisanal fishery development project is typical of the progressive adaptation of national EIF projects to the emerging priorities of the program, including gender and environmental dimensions, a value chain approach, and a regional focus. On the other hand, the COVID-19 has partially put into question the capacity of the EIF in GNB to adapt to a changing global context. In this sense, many activities of the NIU Sustainability Project were suspended at the beginning of the pandemic and were impossible to complete before the expiration of the MoUs.

- **Coherence:** the EIF interventions and results are generally well aligned with the EIF theory of change and logframe. Although there are complementarities and synergies between the three EIF delivery modalities in GNB, their combined effect is not suited to achieve 100% of the goals that were set. On the other hand, there are strong complementarities and synergies with non-EIF initiatives despite political instability and the lack of government leadership. Occasionally, there were duplications of results by technical and financial partners.
- **Effectiveness:** Tier 1 project presented high degrees of effectiveness, partially due to the good results achieved by the DTISU and the ITA assistance. Capacity building, participation in international trade fora, increased trade mainstreaming, and deeper knowledge of trade related issues are the areas where the EIF Tier 1 projects were most effective in delivering results. However, information dissemination, policy reform and contribution to regional objectives are those where they were less effective. Regarding different the structures, the EIF ES and TFM were very effective at delivering their mandate, while the DF was far less effective. The DF (the EU) has not leveraged funds for EIF projects nor fulfilled its role as the donor coordinator, considering how the DF role has been vacant since September 2020. The NIU/ FP performed well on average, and their financial and capacity constrains must be considered.
- **Efficiency:** Tier 1 projects finished with financial savings of 1.07% with respect to the original net budget and delivered in all the outputs established in the EIF logframe, despite some delays in the execution and lack of implementation of activities. During the ITA assistance, the NIU implemented 46 out of 57 activities in its work plan and left the remaining 10 activities in an advanced delivery stage. Over time, the NIU/ FP took measures to increase their efficiency, for they did not go over budget nor did they report any significant delays. The efficiency of the NSC, on the other has progressively declined and is currently out of operation.
- **Sustainability:** The EIF has achieved a good level of sustainability in GNB and the COVID-19 pandemic has not undermined its achievements. However, there is heterogeneity in terms of the sustainability achieved among the different EIF counterparts. The NIU/ FP have been integrated into the Ministry of Trade, along with many Tier 1 initiatives that are embedded into their work plans. However, political instability and the lack of financial resources have undermined the capacity of the government to own them, which puts a risk to their continuity. Indeed, the DTIS has been poorly integrated into government processes due to its high cost, and there are doubts over its ownership and continuity, which is unlikely to persevere without donor support. The NSC was a government-led institution, but it is no longer operational due to lack of financing, which suggests a lack of ownership from the government. The DF was never directly integrated into the government, and it is affected by similar ownership and continuity issues as the NSC. Finally, the government has integrated coordination on trade issues across public agencies with donors, the private sector, and the civil society into its

priorities. Coordination will likely continue despite the end of EIF support, although there are doubts about the mechanisms that will be used.

- **Impact:** the EIF has had some positive impacts in Guinea-Bissau. It has contributed to putting the country on the path of sustainable development through strengthening institutions and policy mechanisms, creating economic opportunities, empowering women, and promoting inclusive trade. However, corruption is still widespread, and trade is neither a national priority nor considered key for the development of the country. The EIF has also contributed to the integration of the country into global and regional trading systems through the elimination of bottlenecks in trade policy and regulation, supporting its participation in regional and international trade fora, and providing value chain training to the private sector and the civil society.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	3	<p>Complex and not homogeneous processes across implementing units. No reporting on VfM processes or indicators.</p> <p>Processes to ensure VfM relies on GNB government regulation and laws, which are aligned with WAEMU's, topped up with EIF procurement framework. Other MIEs follow their own regulations and procedures, like UNIDO and UNDP. No reports have been found including indicators or explanations about how VfM is ensured.</p>
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	3	<p>The NIU has adopted negotiation tactics to ensure suppliers meet quality standards within a small budget. However, it is unclear how the UNDP and UNIDO were selected as MIEs.</p> <p>The NIU's budget is small and little adjusted to the real market prices in GNB, resulting in lower than desired quality. They have to negotiate with suppliers to make sure suppliers meet their quality requirements for the price that they can pay. In order to ensure efficiency, the NIU follows a progressive discarding process for the candidatures/bids received.</p> <p>Regarding the MIEs, in addition to the Ministry, there is UNDP and UNIDO. UNDP was selected to do the DTIS and UNIDO for the fisheries project. However, it is not clear from the MOUs how these MIEs were selected.</p>
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	3	<p>Although all projects have been delivered within budget implementing almost all the foreseen activities, even reporting savings in some cases, synergies have not been maximised and there has been poor coordination.</p> <p>Tier 1 projects have achieved the outcome of improving the trade environment and delivered in all the outputs established in the EIF log-frame, within the allocated budget. However, implementation of activities and actions has happened with delays and no significant savings in financial resources was identified, only 1.07% of the net budget.</p>

	Score	Narrative
		<p>The Donor Facilitator has poorly carried out its mandate and it did not engage with the other EIF institutions in GNB. The EU delegation staff said that they had not been playing their role as donor coordinator because the NIU was not supporting that task and the government did not show any leadership in summoning the technical and financial partners. They also reported duplicities in technical and financial partners interventions in GNB, although not exclusively in the context of EIF interventions.</p>
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	<p>Good initiative shown by UNIDO to suggest the private sector takes over. Regarding the provision of public goods encouraged by the EIF, the government has integrated EIF national structures and covered their operational expenses with the general budget, at least partially. Moreover, the NIU has learnt how to deliver its mission despite financial restrictions.</p> <p>Although the NIU is integrated into the Ministry, once the EIF funding ends there is some uncertainty whether the staff whose capacity has been built thanks to the EIF will stay.</p> <p>UNIDO highlighted their patience and support to get the approval of the artisanal fishery development project. Once EIF funding ends, UNIDO has recommended that the private sector takes over the project so that it becomes financially self-sustainable and long-term impacts can be achieved.</p>
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	2	<p>There have been changes in leadership, most notably the absence of the DF. This has hampered the ability to deliver on VfM. While the NIU is well integrated into the Ministry of Trade, challenges remain (see below).</p> <p>The EIF NIU and FP have been integrated into the Ministry of Trade, along with many Tier 1 initiatives that are embedded into their working plans. However, political instability and the lack of financial resources have undermined the capacity of the government to own them.</p> <p>The EU staff interviewed for the case study had very little knowledge of the EIF and they acknowledged that is was not of their interest. The constant turnover of the person acting as Donor Facilitator, a role that has been vacant since September 2020, has undermined the effectiveness of the institution. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the DF is integrated in the NSC.</p>
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	<p>There has been good flexibility & adaptability.</p> <p>There have been several adaptations to MOUs, most notably in the NIA Support (Phase 1 & 2) project. The MOU amendments, approved by the ES and TFM, have allowed for work plan and budget revisions. In total, there were 6 MOU amendments from May 2012- May 2017.</p> <p>With regards to the Artisanal fisheries project (Phase 2, Tier 2), the ES and TFM recommended that a risk management plan should be prepared by March 2021, however this is still pending.</p>
7. Equity of program design and delivery	3	<p>Women and youth groups were indirectly consulted for the design of EIF interventions, mainly through their</p>

	Score	Narrative
(equity)		<p>representatives in private sector and civil societies associations. Those associations were consulted during the DTISU and included in the NSC. Moreover, they directly benefited from EIF interventions.</p> <p>In the Tier 2 fishery project, there is a focus on supporting female operators and gender desegregated indicators. Women have been empowered through training, e.g., 285 people, out of which 179 women and 24 youth, received training in investment and trade related areas. However, it should be noted that while gender and youth data is available at the disaggregate level, and their interests surveyed, they were not directly consulted to contribute with inputs to the core design of the projects.</p>

Lao PDR

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2010
Total budget	\$6,523,651
Participation in EIF Phases	Phases 1 and 2
Context	LDC, landlocked, FCAS
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Department of Planning and Cooperation (DPC) ○ Department of Industry and Handicrafts (DIH) ○ Department of Standard and Metrology (DSM) • Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LNCCI) • Oudomxay Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) • Phongsaly Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) • Private sector companies (Ock Pop Tok) • EU Delegation • UNIDO <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - World Bank
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhance and sustain the capacity of trade-related institutions (especially MOIC) to formulate and implement trade policies and coordinate aid for trade (AfT) • Strengthen Lao PDR's national quality infrastructure and industrial statistics to improve overall competitiveness of Laotian products, services, and businesses • Targeted support to Lao PDR's handicrafts and selected agribusinesses to enhance productivity and competitiveness and improve local business environments, empowering women and small businesses <p>Alignment to ToC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Outcome 1: Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Output 1</u>. Improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Update (U) 2012 and 2021 ○ National Implementation Arrangements (NIA) support ○ Trade mainstreaming support project ○ Promotion of export competitiveness (ECL) and sustainability support (SSP) to public-private dialogue in northern Lao PDR - <u>Output 2</u>. Strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support ○ Trade mainstreaming support project ○ ECL project and SSP - <u>Output 3</u>. Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support ○ Trade mainstreaming support project ○ ECL project and SSP ● Outcome 2: Increased exports and access to international markets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Output 1.</u> Improved participation of EIF countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ECL project and SSP ○ Strengthening National Quality Infrastructure (SNQI) and Industrial Statistics (IS) - <u>Output 2.</u> Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ECL project and SSP ○ SNQI and IS - <u>Output 3.</u> Support to EIF countries to leverage additional investments for productive capacity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DTISU 2012 and 2021 ○ NIA support ○ Trade mainstreaming support project
National projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Completed projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTISU 2012 (2011-13; Tier 1; phase 1) - NIA support (2010-16; Tier 1; phase 1) - Trade mainstreaming support project (2015-16; tier 1; phase 1) - SNQI and IS (2013-18; Tier 2; phase 1) ● Projects under implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTISU 2021 (2020-21; Tier 1; phase 2) - ECL project and SSP (2019-22; Tier 1 and 2; phase 2)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Projects under implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status - Capacity building for EIF countries on investment promotion within WAIPA activity - A New Trade Policy and Strategy for ASEAN LDCs on market access and related issues

2. Context

- Lao PDR is the only landlocked ASEAN country, bordering Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and China.
- Steady economic growth over the past twenty years, driven by large-scale mining and hydropower, but the economy has been slowing since 2015.
- The country has relied on a narrow growth model, based on natural resource extraction. While this policy orientation delivered sustained economic growth, it has been less successful in fostering the creation of jobs and has led to the accumulation of significant public external debt.
- In recent years, the country's performance has only marginally changed in terms of time of cost of doing business and trading.
- The Lao PDR needs to advance structural transformation and export diversification for higher and more inclusive growth. The new government (2021) is prioritising fostering quality growth and reducing the reliance on the natural resource sector.
- In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic growth declined to an estimated 0.4 percent in 2020, the lowest level in three decades. The service sector, including travel and tourism, has been hit hard by lockdown measures while remittances also reduced substantially. The unemployment

rate has risen to over 23%, from 16% at the end of 2019. Public external debt has increased to 65% of GDP in 2020 compared to 59% in 2019.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June 2021- Sept 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Documents, interviews, survey and EIF results database
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reviewed 20+ documents (EIF programme documents and technical reporting; DTISs; policy and strategy documents; evaluations; minutes of meetings; etc.) Reviewed two e-survey responses (NIU coordinator; EIF DF) 14 interviews; interviewed 18 informants (8 women): 9 from government ministries and agencies; 5 from private sector; 2 donors; 1 EIF ES. Interviews ranging from 30 minutes to 1.5 hours. All done virtually (Zoom and Teams). Used VfM scorecard to summarise.
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited quantitative and qualitative data reported in project progress reports and EIF results database. Delayed data collection as NIU had other very important work commitments until end July.

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned to the needs in-country, including the 7th and 8th NSEDP, as well as trade-related and relevant sector policies and strategies (e.g., Trade Facilitation Roadmap 2017-22; SME Development Plan; Agricultural Development Strategy 2016-20; Tourism Development Strategy 2006-20).</p> <p>The DTISU 2012¹ aligned well with the national priorities at the time. The document is now outdated given emerging and evolving developments in trade and the effects of COVID-19. Hence, its relevance has weakened over time and it is currently being updated. Its coverage was deemed too broad (100+ proposals) and the current update (DTISU 2021) will be narrower in scope and more focused.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned to the needs of the private sector, including at the provincial level, but less so with civil society. Engagement with civil society is very low, largely since civil society organisations are relatively under-developed in Lao PDR.</p>		

¹ DTISU 2012 = Trade and PSD Roadmap = roadmap. This report uses these terms inter-changeably.

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 (DR, KII)
The EIF programme in Lao PDR covers many of the areas that have emerged as priorities for the EIF (global) over recent years, especially regional and global value chains, gender equality and the environment (for example, the export competitiveness (ECL) project).		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
The EIF ES are considered flexible and open to budget reprogramming and revisions as well as no-cost extensions (if necessary and adequately justified), especially in response to emerging issues such as COVID-19.		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	3	2 (DR, KII)
It is not possible to claim that policies have changed as a direct result of the DTISU. The link is typically not direct. For instance, the programmes and projects which align to the DTISU, including Tier 2 projects (SNQI), have contributed to policy reform (including those recommended in the DTIS AM) but the reforms did not happen as a direct result of the DTISU. The main purpose of DTISU was to produce a roadmap to mobilise resources and provide technical assistance and a lot of policies, laws and regulations changes were made as a result of contributions from those AfT projects and programmes, not directly as a result of the DTISU. For example, AfT projects and programmes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> supported a regulatory assessment on MRA (mutual recognition arrangements) under ASEAN commitments as well as other regulatory assessments (telecoms and insurance) through Trade and Development Facility (TDF II) support. provided targeted technical assistance to develop missing laws and regulations (e.g., customs, telecoms, SPS) and support implementation of regulations (e.g., insurance and SPS [food safety, livestock]) including through Tier 2 support. 		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	3	2 (DR, KII)
See other sections		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
The EIF projects and other AfT projects and programmes are very well-aligned to the DTISU 2012. One of the main purposes of the DTISU 2012 was to use it as a framework to mobilise AfT resources and for projects to align with the recommendations and proposed intervention areas.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
A project task team was established to manage the DTISU 2012 process comprising of government (including the NIU), EIF ES representatives, private sector (LNCCI), development partners and international and national lead authors of the DTIS. The DTISU 2012 involved engaging national stakeholders in defining the scope of the DTIS and inputting and commenting on the concept note, background papers and the DTISU. National industry leaders (tourism, textiles and handicrafts) provided inputs into sectoral reports that fed into the DTIS. The concept note and draft DTISU 2012 were reviewed by the Trade and Private Sector Working Group (TPSWG) (membership includes relevant government departments, private sector and development partners). In addition, national workshops took place with government, private sector and development partners to discuss and comment on the draft. Also, regional consultations took place, involving government and business representatives. The validation workshop involved more than 150 stakeholders from government, private sector and development partners. Civil society engagement was very low, largely attributed to		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
the fact civil society was (and still is) relatively under-developed in Lao PDR. It was difficult to find representatives from civil society, except for INGOs (e.g., WWF), and relied on individual industry associations and chambers of commerce (national and provincial).		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	3 (DR)
The project logframes are aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe. Tier 1 and 2 projects are very well-aligned with the results areas (all outcomes and outputs).		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	5	2 (DR, KII)
The EIF delivery modalities (preparatory, analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's goals and objectives.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	5	3 (DR, KII)
Overall coordination on AfT at the policy dialogue and intervention level is very good and the NIU, governance structure and DTISU 2012 has helped deliver complementarities between projects (EIF and non-EIF), particularly between the EIF and TDF. The DTISU 2012 is used as a reference point for all AfT projects. The NIU is the entry point for formulating all AfT projects and has helped identify areas that need support, encouraging complementarities between projects. In addition, the EIF-supported governance structure has helped foster coordination and facilitate complementarities.		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	f) 5	3 (DR, S, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	g) 5	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	h) 3	
c) prioritised interventions	i) 5	
d) programming plan	j) 5	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		
<p>a) Major contribution to setting development priorities on trade and PSD, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) First analytical assessment of the possible impact of LDC graduation – provided a very useful assessment on how to minimise the impact as well as recommend what Lao PDR should do to prepare for graduation; ii) Recognition and elevation of trade facilitation and competitiveness in the development agenda; iii) Highlighted the need to diversify from resource dependency and how to increase competitiveness of non-resource export-oriented sectors including agribusiness, tourism, textiles, handicrafts, garment and wood processing industries; iv) Explored how to improve inclusiveness of economic growth, including poverty reduction, by improving competitiveness and inclusiveness of non-resource sectors (2011/12 growth rates one of highest in region but lagging behind others on poverty impact). <p>b) The DTISU 2012 was produced after the 7th NSEDP 2011-2015. The DTISU 2012 is closely linked to the NSEDP planning process. Rather than provide an input into the NSEDP, the DTISU 2012</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>acts as a road map to operationalise the trade and private sector elements of the NSEDP and achieving the NSEDP's goals, essentially acting as the strategy and road map for trade and private sector development (PSD) in the NSEDP. Consultative meetings on the DTIS were co-chaired by MOIC and MPI (Ministry of Planning and Investment who led the development of the NSEDP) and this helped contribute to greater mainstreaming of trade in the national development agenda.</p> <p>c) The DTISU 2012 links various sectors, government departments and disparate strategies and action plans within a common framework and has a results framework attached to it (with pillars, outcomes and indicators, and interventions). The DTISU 2012 covered a wide-range of outcomes and interventions but did not prioritise interventions. The areas covered were considered too wide and the next DTISU 2021 aims to rationalise the number of areas covered, focusing on priority areas.</p> <p>d) The DTISU 2012 includes a detailed programming plan of proposed intervention areas and included a mapping of existing AfT projects and programmes against these intervention areas.</p> <p>e) Pre DTISU, there were 8 Aid for Trade projects (approx. \$19m). DTISU 2012 contributed to the second phase of the TDF II, a multi-donor trust fund (e.g., EU, Australia, Germany, WB, Ireland, USAID), which was set up immediately after (early 2013) the DTISU, increasing funding from the first phase from \$7m to \$16m supporting priority areas in the DTISU. Since DTISU, AfT projects and programmes have increased to 12 projects (approx. \$78m) completed and 14 projects (approx. \$75M) ongoing. Along with the AfT coordination and governance structure, the DTISU made important contribution to resource mobilisation and formulation of AfT projects and programmes, building confidence of development partners. The focus of many ongoing AfT projects and programmes is trade facilitation and increasing competitiveness of SMEs, which can be traced back to the DTISU 2012 priorities as well as the ratification of the TFA (Lao was the second LDC to ratify the TFA).</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	2 (DR, KII)
Implementation of the DTISU 2012 continues "up to this day". As part of the current DTISU 2021, the NIU and consultants are attempting to assess the extent of implementation of the DTISU 2012 but the assessment is not yet completed, partly because they do not have an overall system in place to track implementation against the DTISU, largely since the DTISU 2012 was too extensive and broad for the NIU to cover. However, all AfT is required to align to the roadmap and the implementation status of all AfT projects is monitored through project review committees semi-annually and annually. While monitoring of implementation takes place at the project-level, an overall systematic assessment aggregating and reporting on results against the roadmap has not yet been completed. Nevertheless, the NIU estimates that at least 70% of all interventions have been implemented. The lack of a robust system to monitor implementation is one of the weaknesses the NIU recognises and admits needs improving in the future (i.e., how to monitor and consolidate results from all projects/programmes) which they are focusing on now as part of the DTISU 2021.		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The DTISU 2012 is out-of-date given the current Lao PDR context and is being updated. The update process started in 2011 and the draft is due end August 2021, with the first consultation meeting to discuss the initial draft expected in September through the TPSWG (development partners, government, private sector), followed by regional consultations (one for the provinces in the north and one in the south) inviting government and private sector. The aim is to finalise in November before the next roundtable meeting where the NIU is organising a side event to showcase the DTISU 2021 to development partners and help mobilise resources. Again, the main objective of the DTISU 2021 is to operationalise the trade and PSD elements of the recently approved 9th NSEDP 2021-25.</p> <p>The main lesson from the DTISU 2012 was that the scope of the roadmap was too broad. As a result, the current DTISU 2021 will be more narrowly focused and with more realistic targets for the next 5 years, which should make it easier to track and monitor implementation.</p> <p>The NIU set up a task team, hired national consultants and used resources from other projects to recruit topic-specific national consultants to provide specific inputs. The lead author (international) is undertaking the work remotely, supported by a national consultant in the NIU. The budget is lower than the previous DTISU (approx. 50%), given EIF budgetary constraints. The update is drawing heavily on existing studies (more than 100+) to feed into the process, including leveraging studies</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
produced by ongoing AfT projects in Lao PDR (e.g., WB, ADB, UNIDO, EU-funded Arise+ project). The NIU has only commissioned two sector studies, one on tourism and one on agri-business. An assessment of the political economy of implementation of DTISU 2012, led by one international consultant based in Lao PDR, is underway but very delayed.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 7th NDESP (2011-15) integrates trade and PSD priorities throughout. The DTISU 2012 then helped operationalise the trade and PSD agenda. Mainstreaming trade continued after the DTISU 2012 with support from the EIF, including studies and consultations that fed into the development of the 8th NDESP (2016-20) and led to further mainstreaming of trade, deepening efforts to focus the country's trade and development strategy in the non-resource sector, especially those with high value-added markets. The TPSWG has been the main forum to mainstream trade, promoting closer collaboration with other sectors (e.g., agriculture, infrastructure) to promote trade in different sectors, including inviting other sector working groups. However, the number of consultations with other sector groups is considered inadequate and the NIU is exploring ways to improve engagement with other sector groups. 		
EIF contribution to policy reform	3	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF supported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the development of the Strategic PSD Plan 2018-2020, through support to analysis and consultations; the NIU to input into the Trade Facilitation Roadmap 2017-2022; several engagements and inputs on business regulations and registration (cost of doing business) through PPDs; drafting regulations on standards and accreditation (Tier 2). <p>However, most of the substantive support to trade policy reform, including implementation, is done through non-EIF projects, especially the TDF, coordinating closely with the NIU.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	2	2 (DR, S, KII)
As mentioned above, most of the support to trade policy, including participation in trade negotiations, etc., was done through non-EIF projects, especially the TDF, coordinating closely with the NIU. However, the EIF did support attendance at global and regional meetings (e.g., WTO Global AfT Review; EIF regional workshop).		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	2	2 (DR, S, KII)
As mentioned above, most of the support to trade policy, including regional negotiations, was done through non-EIF projects, especially the TDF, coordinating closely with the NIU. However, in collaboration with TDF, the EIF supported some specific activities, such as the development of practitioner guides to help exporters access the ASEAN market, as well as workshops.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
Training of NIU staff has led to significant improvements in project management skills (including fiduciary), trade-related knowledge, policy formulation and donor coordination, particularly in phase 1. Much of the capacity building support to MOIC ended in 2016 (when the Tier 1 support to NIA ended). Overall, the EIF's contribution to capacity building under Tier 1 is more focused on project management within the NIU, compared to technical skills on trade policy-making, etc. within MOIC, with capacity building on trade policy for MOIC staff typically carried out by other projects such as TDF II (2013-18) and Lao PDR Competitiveness and Trade Project (2019-24).		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
The EIF has supported several awareness-building activities on the importance of trade for development, particularly between 2010-16. Dissemination workshops helped to increase public and private sector awareness about the important role of trade diversification in country's growth and poverty reduction strategy.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>ECL and SSP (2019-22): The project through its support to specific value chains (textiles, maize, rice and tea) under component 2 (improved competitiveness of target sectors) has already contributed to results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rice: For instance, pilots were undertaken in the rice sector leading to productivity increases (e.g., 50% for rice) as a result of use of improved seeds and fertiliser (provided at a subsidised cost) and training in good agricultural practices. • Textiles: Domestic trade fairs led to orders totally approximately \$6,500 for Ock Pop Tok, amounting to \$4,000 of income for the villagers, in 2020. The project helped improve quality and productivity. Incomes have increased by 75%, compared to the original target of 15-25% in year 1 and 2, reaching 170 households. 		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>ECL and SSP (2019-22): Support under component 2 (improved competitiveness of target sectors) has helped introduce new technologies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Textiles: The project introduced new production technologies to village handicraft producers which has improved the efficiency of cotton yarn production and dying. Given COVID-19, Ock Pop Tok are exploring creating an online platform to sell the villagers produce. • Rice: the project provided new seeds and fertiliser (subsidised) and introduced new production methods which have helped improve rice productivity. 		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	4	2 (DR, KII)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SNQI (2013-18): EIF supported workshops and training on standards, accreditation and packaging to government staff, as well as provision of laboratory equipment including training on how to use and maintain. The support helped build the skills of staff in government and the laboratories, contributing to ISO accreditation of labs and more than 400 standards adopted (exceeding the target of 100) and 550 certificates issued (exceeding the target of 30). In addition, the support helped improve knowledge on WTO TBT, which is important given DSM's role as WTO TBT Enquiry Point, however it is unclear to what extent they have satisfactorily implemented the WTO TBT code of good practice. • ECL and SSP (2019-22) (component 1, business environment): The EIF supported PPDs at the national level on trade facilitation issues, lobbying NTFC to address issues related to cross-border trade, especially agricultural exports, leading to two priority issues being resolved. 		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	5	3
<p>ECL and SSP (2019-22):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Component 1 (business environment): In 2019, MOIC simplified the business registration and licencing process (from 9 to 3 steps; from 174 days to 17 days, on average). The EIF project is supporting capacity building workshops and trainings on new simplified procedures for starting a business and policy advocacy. The project has helped build the capacity of local chambers of commerce to organise and undertake successful local PPDs (who, whilst mandated to do these, did 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>not have sufficient understanding and capacity on how to do these effectively) and connected the local chambers with national level dialogues. The local chambers have spent considerable time working with local businesses to explain the purpose of PPDs and build their trust in PPDs which has led to greater participation. Historically, firms often do not trust government officials to resolve their issues. At the provincial level, the project has facilitated several dialogues including to identify issues that need addressing and facilitated PPDs to resolve these, leading to 25% of these now fully resolved. However, the process of resolving issues is taking longer than some chambers expected.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Component 2 (improved competitiveness of target sectors): Through a pilot, Ock Pop Tok company provide support to women-headed households to form producer groups and add value to their products, linking household producers with buyers (not just Ock Pop Tok). Ock Pop Tok delivered technical and management training (e.g., natural dying techniques, design, product costing and quality control) to 170 households, predominantly women (95%), from six target villages, as well as providing basic equipment (cotton producing machines, sewing machines, etc.). 		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
ECL and SSP (2019-22):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Component 2 (improved competitiveness of target sectors): During 2020, representatives from six villages participated in domestic trade fairs to improve market access, leading to orders of approximately \$6,500 (for Ock Pop Tok and therefore increased sales for villagers). 		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>Overall, the EIF ES and TFM provides effective and efficient guidance to the NIU.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EIF ES: the remoteness, especially this year given restrictions on travel, is quite challenging, reducing the opportunity for face-to-face discussion and supervision. However, overall, there are no major issues. The NIU does not require close supervision from EIF ES since they have strong capacity (management, fiduciary, technical, coordination, etc.). They also work closely with other development partners in-country, especially the World Bank on TDF II and Lao PDR Competitiveness and Trade Project (since 2008), who also provide guidance, if needed. • TFM: The TFM is based in Bangkok, hence supervision is easier. Since 2008, the NIU is implementing World Bank fiduciary standards for all AfT projects which go beyond requirements set up by TFM. 		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The governance structure is comprehensive and fully embedded in government. It covers all AfT, including the EIF. It is very well established and provides effective and efficient direction, coordination and oversight of all AfT, helping eliminate duplication across projects. The seniority of the chairs/co-chairs reflect the importance given to trade and AfT coordination and oversight and provides the governance structure with significant clout and influence. The creation of the governance structure was largely facilitated by the EIF, building on the EIF structure, with the DTISU 2012 used as the main tool to set priorities. The governance structure is held up as good practice, receiving visits from 5-6 EIF countries to learn lessons. Over time, coordination between government, private sector and donors has significantly improved as a result of EIF support and the government's commitment to own and embed coordination structures into government structures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The NSC under the EIF was modified and called Programme Executive Committee (PEC) which provides strategic advice, coordination and common operating guidelines on all AfT, overseeing and supervising all AfT projects, and serves as a super-steering committee under the TPSWG which is part of broader government-donor consultation under the roundtable process. It meets annually and is chaired by Minister of MOIC. • The TPSWG focuses on policy dialogue and priority setting. It provides a forum for policy dialogue and coordination between government, development partners and private sector on trade and PSD, including promoting resource mobilisation and reporting on progress of implementation of the DTISU 2012 (e.g., trade and investment policy and regulations, SME competitiveness and aid 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>effectiveness). It is co-chaired by the Minister/ Deputy Minister of MOIC and EU and Australian Ambassador. It meets every 6 months at the executive level and more regularly at the technical level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Project Review Committees (PRC) sit under the PEC and are set up for each project. PRCs are technical working body where project work plans and implementation reports are discussed and finalised for submission to the PEC for review and endorsement. These committees meet every 6 months. <p>Other committees that sit under the roundtable process include the Lao Business Forum PPD (chaired by the Prime Minister), DB Reform Committee and NTFC which all feed into the TPSWG along with the PEC.</p> <p>Overall, the NIU is operating very well and delivering above and beyond their EIF mandate. The NIU acts as the Secretariat to the TPSWG, PRC and PEC; focal point for donor coordination; focal point for LNCCI and foreign chambers in preparing issues for dialogue through PPDs; provides overall AfT project management and coordination; support to project formulation and implementation, as well as M&E and fiduciary functions. However, the NIU at times are over-burdened with too many responsibilities, especially servicing all the committees. This limits the opportunity to follow up on implementation progress and issues discussed during various dialogues. Areas for improvement, identified by the NIU, include M&E and communications and the NIU are already investing in these areas. However, the NIU is very aware that it needs to go beyond these areas for improvement and narrow down the scope of areas they covered.</p> <p>Private sector is very strongly engaged at different levels and this has increased significantly over time with the support of the EIF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At policy dialogue level under TPSWG, where private sector participants are invited to talk about problems they are facing. EIF is supporting and actively promoting LNCCI to conduct PPDs under Lao Business Forum. LNCCI provide progress updates on progress of PPDs at the TPSWG at the policy level. Also, some business membership organisations, including industry-specific associations (e.g., tourism, textile, handicraft, garments etc.), who are implementing components of AfT projects, attend PEC or PRC as implementers. <p>The current EIF DF is very new to the role. The role of the DF is less important in Lao PDR compared to other countries given the existence of a well-functioning governance structure.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
The EIF ES, TFM and NIU have all demonstrated flexibility in response to COVID-19, encouraging partners to adapt to challenges and reprogramme budgets, issuing no cost extensions where necessary.		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>DTIS: The DTISU 2021 is relying more on existing studies, rather than commissioning all primary research, which is good for efficiency, although the success (effectiveness) of this approach depends on the quality of those studies. Also, the DTISU is 50% the cost of the previous update and relying on more national consultants. Reduced travel, given COVID-19, creates challenges but also keeps the costs down.</p> <p>Tier 1: Overall, Tier 1 activities were delivered efficiently, within budget and on-time, apart from start-up delays (phase 1) and delays conducting a capacity needs assessment of MOIC staff in phase 2 which delayed training activities. Improvements in the NIU's capacity on project management have contributed to increased efficiency of operations, including mobilising and coordinating AfT resources. Also, the integration of NIU's functions into MOIC has helped improve efficiency. There were no issues</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
with procurement, with guidelines followed satisfactorily and no delays in selection processes. For each AfT project, the NIU has set up focal points, which has improved efficiency. The NIU also developed guidelines which is particularly useful when NIU staff move on to other positions. Also, some authority for approvals has been delegated from the Division Director, which has helped speed up approvals. During phase 2 (2014/5), a skills development plan was commissioned by the MOIC Personnel Department which delayed training until its completion. Doing the plan helped identify current status of skills development and identify gaps, therefore ensuring training options were more targeted and therefore efficient, however, it created a hiatus for some time when little training was conducted.		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	4	2 (DR, KII)
SNQI (2013-18): The project was extended on a no-cost basis twice with several activities, such as accreditation, pushed to the final months of implementation. The original timeline was too ambitious for meeting the expected results. The project also suffered from relatively high staff turnover. Also, while DSM charge fees, these go to the ministry of finance and the revenue generated is less than the amount allocated to them by the ministry of finance. ECL and SSP (2019-22): The project received a six-month no cost extension due to COVID-19 delays. There were delays due to COVID-19 and travel restrictions especially at provincial level where it is difficult to do virtual meetings. The project replaced international consultants with national consultants, largely due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, generating cost-saving. Component 1 (business environment) leveraged government structures to support local level implementation and workshops were conducted at no cost to the project.		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	5	3 (DR, KII)
On the whole, the governance structure is very efficient. By combining all AfT under one governance structure, this has led to efficiencies. While the structure appears complex, stakeholders consider it optimal, although the NIU does have a significant workload servicing all of the committees. The NIU performs its mandate and functions very effectively and efficiently considering the heavy workload. For the TPSWG, as the donor co-chairs rotate, this takes time to bring donors up-to-speed etc. and reduces effectiveness and efficiency. The NIU is following up on how to improve how the rotation system operates. The funding provided by the EIF to supporting governance structures is relatively small but delivered substantial benefits.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
See rows above		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	1
Developing and increasing the competitiveness of the non-resource sector is essential to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth; non-resource sectors are more stable and provide more employment opportunities. The targeted support (ECL) to SMEs and cooperatives, including women and youth, has contributed to (or has the potential to contribute to) improved livelihoods (jobs, income, etc.) as a result of increased production, improved quality, better market access, etc. leading to increased sales including exports.		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	1

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
The EIF support has helped Lao PDR to strengthen their participation in regional and global trading systems largely through significant mobilisation of funding for relevant AfT projects.		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The structures and processes set up with support from EIF have been fully embedded into the government system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The DTIS is fully integrated into government priorities, structures and processes, establishing the trade and PSD roadmap for the country (see below for further details under ownership). • NIU and governance structure: In 2016, the NIU was officially fully integrated in MOIC's structure as a division under DPC and is not a project-based structure. The EIF governance structure is fully integrated into the government structures and processes, going much further than just the EIF, covering all AfT. • Tier 2: Tier 2 projects support/ed core work in relevant ministries and the activities are fully integrated into government structures and processes. 		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The structures and processes set up with support from EIF are fully owned by government and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., donors, private sector):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTIS: The DTIS process is fully-owned by government. The DTISU 2012 was the first DTISU led by a country, designed and managed by the NIU and project task team, based on lessons learnt from the earlier DTIS 2006 which was not well-integrated into the national development planning process and considered donor-driven. The government recognised the opportunity to increase ownership by relevant agencies in the diagnostic work and the resulting recommendations for reform. Greater involvement of the national stakeholders helped create more buy-in for the AM recommendations, led to more implementable recommendations (i.e., relevant, actionable, practical) and ensured these were more closely related to the NSEDP. The DTISU 2012 provided a best practice example for other EIF countries of a successful country-led DTIS. Deputy Ministers chaired the review committee and played an active role, reviewing and commenting on drafts and chairing consultation meetings in the capital and provinces. • NIU and governance structure: The institutional set up (NIU) and coordination structures (e.g., PEC, TPSWG) are fully owned by government and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., donors, private sector). <p>Tier 2: There is full buy-in from government ministries involved in the projects, who are continuing work which builds on the supported interventions. For component 1 (business environment), the PPDs are led and managed by the local chambers of commerce and industry, helping build ownership.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Overall, the groundwork has been laid for a successful EIF exit strategy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NIU: Sufficient capacity has been built in the NIU. One concern is the number of consultants in the NIU and the potential for losing institutional memory. To mitigate this, MOIC has designated technical staff to work alongside consultants. MOIC are also planning to bring in more government staff to support the work of the NIU. • Governance structure: The institutional set up and coordination structures (e.g., PEC, TPSWG) will operate and continue without support from EIF. • Tier 2: Completed projects have continued with several activities with results continuing. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The labs under the SNQI project continue to operate providing services to clients. DSM continues to train new staff as they join. However, staff providing the training are not sufficiently keeping up-to-date with new developments (e.g., within ASEAN). However, DSM has received further support from other donors (e.g., ARISE+) to conduct training of trainers support on ISO 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>9000. DSM also needs to do further awareness raising on the benefits of ISO as demand from the private sector remains quite low. DSM charges fees for services (testing, certification, etc.), however these go to the ministry of finance and DSM's budget (in 2018) was less than what they generate and it is unclear whether they have managed to secure more resources recently.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The ECL project has delivered activities and results that improve prospects of continuation of results, for example: building capacity of trainers to train others; and, identifying and creating linkages and partnerships with buyers that have a high likelihood of sustaining those partnerships (e.g., textiles and rice), continuing to provide advice on production, quality, etc.. ○ The support to local chambers of commerce to conduct PPDs is helping build their capacity to undertake these in future. ○ Interventions such as subsidised seed and fertiliser, however, pose challenges in terms of sustainability, especially since access to finance remains a problem. ● There are considerable resources available for AfT, with EIF resources only a very small proportion. Hence, other donors could fill any gaps. However, the main risk is graduation from LDC status. This will lead to reductions in ODA. MOIC are actively discussing with the EIF ES and other donors how to overcome potential financing challenges. 		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	5	3 (DR, KII)
As discussed above, the coordination structures are well-established, go well beyond the EIF and do not require EIF funding to continue.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The DTISU 2021 is funded 50% by government (\$150k and \$50k in-kind) and 50% by EIF (\$200k). The leverage of government resources for the DTISU 2021 reflects the capacity of the NIU in leveraging resources and the interest from government, especially compared to the first DTIS which only mobilised circa \$20k counterpart funding.</p> <p>Pre DTISU 2012, there were 8 Aid for Trade projects (approx. \$19m) and since DTISU this increased to 12 projects (approx. \$78m) completed and 14 projects (approx. \$75M) ongoing. The EIF has been instrumental in creating the structures and processes (e.g., DTIS, NIU, governance structure, etc.) which has effectively leveraged resources.</p> <p>All projects receive co-financing and/or in-kind contributions (e.g., staff time, offices) from government and other partners/projects. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SNQI and IS: \$2.5m EIF; \$0.9m government in-kind. ● ECL and SSP: \$1.8m EIF; \$0.2m government in-kind; \$0.4m other AfT projects. <p>However, not much progress has been made increasing government resources committed to priority areas on trade and PSD, largely due to fiscal constraints, especially now with the impact of the pandemic. This is a particular concern given LDC graduation.</p>		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	2	2 (DR, KII)
COVID-19 has affected the pace of delivery and results delivered. It is important that projects receive no cost extensions to ensure they reach the level of maturation (e.g., capacity built and embedded; practices adopted/adapted) needed for results to continue and possibly scale-up post-project.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and associated projects are well-aligned with the needs and priorities in-country.
- **Coherence:** Lao PDR lives up to its reputation as providing best practice on AfT coordination and complementarity between projects.

- **Effectiveness:** The DTISU is instrumental in defining the priorities on trade and PSD but the last update was too ambitious in coverage and implementation progress was not adequately monitored. There are several examples of effectiveness across Tier 2 projects, including EIF-supported activities contributing to increased competitiveness and improved market access and therefore sales and improvements in livelihoods.
- **Efficiency:** The NIU and NSC have performed their roles well, delivering their mandate efficiently under strong leadership. However, they are over-stretched. On the whole, Tier 2 projects are efficient, except for delays largely due to COVID-19, with several examples of cost-sharing.
- **Sustainability:** EIF-supported initiatives (namely the DTISU 2012 and AfT governance structure) have significantly contributed to trade mainstreaming in Lao PDR. There are examples of adopting methods in delivery of tier 2 that improve efficiency and sustainability. For instance, building the capacity of trainers to train others and connecting buyers and sellers.
- **Impact:** Overall, there are several examples of the EIF contributing to (or has the potential to contribute to) sustainable development and increased integration in regional and global markets.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	There are no VfM metrics and therefore no systematic reporting against VfM metrics or use of VfM data, which are the criteria for this element of the scorecard. Nevertheless, the NIU has robust project and financial management systems in place, in line with the Ministry of Finance guidelines endorsed by ADB and the World Bank. Also, the NIU has performed strongly in fiduciary aspects according to external audits. There are also several examples of measures to ensure VfM (efficiency and effectiveness).
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	5	Procurement processes follow international good practice (World Bank) and are considered efficient, with no delays reported.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	5	Overall excellent donor coordination on AfT in Lao PDR. The NIU has actively avoided duplication and sought complementarities.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	Overall, there are good prospects for sustainability for Tier 1 and 2 activities. Tier 1 and 2 activities support core functions within institutions that will continue. For beneficiaries, for instance, by connecting them with buyers, this helps create sustainable outcomes as buyers have the incentive to continue with successful partnerships.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and	5	The NIU provides excellent leadership of EIF operational processes and support to governance structures. The governance structure operates efficiently – i.e., on time,

	Score	Narrative
governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)		managing and monitoring progress and following up on challenges and risks, making timely decisions, etc. The main concern is that the NIU have too much to do.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	The EIF ES and TFM, on the whole, has demonstrated significant flexibility. Overall, the EIF in Lao PDR has been able to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., COVID-19), amending work plans and delivery modalities when needed and adequately justified.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	Many of the Tier 2 projects target women and youth as the main beneficiaries. However, where women and youth are not the targeted beneficiaries, integration of equity/gender in project design and implementation is typically quite cursory and limited to gender-disaggregated indicators of beneficiaries.

Rwanda

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	20-Oct-2009
Total budget	<p>Total budget= \$7,664,798</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total EIF budget= \$7,247,598 • Total Government budget= \$297,200 • Total Development Partner budget= \$120,000
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 & 2
Context	LDC, landlocked
Key stakeholders	<p><u>MIE</u> Government of Rwanda</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) <p><u>Interviewees</u> Rwanda Development Bank Rwanda Standards Board Karongi District Burera District ICT Chamber</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are two Tier 1 EIF projects in Rwanda. Some of the key objectives of these projects include: to increase ownership of trade-related technical assistance (TRTA); strengthen the in-country arrangements of the EIF (NIU and NSC); to establish how the EIF has contributed to trade mainstreaming and general trade development in Rwanda. These align well with EIF TOC Outcome 1, in particular with output 1 'improved policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'institutional coordination'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are three Tier 2 EIF projects in Rwanda. Some of the key objectives of these projects include: to improve the livelihoods and earning potential of those engaged in informal and formal cross-border trade; to improve the business environment for trading agricultural products; integrate Rwanda into global trade in a way which contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development; increase Rwandan goods and services in international markets through training SMEs, supporting adoption of new technology and leveraging additional support. These align well with all outputs under EIF TOC Outcome 2: output 1 'increased connectivity to markets', output 2 'improved technology use' and output 3 'leverage additional financial support'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NIA Support (Phase 1, Tier 1) • Cross Border Trade Capacity Development (Phase 1, Tier 2) <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade Facilitation (Phase 2, Tier 2) • Trade Competitiveness through e-commerce (Phase 2, Tier 2) • Sustainability Support (Phase 2, Tier 1)
Regional projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainstreaming SPS capacity building into CAADP and other national policy frameworks <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural technology (AgTech) disruptors in East African value chains: Implications for regional integration and inequality (Phase 2, Tier 2)

2. Context

- Rwanda is a landlocked country in East Africa, surrounded by neighbouring countries Uganda, DRC, Tanzania and Burundi. Rwanda has a population of 12.5 million people and the GDP per capita is \$820.
- Rwanda has guarded political stability since 1994. Rwanda's most recent political election was in 2018, with President Kagame re-elected to a seven-year term.
- From 2008-2019, Rwanda's total merchandise and services exports totalled \$12,832 million, while total merchandise and services imports totalled \$32,196 million. This shows that in terms of merchandise and services, Rwanda has a trade deficit.
- From 2008- 2019, the average FDI inflow was \$286 million a year.
- In terms of AfT disbursements from 2008-2019, 53% was spent on infrastructure, 43% was spent on building productive capacity and 4% was spent on trade policy and regulations.
- Rwanda's World Bank (2020) ease of doing business score ranked 38 from 190 countries. This is higher than the Netherlands and Belgium.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June 2021- Sept 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, economic analysis, e-survey, EIF project documents, KII interviews
Methods used (data and document review)	<p><u>Documents reviewed across Rwanda's 5 EIF projects, and 2 regional projects:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOUs (and MOU Amendments) • TORs • Project Proposals/ Concept Notes • Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) • Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports • Budgets (and Budget Revisions) • Work Plans • Project-level Log Frames • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Financial Reports <p><u>E-survey response (1)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor Facilitator- FCDO

	<p><u>Interviews (10)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government (5): Ministry of Trade and Industry- MINICOM (x3); Karongi District; Burera District • Public Sector (3): Rwanda Development Bank; Rwanda Standards Bureau; ICT Chamber • Donors (1): FCDO • EIF ES (1): Country Coordinator <p>Interviews by gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male (9) • Female (1)
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covid-19 pandemic has impacted on slow implementation of the different projects. • Stage of the project implementation was still at beginning stage, some projects were a few months after signing the agreement. • One stakeholder indicated bias. This was through non- response to our calls and emails. • Only the DF completed the e-survey.

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>All the EIF projects in Rwanda have strong relevance and alignment with the priorities, as expressed in various government documents that have acknowledged the role of trade, trade facilitation and exports in the development of Rwanda.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade issues as identified in the DTIS Action Plan have been incorporated into the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II, Private Sector Development Strategy and sectoral strategies. ▪ As a result of the DTIS 2005, the government funded development of national cooperative policy and cooperative law was successfully carried out and this has improved the effectiveness of cooperatives hence benefitting the individuals who are members of the respective cooperatives. ▪ There was also a successful Government funded review of business-related laws, setting out a clear path for the revision of relevant laws and highlighting the key areas for improvement. A number of business-related laws and reforms were successfully carried out and the business environment in Rwanda has improved. ▪ The EIF projects were also well aligned with Rwanda's Vision 2020 <p>This relevance is also confirmed by the e-survey and the KIIs, who all agreed that the EIF support in Rwanda is aligned with the Government's trade related priorities and needs.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>Insofar as the EIF projects support the capacity to develop the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks necessary to lay the foundation for trade and investment, they can be deemed to be largely aligned to needs of private sector. In this regard the private sector has also received support to maintain presence in international and regional markets. Additionally, the NSC has been instrumental in the finalization of the Private Sector Development Strategy. KII from the private sector confirmed that the EIF projects aligned with their needs, especially with regard to cross border trade. The interests of the civil society have also been catered for through consultations notably during the formulation of cross border trade strategy, feasibility studies and even during resource mobilization awareness.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Regional interests have been adapted to mainly by trainings that have built the capacity of negotiators to participate in regional trade negotiations such as the EAC-EU-EPA negotiations and the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite negotiations.</p> <p>Value chain and gender priorities have been addressed mainly through the cross-border trade capacity development project through which the livelihoods of women have been improved, and the development of value chains such as poultry and livestock.</p> <p>The National Export Strategy which was revised using EIF resources included among other things, EIF priorities such as gender, youth and climate.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	2	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>COVID-19 has slowed down the progress and success of the on-going tier 2 EIF projects. Small and Medium Enterprises have been affected in terms of labour productivity, offset of salaries and wages, increased financial burden for loan repayment after the pandemic because of closure of businesses. Even the occupancy levels of the recently constructed Cross Border Markets has declined because some people /businessmen and businesswomen in districts had to close business because of the current COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>Under the E-commerce project, the EIF together with MINICOM has supported 4 companies to have incubations in the development of e-payment systems. Additionally, EIF funding to the ICT chamber through resulted in the increase of online platforms from around 9 to more than 70. This was done through approving the platforms, marketing them and today Rwanda has published more than 70 companies with e-commerce platforms.</p>		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade issues as identified in the DTIS Action Matrix have been incorporated into the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II, and other sectoral strategies. The Cross Border Trade Strategy; the Rwanda development Strategy and the Domestic Market Recapturing Strategy were also developed based on the DTISU. ▪ There was also a successful Government funded review of business-related laws, setting out a clear path for the revision of relevant laws and highlighting the key areas for improvement. A number of business -related laws and reforms were successfully carried out and the business environment in Rwanda has improved. 		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>EIF has played a key role by supporting effective policy formulation, strengthening institutional capacity through training of government staff and the National Steering committee. The staff of the Ministry of Trade and Industry have been trained in trade facilitation competences and mainstreaming trade in development strategies which has increased their capacity to mainstream trade into future policy</p>		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The DTIS and its action matrix noted institutional capacity development, creation of trading markets, setting standards, national export strategy implementation and gender issues as key priorities. All the tier 1 and tier 2 projects align well with these priorities. ▪ However, priorities like energy, water, tax, land, tourism, and mining have only been marginally addressed by the EIF projects. 		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	3 (DR, KII, S)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The DTIS update was done by the National Development Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) members through consultation with different stakeholders in all districts in Rwanda. Consultation was done through workshops that involved vice mayors in charge of economic affairs, districts' executive secretaries, Private Sector representatives, traders, farmers, representatives of cooperatives, Rwanda Revenue Authorities, bank representatives and all Business Development Centre representatives.</p> <p>The consultative processes for the DTIS are largely inclusive of the private sector. As noted above, private sector was involved in both the DTIS and the DTISU formulation processes. Private sector is also incorporated in the NSC. Additionally, the Private Sector Working Group provides a platform for engagement with private sector. There are various mechanisms for engaging the private sector, including the Private Sector Federation (PSF) and a Rwanda Public Private Dialogue (RPPD) mechanism. Key private sector informants confirmed engagement with government on various issues, including in articulating their needs.</p>		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	2 (DR)
<p>The Tier 1 and 2 projects are very well-aligned with the EIF results areas (all outcomes and outputs). Specifically, Tier 1 projects align well with EIF Outcome 1, in particular with output 1 'improved policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'institutional coordination'</p> <p>Tier 2 align well with all outputs under EIF Outcome 2: output 1 'increased connectivity to markets', output 2 'improved technology use' and output 3 'leverage additional financial support'.</p>		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	5	2 (DR)
<p>EIF modalities are very appropriate for Rwanda as the country transitions from a subsistence-economy to one that is commercial-based and export-oriented, takes various steps to mitigate growth in the deficit-by implementing programs to strengthen domestic productive capacity and grow exports and has on-going initiatives to improve the balance of trade. Rwanda has utilised the whole spectrum of EIF delivery modalities, including preparatory support, analytical support such as DTISU, institutional capacity support and supply-side capacity support. It is among the countries implementing 2 Tier 1 projects and 3 Tier 2 projects.</p>		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	5	2 (DR)
<p>Coordination of EIF project with other relevant initiatives has been strong. There is strong coordination with TradeMark East Africa which together with the EIF and the government of Rwanda established and strengthened the Cross-border Trade Unit to coordinate the implementation of the National CBT strategy and provide a central collaboration point for development partners.</p> <p>Recently, the EIF worked in collaboration with ITC, the Private Sector Federation (PSF) Rwanda Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) to launch SheTrades Rwanda.</p> <p>The EIF Donor Facilitator (DF) works with the Focal Point to facilitate coordination with Aid for Trade (AfT). To ensure good coordination, donors are coordinated under sector working groups. Key to trade is the private sector working group consisting of exporters and industry players, which is coordinated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) and chaired by TMEA. Productivity and youth employment chaired by GIZ and co-chaired by Ministry of Public Service and the Investment and Regulations working group Chaired by the World Bank and Rwanda Development Board.</p> <p>EIF supported efforts to mobilise resources to funds the Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project being funded by World Bank, hired consultant to coordinate Trade Logistics and Distribution services Project and also mobilized resources from AfDB to establish cross border markets for Rusumo and Kagitumba</p> <p>The Tier 1 Project end Evaluation Report established that while development partners are coordinated on trade related supported, some of them are not aware of EIF or been part of EIF programme structure.</p>		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs: a) increasing knowledge b) increased mainstreaming of trade c) prioritised interventions d) programming plan e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM	a) 4 b) 5 c) 2 d) 4 e) 4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>a) <i>Increasing knowledge</i>: Various trainings have been undertaken targeting government officials especially from MINICOM. Through the EIF tier 1 project, MINICOM officers were trained in the different fields including e-waste recycling, project management, public — private partnership, project monitoring and evaluation as well as trade negotiations. Some of these trainings were conducted within the country and others abroad. Rwandan exporters were trained in standards and market requirements.</p> <p>b) <i>Increased mainstreaming of trade</i>: Trade was mainstreamed in the EDPRS II (under Priority Area 2 to increase external connectivity of Rwanda’s economy and boosting exports’; in the PSDS (where Program 7 - Market Access and Export Development focuses on increasing external trade and reducing concentration of traditional exports from 84% to 60%.’ and sectoral strategies.</p> <p>c) <i>Prioritised interventions</i>: the DTIS AM did not prioritise interventions, but they indicated a broad timeframe to implement them (from 2010 to 2015). The matrix also designates the responsible institution. Given the number of interventions, prioritization would have been useful in establishing potential quick wins as well as the strategic issues in terms of pay-off. Notable however is that at a high strategic level, through the National Retreat hosted by the President, sector prioritization is undertaken on annual basis.</p> <p>d) <i>Programming plan</i>: the e-survey confirms that an implementation plan to link the DTIS/AM priorities to funding requirements was developed.</p> <p>e) <i>Specific programmes/projects aligned with the DTIS</i>: There are trade-related programmes and projects by Africa Development Bank, TMEA, ITC, Rwanda Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs, AfT, GIZ and World Bank. These align to actions proposed in the DTIS AM.</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	2(DR)
<p>There has not been a review of the implementation of the DTISU. Through EIF, a number of the priorities, especially relating to institutional strengthening and export market development have been implemented.</p> <p>In addition to priorities supported by EIF, other priorities supported by other DPs include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TMEA – Trade Logistics and Distribution Services Platform • ITC – Boosting International Competitiveness of SME Clusters • EU: Trade Regional Integration and Business Support Services • IDA: The Governance for Competitiveness TA Project in Horticulture and Tourism Sectors • Great Lakes Facilitation Project • UNIDO/UNEP -E-waste Management Project(E-Waste) • NEPAD/UN WOMEN -Women in Informal Cross Border Trade(WICBT) Project • AfDB -Skills, Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme II • ITC -Rwanda Business Lifecycle Project (RBLCP) • AfDB -Regional ITC Centre for Excellence (RICTCE) · SIDA -National Employment Programme • Dutch Embassy -Food Security & Capacity Building (FSCBP) • IDA -Governance for Competitiveness Technical Assistance Project (G4C) • UNDP-Building an Inclusive Financial Sector in Rwanda (BIFSIR) • AfDB -Hanga Umurimo Program 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNEP&IDA -Resource Efficient & Cleaner Production Project (RECP) • AfDB -Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project (CEDP) • IFAD -Rural Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Project (PPMER II) • ICF -Rwanda Investment Climate Project (RICP) 		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	4	3 (DR, KII)
The DTIS/AM was developed in 2011 as the context for the DTIS had changed significantly since the first DTIS in 2005. There had since been a number of guiding policy documents, new legislation, and sector policies and strategies, all seeking to deliver the goals of Vision 2020 and the EDPRS. This provided a complex array of policy actions for the DTIS Action Matrix.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (DR, KII)
Evaluation of the Tier 1 projects concluded there 'there is a general sense of approval that the EIF'S contribution to mainstreaming trade into Rwanda's development agenda is impressive'. MINICOM is at the centre of key progress/ achievements in terms of mainstreaming trade. Trade was mainstreamed in Rwanda's development strategies and plans including the EDPRS I and II; the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS); and the and Vision 2020. The KII noted that capacity building on trade mainstreaming was done with EIF support.		
EIF contribution to policy reform	3	2 (DR)
The EIF has also contributed to the improvement of the business environment through a successful Government funded review of business-related laws, setting out a clear path for the revision of relevant laws and highlighting the key areas for improvement. A number of business-related laws and reforms were successfully carried out and the business environment in Rwanda has improved. The EIF has also improvement the legal and policy framework for cooperatives leading to the development of national cooperative policy and cooperative law.		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	3	2 (DR)
The EIF supported the participation of the public and private sector in trade negotiations such as the EAC-EU-EPA negotiations. It has also helped the government participate especially through capacity building activities such as training MINICOM officials in trade negotiation.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	3	2 (DR)
As noted above, the EIF supported the participation of the public and private sector in trade negotiations such as the EAC-EU-EPA negotiations and the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite negotiations. Cross border trade has also been enhanced through the cross border markets that were built under the EIF program. Training of trade negotiators equipped them the necessary negotiation skills to participate in EAC Common Market Protocol and EPA regional meetings.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	2 (DR)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training of trade negotiators equipped them the necessary negotiation skills to participate in EAC Common Market Protocol and EPA regional meetings. Members of the National Development and Trade Policy Forum also underwent training to increase their analytical and negotiation capacity. ▪ Through training of the Rwanda Revenue Authority improved tax related administrative issues through actions such as removing the MAGERWA fees of 3%. ▪ The staff of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has also received training which has helped them in policy creation, project management, monitoring and evaluation and management training. ▪ MINICOM/SPIU in collaboration with ITC trained exporters and potential exporters throughout the country with the aim of equipping them knowledge on exportation. 		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	5	2 (DR, KII)
SPIU/EIF usually organise meetings on information dissemination and awareness raising on need basis. Such meetings were organised upon approval of the DTISU, approval of the Tier 1 project, signing of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, updated trade laws, strategies and policies. For		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>example, 112 exporters were sensitized on the DTIS and external trade opportunities. Through these outreach activities, EIF/SPIU continues to interact with various stakeholders, including traders, civil society and trade related organizations to identify the challenges and collaboratively suggest ways and means to integrate into trade policies and strategies.</p> <p>The EIF/SPIU also targeted sensitization through social media like Twitter, facebook and a live show known as 'Kubaza Bitera Kumenya', usually held on National Radio and TV, a monthly interactive session where the Ministry widely engages with citizens on trade, industry and SME development related issues.</p>		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Under the Inclusive Cross Border Trade Capacity Development Project, 2 modern cross border markets were developed in Karongi (bordering Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Butera District, bordering Uganda. These markets have increased cross border exports between Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda.</p> <p>KII indicated that through the Karongi District, the livestock trade has sales of at least 500 pigs, 500 goats and 500 hens per month. It is estimated that 75Million RwF worth of trade is done monthly. The government has also benefitted through tax revenues, collecting 3.5 million RwF per month from the Karongi CBM. The NIU, however, notes that trade figures of the Karongi Cross Border Market per month as of June 2021 are as follows: 2,093 pigs, 1,253 goats, 1,561 hens, 95 sheep, 25 rabbits, with revenues of 254,624,500 Frw and with tax revenues equivalent to 2,237,450 per month. This has positively impacted the Karongi district, including the economic welfare of the residents, especially women and youth, who have organised themselves in cross border cooperatives. It is estimated that 75Million RwF worth of trade is done monthly. The government has also benefitted through tax revenues, collecting 3.5 million RwF per month from the Karongi CBM.</p> <p>A pyrethrum exporter who was facilitated to access Europe and American markets secured two major contracts.</p> <p>Under the project to Enhance the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Export Growth Initiatives has led to the establishment of a Quality Council and Forums. 5 Manuals have also been developed for the National Quality Council, the National Standards & Stakeholders Forum, the National Certification Bodies Forum, and the National Quality Testing Laboratories Forum.</p> <p>Technical assistance was provided to former OCR-CAFÉ to establish the Rwanda coffee marketing alliance to facilitate farmers sell their coffee on international markets.</p>		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	3	3 (KII)
<p>Under the E-commerce project, the EIF together with MINICOM has supported 4 companies to have incubations in the development of e-payment systems.</p> <p>Additionally, EIF funding to the ICT Chamber through resulted in the increase of online platforms from around 9 to more than 70. This was done through approving the platforms, marketing them and today Rwanda has published more than 70 companies with e-commerce platforms.</p>		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	4	2 (DR)
<p>The EIF started a trade facilitation project to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of export growth initiatives in March 2020, but it is still too early to assess the results the project as it is still in implementation stage. However, the cross-border markets are trade facilitation avenues.</p>		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	4	3 (DR)
<p>Women working in the handicraft subsector also received training through cooperatives through which they were facilitated to access markets.</p> <p>Under the e-commerce project, one workshop was organised in September 2019. It was attended by 12 members of the E-commerce Technical Working Group from the Ministry of ICT and Innovation, Rwanda Information Society Authority, Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority, Rwanda Standard board, National Industrial Research and Development Agency and International Trade Centre.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	4	3 (DR)
<p>EIF has supported participation in various trade fairs and study tours:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 54 artisanal exporters were facilitated to attend the EAC regional 'Jua Kali exhibition'. ▪ 2 cooperatives (with 200 members) and 1 exporter were facilitated to attend international trade fairs in Dubai. The exporter is still exporting to Dubai. ▪ As earlier noted, a pyrethrum exporter who was facilitated to access Europe and American markets secured two major contracts (to est. more) ▪ (add PSF / Milano Italy) 		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR)
<p>Generally, the EIF ES and TFM have provided good guidance including on M&E, reporting, financial management. They also undertook regular supervisory missions, supported staff training and project implementation. This is confirmed by Project evaluation reports.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR)
<p>The FP has been a key player in the coordinated efforts to achieve results. The TFM has contributed tremendously to trade policy formulation.</p> <p>EIF FP and NIU: Overall, the NIU and FP are operating well and delivering their mandate (project identification and development, oversight of delivery, M&E, etc.) under strong leadership. In Rwanda the SPIU is the National Implementation Unit of the EIF and coordinates all project related activities with stakeholders on the routine basis.</p> <p>The NSC is involved in establishing the overall Policy direction and overseeing the work of EIF process and activities; keeping under review the overall effectiveness of EIF operations; promoting coordination among participants; ensuring transparency of the EIF process; providing oversight, ensuring mainstreaming of trade etc.</p> <p>The DF has been performing well in working with the Focal Point to facilitate donor coordination and the donor—government dialogue on trade issues.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	1	2 (DR, KII)
<p>COVID-19 has affected project implementation due to restrictions with regard to events and face to face meetings.</p>		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF project implementation has been efficient in delivering most of its planned activities and in coordination with key institutions under the National Steering Committee.</p> <p>With regard to functional efficiency, the evaluation of Tier 1 Project confirms that the implementation arrangements between MINICOM project management structure was very ideal. The Sustainability Support Report 2019 also noted that the efficiency of the sustainability support project was satisfactory.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The efficiency of the CBM EIF Project was rated at two levels in achieving its outputs and in delivering the intended benefits. At the central level, project management is mostly effective; in providing support to Districts in infrastructure development, provided support in reaching to cross border traders, establishment of CBM BODs and the property manager, as well as elementary capacity building to occupants.</p> <p>At the District level, some delays were observed almost at each stage of project implementation including contracting of construction companies, selection of beneficiaries, establishment of the BODs,</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
procurement of the property manager and the eventual takeover of the CBM Management and operationalization. According to KII, the following inefficiencies relate to the e-commerce project: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are too many different donors working on this with MINICOM and ITC. There might be overlaps in the work done, hence a waste of resources if work is duplicated. • There are too many single yet unconnected projects, which may push and pull e-commerce in different directions. • GIZ is doing a lot of work on e-commerce, the EIF has not fully joined up to this yet. While the EIF has shown some alignment to this e-commerce work, such as an existing plan that has been rolled out of Private Public dialogues and the establishment of a steering committee for e-commerce, closer collaboration between GIZ and the EIF is needed. • No one is looking at the whole picture of e-commerce in Rwanda. So, GIZ, FCDO and Access to Finance Rwanda (AFR) proposed that a steering committee is set up in MINICOM to oversee e-commerce projects. To avoid overlaps and ensure that all initiatives and projects are complementary, an e-commerce Technical Working Group with members from all e-commerce stakeholders was setup and it is involved in all activities.		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	4	3 (S, KII)
The EIF FP, NIU, NSC and FP are delivering their intended mandate and governance functions well.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	2	2 (DR, KII)
COVID 19 has slowed the implementation of ongoing projects and reduced the impact of completed projects. For example, the Cross-border markets were fully occupied in 2019 but due to lockdowns and the closure of the Rwanda-Uganda border and Rwanda-DRC border, the occupation fell in 2019 and has not recovered since then. However, it is important to note that even before pandemic, the Rwanda-Uganda border had been closed due to political issues between the two countries. Export growth facilitation initiatives have also been disrupted by the pandemic. An export growth matching grant agreement was signed a week before Rwanda went into lockdown and the resulting reduction in economic activities affected implementation.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	3 (DR, KII)
Through the Tier 2 projects especially, EIF has and will continue to contribute to sustainable development. Given the COVID context as well as increasing trend towards e-commerce and digital trade, the growth of online platforms from 9 to 70, as well as training of businesses on e-commerce, should support sustainable development in the long term. Additionally, there is strong evidence the cross-border markets have positively impacted livelihoods through enhanced incomes, including among youth and women. The support to Rwanda Standards Board is expected to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of export initiatives, through supportive quality infrastructure as well as training of SMEs on quality standards and certification. Most of the KIIs also indicated potential great contribution of the projects to sustainable development.		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	4	3 (DR, KII)
As noted before, the EIF has contributed to the integration of Rwanda into regional trading systems by supporting the public and private sector in trade negotiations such as the EAC-EU-EPA negotiations and the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite negotiations. Cross border trade has also been enhanced through the cross-border markets that were built under the EIF program. Training of trade negotiators has equipped them with the necessary negotiation skills to participate in EAC Common Market Protocol and EPA regional meetings.		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Tier 1 support was integrated into the EDPRS II as a priority area of the second pillar as earlier seen. Trade has also been integrated into the PSTAG-III, Financial Sector Development Programme II, Energy and Transport Strategies and the National Industrial Policy.</p> <p>At the structure and processes level, Rwanda already has mechanisms in place through the SPIU; the sector working groups and the various coordination group, such as the ones with Development Partners. The existence of these country driven and designed structures under which the NIU works augurs well for sustainability.</p>		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>There has been strong ownership of EIF projects through consultative processes in the SPIU, National Trade Policy Forum (which is now the Trade Facilitation Forum) and the private sector working group which are composed of a number of government institutions, the private sector, the civil society and academia. The NIU is fully integrated under the SPIU, itself integrated under MINICOM. Additionally, there is clear government commitment which is partly funding some activities such as the e-commerce project and the trade facilitation project. The trade facilitation project is also partly funded by development partners.</p> <p>Private Sector Federation representatives and the Districts' officials as well as the CBMs contracted Managers own and sustain the cross-border market infrastructure which was funded by the EIF, TMEA, World Bank and the African Development Bank.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>With regards to the cross-border markets, despite the effects of COVID 19 and the closure of Cyanika Border on Burera Border to Uganda which negatively impacted the operations of the cross-border markets, the projects will continue to operate even after EIF program end. This is evidenced by responses from interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries, Private Sector Federation representatives and the Districts' officials as well as the CBMs contracted Managers; whose ownership in using and sustaining the existing CBM infrastructures to facilitate cross border trading is visible.</p> <p>Though not complete, the prospects for continuation of the e-commerce project are high because MINICOM has developed the strategy for digital transformation of trade, industry and commerce that provides pathways through which ICT-led innovations will be accelerated to boost trade, industry and commerce. In order to ensure the smooth implementation of ICT4COM strategy, MINICOM in collaboration with UNCTAD is developing an E-commerce Strategy. The 2019 Sustainability support report rates the prospects of continuation as satisfactory.</p>		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Coordination with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society is likely to continue through the already established sector working groups.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Department of Trade serves as the secretariat for the National Trade Policy Forum (now NTFC) doubles as the NSC. The PS of MINICOM serves as the chair For private sector, a structured Rwanda Public Private Dialogue (RPPD) mechanism is already in place. There is also a Private Sector Working group that has been put in place to engage the government On donors, there is a donor working group through which donors are engaged and consulted. <p>Additionally, there are other several sector working groups such as the Productivity and Youth employment chaired by GIZ and co-chaired by Ministry of Public Service and the Investment and Regulations working group Chaired by the World Bank and Rwanda Development Board. This therefore provides the formal mechanisms for aid coordination.</p>		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	4	3 (DR)
<p>EIF, especially through the DTIS/AM has largely contributed to leveraging finance and expertise. Various development partners like the World Bank, ITC, TMEA, GIZ, and AfDB are supporting the trade agenda and expected to continue.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	4	3 (DR, KII)
Despite the effects of COVID 19 on the cross border markets, the final report indicates that the pandemic is unlikely to affect sustainability because of the role of beneficiaries, Private Sector Federation representatives and the Districts' officials as well as the CBMs contracted Managers in using and sustaining the existing CBM infrastructures.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and specific projects are very strongly aligned with the needs and national trade development priorities articulated in economic growth strategies. While alignment with private sector needs has been strong, the alignment with civil society interests is not clear beyond the inclusion in meetings. There is clear evidence of adaptation to emerging priorities of value chains, trade and gender; trade and climate change. Covid-19 has slowed the implementation of on-going projects.
- Coherence:** EIF national projects in Rwanda are well aligned with the overall EIF programme's ToC. All the EIF delivery modalities have been greatly appropriate for Rwanda, who has implemented 3 Tier 2 projects. Furthermore, there is strong coordination with other initiatives, ensuring synergy.
- Effectiveness and Efficiency:** The DTIS has played a key role in mainstreaming trade and there is evidence that the action matrix has been fairly implemented. Key results from Tier 1 project have been strongly in mainstreaming trade and capacity building of the personnel of the Ministry of Trade and Industry staff as well as policy reform. Key results under Tier two have been in increased turnover for exporting firms and cross border trade; increased revenue to government and enhance quality environment. While tier 1 projects have been relatively efficient, the cross-border market project has been inefficient at the district level due to delays in project implementation and lack of funds. Some KIIs have also deemed the e-commerce project as being inefficient based on the number of donor projects and activities focused on e-commerce, which they deem as uncoordinated.
- Sustainability:** The EIF initiatives have been well integrated into government initiatives and structures and there is also strong ownership of the projects. So far, the cross-border markets and NIA support projects which are complete have been sustained by the government and other stakeholders. There is evidence that the e-commerce project and the sustainability support project will also continue even after termination of EIF support. COVID 19 has slowed implementation of projects, but strong ownership may prevent it from affecting the sustainability of the CBM project.
- Impact:** Overall, the EIF has been contributing to sustainable development and increased integration to the regional trading system in the main.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM)	4	The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has developed a tool to check value for money for all programmes, whether funded

	Score	Narrative
processes)		by donors or government. The project planning processes in place entail identification and prioritisation of programmes, projects and activities to achieve optimum balance of needs with available resources. The VfM assessment is usually conducted at the audit stage.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	3	Procurement follows standard good practice, but the procedures are too lengthy which makes the process time consuming.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	4	While there are coordination forums between MINICOM, the Ministry of ICT and the ICT Chamber to discuss the e-commerce project, there are still overlaps, wasted resources and scattered activity. Tier 1 and the other Tier 2 projects have been efficient in the use of resources.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	5	So far, the sustainability of already completed projects has already been realized as they are still being implemented after termination of EIF support. Evidence of ownership, integration into government priorities and coordination indicates that on-going projects are also sustainable.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	4	Rwanda has a well-established, country owned management and governance arrangements in place. Through the SPIU; the sector working groups and the various coordination groups, such as the ones with Development Partners ensures strong VfM processes.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	3	The management of the programme has been efficient but there have been challenges adapting to changes and risks such as COVID 19 and political problems between Rwanda and Uganda which has slowed the implementation of projects.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	4	The cross-border trade facilitation project and the regional agricultural technology project have been designed to focus especially on women and youth, who have also been the biggest beneficiaries. Support has also gone to cooperatives, which are bodies representing mainly women and youth.

Sierra Leone

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	27-July-2009
Total budget	<p>Total budget= \$4,505,511</p> <p>Of which EIF budget= \$4,218,296 Government budget= \$287,215</p>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	<p>Government of Sierra Leone</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Trade and Industry - National Tourism Board <p>World Bank</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> Sierra Leone's two Tier 1 EIF projects align to the EIF TOC Outcome 1. Under Outcome 1, there are strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination', and output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation'. This can be seen through the following key objectives: 'enhance capacity to formulate and implement trade related policies', and 'mainstream trade policies into the national development agenda', among others.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> Sierra Leone's three Tier 2 EIF projects align to the EIF TOC Outcome 2. Under Outcome 2, there are strong linkages to output 1 'improved participation in value chains for increased connectivity to markets.' This is demonstrated in the following key objective, for example, 'conserving the environment and reducing poverty' and 'increase productivity of targeted agro-processing firms.'</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <p>NIA Support (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Sierra Leone - Start date: 27-Jul-2009 - End date: 15-Dec-2017 <p>DTISU (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: World Bank - Start date: 12-Apr-2012 - End date: 30-June-2014 <p>Sustainable Tourism (Phase 1, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Sierra Leone

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start date: 21-May-2012 - End date: 20-Sep-2015 <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <p>Sustainability Support (Phase 2, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Sierra Leone - Start date: 08-Jan-2020 - End date: 07-Jan-2022 <p>Sustainable Tourism Repackaged (Phase 2, Tier 2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Sierra Leone - Start date: 03-Feb-2020 - End date: 02-Feb-2022
Regional projects	None

2. Context

- Sierra Leone is situated in West Africa with a coastline along the Atlantic Ocean. It has two bordering countries, which are Guinea and Liberia. Sierra Leone has a population of 7.9 million people (2020) and a GDP per capita of \$485 (2020). However, as recently as 2014, the GDP per capita was \$714.
- Sierra Leone has a Human Development Index (HDI) score of 0.452 (2019).
- On average, Sierra Leone's real GDP grew by 4.9% a year, which is much higher relative to Africa's real GDP growth of 2.9%.
- On average, between 2008-2019, Sierra Leone's FDI inflows were \$332 million a year.
- Between 2008-2019, Sierra Leone received a total of \$1,315 million in Aid for Trade disbursements. Of this, 64% was spent on economic infrastructure, 35% was spent on building productive capacity, and 1% was spent on trade and policy regulation.
- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), Sierra Leone ranked 163rd out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', Sierra Leone scored 44 percentage points in 2015, which increased to 52 percentage points in 2019, hence there has been improvement.
- Sierra Leone's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) was 2.07 in 2012 and has remained constant at 2.07 in 2018. By LPI indicators, its highest scoring LPI was timeliness and its lowest scoring LPI was logistics.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June-2021 to Sep-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Key Informant Interviews; e-survey; Economic Analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<p><u>E-survey</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DF <p><u>Key informant interviews</u></p> <p>A total of 10 interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EIF ES Country Coordinator (1) - National Tourist Board (1) - Ministry of Tourism (1) - Ministry of Trade and Industry (1) - Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1) - Market Women' association (1)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental Association for Africa (1) - Office of the solicitor (1) - Banana Island Community Association (1) - Wara Wara mountains (1) <p>By gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Male (7) - Female (3) <p><u>Documents reviewed across Sierra Leone's 5 EIF projects:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOU - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budget - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p><u>Sierra Leone's Portfolio Review:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The NIU did not answer the e-survey - August is the month with the heaviest rainfall in Freetown. This caused some meetings to be cancelled and rescheduled. Also, the roads deteriorated due to the rains, which made travel difficult.

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF projects are aligned with trade policies and conducive to sustainable pro-poor growth; and increase the presence and perception of the country in the international market as an attractive tourist destination.</p> <p>A detailed DTIS was developed, which started off in the Integrated framework project and then EIF in Sierra Leone, approved in March 2009. This led to the setting up of the NIA the establishment of the NSC, Technical Appraisal Committee (TAC) and EIF focal point office based in the Ministry of Trade. Tourism was one of the sectors under review and recommendations were made to develop the Tourism Strategic Plan. This led to the implementation of the IFTP and an application was made to EIF for TIER 1 and the project was approved in 2012.</p> <p>TIER 2 (2014) received \$3m to assist with sector governance, marketing and product development but not all project objectives were achieved mainly due to the EBOLA outbreak and the Tourism project was repackaged in 2019</p> <p>The programme is aligned with the National Development Agenda (PRSP 3 & 4) and the matrix of the DTIS. Align SL agenda to the AU Agenda 2063, ECOWAS and the UN agendas. The National Development Agenda had to be revisited in line with the DTISU.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	3	2 (S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
The EIF programmes are aligned with the private sector as it supports economic diversification. The approach has always been to integrate with stakeholders across the sector as a whole. Support is given to leverage resources from government, development partners and the private sector. Civil society engagement is limited but processes are being put in place by the Tourist Board.		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	3	2 (DR, KII)
The EIF programmes covers many of the emerging priorities of EIF particularly AFT implementation and the environment through the Tourism project. The programmes have addressed the marginalized such as women and poor people, as seen throughout the Tier 2 projects.		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	3	2 (DR, KII)
Adjustments have had to be made due to emergence of the pandemic which has had a devastating impact on the Tourism sector. Restrictions and lockdown have led to delays of approving the National Tourism Act. COVID- 19 has also led to a derailment of the activities, and NCEs and budget revisions have been granted.		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	5	2 (DR, KII)
DTISU has contributed to the National Development Agenda by improving the regulatory framework in terms of producing the National Tourism Act and other policies such as Tourism Governance and Financial Management Policy and Tourism E-Governance Strategy to ensure tourism policy is coherently integrated across government programmes.		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	4	2 (DR, KII)
The focus has not just been on policy making but also building the weak capacity internally and with the broader public sector to help roll out implementation processes. Capacity building with the Law officers, civil society and ministries. One such training was to train competent negotiators on Trade in services under the AfCFTA.		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	5	3 (DR, S, KII)
The programme is aligned with the National Development Agenda (PRSP3 & 4) and the AM. DTIS defines the issues clearly and how they should be addressed. Tourism has a competitive advantage for LDC's and these have been addressed in the DTIS and AM.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
EIF projects came at an opportune time when Sierra Leone had come out of a Civil War to help build capacity and strengthen its network in the framework of trade and regional integration and rebranding of Sierra Leone. Weekly meetings started in 2005 at the MTI regarding the initial study of the DTIS. Tourism was one of the priority sectors and recommendations were made to develop the Tourism strategic plan. In 2009 TIER 1 was approved. Draft consultations were developed with the units NIU and NSC set up. These units were set up to provide national leadership with the support from the EIF in Secretariat in Geneva. These included the National Implementation Unit comprising of the government (NIU), the NSC, Technical Appraisal Committee (TAC) and EIF ES representatives' private sector and development partners.		
Various consultations and workshops involved representatives from the private sector. The NSC, which is chaired by the Minister of Trade and Industry, has a wide-ranging participation of stakeholders from agencies, line ministries, private sector, and civil societies. There were also plans to develop a public-private sector dialogue with Sierra Leone Business Forum and Chamber of Commerce. However, the private sector in Sierra Leone is characterised by a large number of small actors, most of		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
which operate informally. Previous efforts to create a framework for public-private dialogue have yielded limited success, mostly due to lack of capacity of private sector associations to effectively influence public policy dialogue on trade.		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	4	2 (KII, DR)
TIER 2 projects and programmes are aligned with the EIF logframe. The outcomes of some of the activities are still realistic and reasonable despite the delay in implementation of some of these activities. In the long term these interventions will deliver the expected results.		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	2 (KII, DR)
The EIF delivery methods which includes preparatory, analytical, institutional capacity and supply-side capacity support have been efficient in delivering their goals and objectives. Areas such as community engagement, awareness raising campaigns, media engagement, government support have been implemented.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	3	2 (KII, DR)
With the DTISU feeding into the PRSP's this has helped develop stronger development partners coordination on trade assistance and complementarities between projects. There has been various support by development partners in areas of export strategy (Commonwealth Secretariat), public financial management (AfDB) rural and private sector development. NIU created the framework which led the establishment of other institutions such as SME Development Association and other projects that needed support.		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	a) 5	3 (DR, S, KII)
a) increasing knowledge	b) 3	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	c) 1	
c) prioritised interventions	d) 1	
d) programming plan	e) 5	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) There is now more education on the impact of tourism on national development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Through consultations people are being informed about trade linkages and projects on tourism are being aired on national tv's and radios - There is now buy-in from all stakeholders such as local councils, chiefs and line ministries. - Institutional capacity building through training and participation of external tourist fairs to gain more knowledge b) The goal of integrating trade in the development planning is to improve livelihoods STDP as - repackaged tourism project that started in 2020, coordinated by EIF with the National Tourism Board of Sierra Leone and the Ministry of Tourism and Cultural Affairs, is tackling key constraints and working to increase Sierra Leone's presence as an attractive tourism destination in the international market. c) There was no development of prioritised interventions in DTIS AM. d) There was no implementation plan to link priorities with the DTIS AM 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
e) The priorities identified by the DTIS are captured in the AM which is a priority document for interventions by the development partners.		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	2 (DR, KII)
The first DTIS 2006 was very broad and the AM was very detailed and therefore it was challenging to implement. The DTISU 2013 was structured better and some recommendations were addressed. However, the update has also revealed some gaps and a new concept note has been developed for funding of a review. The conclusion is that a holistic approach is needed for trade related strategies and investments to truly achieve their intended purpose.		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	3	2 (DR, KII)
See above		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (S, DR, KII)
Trade Mainstreaming has been achieved through the creation and consultation on a National Trade Strategy Policy (2020), Project Identification and Design, National Agri-Business Policy and Strategy- to further promote trade and add value to our products. EIF contribution to this is known. These documents are awaiting Cabinet approval for onward implementation. EIF NIU also worked on the development of the SME policy which formed the basis of the Development of the Act, working with other stakeholders to review the Act too. It established the SME Development Agency (SMEDA), a derivative of the Act. EIF also contributed to the development of the Local Content policy and review and validation of the Act.		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	3 (S, DR, KII)
See above		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	2	2 (DR, KII, S)
EIF supported attendance at regional meetings which included the AfCFTA Negotiation forum and EIF regional workshop. There is little evidence beyond this.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	2	2 (DR, KII, S)
See above. In addition, Sierra Leone provides technical expertise for the regional integration in the Man River Union and serves as Chief negotiator for AfCFTA negotiation.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	2	2 (DR, KII, S)
EIF's focus under TIER 1 has been both on policy and building the weak capacity of the NIU staff and the public and private sector to roll out implementation processes. There have been trainings on fiduciary, trade related knowledge and policy formulation. In 2020, trainings such as Trade in Services to train competent negotiators especially as Sierra Leone is now a member of the AfCFTA.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	3	2 (DR, KII, S)
Trainings and workshops have helped to increase public and private sector awareness on the importance of trade and its role in poverty reduction, but there is a lack of concrete evidence to support this awareness raising.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
Product Development – EIF is supporting the rehabilitation of ecotourism sites in the Southern and Northern and Western area for domestic and international tourism. There has been delay in implementation, but first disbursements (2021) have been made. Outcomes are yet to be determined, however there is an expected increase in employment and revenue across the value chain.		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	3	2 (DR, KII, S)
E -Governance strategy has been developed to guide digital process of tourism. Consultation has been done but awaiting validation. Website has also been developed and completed.		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	3	2 (DR, KII, S)
SSP (2020) EIF and UNECA is supporting the development of the Industrial as well as the SEZ policy for Sierra Leone. These policies aim at not only boosting regional trade and integration but will also support the establishment of a Special Economic Zone for agro-processing to boost exports.		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	4	2 (DR, KII, S)
EIF has contributed to human and institutional capacity development. These include rehabilitation of the Hotel and Catering school (24 bedrooms, 6 classrooms and kitchens) to be completed in November 2021 and March 2022. The curriculum has also been developed and is waiting for procurement approval.		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	3	2 (DR, KII, S)
See above		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	2 (DR, KII, S)
<p>Overall, both the ES and TFM provides guidance and leadership to the NIU.</p> <p>ES- Overall guidance and regular monitoring of the project and provides global communication and outreach. The ES also collaborates with other donors and partners. However, the new team from Geneva could not visit as a result of pandemic and rely on the NIU to provide information.</p> <p>TFM supervises and guides project implementation and oversees the fiduciary measures in place. TFM undertakes a thorough review of fiduciary processes and if any irregularity is identified, it has the authority to freeze the related process and any payment related to it. In Sierra Leone, some reporting issues resulted in delays to programmed activities. However, once resolved the workplan and budget were then adjusted accordingly to mitigate delays.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The governance structure is well established and effective. In 2020, the unit has now been absorbed into the Ministry and covers more programmes including the EIF. The team can now provide expertise to national programmes to ensure they are run in a very succinct manner to benefit the whole country.</p> <p>EIF FP/NIU- provides coordination support, and leadership. It's the focal point for donor coordination, policy formulation, providing overall project management and support to project formulation and implementation. They also facilitate intersectoral coordination. The FP provided the liaison between Government of Sierra Leone and the ES in Geneva.</p> <p>NSC- overall leadership and strategic advice and coordination of the project chaired by the Minister of Trade and Industry.</p> <p>TAC-is the technical working body where the workplans and implementation reports are discussed and finalised.</p> <p>EIF DF- newly appointed and relies on the implementing units for information due to the restrictions of movements by the pandemic.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII, S)
All the above teams have adapted and have been flexible in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some projects have been reprogrammed and meetings have continued using digital communication.		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	3	2 (KII, DR, S)
<p>DTIS- The DTIS and DTISU AM recommendations have not been addressed and reviews have identified gaps for which a concept note has been developed to update in 2021.</p> <p>TIER 1-The main objective of the EIF TIER 1 project was to enhance in-country capacity to formulate and implement trade related policies and development strategies geared towards promoting Sierra Leone`s competitiveness in the global market.</p> <p>Overall, some of the activities were delivered efficiently and within budget. However, Sierra Leone still faces a range of trade infrastructure obstacles that puts them at a disadvantage to compete effectively in international trade.</p> <p>The tourism sector also had some activities delivered such as the marketing aspect and rebranding. In 2020, the functions and staff of the NIU have been mainstreamed into the Ministry. The Office of Human Resource Management created the Directorate of Programme Management which absorbed the functions of the NIU. NIU Fiduciary arrangements are overseen by the Sr. Accountant in the Ministry of Trade and Auditing is done by the Audit Service Sierra Leone an Arm of the Government. This has helped to improve efficiency in monitoring and evaluation and bureaucracy.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	3	2 (KII, DR)
<p>IFTP-TIER 2 (2014-2022)- \$3m to assist with sector governance, marketing, promotion, product development and human resource and institutional capacity building.</p> <p>Project implementation has been delayed due to a number of reasons including COVID-19. Implementation has only started in 2021. Local communities are being developed for domestic and international tourism.</p> <p>Enhanced training skills and development has led to increased employment within the sector and local communities being trained as tour guides.</p> <p>There is now more education about the sector, community engagements, awareness campaigns with the private sector and civil society.</p> <p>However, more engagement is needed especially as projects have now been implemented. The sites' development will need more input, guidance and training for future sustainability.</p> <p>Sustainable Tourism programme was repackaged in 2019 which runs until 2022.</p> <p>The Ministry (MTCA) is working on the Sector Governance and the Act and other policies are awaiting validations and approval from Cabinet.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	2 (KII, DR, S)
<p>The repackaging of the Tourism project led to a reduction of the EIF funding which affected staff and Minister of Finance had to provide counterpart funding though this has not been sufficient.</p> <p>The newly appointed ES could not visit due to restriction in travel and the NIU has been efficient in providing the team with up-to-date reports.</p> <p>Overall, the governance structure has been efficient in implementing the projects. (See rows above)</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	2 (KII, DR, S)
<p>Due to lockdown restrictions on movement activities were suspended and/or delayed (See rows above)</p>		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	1 (KII, DR, S)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The three sites (Wara Wara Mountains, Tiwai Island and Banana Island) have been constrained over the years. The rehabilitation has been timely by EIF. This is expected to lead to local job creation, awareness raising and eventually will create economic wealth.</p> <p>These will lead to improve livelihoods as a result of job creation and eradicate poverty.</p> <p>However, due to budget cuts with the repackaged programme, workplans and activities have had to be reviewed and scaled down and only tangible activities of the programme are being implemented. These include, beautification, relics, rehabilitations of lodges and chalets, signage, wells and nature trails.</p>		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	1 (KII, DR, S)
<p>The EIF support has made some significant inroads into regional and global trading systems, but major challenges are still faced in infrastructure to compete effectively in the international trade.</p>		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	2 (KII, S)
<p>TIER 1- DTIS/AM is integrated into government processes and priorities. There are more collaborations and investments for trade across government agencies and ministries with a focus on youth employment, education, women associations and economic empowerment.</p> <p>NIU- In 2020, the unit was institutionalized in the Ministry of Trade and Industry structures and processes and covering all projects including EIF.</p> <p>Tier 2 – The National Tourism Act will help with integration into government structures. There is now a more integrated approach with other sectors in line with the NDA agenda. A communication network has been put in place across the sectors, and there is more buy in from all stakeholders across the sectors.</p>		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	1 (DR, S)
<p>In terms of the structure and processes set up by the EIF, it is fully owned by the Government and relevant stakeholders.</p> <p>DTIS/AM are fully owned by the government and leveraged assistance from the World Bank to fund the DTIS. The government continues to review the DTIS as gaps are identified. There has been more involvement by the various stakeholders which has led to more realistic review to aid implementation in line with the NDP.</p> <p>TIER 2- There is a buy in from government and other stakeholders and collaborations and engagement is more effective now. Through EIF interventions, IFTP TIER 2 has laid the foundation. It has established confidence in the government, other donors, and private sector.</p>		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>TIER 1- Refinancing some of the programmes for sustainability after EIF funding stops will be a challenge. The NIU is encouraging the Government of Sierra Leone to contribute meaningfully to the implementation of such programmes. The other committees set up will continue to operate and carry out their mandated functions. Regarding technical expertise there is sufficient capacity for the near future.</p> <p>TIER 2- Through EIF intervention IFTP has laid the foundation, giving confidence to donors and private sector in the tourist industry. Due to funding cutbacks which supports the work of the NIU, human resource capacity has been limited. Ministry of Finance had to intervene to utilized some of the key staff, so as not to lose the institutional knowledge of the sector. Though some counterpart funding is made available by the line ministries, Sierra Leone will have to ensure that EIF interventions generate revenue and are sustainable. They have to ensure the private sector is more involved in developing the sector. Regarding technical expertise, this will be sustained due to the improved</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
institutional and human resource capacity. There are young educated and professional staff within the sector and they all engage in continuous learning.		
Product Development- the sites have potential to generate large revenues for the communities and job creation. For example, Tiwai raised approximately \$30,000 (LE300,000,00) in the latter half of 2019 despite a few setbacks environmentally. With the rehabilitation and achievement of other objectives these sites have the potential to generate wealth. This revenue was mostly from international visitors. Government has identified ecotourism as a potential development for the economy so the buy-in is already established.		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
The coordination structures as stated above are well established and donors and private sector have started to show interest and are making commitments. For instance: trade in tourism -Six other ecotourism sites have been identified by World Bank (WB) and this will complement the EIF funded projects. There has also been collaboration on trainings with other donors such as EU and DFID.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
Yes, as above, government and development partners have leveraged finance and expertise.		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
Delay in implementation of the TIER2 projects. Objectives are still relevant but due to the pandemic there will likely be “no cost” extensions.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- Relevance:** The EIF in SL is closely aligned with National Development Agenda (PRSP 3 & 4), AU Agenda 2063, ECOWAS and the UN agendas. In particular, the EIF has improved the regulatory framework in terms of producing the National Tourism Act and other policies such as Tourism Governance and Financial Management Policy and Tourism E-Governance Strategy. One area that could be improved is further evidence on adaptation to EIF emerging priorities, particularly the environment, women and marginalized groups.
- Coherence:** EIF projects in SL demonstrate a good level of coherence with other initiatives. For example, the DTISU feeds into the PRSP, which has helped develop stronger development partners coordination on trade assistance and complementarities between projects. In addition, the NIU created the framework which led the establishment of other institutions such as SME Development Association and other projects that needed support. Overall, the EIF projects in SL show strong linkages to the EIF Theory of Change.
- Effectiveness:** **Tier 2** projects have been effective in tackling key constraints and working to increase Sierra Leone’s presence as an attractive tourism destination to the international market. Indeed, EIF is supporting the rehabilitation of ecotourism sites in the Southern and Northern and Western area for domestic and international tourism. **Tier 1** projects have been effective in mainstreaming trade, as this has been achieved through the creation and consultation on a National Trade Strategy Policy (2020), Project Identification and Design, National Agri-Business Policy and Strategy-to further promote trade and add value to our products. Indeed, the EIF’s contribution to this has been acknowledged.
- Efficiency:** In terms of **Tier 1** efficiency, some of the activities were delivered efficiently and within budget. However, inefficiencies remain. For example, the DTIS and DTISU AM

recommendations have not been addressed and reviews have identified gaps, for which a concept note has been developed to address these gaps. For **Tier 2** projects, implementation has been delayed due to several reasons, including COVID -19, and implementation has only started in 2021. One example is the repackaging of the Sustainable Tourism programme in 2019, which now runs until 2022. The repackaging of the Tourism project led to a reduction of the EIF funding, which affected staff and Minister of Finance had to provide counterpart funding, though this has not been sufficient.

- **Impact:** The EIF has shown impact in its timely rehabilitation of three sites (Wara Wara Mountains, Tiwai Island and Banana Island). This is expected to lead to local job creation, awareness raising and eventually will create economic wealth, as well as improve livelihoods and poverty eradication.
- **Sustainability:** There is a strong level of integration of EIF initiatives into government processes. For example, the DTIS/AM is integrated into government priorities. There is strong government ownership and government buy in to EIF initiatives, notably the DTIS and Sustainable Tourism project. There are promising signs that EIF initiatives will continue after EIF support, because, with regards to technical expertise, there is sufficient capacity for the near future. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance has already intervened in Tier 2 projects so as not to lose the institutional knowledge of the sector. Tier 2 projects are giving confidence to donors and private sector in the tourist industry, which is imperative to ensure the projects continue to generate revenue and are sustainable.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (Vfm processes)	2	<p>The main VFM indicators identified are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Trade integrated into NDP 2) DTISU 3) Trade policies 4) Efficient trade coordination mechanisms 5) Sector specific strategies integrating trade such as Tourism <p>Adequate economy and efficiency have been set out though effectiveness in many areas have been weak and reforms have been recommended by TFM regarding management structures and plans to improve VFM measures such as metrics which are not evident.</p>
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	4	<p>Regarding MIE selection, a capacity assessment was carried out by TFM for the TIER 2 project on sustainability. This was sanctioned NSC as per requirement of the AM.</p> <p>The Programme has demonstrated good approach to Procurement guidelines (international best practices) such as open tender process, requirement that service providers be free of conflict of interest and so forth.</p> <p>With reference to TIER 2, there are no evident plans to improve efficiency(outputs) and effectiveness (outcomes)of the operation on the programme as stated by key interviews. Issues such as timeframe is not feasible for the projects as it involves construction work.</p> <p>Secondly, grant is limited to project activities and therefore projects have been streamlined.</p>

	Score	Narrative
		Thirdly, no provision has been made for project team to monitor the sites which will require a lot of monitoring.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	5	EIF interventions has provided fiduciary management and supporting trade agenda of Sierra Leone. It has also improved human capacity training, M&E, dissemination of information and public awareness. The NIU has been excellent in leveraging other donor resources as well as avoiding duplication. Not much evidence as to whether some of these outputs has been achieved by minimal costs as compared to other LDCs.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	There is some evidence that programme activities are likely to continue after EIF funding ends as the foundation has already been laid by EIF (TIER 1 & 2). One key element is that the government has absorbed functions of EIF into the ministry.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	3	In terms of leadership, management and governance structure, EIF's organisational policies, procedures and processes promote continual improvement within the system. An audit was conducted by the incoming TFM to investigate a potential overspend related to an ongoing project; however, the balance was later reconciled. In addition, over the years management and governance structure has changed hands in MIT, MTCA, NTB and also NSC. Change of power means new government with its own governance structure. In other words, leadership changes with political party and this causes disruption. NIU has taken into account that conflicts can arise (internally and externally) and therefore there is a need for flexibility – programmes design to be adjusted as and when necessary. There have also been more guidelines implemented on financial, fiduciary and general overseeing of the projects.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	Programme delivery reviews and reports are in place. There is also a monitoring and evaluation in place. In addition, projects during COVID have had to be adapted to mitigate risk. One such project was the training programme Project Identification and Design which was supposed to be held in the capital but was moved to the rural areas where COVID was not a risk.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	Broad spectrum of people had benefited from EIF interventions to date. These include MSME's, public servants, parliamentarians, private sector, civil society, women and local communities. However not much data particularly how the programme has benefited women and youth.

Solomon Islands

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2011
Total budget	\$4,396,460
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC (scheduled to graduate in 2024); Small island state; FCAS
Key stakeholders ²	<p><i>NIU</i>: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade (MFAET)</p> <p>Ministry of Finance & Treasury Ministry of Commerce, Industries, Labor and Immigration (MCILI) Ministry of Culture and Tourism National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) – Ministry of Health & Medical Services Solomon Islands National University (SINU) Solomon Islands Women in Business Association (SIWIBA) Varivao Holdings Ltd. Goshen Enterprise UNCTAD</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop the capacity of the National Implementation Unit (i.e., the MFAT) for trade mainstreaming and aid for trade implementation and coordination - Provide an assessment of Solomon Islands' readiness for e-commerce with a view of increasing the country's participation in international fora on e-commerce and digital trade and leveraging additional resources from development partners - Provide systematic interventions to the tourism industry and select agricultural value chains (i.e., taro and cassava) with a view of generating livelihood and employment opportunities and enhancing production/export capacities and value addition <p>Linkages to EIF TOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Tier 1 project on supporting national implementation arrangements (NIAs) has linkages to Outcome 1—Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment</i>), Output 2 (<i>Strengthened institutional coordination for trade and development</i>) and Output 3 (<i>Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation</i>) - One of the Tier 2 projects on business support services and institutions (eTrade Readiness Assessment) links to Outcome 2—Output 2 (<i>Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains</i>); the other two primarily support Outcome 2—Output 1 (<i>Improved</i>

² We note that KII were conducted based on the list provided by the national FP and NIU. These stakeholders have been directly involved in the implementation of the EIF projects. However, other private sector stakeholders/programs not interviewed include Chambers of Commerce, PHAMA+, IFC

	<p><i>participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets)</i></p> <p>Overall, EIF interventions in Solomon Islands have contributed to Outcomes 1 and 2 under the abovementioned outputs.</p>
National projects	<p>Completed Projects (MIE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NIA Support [Phase 1 and 2, Tier 1] (<i>Government of Solomon Islands- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade</i>) - Solomon Islands Tourism for Inclusive Development [Phase 1, Tier 2] (<i>Government of Solomon Islands- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade</i>) - eTrade Readiness Assessment [Phase 2, Tier 2] (<i>UNCTAD</i>) <p>Projects under implementation (MIE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enhancing Capacities for Agriculture Trade [Phase 2, Tier 2] (<i>Government of Solomon Islands- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade</i>) <p>Cancelled Project (MIE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTIS Update [Phase 2, Tier 1] (<i>Government of Solomon Islands- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade</i>)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity building for EIF countries on investment promotion within WAIPA activity - Gender Sensitive, Climate Resilient International Market Access through Fairtrade - LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status - Pacific Quality infrastructure Initiative (Phase 1 and Phase 2)

2. Context

- The trade structure of Solomon Islands is dominated by merchandise trade, with recent trends showing an increase in goods trade deficit.
- FDI inflows has been generally trending down.
- Solomon Islands is among the most aid-dependent nations globally. Since the start of EIF support in 2011, EIF disbursements accounted for 0.76% of total AfT disbursements in the country.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country’s performance has remained stagnant in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Nonetheless, modest progress has been made in terms of overall logistics performance.
- The COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected key industries (including tourism) and resulted to increased pressure on domestic resources and government services.
- Overall, the economy of Solomon Islands is highly influenced by fragility, geographic remoteness, vulnerability to environmental shocks, and dependence on foreign aid—factors that will continue to shape its trade strategies and prospects.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June 2021–September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, Document and Data review, E-Survey, Key Informant Interviews, Economic analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reviewed a number of documents (including EIF programme documents, project documents including narrative reports, national policy and strategy documents) Reviewed one e-survey response (NIU Coordinator) Interviewed 11 informants (1 woman): 6 from government ministries and agencies; 3 from private sector; 1 from academe; 1 ES Country Coordinator <i>Portfolio Review</i> covering project types and subtypes; EIF phase involvement; project approval, start, and end dates; main implementing entities; total project costs and EIF and non-EIF contributions; regional projects where the country is a recipient <i>Review of EIF databases</i>, i.e., the Results and DTIS Action Matrix databases Used Value for Money Scorecard to summarise
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No response from Donor Representative Existence of discrepancies on quantitative data reported and variation in extent of reporting amongst project documents, EIF databases, and interviews, resulting in difficulty of triangulating evidence

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	4	2 (RD, KII, DR)
<p>Partly as a result of the DTISI, trade has been incorporated into the newly revised National Development Strategy (NDS) 2016-2035, Objective 1, Mid Term Strategy 2; the Democratic Coalition for Change Government Policies 4.2.5.1 and other sector specific policies which are trade related.</p> <p>While this is the first ever NDS to explicitly state 'trade', it is an overarching guide for the nation and does not explicitly discuss trade policy options. There are 12 sector-specific strategies with a trade element, reported by stakeholders to have received EIF support.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	3	2 (RD, KII, DR)
<p>There is mixed evidence regarding EIF alignment with the needs of private sector and civil society. SI set up the National Trade Development Council (NTDC) with EIF support in 2012. One of its mandates is to secure effective coordination and buy-in among various government institutions, the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders in SI. There are six private sector organisations represented at NTDC, and it meets quarterly. The NTDC meetings provide an avenue for the trade related bodies to advocate and share challenges and trade developments.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>However, it was reported that CSOs sometimes do not attend the meetings. Furthermore, there are instances where stakeholders fail to report back to their departments, notably when junior staff are sent to meetings in lieu of Directors.</p> <p>An NTDC Board member from Solomon Islands Women in Business (SIWIBA) felt the composition of the council does not capture the stakeholders in the provinces.</p> <p>Lastly it was reported that sometimes the needs of beneficiaries are not taken into account in the design of projects. For instance, the network of farmers from the ECAT advocated for a focus on increased production whereas the project focuses on building infrastructure for the taro industry. On the other hand, other stakeholders report that the ECAT also focuses on the cassava industry, that it has assisted a local company (Varivao Holdings) to export its container to Australia in June 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, and that trainings on biosecurity and market access were carried out for local farmers.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	2 (KII, DR)
<p>The EIF projects in SI are adapted to emerging EIF priorities and the DTIS includes references and policy actions related to all EIF areas. Tier 2 projects have primarily supported e-commerce development and digital trade (e-Trade Readiness Assessment) as well as the development of value chains (SI-ECAT).</p> <p>Given the nature of the grants under the SITIDE project which are tourism related and community inclusive women are indirect beneficiaries of all project grants. The beneficiary tourism operators of the ecotourism innovative projects have also been encouraged to set environmental sustainability as one of their key goals. Nevertheless, a recent aid for trade needs assessment by the Institute for International Trade at Adelaide University found that more needs to be done on gender and trade, and that women remain disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of level of access to information in order to trade.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	3	2 (KII, DR)
<p>SI has been severely impacted by COVID-19 and at the time of writing still has a travel ban in place. This has affected government revenue, including through reduced tourism opportunities and exports, and resulted in a government freeze on recruitment.</p> <p>There is written expression of EIF objectives/activities/outputs adapting to changing global context, including COVID-19. For instance, SI was included as a case study in the policy brief for Supporting sustainable tourism development through the SITIDE in least developed countries amid the COVID-19 recovery.</p> <p>The brief highlights that the border closure in March 2020 led to a cessation of all international tourism, with operators forced to cut jobs. The country is set to lose an estimated \$400 million in tourism derived foreign exchange and 90% of tourism employment, which is mostly women. The SIG plans to stabilise the sector – through a Tourism Economic Stimulus Package of \$1.25 million for tourism operators, and a Domestic Tourism Travel Bubble Policy and boost international marketing to restore tourism. This is being actioned through the SITIDE project. The ECAT project has seen its profile raised in light of increased interest in domestic food production as a result of the quarantine and border closures which have affected SI.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	4	3 (RD, KII, DR)
<p>Evidence from KIIs highlights that prior to the DTIS trade was not prominently featured in the National Development Strategies. Following its launch, the SIG mainstreamed and integrated trade in the NDS. It highlighted gaps in the productive sector—tourism, fisheries and mining sector—as well as the services sector, which could then be actioned by relevant ministries. It was highlighted that the DTIS was very relevant to spearhead initiatives in e-commerce.</p> <p>Under tier 2 initiatives, the SITIDE project coordinated with the Department of Tourism and Tourism Solomons to complete and launch the Solomon Islands National Tourism Development Strategy 2015-2019, National Tourism Policy 2015- 2019, Tourism Accommodation official standards and classification, and the final work needs to be done to complete the national Tourism legislation. The national investment policy targeting the cassava and taro sub-sector is currently in development under the ECAT project.</p> <p>It is worth noting that the DTIS was drafted in 2009, and the scheduled update was cancelled with no fixed plans for this to be carried out. It is now outdated given emerging and evolving developments in trade and the effects of COVID-19. Its coverage is very broad (60+ proposals) it is recommended that future updates are narrower in scope.</p>		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	3	2 (DR)
<p>Evidence shows that the Trade Policy Framework targeted national competitiveness and the following-Markets/RTA/TF/infrastructure; including sector analysis; links with poverty and environment in line with DTIS recommendations. EIF staff contributed to its development in terms of arranging consultations and contributing to development of the content, however it was funded by PIFS and MFAET.</p>		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	4	1 (DR)
<p>The EIF projects are well-aligned to the 2009 DTISU and AM recommendations, notably under trade facilitation/ trade policy/ tourism subheadings in the AM (e.g. the tier 2 tourism project activities, see below sections for more details).</p>		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The DTIS process began in 2006 at the request of the Government, and an information workshop was held in Honiara in 2007. Throughout the main mission detailed discussions were held with relevant Ministries and Departments, NGOs and other stakeholders.</p> <p>The draft DTIS report and AM matrix were then circulated amongst Government ministries, IF partners and national stakeholders and discussed in a validation workshop at which all relevant Ministries and stakeholders were represented.</p>		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	4	1 (DR)
<p>The project logframes are aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe. Tier 1 and 2 projects are very well-aligned with the results areas (all outcomes and outputs). See context section for details.</p>		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	5	1 (DR)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
The EIF SI delivery modalities (preparatory, analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's goals and objectives.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	4	2 (DR)
There are written expressions of this. For instance, MDPAC organises regular meetings with SIG-development partners. MFAET Permanent Secretary is involved in all the meetings. MDPAC launched an SI Aid management and development cooperation policy and partnership framework for effective development cooperation, which is used as a guide for all DP initiatives in SI.		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:		2 (DR)
a) increasing knowledge	k) 4 l) 4	
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	m) 3	
c) prioritised interventions	n) 3	
d) programming plan	o) 3	
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		
a) The DTIS has led to a centralised function for trade oversight by the NTDC helping thereby creating the structures to centralise institutional knowledge b) The DTIS mainstreamed trade in the NDS and the Trade Policy Framework c) The DTIS identified policy actions for reforms, but the list was extensive and a DTSIU was not carried out d) The DTIS/ AM did not lead to a specific programming plan as far as the evidence suggests e) The interventions supported by the EIF do align to a number of DTIS sub-headings as highlighted		
Extent of implementation of the AM	3	2 (DR)
As above, the DTIS and AM include a large number of recommendations, and it has not been practical to implement them all. The sub-categories that have been taken forward in subsequent interventions are well-aligned, however. For instance, the tourism project is fully aligned with all AM recommendations including involving local communities, building the handicrafts trade increasing the number of trained tourism staff, and ensuring environmental sustainability.		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	1	2 (RD, DR)
The DTIS was developed in 2009. A DTISU was planned for and approved by NTDC, however the allocated funding was not made available to the NIU, and the DTISU was subsequently cancelled. The decision to not carry out another study-DTIS Update was done by the NTDC. This is due to the fact that the NTDC see the TPF as already constituting an update of the DTIS. The DTIS was carried out in 2009 followed by the TPF in 2015. Though the DTIS and TPF are funded from different sources (EIF and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-PIFs respectively); the TPF was based on the DTIS. The EIF is engaging with the TPFs through the EIF funded Pacific Quality Infrastructure Initiative. This initiative is facilitated through PIFs and aimed at addressing standardisation, metrology, conformity assessment and quality promotion constraints identified in the TPFs to bolster trade capacity of small island states.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	2 (DR, KII)
One of the main objectives of the EIF in SI is trade mainstreaming, which has been enacted through mainstreaming trade into the National Development Strategy (NDS). The NIU reported that prior to the EIF and DTIS recommendations, the trade department moved from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration (MCILI) to the MFAET and back to the		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
MCILI before it eventually settled in MFAET. Its main mandate was market access and trade negotiations, including the WTO. The DTIS and Trade Policy Framework helped to mainstream trade. The NTDC is mandated as a National Council to oversee trade related issues and developments, and advocates for trade mainstreaming across different sectors and actors		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	2 (DR, KII)
As mentioned above the first ever trade policy framework in SI was published in 2015 with support from EI. The TPF is reportedly used to guide and prioritise activities being undertaken.		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	3 (RD, DR, KII)
There is written evidence to suggest this has occurred. Staff have been supported by the NIU to be actively involved in bilateral, regional and multilateral meetings including preparation for the WTO TFA ratification, participation at WTO MC11, DI Goods offer with EU and EPA trade meetings. The EIF contributed to official's participation in various fora including: attendance to the WTO MC10 in Nairobi Kenya; NIU engagement in the WTO Trade policy Review; NIU supported the organisation of SMEC-Israel workshop on Business Innovations November 2016.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	4	2 (DR)
NIU staff contributed to the negotiation and conclusion of PACER Plus aiming to achieve closer economic integrating in the Pacific between 9 island countries and Australia and NZ negotiations which were signed in 2017. Support also provided for SI to accede the interim EPA with the EU and PNG and Fiji.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	2 (DR)
As per the documentation, the SIG prioritises in-service training on various levels including short term certificate level trainings to master level for officials. Sectors of training prioritised align with country development needs in trade related areas. NIU jointly organised a national honey symposium to train 30 private sector representatives in business running and best market practices. Evidence of specific training outcomes for tier 1 projects is lacking in the documentation.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	3	2 (RD, DR)
There is evidence of information dissemination activities including 14 information dissemination activities/tools, of which, 4 marked as conforming to EIF branding guidelines (missing info if activities/tools included EIF support/used by NIU/project team). In terms of results from communications actions an estimated 25,000 people have been reached through radio, newspaper and facebook. Some articles target women recipients but not with an emphasis on gender.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	4	3 (RD, DR, KII)
The tier 2 interventions show the EIF has contributed to results in different value chains aligned to the interventions i.e. e-commerce; tourism (SITIDE) – where there is reportedly indicative evidence some value chain incomes (primarily local suppliers and community labour) have improved; and agriculture (taro, cassava under the ECAT project). The ECAT project is the main ongoing project in Solomon Islands. As an example the SITIDE quality enhancement (QE) programme sought to address pressing short-term obstacles to the realisation of the long-term plans for the targeted sectors of local small and		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>medium tourism operators (i.e. farmers, local handicraft suppliers etc) . QE spanned the full spectrum of the value chain in the three targeted sectors: from upstream farming activities, including cross-cutting regulatory oversight and quality certification, through to support for downstream intermediaries who process and/or trade for the domestic and export markets.</p> <p>The volume of production generated through EIF interventions is estimated at (tonnes) 120 MT (direct). The value (USD) of production generated through EIF interventions (direct) is \$75,000, and the Volume of export (direct) is \$11,142.</p>		
<p>EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)</p>	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The e-Trade Readiness Assessment one of the tier 2 interventions is directly linked to the adoption of new technologies.</p> <p>In addition, the SITIDE project includes a focus on online marketing and e-commerce to hit targeted visitor figures. There has been a significant improvement in how the Tourism office of SI is supporting SMEs in online marketing, including establishing a partnership with the Pacific Trade Investment to organize internet marketing trainings in identified tourism spots of Western Province (Gizo and Munda) and Honiara (Guadalcanal, Central Islands, and Malaita).</p> <p>The ECAT project has funded tiller machines for farmers to move from subsistence to commercial farming and has engaged a consultant to work on E-Marketing through social media. Moreover, the project is currently working on purchasing tractors and equipment for processing of cassava into export goods, such as flour and grated cassava.</p>		
<p>EIF contribution to trade facilitation</p>	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Under the ECAT project the EIF supported the construction of the National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) office, the accreditation for NPHL chemical testing in agriculture and export commodities is currently on schedule. The NIU is already purchasing basic lab equipment and consumables to increase the capacity of the NPHL to carry out testing for food grade products. The QI for commercial trade analytical is on schedule with draft policy/ legislation in place. The QI for health safety food trade and national body for food standards is behind schedule (as of end 2020). Processing facilities, distribution and marketing systems are well established. The project has also assisted biosecurity officials to carry out market access and biosecurity trainings to rural farmers in four provinces across the country.</p> <p>Under the SITIDE project, the Department of Tourism identified a need to develop the Solomon Islands Tourism Quality Standards program, which would ensure the tourist attractions, activities, and accommodations are quality to meet the visitors expectations. 2015, the SITIDE project reviewed its activities and included the development of the Tourism Accommodation Minimum Standards. It participated in the process of developing the Tourism accommodation Minimum Standards and financed the printing of the Minimum Standards handbook copies, brochures, and posters.</p>		
<p>EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains</p>	4	3 (RD, KII, DR)
<p>There is evidence and respondent feedback that EIF has contributed to trainings and skills in different Value Chains.</p> <p>Under the ECAT the total number of people trained in value chain practices is 336 (of which 231 women and 20 youth). This including training in hospitality, and entrepreneurial mindset training in the context of the cassava project. The entrepreneurial training aimed to educate rural dwellers on savings, budgeting and general financial literacy courses, as well as make them understand income-generating options available to them concerning taro processing and selling domestically.</p> <p>The trainings reportedly gave women, youth and men the opportunity to learn about chip and flour making techniques and marketing opportunities. Respondent feedback on the trainings is positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “training is open to farmers and some of them have never been exposed to workshops that talk about international standards or meeting requirements to export containers. It makes them feel they are contributing something to the country.” - “most of the farmers who experience the EIF support were using hoe and bush knife, but some are now using big equipment like backhoes, tractors, tillers. These are agricultural equipment that are used for commercial purposes” 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “on downstream processing, we worked with a consultant firm that actually looks at downstream processing of taro for mothers. Training on how to do taro chips and how to use our traditional method, and how can extract powder from taro. These trainings help mothers venture into their own small income generating projects with taro.” - However, one respondent highlighted that “farmers are given technical trainings on how to grow and raise their produce but it is the export part that is lacking.” <p>The ECAT project also assisted biosecurity officials and NPHL staff to carry out trainings in terms of meeting standards for exports. This has been carried out in 5 provinces.</p> <p>The SITIDE project promotes women participation. At the Solomon Islands National University’s Institute of Tourism and Hospitality supported by EIF, 70 per cent enrolment has been female since 2015 till 2018, and many female trained hospitality and tourism are moving into the formal employment sector. The funding supported a Trainer of Trainers Program delivered by industry experts to facilitate collaborations with the industry.</p> <p>Students are provided with allowances to cater for bus fares and other expenses when they were doing their practical work. This funding assists students who would otherwise not have funds to continue their practical work.</p> <p>The e-trade readiness assessment advocates filling the legislative gaps swiftly as well as improving capability for enforcement as well increased consumer awareness on the tenets of the developed regulations and their related obligations and rights. Areas of implementation being discussed following completion of the assessment include private sector trainings aimed at sensitizing and mentoring promising companies on e-commerce fundamentals (developing online presence, content, marketing, and fulfilment etc.)</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	1	1 (DR)
Neither the SITIDE nor the e-trade readiness projects included contribution to participation in trade fairs. This is also the case for ECAT given the impact of COVID-19 on travel.		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	4	1 (KII)
<p>It has been reported that the EIF Secretariat Coordinator and the UNOPS Focal Point are very helpful. In light of COVID-19 meetings or held on zoom. Although the support is there it was felt by the NIU respondent that zoom meetings have drawbacks as they fail to convey the practical reality or situational awareness on the ground.</p> <p>The Trust Fund Manager (TFM) is reported to have provided financial guidance throughout the tourism project implementation, including in reviewing activities and approving 2 project extensions. This was done in close cooperation with ES, TFM, NIU and key implementing stakeholders like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture and Tourism.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The National Implementation Unit (NIU) is functioning quite well in comparison to other countries. NIU staff is currently comprised of the NIU Coordinator, Finance Officer, Logistics Officer, EIF Focal Point, and the Coordinator for the Enhancing Capacities for Agriculture Trade (ECAT) project. The EIF Focal Point and NIU Coordinator are embedded in the Government payroll.</p> <p>Core challenges in the delivery and implementation of EIF projects in Solomon Islands include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inter-ministerial coordination issues - Challenges rooted in projects being channelled centrally to the Ministry of Finance and funds allocated subsequently to individual projects. Bureaucratic processes and coordination issues are causing implementation delays. - ‘Outstanding submission of financial reports. 		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hierarchical issues between the EIF and national agencies, consequently eliciting coordination issues. - Donor facilitator role has not been functional in the Solomon Islands since the EU (who has traditionally been the DF for SI) moved their office to Fiji in 2018. This has caused some difficulties, for instance as a result of the DF role being vacant, the SI-ECAT project has not been able to look at mobilisation of additional resources for the project through donor support. On the EIF side, there are plans to reinvigorate this role, particularly in light of concerns on sustainability of interventions in the country. Since September 2021, the EU have recommitted to being the DF. Meetings have been held between the EIF ES and DF, and meetings are planned to be held with the Focal Point and NIU team. To date, the DF has already been involved in helping to circulate project-related Expressions of Interest. 		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	2 (KII, DR)
<p>As mentioned above, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a serious impact on SI, including on its operations. This is primarily linked to reduced government revenue impacting fund disbursement which has had a knock-on effect on implementation of the ongoing ECAT project.</p> <p>However, there is written evidence that the ECAT project made good progress in 2020 despite the pandemic. A number of activities under output 2: improved capacity to meet TBT and SPS standards were however delayed, which led to the fast track of some activities. At the end of the year 30% of activities reported no action, 50% completed and 20% ongoing. A revised workplan has been agreed and a contract extension has been signed.</p>		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>There is written evidence of challenges to efficiency including constrained staffing capacity, notably as a result of the departure of the Chief Trade officer assisting with M&E and report preparation.</p> <p>Budget delays and limited use of funds have further impacted efficiency. This was particularly the case in the first half of 2018 due to MOFT bureaucratic restrictions. As a result, the NIA project under achieved some of its core activities in 2018 affecting overall implementation in that year.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The SITIDE project specifically experienced efficiency challenges. This related to challenges with absorption capacity and implementation of the new UN-wide resource planning and accounting system UMOJA caused substantial delays on project implementation at ITC's end. Thus, the decision was taken together with the NIU as well as the donor EIF and UNOPS to extend the project to facilitate the last pending activities. At project close, 99% of funds had been used.</p> <p>Under the ECAT project, it was highlighted that bureaucratic red tape affects efficiency. Since policies are from the former government, all policies have to be reviewed which can "push the project 2-3 years behind schedule." The MOU was signed in 2018 during the last couple of months of the former government administration when they are on a "caretaker mode". The new government was formed in the 2nd quarter of 2019. This gap in the establishment of a ruling government led to parallel project implementation delays.</p> <p>E-readiness: This project was conducted in accordance with the proposed budget.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	2	2 (DR, KII)
<p>Although processes are in place for project identification (managed by the NTDC) and oversight (project oversight committees are set up for all interventions to deal with operational issues) approval</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
processes are slow as they are dependent on high level endorsement. The NTDC meetings depend on the availability of the Minister who chairs the committee which often results in delays to activities. The use of government financial system has been highlighted as resulting in inefficiencies which have been exacerbated by the pandemic given the SIG revenue has declined. There is also reported high turnover of finance staff which affects reporting.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	2	3 (KII, DR)
See above sections. As mentioned, COVID-19 has affected budget disbursements, reporting and the overall pace of delivery under the ongoing ECAT project, although adaptive management and no cost extensions has facilitated implementation.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	3	3 (RD, KII, DR)
<p>EIF contributed to sustainable development although gains may subsequently be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic given its impact on SI.</p> <p>A reported 1146 jobs have been created through the ECAT project. The tourism project promoted inclusive development and innovation among the local rural tourism small operators. There is indicative evidence some value chain incomes (primarily local suppliers and community labour) have improved. Some community beneficiaries have revealed through their personal stories that there has been improvement in their families' livelihoods as a result of tourism developments in their communities.</p> <p>Respondent stories are reproduced below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "ECAT project Varivao's cassava export is now financially sustainable in the long term. Prior to EIF financial support, earnings obtained from kava exports helped propped their cassava operation, however, currently they have made profit margin with the cassava operation with the financial assistance from EIF." <p>"I think for value for money I would give it a score of 80 percent. The project is designed to deliver its designed activities. Cassava and Taro farmers are more confident and have hope for their market. The government is working on finding markets for them. The cassava and taro they are farming will not be wasted. When you look back, for the last 40 years there is no market for taro and cassava, but now these farmers are excited about their prospects."</p>		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	3	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF support has helped SI to strengthen its participation in regional and global trading systems under the Tier 1 intervention. However, and with the exception of the most recent national project (ECAT), the Tier 2 interventions have been relatively more focused on domestic markets.</p> <p>The ECAT project assists farmers to increase their production and export. It supports cassava farmers/out growers to link with export buyers. Due to COVID-19 induced travel restrictions, however, cassava exporters to Australia were forced to scale down operations.</p>		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	4	2 (KII, DR)
<p>There is written evidence that the EIF is well integrated into government structures. For instance, the NTDC was established through the EIF, and its relevance is reflected in the NDS 2016 -2035. The NTDC is embedded both in the government system and the MFAET budget.</p> <p>NIU staff are integrated into the Department of External Trade. The Government covers the cost of the NIU Coordinator and EIF Focal Point.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Under tier 2 the tourism project uses the Solomon Islands Government procurement system, and the Tourism Department has since taken over the development of the Tourism website created by the EIF for information sharing.		
The TWG committee was established by the NIU to act as a steering committee overseeing the implementation of the ECAT project. However, KIIs revealed that for the SI-ECAT Project, major activities of the project may not receive funding beyond project close given the National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) does not have their own budget under the MoH.		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
As above, the structures and processes set up with support from EIF are owned by government, notably related to the institutional set up (NIU) and its coordination structures.		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	3	2 (DR, KII)
EIF have been used following project completion. For instance, the National Tourism Policy 2015-2019 was used as a tool promoting sustainable tourism development. The National Tourism Legislation set up by the EIF has formed the legal base for how tourism development is now conducted in SI. Other evidence embedded in respondent stories (see other sections).		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	3	2 (DR, KII)
Please see above. The national coordination structures are established, but challenges remain.		
We note that the 11 projects mentioned and assessed for the evaluation do not include major projects such as PHAMA Plus (regional funded by Australia and New Zealand), Private sector development initiative by ADB (funded through Australia and New Zealand) and Strongim Bisnis (bilateral project funded by Australia). However, these are other key donor programmes in the trade arena addressing EIF priorities.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	4	2 (RD, KII, DR)
Overall there are 11 projects funded by development partners (ADB, Australian Aid, STDF/ FAO) related to the AM of the DTIS.		
Under tier 2, the SITIDE received a contribution from Taiwan of SBD3 million. It also received New Zealand Government funding for tourism hub infrastructure; Australian supports for tourism digital marketing; Solomon Islands Government and the KOICA continue the financial assistance to the Institute of Tourism and Hospitality at the Solomon Islands National University, and the International Financial Corporation (IFC), coordinates donor funds to develop the tourist products in the Western Province.		
The ECAT project has been receiving additional support from China, Australia, New Zealand, and USAID. Tractors have been donated by China and will be managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. This is targeting senior high schools in and around Honiara to also supplement school rations during COVID-19 and to address financial constraints. Some of these high schools also do have a lot of land to farm, and efforts are ongoing re: establishing linkages to Varivao Holding Ltd. for export. The Prime Minister & Cabinet office supported the ECAT project with funding to Sape commercial Cassava farm in Guadalcanal (50 hectares).		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	3	3 (DR, KII)
Overall, the pandemic has brought both advantages and disadvantages. It has increased SIG support for the SI-ECAT Project, given the government is now putting more emphasis on agriculture and support through stimulus packages for agriculture such as cocoa, kava, cassava. This is to ensure local food production for the country in the case of a lockdown.		
In terms of disadvantages, the pandemic has impacted international exports and imports, flights are not regular, and ships have to be quarantined 21 days outside of the country. It also impacts the		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
domestic markets. The government is also prioritizing payments towards COVID related activities (including repatriation and quarantine) over capacity building efforts. One company reported that so far in terms of cassava exports, the company had exported 2 containers each year from 2016 to 2018. There was no export in 2019 because of COVID. One container was exported in 2020. All of the above may have a knock-on impact on the results and sustainability of the ECAT project.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and associated projects are well-aligned with the needs and priorities in-country. Following the EIF support, the NDS now explicitly states trade within its priorities, and oversight of trade interventions have been centralised within government. However, while the DTIS reflected needs at the time, it was published in 2009 and the DTISU update was subsequently cancelled. The EIF in SI has remained relevant to emerging EIF global priorities. The pandemic has severely impacted SI, and the EIF has had to adapt to the new context, with some of its value chain projects receiving increased interest given a renewed focus on domestic food production as a result of border closures.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF has helped to centralised trade functions within the MFAET and improved the capacity of staff and others to formulate policies and engage in regional and multilateral negotiations. The EIF has helped mainstream trade in policy documents where this was previously not mentioned which has been highlighted as a major success.
- **Efficiency:** Despite the results achieved, there are serious challenges in terms of the delivery and implementation of projects, given bureaucratic processes and slow disbursements, as well as coordination issues. These have been accentuated due to the pandemic given decreased government revenue.
- **Impact:** There are several examples of the EIF contributing to sustainable development, notably in the taro and cassava markets which have been “put on the map” through EIF support.
- **Sustainability:** The tier 2 interventions show the EIF has contributed to results in different value chains aligned to the interventions, including increased production and exports. Since the pandemic, the interventions have had an increased focus on developing domestic markets given challenges linked to exports. Positive outcomes of training have been highlighted by a number of respondents in the agriculture and tourism sectors, with evidence of improvements in livelihoods. The projects have been effective at leveraging additional finance through other donors, as well as government contributions which will contribute to sustainability.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	Based on the evidence, there are no VfM metrics and therefore no systematic reporting against VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	4	Procurement processes follow international good practice. Bureaucratic processes cause project delays (see below) however this hasn't impacted budgets overall.

	Score	Narrative
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	3	The coordination structures are established in Solomon Islands. An SI Aid management and development cooperation policy and partnership framework for effective development cooperation is in place, which is used as a guide for all DP initiatives in SI. This framework helps avoid duplication across interventions.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	<p>There is evidence of sustainability notably of tier 2 activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Beneficiaries of the cassava and taro markets for instance, report that the government supported them in finding markets, and that cassava exports are now financially sustainable in the long term. The government has provided stimulus packages for agriculture as a result of COVID-19 and an increased emphasis on domestic food production. - For the tourism project, the Tourism Department has since taken over the development of the Tourism website created by the EIF for information sharing. <p>The projects have been effective at leveraging additional finance through other donors, as well as government contributions which will contribute to sustainability. There is also evidence to suggest that policies put in place by EIF have been used following project completion.</p>
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	3	<p>Processes are in place for project identification and oversight of operational issues. However, cumbersome governance structures, and bureaucratic red tape affect efficiency and result in delays to project activities.</p> <p>For instance, approval processes are reportedly slow given their dependency on high level political ministerial endorsement/ sign off. The use of government financial systems has also resulted in inefficiencies. This has been exacerbated by the pandemic given the SIG revenue has declined. The NIU are understaffed, including a high turnover of finance staff, so have limited capacity for effective management.</p>
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	<p>The EIF SC, UNOPS Focal Point, and TFM have provided financial guidance during tier 2 project interventions to support delivery and mitigate inefficient government processes.</p> <p>Overall, the EIF in Solomon Islands has been able to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., COVID-19), amending work plans and approving contract extensions as relevant.</p>
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	<p>The Tier 2 projects target women and youth as the main beneficiaries, notably the tourism project which focuses on inclusive development. SI is also one of the target countries for the Gender Sensitive, Climate Resilient International Market Access through Fairtrade regional projects.</p> <p>The National Trade Development Council (NTDC) includes a representative of Solomon Islands Women in Business (SIWIBA) on its board.</p> <p>In terms of reporting equity/ gender is largely limited to gender-disaggregated indicators of beneficiaries, and it is unclear if GESI is mainstreamed across programme design.</p>

Sudan

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	24-Apr-2013
Total budget	<p>Total budget= \$813,778</p> <p>Of which</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total EIF budget= \$813,778 - Total Government budget= \$0 - Total Development Partner budget= \$0
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 & 2
Context	LDC, high institutional and social fragility
Key stakeholders	<p>Government of Sudan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Industry and Trade - Ministry of Finance & National Planning <p>World Bank International Trade Department (PRMTR)</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are two Tier 1 EIF projects in Sudan, which align well to the EIF ToC Outcome 1, under output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are no Tier 2 EIF projects in Sudan.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <p>DTISU (Phase 1, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: World Bank - Start date: 24-April-2013 - End date: 30-Oct-2014 <p><u>Ongoing projects</u></p> <p>NIA Support (repackaged) (Phase 2, Tier 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Sudan, Ministry of Industry & Trade - Start date: 06-Jul-2021 <p>End date: 05-Jan-2023</p>
Regional projects	None

2. Context

- Sudan is situated at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and stretches across the Red Sea. Sudan has seven bordering countries: Libya, Egypt, Chad, CAR, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The population of Sudan is 42.8 million and the GDP per capita is \$753 (2019). However, it should be noted that the GDP per capita was \$1,656 in 2015.
- The secession of South Sudan induced multiple economic shocks. The biggest one being the loss of the oil revenue that accounted for more than half of Sudan's government revenue and 95% of its exports. This has reduced economic growth, and resulted in double-digit consumer

price inflation, which, together with increased fuel prices, triggered violent protests in September 2013.

- From 2008-2019, Sudan's total merchandise and services exports totalled \$84,573 million, while total merchandise and services imports totalled \$132,754 million. This shows that in terms of merchandise and services, Sudan has a trade deficit.
- From 2008- 2019, the average FDI inflow was \$1,520 million a year.
- The total Aid for Trade disbursements from 2008-2019 was \$2,1722 million. Of this, 49% was spent on economic infrastructure, 47% was spent on building productive capacity and 4% was spent on trade policy and regulations.
- Sudan's World Bank (2020) ease of doing business score ranked 171 from 190 countries.
- Sudan's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) was 2 in 2010, and 2.1 in 2018, hence there has been little progress over time. Sudan's highest scoring LPI indicator is timeliness, while its lowest scoring LPI indicators are customs and infrastructure.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June-2021 to Sept-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, economic analysis, e-survey, EIF project documents, KII interviews
Methods used (data and document review)	<p><u>E-survey response</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NIU/ FP <p><u>Key Informant Interviews</u></p> <p>There are a total of 9 interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EIF ES Country Coordinator (1) - EIF Focal Point (1) - EIF project coordinator (2) - Ministry of Industry and Trade (2) - Economic expert (1) - private sector (1) - Sudanese Standard and Metrology Corporation (SSMC) (1) <p>By gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Male (3) - Female (5) - Unknown- Undersecretary of the Ministry (1) <p><u>Documents reviewed across Sudan's 2 EIF projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOUs (and MOU Amendments) - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Budgets (and Budget Revisions) - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Capacity needs assessment <p><u>Sudan's Portfolio Review:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates

	Main Implementing Entities
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The DF (EU) did not complete the e-survey - The KII revealed that there was little to talk about, since the EIF activities were only just beginning

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The EIF is well aligned with the priorities of the transitional government such as integration with the international community after suffering under economic sanctions and poor relations with the international community. Based on the KII, the transitional government has a strong commitment to engage in regional and global multilateral trading systems, including the WTO.</p> <p>Priorities identified in the DTIS/AM have been partially integrated in Transitional Government Economic Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy to improve balance of trade through increased value-added exports of agriculture & livestock. DTIS/AM priorities such as regional integration inspired the formulation of policy such a trading policy with Ethiopia. The government is developing the National Quality Policy through 2018-2019 which is related to WTO requirement. The EIF is also aligned with the transitional government priorities that focus mainly on how to improve the economic performance and mitigate poverty and suffering from economic hardship that resulted from the polices of the previous regime.</p> <p>The DTIS is also aligned with national interests such as agriculture-led growth, trade coordination, the Economic Salvation Program, and the hall project.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The roadmap for implementation of the EIF program was developed in consultation with various stakeholders including representatives of the private sector and the civil society. As part of the national implementation arrangements, representatives of the private sector and the civil society are members of the national steering committee which holds meetings every 3 months to provide support and oversight to the program.</p> <p>However, it was highlighted that small and medium sized enterprises are not considered in consultation and capacity building programs. There is no dissemination of information at lower levels.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The EIF programme in Sudan covers many of the areas that have emerged as priorities for the EIF as per the below:</p> <p>Regional integration: The DTISU integrated the regional dimension into priority recommendations, specifically addressing cross-border trade costs and the policy, regulatory and administrative factors contributing to high trade costs and identifies specific reforms that will reduce trade costs. The DTISU also reviewed the status of regional initiatives such as the Tripartite trade negotiations aim to realize a regional FTA by harmonizing policies across COMESA, SADC and the EAC.</p> <p>In response to the DTIS matrix, the EIF coordinator in Sudan suggested the formulation of trading policy between Sudan and Ethiopia through which measures were taken to facilitate cross border trade between the two countries and reduce smuggling.</p> <p>Value chains: The EIF programme has put focus on the diversification of trade from oil to agricultural products like sheep and sesame with the objective of identifying constraints to competitive regional value chains. The DTISU also assesses the potential for food processing.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Gender: To enhance gender participation, the National Steering Committee identified women as part of relevant stakeholders. Climate and environment issues have not been mentioned in the DTISU and other project documents		
Adaptation to changing global context, including COVID-19	1	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>Adaptation has been slow largely due to the political atmosphere in Sudan. The previous government took some steps to implement the EIF project but the international community was mostly unresponsive due to the economic sanctions that had been placed against Sudan at the time. The government also made decisions that made implementation difficult, such as ending the services of all experts who were working with the EIF project secretary in 2012 and the continuous change of government ministries. The scission of South Sudan in 2011 also negatively impacted EIF progress. The project document was submitted in December 2018 at the beginning of the Sudanese revolution which led to the removal of the dictatorship regime in April 2019. The political instability at the time meant that none of the proposed activities could begin.</p> <p>The current transitional government which took power following the revolution gives a high priority to integration with the international community and there is now more support for the EIF and engagement with the WTO. Even then, due to the COVID 19 pandemic no action was taken in 2020. Actual implementation only began in August 2021. Given the increasing popularity of e-commerce, there are plans to integrate e-commerce in EIF supported trade, but efforts have been hampered by the effects of sanctions which have left Sudan with little access to open internet sources. The current infrastructure including internet services, electricity and banking services are not reliable enough to engage in e-commerce.</p>		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>In line with the DTIS recommendations, the government is developing the National Quality Policy for goods and services produced and consumed in the country. The quality policy has been developed in collaboration with the ministry of industry and is now at the stage of approval by the ministries council. The DTIS contributed to the development of a strategy to strengthen Sudan's trade capacity and mainstream trade in the national development strategy as outlined in the long term National Strategic Plan (2007-2013) and the Five-Year Development Plan (2012-2016). As a response to DTISU matrix, the EIF secretary in Sudan suggested formulation of trading policy between Sudan and Ethiopia, through which some measures were taken to facilitate and organize border trading between the two countries and to reduce smuggling.</p> <p>According to KII, the DTIS recommendations have not been integrated into the Poverty Reduction Strategy 2021-2023 though some sections of the interim strategy of poverty reduction 2014-2015 had included the World Trade system. The Ministry of Trade and Supply will work with the Ministry of Finance to ensure the inclusion of trade mainstreaming in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 2021-2023.</p>		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The results of the DTIS had been circulated with the ministry of finance and other government relevant institutions which contribute in provision of some capacity building and training activities based on the action matrix. Some government institutions (e.g customs general administration) set up policies and regulations as a response to DTIS matrix. Also Standards and Metrology has developed their performance and set up new policies and procedures.</p>		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>According to KII respondents, many training activities at national, regional and international level are aligned with DTIS matrix.</p>		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	3	3 (DR, KII, S)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>The experts involved in updating the DTIS consulted the Ministry of Trade and Supply, Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, customs general administration, marine ports, shipping, small-holder producers, marginalized groups, Sudanese Standard and Metrology Corporation, Chamber of commerce and private sector.</p> <p>However, small and medium enterprises and marginalized groups were not considered in consultation. The member of the NSC representing the private sector is newly appointed and therefore did not know who was consulted (KII) As noted above, the private sector was involved in the DTIS update.</p>		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>The project log-frame is aligned with the outputs of the EIF TOC with identical indicators for outcome 1 for tier 1 activities such as quality trade policies updated with support from the EIF, number of actions in support of improved legislation and participation in fora (regional and multilateral) and number of Diagnostic studies developed/updated with support from the EIF.</p>		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>As a country that is still in transition from a period of instability, the EIF delivery modalities are appropriate for Sudan. The DTIS has helped Sudan identify some priority interventions that will help the country mainstream trade and grow exports.</p>		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>There is coordination with the WTO which is undertaking projects such as the Sudan Reengagement and Reform Development Policy Financing which is in line with the AM action to continue with and expedite the ongoing WTO Accession Process.</p>		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
<p>DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:</p> <p>a) increasing knowledge</p> <p>b) increased mainstreaming of trade</p> <p>c) prioritised interventions</p> <p>d) programming plan</p> <p>e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM</p>	<p>a) 3</p> <p>b) 3</p> <p>c) 4</p> <p>d) 4</p> <p>e) 5</p>	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>a) Many training activities at national, regional and the international level are aligned with the DTIS matrix. However, it was noted that there is no dissemination of knowledge at lower levels leaving out groups such as small and medium enterprises.</p> <p>b) There is no clear mainstreaming of trade. The draft document Poverty Reduction Strategy that prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, has not included trade mainstreaming in different areas of interventions but MTS shall work with the ministry of finance to ensure inclusion of trade mainstreaming in poverty reduction strategy of 2021-2023.</p> <p>c) As a response to the DTIS matrix, the EIF coordinator in Sudan suggested the formulation of trading policy between Sudan and Ethiopia through which procedures and policies facilitating and organizing border trade were developed. The development of the National Quality Policy has also been influenced by the DTIS.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
d) There is an action plan based on the DTIS and AM but implementation was hampered by the change of government and COVID 19. It now needs to be revised and updated.		
e) The NIA Support project is well aligned to the DTIS.		
Extent of implementation of the AM	1	3 (DR, KII, S)
From the KII, very little has been implemented yet as the TIER project has just commenced. Training activities and the formulation of trading policy between Sudan and Ethiopia have been conducted based on the matrix.		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
The 2008 DTIS had an action matrix which was updated with the DTIS in 2014 following the split of South Sudan from Sudan. Based on the interviews conducted, the current DTISU and action matrix have since become outdated too and need to be updated again to take into account the current political and economic landscape.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	1	3 (DR, KII, S)
There is no mainstreaming of trade in sector plans and work at the moment, but this because the implementation has just commenced. A more accurate assessment of the EIF's contribution to trade mainstreaming will be possible later on as implementation continues.		
EIF contribution to policy reform	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
The trading policy between Sudan and Ethiopia through which procedures and policies facilitating and organizing border trade were developed. The development of the National Quality Policy has also been influenced by the DTIS.		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
The project is helping the government to get involved with the WTO. One of the main activities of the project is to conduct workshops to address weakness, issues and challenges that face Sudan in its potential engagement with WTO. KII indicated that the new government might be more committed and serious about engagement of Sudan to WTO. The Ministry of Trade and Supply is working very hard to meet the requirements of EIF, provide the conducive environment to improve trading system and increase exports and access to regional and international markets.		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	2	3 (DR, KII, S)
Some KIIs indicated that Sudan is still lagging behind in maximizing benefits from regional economic entities whether in Africa or Arabic states like COMESA mainly due to governance challenges especially under the previous regime and restrictive regulation that reduces regional competitiveness.		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
Many training activities were done by international consultants. Due to COVID 19, many trainings were delivered online. Trainings are designed based on capacity need assessment. Capacity building activities are aligned with production improvement and open new markets. Training outlines have been designed and delivered for (300) participants from public employees and (300) from private sector. Women representation is always not less than (50%). The outcome of training based on the DTIS AM has been setting up of policy and regulation by government institutions such as the National Quality Policy, National Strategic Plan (2007-2013) and the recent Five-Year Development Plan.		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	2	3 (DR, KII, S)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Since the project has just started, there has been very little dissemination of knowledge. Information has not been disseminated to SMEs and marginalized groups. There is no evidence that a Ministry website exists.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	N/A	N/A
N/A		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	5	3 (DR, KII, S)
During the previous regime, the amount of support the EIF secretariat could give was limited due to lack of cooperation from the government. Communication was a challenge as the government did not reply to emails or letters. The EIF executive secretariat however continued to offer support such as giving recommendations from time to time based on political and economic changes that were used to update the Tier 1 project. In 2018 the EIF secretariat sent the coordinator of Sudan who visited Sudan to evaluate the needed arrangements for the purpose of reviewing the efforts to complete the institutional building.		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
EIF FP and NIU: The current FP has done a lot shouldering the responsibility of project implementation, including updating the project document and beginning implementation. The challenge has been that since the FP is a government staff, they are paid poorly which resulted in many FPs applying for positions as coordinators instead. Very little information concerning the NIU was obtained from the interviews, but it was stated that the NIU needs support and help by a technical body. This is being addressed; in September 2021, the EIF Executive Secretariat started the recruitment of an expert to provide MEL training to the NIU team.		
NSC: This council discusses the EIF implementation process, chaired by the undersecretary of the MTS with members representing relevant ministries in addition to Civil Society and private sector. It is through the NSC that the MTS works in coordination with relevant stakeholders to achieve the objectives of the EIF.		
The NSC has regular meeting every 3 months, through which different stakeholder meet regularly to support trade system, provide oversight through reviewing reports and plans as well as discussing the most likely interventions and opportunities with international donors. However, it has been mentioned that commitment to attending the meetings has been a challenge, and that the meetings should be held more frequently.		
It has been suggested during KII that the DF should be given a larger role.		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
See below- Efficiency- Extent COVID-19 disrupted activities in the country.		

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
Tier 1 activities are well within the budget. However, the fact that Sudan is still at a transitional stage as well as the COVID 19 has led to delays in implementation. Moving meetings to online platforms has helped resume training activities while saving money that would have been spent on travel costs. Additionally, tier 1 efficiency has been affected by instability, sanctions, recruitment of irrelevant/ disqualified staff, and high staff turnover.		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	N/A	N/A
N/A		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
EIF NIU and FP: The NIU and FP undertake their duties as efficiently as possible, but factors (discussed in section 1.3) reduce their potential effectiveness and efficiency. NSC: As discussed in 1.3, the NSC has meetings every 3 months but not all members are committed to attending. It has been suggested that the meetings may not be frequent enough.		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
Despite the pandemic, progress has been made. The NIU has provided a written statement of progress, including the establishment of a selection committee for the recruitment of NIU staff; the opening of a dedicated project account in a commercial bank as recommended by the EIF/TFM; the signing of the MoU by Ministry of Finance and National Economy; recommendations of the project approval letter are being implemented after NIU establishment; a Ministerial decree for the formation of a new NSC was issued in January 2021; in 2020 there was continued engagement with the DF, developing the TOR to engage the consultant to revamp the project document.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	2	3 (DR, KII, S)
The contribution of Tier 1 activities to sustainable development is not clear but growth opportunities that will promote sustainable development such as agriculture and tourism were included in the action matrix.		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	2	3 (DR, KII, S)
The EIF support (Tier 1) is helping Sudan improve its participation in global and regional trading markets. Sudan is now part of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Sudan has still not maximized the benefits from regional economic entities.		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	5	3 (DR, KII, S)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Priorities identified in the DTIS/AM have been partially integrated in Transitional Government Economic Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy to improve balance of trade through increased value-added exports of agriculture & livestock. DTIS/AM priorities such as regional integration inspired the formulation of policy such a trading policy with Ethiopia. The government is developing the National Quality Policy through 2018-2019 which is related to WTO requirement.		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
Ownership of the EIF initiatives is strong mainly because of the robust consultation process with various stakeholders. The sustainability support of the EIF project has been funded by the EIF. Moreover, the NIU has provided a written statement that the EU as the DF signed a project of support to the Ministry of Trade in the summer of 2021 worth approx. €5 million that was directly informed by and compliments the EIF Tier 1 project. Other development partners such as ITC and WTO are planning to support the EIF work too.		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
It is difficult to gauge whether the initiatives would continue after the end of support, but the structures created, and capacity building activities will make the initiatives sustainable in the future.		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	2	3 (DR, KII, S)
From the KII, coordination between the government and different EIF stakeholders is weak. There is no regular reporting system a lack of visibility on the progress of the project. Most members of the private sector (mainly traders and producers) do not understand exportation technical requirements. Lack of close monitoring leads to failure in exporting some products particularly livestock sector. It is observed that any ministry is working in isolation, and no coordination is in place. There is a written statement from the NIU that the revamped Tier 1 project, which has just stated, is encouraging renewed coordination efforts and closer engagement among stakeholders.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	3	3 (DR, KII, S)
See above 'ownership of EIF initiatives'. There has also been leveraging of expertise to update project document and DTIS.		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	1	3 (DR, KII, S)
COVID 19 slowed the pace of delivery of tier 1 activities since no action was taken in 2020.		

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** The EIF is well-aligned to Sudan's national needs and priorities. Indeed, the DTIS/AM has been partially integrated into the Transitional Government Economic Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy to improve balance of trade through increased value-added exports of agriculture & livestock. In particular, the DTIS contributed to the development of a strategy to strengthen Sudan's trade capacity and mainstream trade in the national development strategy as outlined in the long term National Strategic Plan (2007-2013) and the Five-Year Development Plan (2012-2016). However, it must be noted that Sudan has struggled to adapt to changing contexts, most notably the scission of South Sudan in 2011, along with the 2018 revolution which led to the removal of a dictatorship in 2019, which has greatly affected the implementation of the EIF.
- **Coherence:** Overall, there is good coherence. Firstly, the EIF projects in Sudan are well aligned with the EIF Theory of Change. Secondly, there is good coordination with the WTO, which is undertaking projects such as the Sudan Reengagement and Reform Development

Policy Financing; these projects are well aligned to the DTIS/AM and continue to expedite the ongoing WTO Accession Process.

- **Effectiveness:** This EIF has been effective in updating the DTIS (2008) to the DTISU (2014). However, stakeholders have acknowledged that the DTISU (2014) is out of date and does not reflect the current political and economic landscape. While the DTISU has been effective in increasing knowledge and influencing the development of the National Quality Policy, it has not fully mainstreamed trade into policies. While the operational systems have been effective in bringing together various stakeholders and establishing quarterly meetings, it should be noted that attendance to these meetings is ad hoc and commitment levels are low.
- **Efficiency:** While Tier 1 activities are well within the budget, there have been major implementation delays caused by Sudan’s transitional stage and the COVID-19 has led to delays in implementation. In 2020, no EIF implementation was achieved. Hence, efficiency has been low. Despite this, good progress across EIF initiatives has been made.
- **Impact:** The contribution of Tier 1 activities to sustainable development is not clear, due to poor implementation of EIF activities. However, it can be recognised that growth opportunities outlined in the DTIS AM plan to promote sustainable development measures, such as agriculture and tourism. While Sudan has made progress in regional trading systems, such as the AfCFTA, the EIF’s contribution to this is unclear.
- **Sustainability:** With regards to EIF ownership, although the government has played an active role in EIF consultative processes, it has not contributed any funding to EIF activities. Moreover, while coordination among the EIF stakeholders, including government, the private sector, civil society and the donors, has been weak, the revamped Tier 1 project has encouraged renewed coordination efforts and closer engagement. Exacerbating these underlying issues, COVID-19 has greatly affected the implementation of EIF activities. Overall, EIF sustainability in Sudan is low.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	There are no VfM systems in place.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	4	A capacity needs assessment was carried out, where the roles of the Ministry of Trade and Supply, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Animal Resources were clearly defined. However, no information on cost containment was provided. In addition, detailed TORs for the recruitment of the following roles demonstrates transparency and a fair approach to recruitment: of a part time communications consultant; M&E officer; finance officer; administrative assistant; part time trade & regional integration officer; NIU project coordinator; etc.
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and	2	There is good coordination with other initiatives, such as with the WTO’s Sudan Reengagement and Reform Development Policy Financing projects. However, there is poor coordination between the government, donor facilitator, and other stakeholders. It has been observed that each ministry is

	Score	Narrative
maximizing of synergies (efficiency)		working in isolation, and no coordination is in place, which implies that synergises are not maximised. This may suggest a need for new Tier 1 projects.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	2	The main implementing entities (MIEs) in Sudan's EIF projects are the World Bank (DTISU) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (NIA Support). The Government's presence in the EIF projects may suggest that the skills and knowledge developed by the EIF could be carried out in future government projects. Some major concerns hindering the sustainability of EIF activities, however, is firstly the availability of funds, and secondly, whether the government chooses to mainstream trade into its policies.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	2	An overarching challenge has been that since the FP is government staff (a senior civil servant), there is a conflict of interest over the EIF salary and the government salary. It has been stated that the NIU needs support and help by a technical body. These challenges are exacerbated by political instability (namely the 2018 revolution and the transitional government), which undermines the governance arrangements to deliver on VfM.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	3	To mitigate risk, the NIA Support project proposal states, 'The customs clearance environment that existed at the time of the DTIS Update (2014) was based on a 100 percent real time documentary and physical intervention in all transactions. This has since been replaced with a risk-based strategy in which only transactions categorized as high risk are subject to 100 percent inspection.' To enhance delivery, there have been several project-level workplan and budget revisions, NCEs, and MOU amendments. The NIU has stated that a new Tier 1 project was revamped in 2020 and 2021, which took the risks of COVID-19 into account.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	The capacity needs assessment includes the 'Sudan Women Business Secretariat', with training on product development/ accessing finance/ marketing. In addition, the capacity needs assessment also includes the 'Chamber of Small Industries and Handcrafts Union', which involves public awareness campaigns on the contribution of SMEs to the economy.

Zambia

In-depth country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2010
Total budget	\$6,552,734
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, landlocked
Key stakeholders	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI): Foreign Trade Department; National Implementation Unit (NIU); Cooperatives Department; and National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC) Secretariat European Union Delegation (EUD) Zambia Agriculture Research Institute (ZARI) Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Zambia Manufactures Association (ZAM) Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) EIF Geneva
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen and sustain the capacity of trade-related institutions (especially MCTI) to develop and implement evidence-based trade policies to strengthen the country's participation in regional and global markets and coordinate aid for trade (AfT). - Targeted support to enhance Zambia's non-traditional exports including promoting women's economic empowerment, strengthening cooperative development and strengthening SPS capacity. <p>Alignment to ToC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Outcome 1: Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i> - <u>Output 1.</u> Improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Update (U) ○ National Implementation Arrangements (NIA) support ○ Cooperative Development and Sustainability Project (CDSP) and Sustainability Support Project (SSP) - <u>Output 2.</u> Strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support ○ CDSP & SSP - <u>Output 3.</u> Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NIA support ○ CDSP & SSP • <i>Outcome 2: Increased exports and access to international markets</i> - <u>Output 1.</u> Improved participation of EIF countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trade and Investment Project for Enhanced Competitiveness of the Zambia Apiculture Sector (TIPEC-ZAS)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SheTrades ○ Strengthening Phytosanitary Capacity (SPC) ○ CDSP & SSP - <u>Output 2.</u> Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ TIPEC-ZAS ○ SheTrades - <u>Output 3.</u> Support to EIF countries to leverage additional investments for productive capacity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DTISU ○ NIA support ○ CDSP & SSP ○ TIPEC-ZAS ○ SheTrades <p>SPC</p>
National projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTISU (Tier 1; phase 1) - NIA support (Tier 1; phase 1 and 2) - TIPEC-ZAS (Tier 2; phase 1) - SheTrades (Tier 2; phase 2) • Projects under implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDSP & SSP (Tier 1 and 2; phase 2) SPC (Tier 2; phase 2)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transferring technologies and know-how for the development of cotton by-products in eight pilot African LDCs • Projects under implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Context

- Zambia is a large, landlocked, resource-rich country that shares its border with eight countries (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe). Zambia is a member of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
- Copper accounts for 74% of total goods exports and Zambia was the world's largest exporter of raw copper in 2019.
- After nearly 15 years of significant progress in terms of sustained real GDP growth, Zambia's economic performance stalled in recent years. Recently, the economy fell into recession. Real GDP contracted significantly due to an unprecedented deterioration in all key sectors of the economy. Manufacturing output fell sharply as supply chains were disrupted, while the service and tourism sectors suffered as consumption and investment weakened due to COVID-19 restrictions.
- Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy was already experiencing serious macroeconomic challenges, such as high inflation, widening fiscal deficits, unsustainable debt levels, low international reserves and tight liquidity conditions.
- Between 2000 and 2014, the annual real GDP growth rate averaged 6.8%; this slowed to 3.1% per annum between 2015 and 2019, mainly due to domestic policy misalignments, economic

management slippages, falling global copper prices, and declines in agricultural output and hydro-electric power generation.

- The government’s expansionary fiscal policy for public investments has resulted in widening fiscal deficits and caused Zambia’s debt to hit 91.6% of GDP in 2019 and 104% in 2020.
- Price levels and the financial sector have not stabilised, despite efforts to deploy monetary easing in 2019 and 2020. Inflation has been rising, mainly driven by depreciation and higher food and transport prices. After the onset of the pandemic, inflation rose to 17.4% in 2020 and is projected to remain above the target range (6%–8%) in 2021.
- The external position also worsened in 2020, with dwindling reserves and is likely to remain depressed in 2021 due to copper price and output fluctuations, rising public debt payments and higher imports.
- Zambia made some progress in reducing time and cost of trading and overall ease of doing business. Zambia’s logistics performance index improved from 2.46 (2014) to 2.53 (2018) and its doing business score improved from 59.7 (2014) to 66.9 (2019). Despite this progress, Zambia’s score on trading across borders fell by 10.4 percentage points from 63.5 in DB2015 to 56.9 in DB2019.
- The country receives support on trade, trade facilitation and regional integration from several development partners.
- Elections took place on August 12, 2021, and the incumbent lost to the United Party for National Development (UPND), which, on the face of it, seems significantly more business and export trade oriented than the predecessor regime; thus, trade is likely to rebound as a priority, although it is still too early to determine this for sure.

3. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted	June 2021- Sept 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Documents, KII interviews, e-survey and EIF results database
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewed 30+ documents (EIF programme documents and technical reporting; DTISs; policy and strategy documents; evaluations; minutes of meetings; etc.) • Reviewed one e-survey response (NIU coordinator) • Interviewed 19 informants (5 women): 14 from government ministries and agencies; 2 from private sector; 1 from civil society; 1 donor; 1 EIF ES. Interviews ranging from 30 minutes to 1.5 hours. All done virtually (Zoom and Teams). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used VfM scorecard to summarise.
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No response from EIF DF for e-survey but not essential as interview pretty comprehensive. • Lots of discrepancies on quantitative data reported (between EIF results database, project technical reports and interviews). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection delayed due to (a) the Zambia national expert suffering a carjacking (b) coinciding with election period so lots of unavailability from both the interviewees and national expert (c) requests from the new President for assistance from the national expert.

4. Findings

1.1 Relevance

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with national priorities and needs	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned to the needs in-country, including the sixth and (6NDP, 2013-16) seventh national development plan (7NDP, 2017-21) as well as trade-related and relevant sector policies and strategies (e.g., trade policy, industrial policy and strategy, export strategy, investment promotion strategy, cooperative development strategy, etc.)</p> <p>The DTISU in 2014 aligned well with the national priorities at the time. However, the document is now outdated given emerging and evolving developments in trade globally (e.g., the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), ICT, e-commerce, green growth, etc.), the effects of COVID-19, and the changing political regime in Zambia. Hence, it's relevance has weakened over time. Very recently (i.e. after case study data collection), the EIF included a DTISU in the pipeline and the ToR is in development. With the political change in Zambia and the high likelihood of the draft 8NDP document being extensively revised to align it to the UPND's manifesto, there is an opportunity for a DTISU to foster re-alignment of trade and trade-related policy and strategic needs and priorities to the NDP.</p>		
Alignment with needs of private sector and civil society	3	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The EIF programme and projects are well aligned to the needs of the private sector (largely due to the space accorded them to participate in the EIF coordination mechanism, including chairing the NSC) but less well aligned to the needs of civil society. However, as discussed below, largely due to relatively limited convening power on the part of MCTI coupled with a somewhat non-consultative stance at the higher policy-making levels of the government and reluctance to share information and ideas, the consultative mechanisms for engaging private sector and civil society on AfT have weakened over recent years, reducing the opportunity to raise concerns, discuss priorities, identify interventions and follow up.</p>		
Adaptation to emerging EIF priorities (e.g., regional, value chains, gender equality, climate change)	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF programme in Zambia covers many of the areas that have emerged as priorities for the EIF (global) over recent years (see examples below).</p> <p>MCTI prioritised several regional initiatives including the development and implementation of one stop border posts (NB. the EIF did not fund these interventions directly) as well as participation in regional negotiations (e.g., COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area and the African Continental Free Trade Area) and collaborates closely with the COMESA Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) project.</p> <p>Tier 2 projects supported (e.g., TIPEC-ZAS), or are supporting (e.g., SheTrades and CDSP), the development of regional and global value chains in non-traditional sectors, along with the SPC which aims to improve capacity to reach regional and international standards (SPS) and access to regional and global value chains.</p> <p>TIPEC-ZAS, SheTrades and CDSP focused/focuses on supporting women-owned businesses, female-led cooperatives and cooperatives with significant female membership.</p> <p>There is little mention of the environment, climate change or green growth in the DTISU 2014, EIF programme and project documents and reporting.</p>		
Adaptation to changing global context	2	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Over the last decade, several regime changes have impacted on the appetite for trade and private sector development in the country. Over recent years, the importance of trade and private sector development has reduced and protectionism increased, partly reflecting the political context and trend in other countries. This has undermined the achievement of the EIF's objectives, particularly under</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Tier 1. The EIF made limited progress to adapt and overcome the challenges associated with the political and policy environment, partly due to weak dialogue, information sharing and feedback mechanisms (e.g., between government, private sector and civil society; between private sector and civil society organisations and their own membership). However, there is optimism this may change given the outcome of the very recent election. Private sector associations and chambers are particularly optimistic that the new administration in office in the Government will re-establish pre-2011 GRZ-Private Sector Annual Consultative Forums, which they foresee being chaired by the President.		
Adaptation to COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF ES and TFM encouraged the EIF Zambia to adapt to challenges presented by COVID-19. The EIF ES and TFM are considered flexible and open to budget reprogramming and revisions, especially to respond to emerging issues, as well as no-cost extensions (if necessary and adequately justified). While COVID-19 has impacted on implementation and created delays, there are several positive examples of adapting to COVID-19:</p> <p>a) Tier 1: Given the COVID-19 pandemic and increased e-commerce over recent years, there are plans to integrate e-commerce in the EIF-supported trade and development course at the university. Also, there is renewed impetus for MCTI to finalise the draft e-commerce strategy. The EIF also supported an assessment of the effect of COVID-19 on tourism trade early on in the pandemic (May 2020).</p> <p>b) Tier 2: When COVID-19 hit, SheTrades repurposed production lines with women businesses producing facemasks. The project is also fast-tracking e-commerce initiatives, with support from DHL Zambia to deliver training on logistics and e-commerce. The SheTrades app (virtual platform) has massively helped sustain B2B activities and exchanges.</p>		
New policies introduced, or existing national policies modified, as a result of the policy proposals in the DTISU	3	3 (DR, KII)
<p>The DTIS AM proposals are reported to have contributed to several results. These include development of the National Export Strategy 2018; updated National Trade Policy 2018; enactment of the Border Management and Trade Facilitation Act which also established the National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC) and Secretariat (NTFS); operationalisation of two OSBPs; improvements in customs clearances processes between agencies; establishment of the Business Regulatory Review Agency which will carry out regulatory impact assessments; enactment of various regulations; development of an online non-tariff barrier reporting system; and the establishment of the national committee on trade facilitation. It is unclear the extent to which the DTIS AM proposals directly led to these results due to lack of robust evidence reported, with several initiatives likely to have taken place regardless of the DTISU and the EIF (e.g., establishment of the NTFC). However, there is evidence that the DTIS was used to, for example, feed into the development of the National Export Strategy, update the National Trade Policy and the development of the Border Management and Trade Facilitation Act including establishment of the NTFC.</p> <p>Moreover, the link between the DTISU policy proposals and reform is often not direct. For instance, the DTIS analysis and tier 1 support have built the capacity of officials and, as a result, their contributions to the formulation of some of the policies and strategies above have improved (i.e., because of the improvement in capacity, not the DTISU proposal/ recommendation per se).</p> <p>Also, the programmes/projects which align to the DTIS AM and Tier 2 projects have contributed to some policy reforms (including those recommended in the DTIS AM), but this happened regardless of the fact the proposals/recommendations were stated in the DTIS AM.</p>		
Public sector capacity building resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/ action plans using local resources	3	3 (DR, KII)
See other sections on DTIS		
Extent EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and action matrix	3	3 (DR, S, KII)

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Tier 1 support (phase 1 and 2) align well with the DTIS but in many cases the link is not explicitly made. Similarly, Tier 2 projects and activities (TIPEC-ZAS, CDSP, SPC and She Trades) are not explicitly linked to the proposed actions in the DTIS AM, although the analysis of the binding constraints to trade in the main text of the DTIS and several of the AM proposals underpin the rationale for these projects.		
Inclusiveness of DTIS consultative processes	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
Members of the NSC were consulted during the DTIS process. These included government, private sector, civil society and donors. Both private sector and civil society were given the opportunity to comment and highlight the main challenges their membership groups faced, according to interviews with government, private sector and civil society. In addition, pre-validation, small traders were consulted at the Zambia-Malawi border to discuss the DTIS findings of direct relevance to small traders, generating discussions on the proposed areas of reform related to informal trade, trade in agriculture and NTBs. On the whole, private sector engagement was stronger than civil society.		

1.2 Coherence

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Alignment with EIF Theory of Change/logframe	5	3 (DR)
The project logframes are aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe. Tier 1 and 2 projects are very well-aligned with the results areas (all outcomes and outputs). Under outcome 2, there is more focus on value chain projects.		
Appropriateness of EIF delivery modalities	4	2 (DR, KII)
The EIF delivery modalities (preparatory, analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's goals and objectives, however, partners often do not fully understand the small sums involved and catalytic nature of support and expect more substantial support.		
Coordination with other relevant initiatives	3	2 (DR, KII)
Overall coordination on AfT in Zambia deteriorated between 2017/18 up until recently, largely due to the lack of GRZ-Donor Platform meetings and limited activity by the NTFC to facilitate AfT coordination until recently (see section 1.3). This has also led to cases of duplication of efforts (e.g., World Bank and EU). The multiplication of AfT dialogues (GRZ-Donor Platform and NTFC) was recognised as an issue. Following the establishment of the NTFC Secretariat and the legislation of the Border Management and Trade Facilitation Act, it was noted that issues on trade facilitation were discussed in both the EIF-supported GRZ-Donor Platform and the NTFC. To avoid duplication, MCTI decided trade facilitation issues, including DTIS implementation, would be better placed under the NTFC, given the NTFC's legal mandate, making it a more sustainable forum. For Tier 2 projects specifically, there are several examples of coordination between EIF projects (e.g., CDSP building on TIPEC-ZAS; CDSP and SheTrades) and with other non-EIF projects, leading to complementarities.		

1.3 Effectiveness

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
DTIS		
DTIS contribution to EIF outputs:	(a) 2	(a) 2
a) increasing knowledge	(b) 2	(b) 3
b) increased mainstreaming of trade	(c) 3	(c) 3

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
c) prioritised interventions	(d) 1	(d) 3
d) programming plan	(e) 3	(e) 3
e) specific programmes/ projects aligned to DTIS/AM		(DR, S, KII)
<p>a) The DTIS contributed to increasing knowledge on trade within MCTI. Given the DTIS is now quite dated and less relevant, coupled with relatively high staff turnover, this has hampered the institutional understanding and memory of the DTIS. Currently, few officers use the DTIS. The upcoming DTISU will provide an opportunity to update information and improve knowledge within MCTI and beyond.</p> <p>b)The MCTI used the DTIS to mainstream trade issues in the 7NDP. The 7NDP addresses some of the issues and challenges in the DTIS with both documents identifying similar areas. For instance, the DTIS helped outline the link between trade and agriculture in the formulation of the 7NDP. However, in many cases the coverage of the same issues in both documents is considered coincidental, rather than a deliberate use of material from the DTIS. According to interviews, integration of the DTIS in the 7NDP did not go far enough. The DTIS, including AM, is treated as a standalone document, not linked to wider GRZ implementation and financial plans.</p> <p>c)The DTIS AM prioritised interventions according to impact (great; medium; small), timeframe (short, medium and long term) and difficulty (low, medium and high). However, the GRZ Donor Platform meeting in 2017 recommended the addition of specific timeframes but this has not been done.</p> <p>d)No programming or resource mobilisation plan was developed which was a missed opportunity according to interviews and may be partly due to inadequate integration of the DTIS in the NDP.</p> <p>e)There are several trade-related programmes and projects (funded by, for example, AfDB, EU, FCDO, GIZ, USAID and WB), including EIF tier 1 activities, that align to the specific actions proposed in the DTIS AM. Not all actions in the AM require donor programmes/projects and financial support; and several are being implemented by government without donor support. It is likely that several of these programmes/projects and activities would have taken place without the presence of the DTIS and AM, as many of the challenges and priorities in the DTIS were already known and donors already had prior interests. Since 2017/18, donors have moved away from using the DTIS AM to set their priorities. The move was mainly due to changes in the PS at MCTI (from someone who was pro-donor engagement to someone who was “lukewarm”). The drifting away from DTIS AM by donors may have contributed to duplication in donor support.</p>		
Extent of implementation of the AM	2	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>DTIS 2005: Approximately 60% of actions in the DTIS 2005 were implemented, with half of those actions implemented on a continuous basis. Approximately 20% were not completed by the 2014 update, with some actions outdated and redundant. Approximately 20% actions were ‘in process’.</p> <p>DTISU 2014: The DTIS AM provides a useful coordination and monitoring tool to follow up on recommended actions, however, the DTIS has not been used in this way since 2017/18 by government or donors. Overall, there is a lack of government commitment, leadership and drive to use the DTIS AM (particularly beyond MCTI) since 2017/18; MCTI also does not seem to have sufficient convening power to sufficiently drive implementation and M&E of DTIS actions in other line ministries and Government agencies.</p> <p>The first meeting of the GRZ-Donor Platform (2017) since the start of EIF phase 2 reported on progress against actions in the DTISU 2014, outlining actions taken, where donors were providing support and follow up action. The platform was intended to annually report on implementation against the DTIS AM. However, only one more meeting took place in 2018 which focused on OSBP issues only and donor interest in the DTIS waned given the lack of meetings. In 2018, the responsibility for monitoring implementation of the DTIS AM moved to the NTFC which has a stronger legal mandate, chaired by the PS MCTI. Reporting through the NSC still continued.</p> <p>However, the NTFC has not, so far, played an active role in following up on DTIS implementation. The first meeting to discuss DTIS implementation took place in July 2021 but only covered updates from MCTI and only very briefly, lacking the substance compared to coverage in the 2017 Donor Platform.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Hence, it is difficult to assess the extent of implementation given the lack of follow up and absence of systematic reporting against the AM. According to interviews, implementation of the actions has been slow due to lack of domestic resources, particularly given the high fiscal deficit (made worse by COVID-19), lack of donor support in some of the priority areas and, more generally, lack of political will and a deteriorating policy environment where the importance of trade has reduced and barriers to trade are increasing rather than decreasing. For example: liberalisation of the maize market has been on the agenda for some time now but ad hoc export bans are quite frequent; increasing (rather than decreasing) number of documents needed to trade; and, the introduction of a local customs system replacing the ASYCUDA system potentially reversing gains in streamlining customs procedures and raising serious concerns about the ability of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) to remain effective in cooperating with other customs authorities (the rationale/justification for the system change does not seem to have been widely consulted or disseminated).		
Updating of the AM since it was first produced	3	3 (DR, KII)
The current DTISU 2014 is out-of-date given the current Zambian context. The EIF have included a DTISU in the pipeline and the ToR is under development.		
EIF contribution to trade mainstreaming	4	3 (DR, S, KII)
The 7NDP integrates trade, including a separate chapter on access to regional and international markets. The plan emphasises export diversification, away from copper towards non-traditional exports. Several chapters refer to reducing the cost of doing business (e.g., improving infrastructure and transport) to stimulate trade. The EIF supported MCTI's consultations including workshops to provide inputs into the NDP and continues (under CDSP, since April 2021) to support awareness-raising/ sensitisation workshops at the provincial level on trade mainstreaming as well as broader support to building the capacity of MCTI staff. However, MCTI remains one of the weaker ministries in government with lower convening power and MCTI has struggled to fully mainstream trade across government, particularly in recent years given the political context. For instance, other ministries do not show up to NSC meetings. MCTI recognise that they need to do more trade mainstreaming work across government.		
EIF contribution to policy reform	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
Overall, the EIF's support to policy and regulatory reform is considered relevant and effective. The EIF has supported the review and formulation of several national policies (e.g., National Export Strategy 2018, National Trade Policy 2018, Local Content Strategy, AfCFTA Strategy) and regulations (e.g., Trade Remedies Bill, Border Management and Trade Act) by funding technical assistance, training, workshops and meetings, as well as consultations and sensitisation on international and regional agreements and negotiations (e.g., WTO TFA). Key to ensuring effectiveness is the extent of implementation and the evidence here is unclear, partly due to weaknesses in monitoring implementation, although the NTFC aims to address this in future including reporting on the implementation of the TFA.		
EIF contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g., WTO)	4	2 (DR, S, KII)
Overall, the EIF's support to participation in international trade fora is considered relevant and effective. The EIF has supported attendance at regional and international meetings, including supporting the development of position papers and offers, through analysis and national-level consultations ahead of meetings and negotiations, and developing the capacity of MCTI staff to effectively contribute (WTO MC11; COMESA; SADC; COMESA-EAC-SADC TFTA; AfCFTA).		
EIF contribution to regional objectives	4	2 (DR, KII)
As above, the EIF has supported attendance at regional meetings, including supporting the development of position papers and offers, through analysis and national-level consultations ahead of		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
meetings and negotiations, as well as developing capacity of MCTI staff to effectively contribute (COMESA; SADC; COMESA-EAC-SADC TFTA; AfCFTA).		
Training participation and uptake/ outcomes	4	3 (DR, KII, S)
<p>Training on trade policy analysis for MCTI staff has substantially built the capacity of staff who have used the skills gained when formulating and inputting into policies, strategies and regulations (e.g., National Export Strategy 2018 and National Trade Policy 2018) and negotiations.</p> <p>The EIF has supported the development of a trade policy and development course at public universities to equip students with skills in trade mainstreaming, formulation of policy and strengthening trade negotiations, among others. Feedback on the course is very positive, particularly with respect to sustainability. The course is being rolling out to other universities.</p>		
Information dissemination and awareness raising (including gender and environment)	4	1 (DR, KII)
The EIF has supported several information dissemination, awareness-raising and sensitisation activities to elevate the understanding of trade-related issues across the country, including at the provincial level. This has helped improve understanding of the role of different key stakeholders and connect stakeholders to each other. However, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these initiatives without speaking to the target audiences first-hand.		
EIF contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g., productivity, turnover, employment)	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The TIPEC-ZAS project supported honey cooperatives to integrate in the value chain with the objective of improving production and increasing exports. Exports increased over six-fold (regional and international), with the EIF-funded project considered the main contributing factor as quality, production and market access improved as a result of the support. Processors reported a 76% improvement in quality. The project exceeded the number of targeted beneficiaries (123%), 30% of whom were women.</p> <p>The SheTrades project has helped increase the participation of women-owned businesses to trade by enhancing their competitiveness and strengthening market linkages, supporting and encouraging women to work together through cooperatives. The project generated sales of over US\$3million, 128 new jobs created (95 women) and exports to 13 regional and international markets in 2020, all over an effective implementation period of roughly 18 months.</p>		
EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce initiatives)	5	2
<p>The TIPEC-ZAS project distributed modern hives amongst producer groups, leading to increased productivity and quality compared to traditional hives, and demonstration effects to others, leading to greater use of modern hives. <i>[See above for results].</i></p> <p>The SheTrades project supported women-owned business to use the SheTrade Platform to network and connect with buyers and engage in e-commerce. The use of the platform accelerated with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. <i>[See above for results].</i></p>		
EIF contribution to trade facilitation	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p><i>[The EIF Zambia reports some Tier 1 results against the 'trade facilitation initiatives' indicator in the results framework. We report these results under Tier 1 above and do not duplicate here. Also, the EIF Zambia report results of the Tier 2 project on SPS (SPC) under Tier 1, however it is a Tier 2 project and related to trade facilitation, therefore we cover it here].</i></p> <p>The SPC project has undertaken several consultations and training activities to review and draft strategies, regulations and plans to strengthen Zambia's institutional capacity on SPS issues and compliance to increase confidence of trading partners. Previously the PQPS was a very weak institution focusing on crisis management and dealing with SPS risks in an ad hoc manner, leading to</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
low compliance and several notifications from other countries. However, the support has helped develop the 5-year strategic plan and operational plan and built the capacity of the institution through technical assistance, consultations with a range of key stakeholders (e.g., private, public and academic) and lesson learning from other countries (e.g., South Africa). The project has supported a legal review of the plant pests and disease act (including recommendations to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of PQPS on SPS) and the development of the draft bill which was submitted to the Ministry of Justice. In addition, the project supported Zambia to contribute to the development of the SADC priority list of quarantine pests. COVID-19 led to consultations moving online with few challenges but the project faced recruitment delays. However, it is now on-track.		
EIF contribution to training and skills in different value-chains	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
<p>The TIPEC ZAS project trained beekeepers, including training conducted by the processors, who then went on to train other group members and others in the community (through a 'training of trainers' programme). Members managing the bulking centres were also trained. The trainings led to increases in both production and productivity as well as quality improvements which, combined with bulking centres, led to better market access and price increases. After training, the producers changed their practices including better apiary management, acquired honey grading skills and improved harvesting techniques, according to the evaluation. Direct involvement of processors in the training contributed to increased effectiveness, given they know what is needed with respect to product quality, etc. <i>[See above for results]</i>.</p> <p>The SheTrades project provided training (including mentoring and coaching) across a wide range of topics aimed at integrating women entrepreneurs in the value chain through improved competitiveness and quality, including training on logistics, standards and packaging, branding and marketing, financial literacy and investment readiness. Much of the training was provided virtually and new training was introduced to respond to challenges resulting from COVID-19 including training and advice on identifying new market trends, e-commerce, access to finance, managing cash flow, how to adapt business strategies and crisis management. The project also worked with cooperatives to improve leadership and management. <i>[See above for results]</i>.</p> <p>The CDSP project is building the capacity of cooperatives (including youth and women) in selected value chains to increase production, productivity, market access and quality, improving competitiveness and leading to increased non-traditional exports and incomes. The project has developed training manuals, trained 45 District Cooperative Officers (DCOs) as trainer to deliver business development services (BDSs) and trained nearly 500 cooperative members on cooperative governance (including marketing, costing and pricing, environmental management). Those trained admitted they often overlooked some costs which led them to selling at a loss and that the training is helping change their mindset. So far project delivery has suffered substantial delays given COVID-19 has significantly reduced the ability for face-to-face interactions over the last 18 months. Hence, there is limited evidence of the impact on the ground of the training conducted so far.</p>		
EIF contribution to participation in trade fairs	5	2 (DR, KII)
<p>SheTrades project has helped connect sellers with buyers both virtually and through business-to-business (B2B) events, with beneficiaries reporting access to 10 new international markets as a result of B2B initiatives. <i>[See above for results]</i>.</p> <p>TIPEC-ZAS supported participation in trade fairs.</p> <p>Also, the NIU supported MCTI's participation in trade fairs and provincial expos.</p>		
EIF executive secretariat and trust fund manager (programme-level) support to country level results and performance	5	2 (DR, S, KII)
Generally, the EIF ES and TFM have provided good guidance including on M&E, reporting, financial management, risk management, etc. Pre-COVID-19, they also undertook regular supervisory and		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>M&E missions which were useful. They are quite flexible and responsive and communication channels are fairly open. The EIF ES and TFM systems work well with respect to reporting.</p> <p>The EIF TFM has shown considerable flexibility with respect to audit and other financial reporting, which have often been received late from the NIU. Also, the TFM demonstrated flexibility when some of the expenditures could not be reconciled, hiring a consultant to assist with the process to reconcile the budget necessary to make further disbursements. Similarly, the EIF TFM avoided potential delays disbursing funds to the NIU as a result of a government-wide control (control-99 whereby all development partners need to go through the Treasury).</p> <p>The assessment of procurement bids has taken longer than desired and the NIU would like the EIF to fund retreats to speed up the assessment process, where staff intensively focus on the assessments over several days. However, these expenditures are not eligible under the EIF. Other development partners also have similar rules. In such instances, the NIU should lobby for government resources instead.</p>		
EIF operational systems and processes (country-level) support to country level results and performance	3	3 (DR, S, KII)
<p>EIF FP and NIU: Overall, the NIU and FP (Director, Foreign Trade) are operating well and delivering their mandate (project identification and development, oversight of delivery, M&E, etc.) under strong leadership. However, the NIU faces challenges gaining traction on the EIF within MCTI and across government, largely due to resource constraints and competing priorities. The NIU does a good job bringing in MCTI colleagues into EIF processes. However, responses from departments are often low during project identification and development stages, largely due to staff availability, given limited resources and conflicting priorities (i.e., staff are overstretched). Few concept notes are submitted to the FP and NIU. When concept notes are submitted, these are sometimes of poor quality but the NIU assists in improving the quality. Regarding delivery, delays in GRZ recruitment processes have reduced the implementation time for the Tier 1 project.</p> <p>There are discussions to explore the viability of a single NIU to coordinate and oversee implementation of all AfT, housed at MCTI under the NTFC and NTFS, which may help improve overall effectiveness. Any decision will need to be made by Cabinet (GRZ).</p> <p>NSC: The NSC provides effective oversight of EIF funds, holding regular quarterly meetings and effectively taking decisions within its mandate. Progress and challenges, including risks, are reported on and discussed at the NSC and actions are recommended and followed up on. If issues cannot be resolved at the NSC, follow up is done through the Director or PS. However, not all ministries attend the meetings.</p> <p>The NSC is an important dialogue mechanism for the private sector beyond the EIF, largely given the lack of other effective PPD fora.</p> <p>The role of the NSC has changed significantly over the years, partly reflecting political regime changes. After 2011, the NSC absorbed many trade facilitation functions and had its mandate expanded from project-specific to broader trade facilitation issues. This was very useful given the EIF's role in supporting policy and strategy development. Given the establishment of the NTFC, some of the NSC functions moved to the NTFC in 2017/18 and the NSC focused on oversight of the EIF. The NTFC is higher in the governance hierarchy than the NSC and has more decision-making powers than the NSC (which is advisory). At present, there is limited interaction between the NTFC and NSC but the NSC is in the process of transitioning to a sub-committee under the NTFC. The NTFC are currently working with the NSC to develop a common matrix to monitor implementation and progress on trade-related issues which is expected by November 2021.</p> <p>EIF DF (EU is the DF in Zambia): The relationship and interactions between the EIF FP, NIU and DF are good. However, the role of the DF is not strong enough to drive donor coordination and resource mobilisation without the backing of an effective mechanism such as the GRZ Donor Platform which has not held any meetings since 2018.</p>		
Extent the EIF operational systems and processes have been able to respond to COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>The EIF, both in Lusaka and Geneva, have demonstrated flexibility in response to COVID-19, encouraging partners to adapt to challenges presented by COVID-19 and reprogramming budgets, as well as issuing no cost-extensions.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)

1.4 Efficiency

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Efficiency of Tier 1 initiatives	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>Tier 1 projects are within budget, according to reporting over the last few years. Over the last two years, the project has fallen behind schedule due to restrictions related to COVID-19 and recruitment delays. MCTI have attempted to address COVID-19 delays by moving consultations online and revising work plans to bring forward other work that does not necessitate consultation and travel. The EIF ES and TFM have been flexible and encouraged the MCTI to adapt in response to COVID-19 (see above) which is positive but reprogramming itself obviously takes time, adding to delays. Delays have reduced somewhat as stakeholders adapted to using virtual platforms and as restrictions lift. However, uncertainty prevails with respect to possible successive waves of COVID-19, impacting on planning and therefore efficiency.</p> <p>Other factors that have affected efficiency are the length of time it took to recruit staff, as recruitment could only start once the project was approved, leading to a six-month delay between approval and having staff in post, reducing project implementation time. Also, non-NIU MCTI staff are often slow to respond to requests (e.g., for comments, etc.), creating delays.</p> <p>Procurement requires advertising and MCTI sometimes receive 30-40 bids. As discussed above, the bid assessment process is lengthy and could be more efficiently conducted through a two/three-day retreat to focus staff and intensively assess the bids. However, the EIF ES and TFM does not allow such expenditures, and the NIU need to seek government resources to do such activities to speed up the process.</p>		
Efficiency of Tier 2 initiatives	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>As discussed below under sustainability (see section 1.6), all projects receive in-kind contributions, which contributes to efficiency. There are several examples of EIF projects collaborating with each other and other non-EIF interventions, improving efficiency (see section 1.2). Many projects are employing approaches that have the potential to improve efficiency and sustainability (e.g., ‘training of trainers’; encouraging demonstration effects, etc.).</p> <p>TIPEC-ZAS: The project managed to undertake all activities within the allocated timeframe and were able to use resources efficiently, largely as a result of effective annual budget reviews and procurement processes. This led to some savings which were converted into more equipment for beekeepers.</p> <p>CDSP: Activities undertaken so far are within budget. However, most are behind schedule given the need to work closely with stakeholders which has been significantly impaired by COVID-19 restrictions. Virtual meetings are taking place, where feasible.</p> <p>SPC: The project managed to stay on-track, despite COVID-19, by moving consultations online. However, the efficiency (and effectiveness and sustainability) of the project is compromised by the lack of funding to transport (i.e., vehicles which is not eligible for EIF funding) to apply knowledge gained and check SPS compliance in the field. The project is exploring cost-sharing for regional SPS operational activities such as surveillance which, if successful, could generate efficiencies.</p> <p>SheTrades: The project faced few delays and funds were released on time. ITC’s processes were considered strict but efficient and effective. The project cost-shared some activities with other projects (e.g., SheTrades Invest, SheTrades Global) and secured additional technical expertise (in-kind), for example, from the SheTrades Academy.</p>		
Efficiency (use of time and money) of EIF governance structures at the country level	4	3 (DR, KII)
<p>EIF NIU and FP: Overall, the NIU and FP undertake their duties as efficiently as possible but factors (discussed in section 1.3) largely outside of their direct control reduce their potential effectiveness and efficiency. Also, recruitment delays have impacted on NIU efficiency.</p>		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<p>NSC: Overall, the NSC conducts its mandate efficiently, holding regular quarterly meetings on schedule and with decisions taken at an adequate pace with little red tape/ bureaucracy. The meetings draw on and update the risks in the matrix³ as relevant, but not as a standing item. However, as discussed above (section 1.3), the NSC often has challenges gaining traction across government reducing both effectiveness and efficiency.</p> <p>Donor coordination (including EIF EF role): At present, the coordination of AfT projects and programmes is inefficient, and this is largely due to the lack of meetings and the restructuring taking place (see section 1.3).</p>		
Extent activities continued during COVID-19	3	3 (DR, KII)
See rows above.		

1.5 Impact

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
EIF contribution to sustainable development	4	1 (DR, KII)
The targeted support (under Tier 2: TIPEC-ZAS, SheTrades, CDSP) to SMEs and cooperatives, including women and youth, has contributed to (or has the potential to contribute to) improved livelihoods (jobs, income, etc.) as a result of increased production, improved quality, better market access, etc. leading to increased sales including exports.		
EIF contribution to integration into global and regional trading systems	4	1 (DR, KII)
The EIF support (Tier 1) has helped Zambia to strengthen their participation in regional and global systems through contributing to improvements in policies, strategies, regulations, etc. by building capacity, especially within MCTI.		

1.6 Sustainability

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
Integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities, activities, structures and processes	4	3 (DR, KII)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The DTIS AM is a standalone document known mainly by those directly involved in the EIF and the GRZ Donor Platform, which reduces its reach and sustainability. The NIU and Tier 1 activities support functions and activities that are already integrated into MCTI's core structure and strategic plan. If the NIU's functions extend to a single NIU covering all AfT, it should help embed the NIU across government structures and processes beyond MCTI. The NSC is in the process of transitioning to a sub-committee of the NTFC which should help embed the committee into government structures and processes. Tier 2: The SPC project is fully integrated into government structures and processes given that it is directly supporting the strengthening of institutional structures and processes (e.g., PQPS strategic plan, etc.). Similarly, with the creation of the cooperative department in MCTI, the CDSP project supports activities that are fully integrated into MCTI's core work. Also, SheTrades is integrated into ZDA's core functions. 		
Ownership of EIF initiatives	3	3 (DR, KII)

³ Annexed to EIF annual reports submitted by NIU and Tier 2 partners, covering reputational, political, financial, fiduciary, operational and sustainability risks and mitigation measures

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As discussed above, the ownership of the current DTISU has dwindled over time, except for those directly involved (EIF staff and DF). There is strong ownership of the NIU and NSC by those involved in the EIF, including MCTI staff, the private sector and DF. But beyond those involved in the EIF, ownership is relatively low. However, this is likely to improve if the single NIU goes ahead and as the NSC is integrated under the NTFC structure. Tier 1 activities support the core work of MCTI hence ownership is strong amongst MCTI and others involved in the EIF. Tier 2: The SPC, CDSP and SheTrades projects are owned by government given that these projects directly support core work of the lead institutions. Both Tier 1 and 2 activities receive in-kind support from government and partners, demonstrating ownership. 		
Continuation of EIF initiatives (and results) after the end of EIF support	4	3 (DR, KII)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is unlikely that another DTISU would be undertaken without funding by a donor. Moreover, it is more likely to take place under the auspices of the NTFC and NTFS, but would still require donor funding given the NTFC and NTFS are resource constrained. Without the EIF, the NIU may not exist as an entity but many of its activities would continue given these are core activities of MCTI. If the NIU was extended to cover other AfT projects, not just EIF, it is likely to continue (under the NTFC and NTFS). Given the lack of an effective private sector dialogue mechanism beyond the EIF, private sector actors are keen to see the continuation of the NSC, which should help ensure it continues in one form or another (under the NTFC). Many of the Tier 1 activities have helped build capacity of MCTI staff and others (e.g., private sector) on trade policy formulation and related activities. Results are likely to sustain and continue, although there are concerns about staff turnover and loss of institutional memory. Moreover, there are concerns that NIU staff will not be integrated into MCTI once the EIF ends due to a recruitment freeze by government. Under Tier 1, the EIF has supported a trade policy and development course at various universities in Zambia to equip students with practical skills in trade mainstreaming, trade policy formulation, negotiations, etc., with support from the National Board of Trade (Sweden) who provided experts to train trainers ('training of trainers'). This has helped develop the expertise of staff who work (or go on to work) in private sector organisations and government and who have applied their knowledge (e.g., staff at the Zambia Association of Manufacturing applying knowledge on export bans to lobby for lifting restrictions). Also, attendees of the courses have been able to share their knowledge with others in their organisations. Given its success, the course is being rolled out to other universities. Many of the Tier 2 initiatives and results have, or are likely, to continue without EIF support but in some cases at a reduced scale. In particular, by building capacity, developing partnerships and connecting producers to markets (e.g., TIPEC-ZAS and SheTrades) this has helped results continue. One of the main factors which sustain gains is connecting buyers with sellers who continue with successful trading partnerships. However, additional funding would help extend and scale-up benefits more quickly to other beneficiaries, rather than rely on demonstration effects over time. Tier 2 projects like SheTrades are unlikely to receive more government funding (given current fiscal situation) but will lobby for this, as well as explore other donors and how to generate more revenue through services provided. The cooperative department is working with TIPEC-ZAS beneficiaries through CDSP, which has helped continue, build on and extend the gains from TIPEC-ZAS. 		
Coordination (with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society)	2	3 (DR, KII)
As discussed above, coordination mechanisms between donors, private sector and government require significant improvement, beyond the EIF. Coordination between government and private sector		

	Result score (1-5)	Evidence score (1-3)
is likely to deteriorate without the NSC unless the NTFC steps up its engagement with the private sector. Coordination through the GRZ Donor Platform has stalled but there are plans to improve this under the NTFC. Given the NTFC and NTFS are permanent mandated structures, these have greater potential than EIF structures alone to own and sustain coordination. MCTI recognises the need to harmonise dialogue and coordination and is in the process of integrating the NSC into the NTFC.		
EIF contribution to leveraging finance and expertise	3	3 (DR, KII)
<p>All projects receive co-financing and/or in-kind contributions. For example, technical expertise from donors; staff time, office premises and equipment from government; and, technical expertise from private sector.⁴ Both the EIF and lead project partners (e.g., ITC) have helped leverage these contributions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIPEC-ZAS (13% SNV); CDSP and SSP (27% government in-kind) • Tier 1 NIU (30% government in-kind; other support from SNV and NBT Sweden) • SPC (28% government in-kind; 40% STDF) • SheTrades (ITC, partners and government in-kind); SheTrades also leveraged private sector contributions (e.g., commercial banks such as Stanbic on access to finance; DHL on logistics and e-commerce) <p>Beyond EIF projects, the NIU leveraged its expertise to contribute to the development of the following proposals: EU/COMESA Regional Integration Capacity Building (RICB); EU/SADC Trade Related Facility Project; and World Bank Great Lakes Project.</p> <p>In addition, it is worth noting that many development partners do not prioritise AfT, hence limiting the ability to leverage resources for AfT.</p>		
Extent the achieved results are sustainable/ not undermined by COVID-19	4	2 (DR, KII)
<p>COVID-19 has affected the pace of delivery and results achieved for both Tier 1 and 2 activities. The main concern is that some projects may not have enough time to reach the level of maturation needed (e.g., capacity built and embedded; practices adopted/adapted; etc.) for results to continue and possibly scale-up through, for example, demonstration effects. No cost-extensions are necessary to make up for lost time.</p>		

5. Conclusions and learning

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and associated projects are well-aligned with the needs and priorities in-country. However, while the DTISU reflected needs at the time, it is now out-of-date and an update is being planned. The EIF in Zambia has remained relevant to emerging EIF global priorities. Over the last decade, several regime changes have impacted on the appetite for trade and private sector development in the country. Over recent years, the importance of trade and private sector development has reduced and protectionism increased, partly reflecting the political context and trend in other countries. The EIF in Zambia has been able to adapt, especially recently given challenges presented by COVID-19.
- **Coherence:** Overall coordination on AfT deteriorated between 2017/18 up until recently, given the lack of meetings of the GRZ Donor Platform, however, EIF Tier 2 projects are coordinating and seeking complementarities with others. The NTFC will now lead coordination efforts with respect to AfT and DTIS implementation but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this arrangement.

⁴ The data should be treated with caution as figures vary across sources

- **Effectiveness:** The role of the DTIS has reduced over time given the lack of overall coordination, limited monitoring of implementation and the fact that the DTIS is now quite dated. The EIF has helped improve the capacity of MCTI staff and others to formulate policies and engage in negotiations, with numerous examples of effective capacity building initiatives. While the EIF has helped mainstream trade, more recently MCTI has struggled to advance mainstreaming of trade across government ministries and agencies, especially given the prevailing political context during the reference period of the case study. There are several examples of effectiveness across Tier 2 projects, including EIF-supported activities contributing to increased competitiveness and improved market access and therefore sales and improvements in livelihoods.
- **Efficiency:** Overall, Tier 1 activities are efficient except for some delays (e.g., due to recruitment, COVID-19, etc.). The NIU and NSC have performed their roles well, delivering their mandate efficiently under strong leadership. However, they have suffered from lack of traction across government. Coordination mechanisms between donors, private sector and government require significant improvement, beyond the EIF. On the whole, Tier 2 projects are efficient, except for delays largely due to COVID-19, with several examples of cost-sharing and examples of adopting methods in delivery that improve efficiency.
- **Sustainability:** The lack of donor coordination meetings has reduced the EIF's ability to improve AfT coordination, seek complementarities and mobilise resources. This is also compounded by development partners own priorities, with many having limited resources dedicated to AfT. Many of the current governance issues appear to be a result of low levels of mainstreaming and lack of clarity and slow progress on transitioning the functions of the NSC and GRZ Donor Platform under the NTFC. Given the NTFC and NTFS are permanent mandated structures, these have greater potential than EIF structures alone to own and sustain coordination. Under tier 2, for instance, building the capacity of trainers to train others, piloting interventions with the potential for demonstration effects and connecting buyers and sellers who are continuing with trading partnerships, irrespective of support, have helped contribute to sustainability.
- **Impact:** Overall, there are several examples of the EIF contributing to (or has the potential to contribute to) sustainable development and increased integration in regional and global markets.

6. VFM Score Card

	Score	Narrative
1. Processes to ensure Value for Money (VfM processes)	1	While there are several examples of the EIF programme and Tier 2 projects taking measures to ensure efficiency and improve VfM, there are no VfM metrics and therefore no systematic reporting against VfM.
2. Approach to procurement, MIE selection and cost containment (economy)	4	Procurement processes are on the whole efficient and follow international good practice (open competition, encouraging multiple bids, thorough bid assessment processes, etc.). However, the bid assessment process takes considerable time (often too many bids and no funding available to pay for a 'retreat' to do the bid assessment process), reducing the speed of the process. Also, recruitment often starts once projects are approved and it takes time to hire staff, which 'eats into' project implementation time.

	Score	Narrative
3. Efficient use of resources by EIF interventions, including minimization of duplication and maximizing of synergies (efficiency)	4	Overall donor coordination on AfT in Zambia has been lacking over the last few years until recently, leading to cases of duplication. However, across EIF-funded projects, the EIF has avoided duplication and sought complementarities (e.g., between EIF projects and with non-EIF projects), including examples of phase 2 activities building on phase 1 activities for both Tier 1 and 2.
4. Sustainability of EIF activities (effectiveness)	4	Overall, there are good prospects for sustainability for Tier 1 and 2 activities. Tier 1 activities support core functions within government that will continue and it is very likely that the capacity built will continue to be applied with the option of refreshing knowledge through the university courses. Tier 2 activities support core functions in many of the implementing partners that will continue. For beneficiaries, for instance, by connecting them with buyers, this helps create sustainable outcomes as buyers have the incentive to continue with successful partnerships.
5. Review of country-level leadership, management and governance arrangements to deliver VfM (VfM processes)	3	Overall, the NIU and FP provide good leadership of EIF operational processes and governance structures. However, there were challenges related to the timeliness and accuracy of audit and financial reporting (especially between the phases, Tier 1 and Tier 2) which have improved more recently. The NSC operates efficiently – i.e., on time, managing and monitoring progress and following up on challenges and risks, making timely decisions, etc. Wider challenges with respect to coordination on trade and AfT, including reduced importance of trade and weakening mainstreaming across government, have undermined both the effectiveness and efficiency of the operational and governance arrangements.
6. Strategies and measures adopted to enhance delivery and mitigate risk (effectiveness)	4	The EIF ES and TFM, on the whole, has demonstrated significant flexibility. Overall, the EIF in Zambia has been able to adapt to changes and shocks (e.g., COVID-19), amending work plans and delivery modalities when needed and adequately justified.
7. Equity of program design and delivery (equity)	3	Many of the Tier 2 projects target women and youth as the main beneficiaries. However, where women and youth are not the targeted beneficiaries, integration of equity/gender in project design and implementation is typically quite cursory and limited to gender-disaggregated indicators of beneficiaries.

SUMMARY COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

Afghanistan

Summary country case study

1. COUNTRY SUMMARY

Start date of EIF support	2009
Total budget	\$ 1,350,160 ⁵ <i>of which \$0.725m disbursements to date</i>
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, Landlocked, FCAS
Key stakeholders	<p><i>NIU: Ministry of Industry and Commerce</i></p> <p><i>Other Members of the National Steering Committee:</i> Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation Ministry of Economy Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce & Industry Afghanistan National Standards Authority General Directorate of Customs Ministry of Public Works Da Afghanistan Bank Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock Afghanistan Investment Support Agency Ministry of Justice</p> <p><i>Other relevant government entities:</i> Ministry of Finance Ministry of Mines Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development</p> <p><i>Development partners:</i> World Bank International Trade Centre United Nations Development Programme</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key objectives The overall objective of EIF interventions in Afghanistan is to support the country's integration into the global trading system, accompanied by a coordinated delivery of trade-related technical assistance.</p> <p>The preparatory support project (Pre-DTIS) and two analytical support projects (DTIS & DTISU) have linkages to Outcome 1, and particularly to output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks</i>).</p> <p>The Tier 1 project on supporting national implementation arrangements similarly has links to Outcome 1 (<i>Improved trade environment conducive for inclusive and sustainable growth</i>) and particularly Outputs 1-3.</p> <p>Overall, all EIF interventions in Afghanistan have been exclusively in Tier 1 and linked to Outcome 1, with very limited progress to date on targeted results (mostly on output 1), partly due to the nature and extent of mobilisation of aid for trade in the country, as well as domestic challenges.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed Projects</u></p> <p>(i) Pre-DTIS "Establishing NIU/Core Functions in Order to Implement the Enhanced Integrated Framework" [Phase 1, Tier 1]</p>

⁵ Source: Portfolio review based on available data from the Knowledge Hub.

	<p>(ii) DTIS [Phase 1, Tier 1]</p> <p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <p>(iii) DTIS Update [Phase 2, Tier 1]</p> <p>(iv) Support to National Implementation Arrangements (Repackaged) [Phase 2, Tier 1]</p> <p><u>Terminated Project</u></p> <p>Support to National Implementation Arrangements (Phase 1) [Phase 2, Tier 1]</p>
Regional projects	<p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <p>(i) E-Commerce Capacity Building for women-led SMEs in South Asia Project</p>

2. APPROACH AND METHODS

Date when case study conducted	August 2021 ⁶
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, Document and Data review, Economic analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Document Review</i> of project documents, including MOU and MOU amendments; project references, including project proposals, concept notes, project-level logframes, work plans, budget plans, TOR, and risk mitigation strategies/matrices; narrative reports, including technical and progress reports; the DTIS report; country situation updates; national policy documents • <i>Portfolio Review</i> covering project types and subtypes; EIF phase involvement; project approval, start, and end dates; main implementing entities; total project costs and EIF and non-EIF contributions; regional projects where the country is a recipient • <i>Review of EIF databases</i>, i.e., the Results and DTIS Action Matrix databases, Management Information System
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sparsity of data and documents, limiting assessment of progress and results against targets • Low levels of and variation in extent of reporting between project documents and EIF databases (both offline and online) resulting to low probability of triangulating evidence • No response to the country e-survey • No stakeholder interviews

3. CONTEXT

- Afghanistan has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 2016. It has a total land area of 652,860 km², with an estimated population of 38.9 million and a labour force participation rate of 47%. The country was predominantly an agriculture-based economy, but services has become a significant contributor to its economic development, with the sector accounting for at least less than half of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) since 2008.
- Overall, Afghanistan's economy is shaped by fragility, conflict, and aid dependence. Economic growth is generally characterised by high volatility due to its heavy reliance on agriculture. Moreover, the realisation of trade and development gains has been constrained by political instability and insecurity, weak competitiveness, governance and institutional challenges, and inadequate infrastructure.
- During 2008-2019, Afghanistan's real GDP grew 5.5% annually on average, lower than the 5.8% regional average in Asia. The country has remained a low-income economy, with average real income per capita moderately increasing from \$412 in 2008 to \$573 in 2019. While its Human Development Index score rose from 0.472 in 2010 to 0.511 in 2019, it remains as a country with low human development.
- Afghanistan is largely a net importer, with merchandise trade still dominating the country's trade structure. Meanwhile, merchandise exports totalled \$0.864 billion in

⁶ This case study was undertaken prior to the collapse of the Afghan Government and takeover of the country by the Taliban.

2019, a nearly twofold increase from 2008 (or an annual average of 4.0% in 2008-2019). Services exports continue to account for a substantially smaller proportion of the country's exports. It also exhibited a significant decrease at an average of 6.0% annually in 2008-2019, reaching \$0.600 billion in 2019. Nonetheless, it has seen a more robust growth than merchandise trade in 2018. Overall, Afghanistan accounted for 0.09% and 0.16% of Asia's total merchandise and services trade, respectively, over the period 2008-2019.

- Afghanistan's foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow since 2008 has been generally characterised by high volatility. FDI inflows amounted to \$38.5 million in 2019. Overall, the country's share in Asia's total FDI inflows stood at a marginal 0.03% over the period 2008-2019.
- Afghanistan is among the top largest recipients of AfT and most aid-dependent nations globally. In 2019, aid for trade (AfT) disbursements accounted for 3.9% of the country's GDP, or 6.6% on average over the period 2008-2019. However, AfT disbursements to the country has declined over the years. From an annual average of \$1.60 billion in 2008-2012, AfT disbursements contracted to reach an average of \$0.79 billion in 2015-2019. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements accounted for 7.5% of Asia's regional AfT disbursements and 3.6% of global AfT disbursements. Afghanistan is a recipient of AfT from several donors, but primarily the US, Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the UK, and Japan. The EIF has assisted Afghanistan since 2009, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$1.35 million⁷ and with disbursements to date totalling \$0.725 million, accounting for 0.006% of total AfT disbursements since 2009. The EIF's investment has focused on preparatory and analytical support, as well as strengthening national implementation arrangements. Overall, AfT flows to the country have mainly targeted economic infrastructure (53.1% of total AfT disbursements over 2008-2019, and notably on transport and storage); as well as building productive capacities (43.7%, and especially in agriculture).

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and in-country projects are aligned with the needs and national priorities of Afghanistan as expressed in the country's National Development Strategy 2008-2013. The EIF in Afghanistan has also been able to adapt to the evolving development context of the country and maintain its relevance to emerging EIF global priorities (including regional integration, value chains, trade participation of women and MSMEs, and services trade) and changing context, including from COVID-19. However, its relevance to the needs and priorities of the private sector and civil society remains relatively limited and/or unclear. Having regard to the relevance of the DTIS process, trade reforms match in content with the DTIS Action Matrix (AM) recommendations. Moreover, the DTIS Update and NIA Support projects build on the DTIS AM recommendations and priorities, particularly on compliance with post-WTO accession trade-related legislations and agricultural value chains. However, strong weaknesses were identified in terms of institutional capacity to develop trade policies/action plans using local resources, and in terms of inclusiveness of the consultative process (government, private sector and civil society views).
- **Coherence:** EIF Tier 1 projects are coordinating and seeking complementarities with other non-EIF AfT interventions. On the whole, however, while the country's aid-dependency has potentially provided an opportunity for the EIF to play a co-ordinating

⁷ \$1.34 million excluding the terminated NIA Support project.

role, this has not materialised and the EIF has not been able to gain much traction or influence in working with other donors or the government and private sector on AfT supply side programmes. Moreover, the suitability of in-country EIF delivery modalities (covering preparatory support through the pre-DTIS, analytical support through the DTIS and DTIS Update, and institutional capacity support through NIA support) in delivering the EIF's objectives and goals has only been limited to mainstreaming trade into NDPs and sector strategies.

- **Effectiveness:** Overall, the effectiveness of the Tier 1 projects in Afghanistan is low. Contribution to trade mainstreaming, policy reform, participation in international trade fora, regional objectives, training of officials and information dissemination is limited. However despite the narrow results, some outputs can be highlighted: the EIF has provided support to the country's accession to the WTO, it helped identify opportunities and priority actions relating to Afghanistan's trade agreements, and it provided training on project management to Ministry officials.
- **Efficiency:** The country has continued to face severe economic and governance challenges as a fragile and conflict-affected state, ultimately stalling the progress and efficiency of both EIF and non-EIF AfT interventions in the country. EIF delivery in the country has been hampered by long delays, mostly associated with inefficiency in governance structures (intra-ministerial challenges and inter-ministerial coordination issues causing delays in receiving government funding) and domestic challenges. Furthermore, out of the total EIF programmed budget, disbursements to date stand only at around 50%.
- **Sustainability:** Overall, given the contextual challenges (including security and conflict situations in the country, governance and operational challenges within and between key stakeholders) and institutional capacity constraints, the prospect of sustainability of EIF interventions and results is not very optimistic. For instance, there is evidence of the existence of trade coordination mechanisms in the country; however, there is relatively weak evidence to ascertain their sustainability. Moreover, there has been a relatively slow progress in terms of the integration of NIU functions into the government systems and processes. Domestic challenges coupled with coordination issues are potential contributing factors. Prior to the recent coup, it was noted that there was positive momentum in 2020 and early 2021. Overall, the project team was recruited and physically housed in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MoIC). [The core project staff was still externally recruited but generally considered advisable to ensure adequate management and accountability in the context of the country.] The MoIC has also established an AfT and donor coordination team under the leadership of MoIC's Deputy Minister. The team is considered as extended EIF NIU and consisted of government officials from various directorates of the MoIC. Coordination challenges between the MoIC as the main implementing entity and Ministry of Finance however remained, which are being improved through increased engagement including with ES and TFM. More optimistic results were identified in two areas: ownership of EIF activities and contribution to leveraging finance and expertise. On the former, the Afghan government subscribed to the DTIS/AM, co-funded the repackaged NIA support project and acted as its main implementing entity. For the latter, all the projects received in-kind contributions from the government and the EIF collaborated with and leveraged resources from development partners and donors to deliver several project outputs (e.g., compliance with post-WTO accession trade-related legislation especially on SPS and TBT, analytical work on value chains, or feasibility study on industrial parks for women entrepreneurs).

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- **Impact:** Due to the lack of institutional structures and a plethora of domestic challenges and constraints, the impact of EIF interventions has only been realised through supporting the country's integration into global and regional trading systems, and to a fairly limited extent. Over the course of the EIF programme in-country, Afghanistan has made some relative progress in terms of improving its business/regulatory environment for international trade. However, implementation of further regulatory reforms (e.g., on enhancing the logistics environment)—coupled with proper sequencing—proves imperative to sustain this progress and accelerate its integration in international markets.

Angola

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	13-March-2020
Total budget (Total EIF Contribution)	Total budget = \$365,000 Where EIF contribution= \$300,000 (including \$18,275 of World Bank internal funds) Development partners contribution= \$65,000
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	Government of Angola <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Commerce (as a pilot institution for the EIF) - Ministry of Finance - Ministry of Economy and Planning - Priority sector ministries (to be defined, but likely to be Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) World Bank <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International Trade Department (PRMTR) Other Stakeholders: UNDP African Development Bank EU Mission to Angola US Embassy China Embassy Private sector representatives
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<u>Tier 1</u> DTISU is a Tier 1 project under Outcome 1. It aligns with output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks'. <u>Tier 2</u> There are EIF Tier 2 EIF projects in Angola.
National projects	<u>Ongoing projects</u> DTIS Update (Phase 2, Tier 1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: World Bank, International Trade Department (PRMTR) - Start date: 13-March-2020 - End date: October 2021 *Please note, the NIA Support project has a status of 'formulation- in process' and has not yet begun.
Regional projects	LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	July-2021 to September-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document review; Economic Analysis

Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NIU- Ministry of Industry and Commerce <p>Internal documents reviewed across Angola’s DTISU project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ToRs - Project Document - Concept Note - Budget - Work Plans - Funds letter from World Bank - DTIS (2006) <p>External documents reviewed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Angola’s National Development Plan 2018-2022 <p>Angola’s Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Angola has no data in the EIF Results Database. - As the DTISU is still under implementation, the extent to which results will be achieved is unknown. - It is not clear who the country coordinator and DF are, since the ‘country team’ information is absent from Angola’s EIF webpage, as well as an internal list of contacts.

3. Context

- Angola is situated in southern Africa and has a long coastline. Its bordering countries are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia and Zambia. Angola has a population of 31.8 million people (2019). Angola’s GDP per capita was \$5,408 in 2014, falling to \$2,809 in 2019.
- Angola’s Human Development Index (HDI) score was 0.52 in 2010, which increased to 0.58 in 2019.
- Angola is part of several regional integration initiatives. In 2018, Angola signed up to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and in 2020 Angola ratified the AfCFTA. In 2018, Angola presented its tariff offer for the Free Trade Zone of SADC. It is also part of the CEEAC.
- On average, Angola’s real GDP grew 2.06%, compared to Africa’s real GDP growth of 2.9%.
- Angola’s oil sector accounts for one-third of GDP and more than 90% of exports. The transformation of a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model is a complex and long-term process and the oil sector will continue to play an important role during this transition period.
- Angola exported US\$41.4 billion in goods and services in 2018, out of which 95 percent were oil exports. On the other hand, imports, which reached US\$25.9 billion in goods and services in 2018, are more diversified. The main trading partners are China and Portugal and the main imported goods are: machinery, fuel, and foods. The average weighted tariff is 10.24%, but Angola has a lot of non-tariff trade barriers.
- Non-oil sector growth is projected to decline due to spillover effects from lower oil prices, reduced imported capital goods, tighter financing conditions, currency depreciation, and restrictions in the movements of goods and people due to COVID-19.

- According to the EIF study 'Aid for Trade at a glance' (2019), in Chapter 4 'Aid for Trade in challenging contexts', three LDCs- Angola, Bangladesh and Myanmar- account for over half of the LDC share of merchandise exports.
- On average, Angola's FDI inflows are -\$1,283 million a year. However, in 2015 alone, the FDI inflow was its highest at \$10,002 million.
- From 2008-2019, Angola received a total of \$644 million in Aid for Trade disbursements. Of this, 51% was spent on building productive capacity; 47% was spent on economic infrastructure; 2% was spent on trade policy and regulation. It can be noted that in 2015 alone, the total Aid for Trade disbursement was \$212 million.
- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), Angola ranked 177th out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', Angola scored 17 percentage points in 2015, which increased to 36 percentage points in 2019, hence there has been improvement.
- Angola's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) was 2.25 in 2010, which decreased to 2.05 in 2018. By LPI indicators, Angola's LPI Timeliness score highest, while its LPI Customs scored lowest.
- Angola's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) has remained constant from 2010-2014 with an average score of 3. By GCI indicators, Angola's Macroeconomic environment scores highest, while Angola's infrastructure scores lowest.

4. Conclusions

Relevance: According to Angola's DTISU concept note and Terms of Reference, the DTISU is well aligned with national needs and priorities. This is because the DTISU's key objective is to mainstream trade into economic diversification and poverty reduction strategies and to facilitate the achievement of the National Development Plan 2018-22 goals. In particular, the DTISU aligns with NDP 2018-22 Chapter 7 'Strategic Development Policies'. Within Chapter 7, there is 'Strategic Axis 2: Sustainable, Diversified and Inclusive Economic Development' (p.146), which entails a policy to promote production, import substitution and diversification of exports, as well as to improve the business environment. In 'Strategic Axis 3: Infrastructure necessary for development' (p.156), there is a focus on transportation and logistics. However, the DTISU aims to diversify Angola's economy away from oil production, yet the NDP 2018-22 still emphasises oil's importance, e.g., the oil sector has an employment annual growth rate of 6%, and oil can be transformed by adding-value further along the value-chain.

The DITSU is well aligned to the needs of Angola's private sector, as it identifies the following needs: improvement in business environment; regulation; business entry & exit; construction licensing; accessing electricity; land registration; access to credit. Indeed, these needs are reflected in NDP 2018-22. However, the DTISU is not aligned to the needs of civil society, and there is little to no mention of their needs or involvement in the DTISU.

The DTISU is aligned to emerging EIF priorities, as follows. Firstly, it states that a gender dimension will be integrated into the Action Matrix. Secondly, it identifies three potential Regional Value Chains for Angola: meat, cereals, and fish ornamental stones. Thirdly, it identifies barriers to accessing these regional and/or global agricultural value chains.

Angola is adapting to the following changing global contexts. Firstly, Angola's current growth model is based on oil wealth, which is volatile to international oil prices and failing oil production, and thereby threatens Angola's macroeconomic stability. The NDP 2018-22 acknowledges the need for diversified and inclusive economic growth, and in 2018, Angola adopted the Programme to Enhance Production, Export Diversification and Import Substitution (PRODESI). Secondly, Angola may lose preferential access to development markers if it

graduates from LDC status in 2024. Thirdly, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is due to expire in 2025. Indeed, the DTISU is timely because it is due for completion in 2021 and provides future trade planning and policy guidance to adapt to these changes.

The DTISU has inclusive consultative processes. A Technical Working Group will be formed of representatives from the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Planning, along with ministries responsible for priority sectors (to be defined, e.g., agriculture). The TWG will also be formed of development partners (World Bank, UNDP, African Development Bank, European Union, US Embassy, China Embassy), as well as Private Sector representatives, and will meet once a month and maintain dialogue with national and international stakeholders. However, civil society is not included in this TWG.

Coherence: The DTISU is broadly aligned to the EIF Theory of Change under outcome 1 'improved trade environment', particularly to indicator 1.1c 'DTIS developed' and indicator 2.2.b 'government-donor dialogue mechanisms on trade and investment matters'. It is expected the DTISU will serve as an appropriate analytical tool, which will be conducted by experts from the World Bank. In terms of coherence of other initiatives, the DTISU is timely because it is due for completion in 2021, and therefore could influence the mainstreaming of trade into the forthcoming NDP 2023-27.

Effectiveness: The DTISU's concept note and Terms of Reference indicate that the DTISU will be effective in the following areas. Firstly, the DTISU plans to contribute to increased knowledge by identifying some of the main constraints to trade, namely volatile oil prices, high tariffs, and non-tariff barriers. Secondly, the DTISU plans to mainstream trade into national economic diversification strategies, most notably in the forthcoming NDP 2023-27. Thirdly, the DTISU outlines recommendations to a) improve preferential agreements with other countries, b) to address policy and legislative constraints, c) to review multilateral, bilateral, regional integration schemes, and d) to provide recommendations on horizontal reforms on trade policy. Indeed, the Technical Working Group's arrangement to provide monthly updates should present ample opportunity for information sharing among key stakeholders. However, while the DTISU design is effective, it is not yet known whether the DTISU implementation will be equally as effective, considering the implementation phase has not yet begun.

Efficiency: In terms of money efficiency, the extent to which the DTISU has achieved activities within the allocated budget is unknown, as there is no available documentation on this. One concern to raise is that the World Bank contributed \$18,275 of its internal funds to the DTISU budget, yet the DTISU budget lines reveal that the World Bank administrative fee is \$17,500, which implies that the World Bank only contributed \$775 to the DTISU.

Impact: While the EIF's impact on sustainable development is unknown, it can be recognised that the DTISU's design has centred around sustainable development and poverty reduction, particularly because it emphasised a shift away from extractive economies (notably oil) towards inclusive and sustainable economic growth. In terms of the EIF's contribution to Angola's integration into global and regional trading systems, while it is noted that Angola ratified the AfCFTA in late 2020- while Angola was receiving EIF support- the EIF's contribution to this is unknown.

Sustainability: The NIU/ FP strongly agree that EIF initiatives are integrated into government systems. However, there is lack of supporting evidence. In terms of ownership, it is noted that the Government of Angola has not co-funded the DTISU. However, given that the ministries are heavily involved in the Technical Working Group arrangements, this does suggest a level of ownership. Through this Technical Working Group, the EIF is coordinating with key central ministries (e.g., Ministry of trade; finance; economy and planning), as well as partners (World Bank; UNDP; African Development Bank) and donors (EU, Embassy of US, Embassy of

China). However, it is not yet known whether the EIF will leverage additional finance, nor is it known the extent to which COVID-19 may affect the sustainability of results.

Cabo Verde

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	15-December-2011
Total budget (Total EIF Contribution)	Total budget: \$1,767,906 <u>Total EIF budget: \$1,694,343</u> DTISU: \$200,000 NIA Support (phase 1): \$900,000 NIA Support (phase 2): \$594,343 <u>Government contribution:</u> NIA Support: \$73,563
Participation in EIF Phases	Both Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, small island
Key stakeholders	Government of Cabo Verde - Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy - General Directorate of Industry and Trade (GDIT)
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<u>Tier 1</u> All 3 EIF projects in Cabo Verde are Tier 1, therefore align to Outcome 1. Under Outcome 1, there are strongly linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination', along with links to output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation'. <u>Tier 2</u> There are no EIF Tier 2 EIF projects in Cabo Verde.
National projects	<u>Completed projects:</u> DTIS Update (Phase 2, Tier 1) - MIE: Ministry of Tourism, Industry & Energy - Start date: 24-Sept-2012 - End date: 31-Aug-2020 NIA Support (Phase 1, Tier 1) - MIE: Ministry of Tourism, Industry & Energy - Start date: 15-Dec-2011 - End date: 31-Aug-2020 NIA Support (Phase 2, Tier 1) - MIE: Ministry of Tourism, Industry & Energy - Start date: 09-May-2016 - End date: 31-Aug-2020 *Please note, two Tier 2 projects have a status of 'identification' but were not implemented. These include 'Trade Facilitation, Cultural Industries and Quality framework' and 'Strengthening Trade Capacities of Cape Verde'
Regional projects	- N/A

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June-2021 to Sept-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-survey; Economic Analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pending <p>Documents reviewed across Cabo Verde's projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOU - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budget - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Creating Cabos Verde's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No e-survey was received from the NIU nor the DF. - In some documents, the MIE is confirmed to be the Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy. In other documents, it is confirmed to be the Ministry of Tourism, Investment and Entrepreneurial Development.

3. Context

- Cabo Verde is a small island state on an archipelago of volcanic origin in the Atlantic Ocean off the north-western coast of Africa. It shares maritime borders with Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal. Cabo Verde has a population of 550,000 people and a GDP per capita of \$3,603 (2019). Cabo Verde's economy is driven by tourism.
- Cabo Verde's Human Development Index (HDI) score was 0.66 in 2019.
- Cabo Verde is part of several regional initiatives: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AfCFTA and the EU EPA with West Africa.
- On average, Cabo Verde's real GDP grew 2.3%, which is comparable to Africa's real GDP growth of 2.9%.
- From 2008-2019, Cabo Verde received FDI inflows of \$136 million a year on average.
- Cabo Verde's merchandise and services exports totalled \$7,583 million, with services accounting for 90% of this total, and merchandise accounting for 10% of this total.
- Cabo Verde's merchandise and services imports totalled \$13,105 million, with merchandise accounting for 70% of this total, and services accounting for 30% of this total.

- From 2008-2019, the total Aid for Trade disbursement was \$866 million. Of this, 85% was spent on economic infrastructure and 15% was spent on building productive capacity. No AfT spent on trade policy and regulation.
- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), Cabo Verde was ranked 137 out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', Cabo Verde scored 64 percentage points in 2015, which increased to 69 percentage points in 2019, hence there has been some improvement.
- There is no data available on Cabo Verde's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI).
- Cabo Verde's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) was 3.5 in 2010, which increased to 3.7 in 2017. By GCI indicators, Cabo Verde' Health and Primary Education scored highest, while Cabo Verde's market size scored lowest.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Firstly, it should be noted that Cabo Verde's graduation and drop in development aid has increased the government's awareness of the importance of trade as a stimulant for production, consumption and income. Cabo Verde's 4 pillars of national priorities in 2012 were 1) develop tourism, 2) value-added fisheries, 3) strengthen port infrastructure, and 4) export financial and telecommunication ICT services. In the most recent National Sustainable Development Plan (PEDS) 2018-2022, the 3 pillars are: 1) Economy - a new model of economic growth; 2) Social- human capital quality of life, combatting inequalities, 3) Sovereignty- a new state model. There is documented evidence that Cabo Verde's EIF project-level logframes and objectives are well aligned with these national needs and priorities. However, while there are clear linkages between DTISU (2013) and the National Sustainable Development Plan (PEDS) 2018-2022, such as emphasis on fishery resources and export promotion, the EIF results database states the EIF's contribution to the NDP is unknown. Given that the Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy is not acknowledged in PEDS 2018-22, it is likely the DTISU did not have direct influence. Cabo Verde's DTISU highlights the challenges of the private sector, which are poor access to financing; high cost & low-quality inputs; lack of market dimensions; poor business environment. The DTISU AM addresses these challenges with targeted interventions, for example, one NIA Support Phase 2 logframe activity is that 'the private sector actively participates in trade priorities formulation under the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper III (2012-2016)'. While this strategic paper was created almost 10 years ago, the NIU has provided a written statement that this paper evolved into the NDEP with the entry of the new government. Compared to the private sector, there is little attention to the needs of civil society. For example, the DTISU AM recognises civil society as a group responsible for implementing actions, rather than as a group that merits its own AM activities.

There is some evidence that Cabo Verde is adapting to the EIF's emerging priorities, such as gender. There are two women-led NGOs (OMCV and MORABI), which are represented at Cabo Verde's National Steering Committee. Moreover, the EIF results database shows that training data has been disaggregated by gender. While there is mention of other emerging EIF priorities, such as regional integration into ECOWAS, the EIF role in this is not clearly defined.

Cabo Verde has proven to be adaptive during changing global contexts. This is evident by Cabo Verde's ability to continue implementing the action matrix with good progress despite two major challenges, as follows: 1) Cabo Verde faced adverse effects of the global economic and financial crisis 2008-09, particularly in the Euro Zone, which is its main economic partner, and 2) the interruption in Cabo Verde's continuous participation in the EIF as a result of its graduation from the LDC list caused it to lose momentum.

Cabo Verde's DTIS has been somewhat successful in implementing new policies. For example, under DTIS (2009), a trade strategy paper was prepared with support from UNCTAD, which led to the approval of a new maritime code in 2010. Moreover, the DTIS (2009) led to capacity building training programmes that benefited public administration staff in areas of customs administration, economic regulation, SPS and TRIPs, quality systems.

The DTISU was drafted by the National Implementation Unit, Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy (MTIE). Moreover, the DTISU was consulted by UNDP, the Centre for Policy Strategy- CPE, the National Directorate for Planning, the Coordinating Unit for State Reform, and the West Africa Institute- IAO. In addition, both the private sector and civil society were part of the DTISU preparation and validation process, and actively participated in setting priorities in the medium-long term.

- **Coherence:** There is strong alignment with the EIF Theory of Change, which is most notably in the NIA Support Phase 2 project-level logframe with direct indicators on the number of programmes that integrate trade, establish coordination mechanisms, and update policies. The EIF appears to have avoided duplication with other programme; this could be attributed to the fact that the NIU coordinator was also the strategic advisor to the General Directorate of Industry and Trade (GDIT), hence facilitating good coordination between GDIT and the EIF's Main Implementing Entity, the Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy.
- **Effectiveness:** With regards to how effective the DTIS AM has been, of the 25 actions in the DTIS (2009) AM, 56% are in progress of implementation, while 44% have not made progress. There is less evidence to show the extent to which DTISU (2013) has been implemented. However, given that Cabo Verde's EIF projects have been completed, more evidence on the progress of implementation would have been expected. With regards to mainstreaming trade, the NIU has stated that the DTIS directly influenced the National Sustainable Development Plan (PEDS 2018-22) paper.

In terms of EIF contribution to policy reform, there is written documentation that the EIF provided input to the revision of Cabo Verde's Industry and Trade Law in 2018. Moreover, it appears the EIF contributed to Cabo Verde's participation in international trade for a, as follows. Firstly, the NIU provided support to the National Directorate on Energy, Industry and Trade in the implementation of WTO's trade facilitation agreement. Secondly, the NIU coordinator participated in the International Forum of National Trade Facilitation Committees in Geneva from 23-27 Jan 2017. Thirdly, an impact study on the EPA with the European Union was conducted, as a result of the DTIS (2009) recommendations.

In terms of regional integration, the DTIS (2009) AM recommendations have been effective, as a specialised unit for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created as part of the overall effort to create a national trade strategy. On the contrary, it is noted that there is little mention of the EIF's contribution to ECOWAS regional objectives.

In 2017, the NIU participated in multiple trainings, including Training Trade Policy Analysis organised by UNECA; Participation to UNIDO Ministerial Conference for LDCs in Vienna; and Participation in the World Bank's Doing Business meeting. In addition, the private sector participated in a series of training in 2017, including, Training on Harvest and Post-Harvest techniques and Good Agricultural practices for MSMEs with 32 participants, 8 of which were women; Training on Good Practices in Cheese Production with 14 participants, all of whom were women; and Certification on agro-food products 'GROGUE', with 22 participants, of which 8 were women. There is

an annual training plan, which shows that these trainings were planned in consultation with partners.

There are good M&E systems in place, which is evident in frequency of mid-term evaluations, annual reports and financial reports. An M&E framework was created in 2014. However, it remains unclear why two Tier 2 projects were identified, but not implemented. This could be due to LDC graduation.

In terms of EIF operational systems, the NSC used to consist predominately of members of government. However, after review of the NSC in 2015, the NSC agreed to strengthen representation from the private sector, civil society and donors. The NSC was then replaced by the National Council of Trade (NCT), whose main objective is the development, negotiation, implementation and supervision of trade policy. It is also responsible for piloting the EIF. The NSC will be taken over by the future Aid for Trade Committee (ATC). This is a strong example of ownership.

- **Efficiency:** There has been a good level of efficiency, as all projects and activities were completed within budget, with a remaining balance of \$5,651, which was refunded back to TFM. For the NIA Support project, there have been multiple no-cost extensions, approved in: December 2014, June 2015, November 2015, January 2018, January 2019, June 2019, and June 2020. These NCEs were caused by a lengthy government transition.
- **Sustainability:** When considering the integration of EIF initiatives into government structures and ownership of EIF initiatives, progress has made. Most notably, because the NSC evolved to become the Aid for Trade Committee (ATC). In addition, the National Council of Commerce was created to serve as a mechanism for public-private coordination. Moreover, the NIU was extended to cover activities beyond EIF, which is a promising sign. However, it remains unclear who will fund these structures once EIF funding ends.

All EIF projects in Cabo Verde were completed by August 2020. A final report was due produced in December 2020 however this was cancelled. Therefore, there is no written confirmation as to whether COVID-19 affected the sustainability of the achieved results. Given that there were no tier 2 projects, it can be inferred that COVID-19 is less likely to have significant affect.

- **Impact:** While there have been Tier 2-style trainings (see above in the Effectiveness section), there is little evidence that the EIF has contributed to sustainable development in Cabo Verde. In terms of EIF contribution to integration of LDCS in global/ regional trading systems, the EIF did support the creation of a specialised unit for ECOWAS. There is written confirmation that Cabo Verde has been a strong enthusiast of the EIF process, having successfully completed accession into the WTO. However, it should be noted that the EIF has reported 'progress made' against some of the regional integration activities in the logframe, within explicitly stating what type of progress has been made, hence evidence in this area is weak.

Central African Republic

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	26 May 2010
Total budget	\$3,020,313
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC; Landlocked; FCAS
Key stakeholders	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are two (2) Tier 1 projects in Central African Republic which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, one (1) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment' and two (2) projects have strong linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There is one (1) Tier 2 project in Central African Republic which therefore aligns under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Specifically, this project has strong linkages with output 1 'improved participation of EIF countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets' and output 2 'improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NIA Support (Ph1) <p><u>Ongoing project</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NIA Support (Ph2) Strengthening the productive and commercial capacities of sesame, corn and palm oil
Regional projects	LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Economic Analysis; E-Survey Results (NIU)
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>Documents reviewed across CAR's 3 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOUs (and MOU Amendments) TORs Project Proposals/ Concept Notes Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports Budgets (and Budget Revisions) Work Plans Risk Mitigation Strategies Financial Reports

	<p>CAR's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) • Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates • Project Tiers (1 or 2) • Project Phase (1 or 2) • Main Implementing Entities • Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
<p>Limitations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of clear data in the results database communicated by the EIF ES. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Double counting and counting of entries even if entry there is uncertainty or if cited from 'old database' but unidentified (e.g. under indicator 2.3a); ○ Activities/tools included do not necessarily conform to indicator/data definitions set out in the EIF programme logframe (e.g. Training of women and young people on business creation and business plan include under indicator 1.3a relating to training of public official). • Lack of e-survey response from the donor facilitator • Results of final evaluation for NIA Support (Ph2) not yet available – Evaluation in process

3. Context

- The Central African Republic is a landlocked country amongst the poorest and most fragile in the world despite its wealth of agricultural and mineral resources. Over the last decade, the persistence of insecurity has overall hindered the country's economic performance and prevented the implementation of certain EIF projects on a national scale. In 2021, the incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra was re-elected as President of the Central African Republic after a turbulent election cycle.
- Over the 2008-2019 period, CAR's real GDP grew 0.59% annually on average, lower than the 2.9% regional average in the Africa. The low annual average is the result of a 36,39% fall in 2013 linked to internal conflicts. The country's real GDP in constant 2010 dollars decreased from \$1886 million in 2008 to about \$1823 million in 2019. By 2019, CAR accounted for 0.07% of Africa's GDP. CAR remains a low development country, currently ranking 188 out of 189 on the UN Human Development Index (HDI) with its HDI score rising from 0.365 in 2010 to 0.397 in 2019.
- International trade has not played a key role in CAR's economy, accounting for 40,9% of GDP since 2008. Merchandise trade still dominates the country's trade structure. Merchandise exports totalled \$147 million in 2019, down by 1,69% from 2008 (or an annual average of 2.85% in 2008-2019). While services exports continue to account for a smaller proportion of the country's exports, it remarkably grew by 284% or 16.1% annually in 2008-2018, reaching \$53 million in 2018. Overall, CAR accounted for 0.04% and 0.04% of Africa's total merchandise and services trade, respectively, over the period 2008-2018.
- CAR's foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been trending up since an important decrease from 2008-2013. Despite a positive trend in recent years, FDI inflows remain low, amounting to \$25.5 million in 2019, up from the \$18 million the previous year. Overall, CAR's share in Africa's total FDI inflows stood at 0.06% over the period 2008-2019.

- In 2019, AfT disbursements accounted for 2.5% of the country's GDP, or 1.75% on average over the period 2008-2019. With annual average of \$38 million over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements were generally trending down since reaching a peak at \$93.2 million in 2011. However, an uptake in AfT has been observed in 2018 and 2019 with disbursements amounting to \$71.5 million and \$57.6 million respectively. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements to CAR accounted for 0.3% of Africa's regional AfT disbursements. Overall, AfT flows to CAR have mainly targeted aid for economic infrastructure (74.1% of total AfT disbursements over 2008-2019), as well as building productive capacity (21.2%).
- Recent data shows that over the period 2015-2019, CAR has not made any progress in terms of reducing the time and cost associated with the logistics of exporting and importing goods. However, overall ease of doing business score increased slightly from 32 to 36. Moreover, CAR has regressed in terms of overall logistics performance. While it regressed on all 6 indicators, the most notable deterioration is to be observed in the area of timeliness of shipments reaching destination within the scheduled delivery time, tracking and tracing consignments and competence and quality of logistics services

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and in-country projects are aligned with the needs and national priorities of CAR, several projects having close linkages with objectives identified in the Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA 2017-2021). In addition, the ongoing Tier 2 project targets value chains identified in the Strategy for the transformation of Central African agriculture (2020-2025). EIF Activities are also well aligned with the needs of the private sector and the civil society. In this respect, the ongoing Tier 2 project targets small production units, associations of producers, traders. The project's implementation involves farmers' organisations and private sector groups. Moreover, the national EIF steering committee, responsible *inter alia* for the developing sectoral strategies and monitoring the EIF process, chaired by the Minister of trade and industry, is composed of representatives of public services, the private sector, civil society and development partners. Lastly, the EIF in CAR has also been able to adapt to the evolving development context of the country and maintain its relevance to emerging EIF global priorities and changing context, including in the areas of participation of women and SMEs.
- **Coherence:** EIF national projects in CAR are broadly aligned with the programme's TOC (all outputs under outcome 1; and two out of three outputs under outcome 2). Yet, it shall be noted that a Tier 1 project has linkages with Outcome 2 and a Tier 2 project has linkages with Outcome 1. Complementarities with other development interventions in-country were sought, notably through several strategy papers aimed at coordination AfT support. For instance, NIA Support Ph2 is currently implementing trade-related priorities identified in the RCPCA which was developed by the Government with the support and backing of the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank. However, EIF interventions in CAR were limited to institutional capacity building (through NIA Support Ph1 & Ph2) and supply-side support (through the Tier 2 project), and the DTIS developed in 2007 under the IF has not yet been updated. The lack of analytical support in CAR is attributable to the fragile country context which limited EIF in-country interventions.
- **Effectiveness:** Despite CAR's FCAS status, the EIF Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching their objectives. Specifically, the EIF has helped the country with trade mainstreaming. Indeed, trade is now integrated into the latest national

development and poverty reduction strategy and sectoral strategies. Moreover, the EIF initiatives are very well integrated into government systems. This is evidence by the NIU meeting the five criteria set by the program logframe. It is physically housed in a government ministry, government officials form part of the of the NIU, the NIU is formally in the ministry organigramme, it has a role in coordinating technical assistance and its team facilitates the coordination of inter-sectoral bodies related to trade. Tier 1 interventions also contributed to policy reform and the strengthening regulatory frameworks, as well as to CAR's participation in international trade fora. As of the latter, CAR received support for the ratification and implementation of the WTO TFA, the adoption of several laws aligned with WTO rules and the ratification of the AfCFTA. Lastly, more than 300 officials and private sector actors joined trade-related trainings and a number of information dissemination and awareness raising tools were rolled out. As of Tier 2 effectiveness, the Sesame Corn & Palm Oil project was signed in September 2020, most of the planned activities has not yet been carried out and it is thus too early to evaluate the contribution to results in different value-chains. Moreover, EIF contribution to the adoption of new technologies, although limited for the moment, is foreseeable. A preparatory meeting took place in anticipation to the purchase of small equipment and laboratory materials for the Central African Institute for Agricultural Research (ICRA) and the Office for the Regulation of the Marketing and Packaging of Agricultural Products (ORCCPA). Results under Outcome 2 of the EIF TOC can also be found under Tier 1 interventions. For instance, under NIA Support, private sector and civil society actors received training on business creation, business planning, ISO standards, packaging techniques, and SMEs were supported to participate to trade fairs.

- **Efficiency:** Tier 1 interventions in CAR are characterized by high expenditure rates for low levels of completion and overall delays in the execution of planned activities, in part due to contextual reasons (deterioration of in-country security situation). As of Tier 2 projects, it is yet to early to rate their efficiency. Moreover, Covid-19 disrupted EIF activities in CAR, causing slight delays in the delivery of some planned expenditure and affecting trade fairs and communication campaigns.
- **Sustainability:** EIF initiatives are well integrated into government priorities in CAR, mainly through the integration of the NIU into government systems (see the five criteria in 'Effectiveness'). In addition, there is evidence of the strong ownership of EIF activities by the government which is the main implementing entity in all three national projects, despite the country's FCAS status. Having regard to the EIF's contribution to leveraging finance, despite numerous actions in this regard, only one EIF project was co-financed by development partners and the private sector. The government's financial and in-kind contribution to the two ongoing projects and the existence of coordination mechanisms with donors and private sector reflect positively on the sustainability of EIF initiatives in CAR.
- **Impact:** Overall, EIF interventions in CAR have contributed to sustainable (and inclusive) development, through activities aimed at empowering women and youth and supporting trade associations and small business. Also the EIF has contributed to the integration of CAR into global and regional trading systems through, for instance, support for the ratification of the WTO TFA and the AfCFTA. As a result, CAR ratified the WTO TFA on 11 January 2018 and has now implemented 26.9% of its commitments. As of the AfCFTA, CAR deposited its instruments of ratification on 22 September 2020. However, EIF initiatives have not yet led to increased exports, production or turnover.

Djibouti

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	30 September 2011
Total budget	\$5,631,049
Participation in EIF Phases	Both Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, FCAS (until 2019)
Key stakeholders	Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Office National du Tourisme; UNOPS; UNCTAD
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>NIA Support</p> <p>Objective: Enable the NIU and the NSC to effectively manage the EIF process and facilitate the integration of trade into the national development strategies of the country. It aims to provide efficient technical assistance to coordinate the participation of Djibouti in the EIF. It will also support the establishment of a long-term successful partnership between the NIU and EIF development partners.</p> <p>Expected results: The expected results are: (1) commerce is an essential component of the global development strategy, including the INDS and/or other strategic documents of the Republic of Djibouti; and (2) the staff of the beneficiary institutions will be trained in the intricacies of the multi-lateral trading system, trade negotiation techniques, the formulation and management of projects and other trade-related thematic issues.</p> <p>Tier 1 outputs: Assist in the formulation of Category 2 projects and monitor and evaluate their implementation <i>[links to output 1.3c]</i>; Organise regular meetings to establish a permanent dialogue between Djibouti's partners (public/private/civil society partnership) and between donors and the government in order to mobilise funds for Aid for Trade <i>[links to output 1.2b]</i>; Participate in committees, commissions or working groups that develop partners' sectoral strategies in order to facilitate the inclusion of trade in all national development plans development plans <i>[links to output 1.1a]</i>; Collaborate with the beneficiaries of the EIF, the NDC, the ES, the Donor Facilitator and the international organisations involved in the EIF to ensure coordination between these actors at all stages of the process <i>[links to output 1.2c]</i>.</p> <p>Sustainability Support</p> <p>Objective: Support the Republic of Djibouti in its progressive integration into the multilateral trading system.</p> <p>Expected results: (1) The availability of a trade agenda that supports sustainable growth for the poor; and (2) the strengthening of the country's presence in international markets.</p> <p>Tier 1 outputs: Update the National Trade Development Strategy (NTS2) <i>[links to output 1.1.a]</i>; prepare and participate in trade-related regional and international meetings <i>[links to output 1.1.b]</i>; support the meetings of the national high council for public-private dialogue and the meetings of the sub-committee in charge of trade-related issues. <i>[links to output 1.2.c]</i>; implement the communication plan. <i>[links to output 1.3.c]</i>; organise training sessions in partnership with the Djibouti Chamber of Commerce and/or professional associations for the benefit of private sector actors according to the needs identified in the work plan. <i>[links to output 1.3.b]</i>; organise awareness-raising meetings on the themes of "gender & trade" and "environment & trade. <i>[links to output 2.1.b]</i>.</p> <p>National trade & e-commerce strategy development</p>

	<p>Objective: Support in the elaboration of two sectoral strategies: a national strategy for the development of trade and a national strategy for the development of e-commerce in order to best contribute to the fight against poverty. Tier 1 outputs: <i>[Links to 1.1.a]</i></p> <p><u>Tourism Development & Promotion</u> Objective: To contribute to the creation of income and employment in the tourism sector in Djibouti in order to reduce poverty. Expected results: The institutional and human capacities of the National Tourist Office, the Tourism Directorate and the Arta Hotel School are strengthened; the range of Djibouti tourism products/services is improved and diversified; and the commercial promotion and marketing of Djibouti destinations are carried out at national, regional and international levels. Tier 1 and 2 outputs: Support the government in concluding air service agreements with other countries that include liberal include liberal clauses such as fifth freedom free capacity and free determination, in order to encourage determination, in order to encourage passenger traffic in the region <i>[Links to 1.1.b]</i>; strengthen the teams of the ONTD and the Ministry's Directorate of Handicrafts and Tourism in the following areas: development, implementation and monitoring of tourism development strategies and actions <i>[Links to 2.1.a]</i>; training in tourism professions <i>[Links to 2.1.a]</i>; participating in world tourism fairs in Paris, Dubai, Berlin, Tokyo <i>[Links to 2.1.e]</i>.</p> <p><u>Amelioration de l'économie informelle</u> Objective: This project aims to contribute to the improvement of the business environment through the integration of the informal economy into the formal economic fabric and the development of entrepreneurship in order to allow for inclusive and income-generating growth. Expected results: (1) Private sector governance for better decision making is strengthened; (2) formalization and control of informal units are promoted; and (3) the quality of production and marketing is developed. Tier 1 and 2 outputs: Develop a Master Plan on formalization and crafts <i>[Links to 1.1.a]</i>; and review and improve 10 priority legal texts and establish a legal text and a licence card for the exercise of craft, trade and service trades <i>[Links to 1.1.d]</i>; strengthen the Directorate of Handicrafts, the Directorate of Formalisation and the UMO with computer equipment plus CASAF <i>[Links to 2.1.a]</i>; organise a round table for the mobilisation of partners around the development of the craft industry and the development of SMEs <i>[Links to 2.1.d]</i>.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTIS Update • NIA Support • NIA Support through ITA • Sustainability Support • Tourism Development & promotion <p><u>Projects under implementation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National trade & e-commerce strategy development • Improving the business environment and developing entrepreneurship
Regional projects	N/A

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Economic Analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey (answers from the NIU and DF) Documents reviewed across Djibouti's 7 projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOUs (and MOU Amendments) • TORs • Project Proposals/ Concept Notes • Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) • Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports • Budgets (and Budget Revisions) • Work Plans • Project-level Log Frames • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Financial Reports <p>Djibouti's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) • Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates • Project Tiers (1 or 2) • Project Phase (1 or 2) • Main Implementing Entities • Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low response rate to the e-survey • Some evaluation reports are missing (e.g., for Sustainability Support Project) • Often, external evaluators do not use the 1-4 scoring system against the OECD DAC criteria, but use an independent scoring system. This means that external and internal project scoring cannot be compared. • Often, non-EIF contribution is not visibly recorded (e.g., counterpart funding from government)

3. Context

- Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in Africa and set to be one of the fastest growing economy on the continent. Because of the small size of its economy, Djibouti can hardly diversify its production and is all the more dependent on imports, which makes it more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the economy. However, its advantage lies in its strategic geographical position, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, close to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, and at the crossroads of Asia and Europe. Its economy is based on a port complex that is among the most modern in the world.
- While Djibouti's trade structure is dominated by merchandise trade, services trade is in ascendance. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total services trade exhibited a robust growth, driven by growth in both exports and imports.
- Djibouti has not faced as severe an outbreak of COVID-19 as some countries. Overall, its economy has suffered from weakened global demand due to the pandemic, which has led to a sharp slowdown in re-export activity from the Doraleh terminal - Djibouti's main source of growth. Real GDP growth has slowed to 1.4% in 2020 from 7.8% in 2019. A decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) and port revenues weakened the current account balance, which showed a deficit of 9.2% of GDP in 2020, compared with a surplus of 13% of GDP a year earlier.
- Aid for trade (Aft) disbursements in Djibouti have been generally trending up since 2008. In 2019, Aft disbursements accounted for 3.0% of the country's GDP, or 2.1% on average over the period 2008-2019. From an annual average of \$37.9 million in 2008-2018, Aft disbursements more than doubled, reaching \$99.8 million in 2019. Over the period 2008-2019, Aft disbursements to Djibouti accounted for 0.34% of Africa's regional Aft disbursements. The EIF has assisted Djibouti since 2011, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$4.6 million and accounting for 1.0% of total Aft disbursements since 2011. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, strengthening national implementation arrangements and support to the tourism sector.
- Djibouti has not made any progress in reducing time and cost of trading. However, overall ease of doing business improved from 46 (2014) to 60 (2019). Djibouti's logistics performance index improved from 2.15 (2014) to 2.63 (2018).
- Unlike its neighbours (Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia and Eritrea) Djibouti has managed to preserve peace and social cohesion over the last decade. In 2021, the incumbent President Ismail Omar Guelleh was re-elected for the fifth time since he has started running the country in 1999. Legally, this is the President's last term.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF intervention in Djibouti is relevant, its objectives and design respond to the needs and priorities of the country. In particular, Tier 1 and Tier 2 intervention are well aligned with nation priorities and needs, with trade being integrated in Djibouti's Strategy for Accelerated Growth and promotion of Employment (2015-2019) under its First Axis on Economic Growth, Competition and Leading Role of the private Sector. With the end of the NDP in 2019, Trade continues to be integrated at a national and strategic level through the long-term development strategy "Djibouti Vision 2035" as well as into the five-year strategy for operationalizing the vision. Trade is also integrated into the national trade development strategy and the SCAPE, which emanate from Vision 2035. It is also integrated into the strategies of sectoral ministries such as those of the environment, energy, transport, etc. Likewise, EIF interventions are aligned with the needs of the private sector and civil society with

the *Haut Conseil National du Dialogue Public-privé* (HCNDPP) operational since March 2014. This body serves as a forum for discussion between the private and public sectors. Finally, the scope of EIF projects in Djibouti is reflective of an adaptation to emerging EIF priorities: a project on the improvement of the informal economy aims, by nature, supporting women, youth and actors of the informal economy. Under Tier 1, the sustainability support project also organised awareness-raising meetings on the themes of "gender & trade" and "environment & trade".

The DTIS process in Djibouti is similarly relevant. Some EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and the action matrix, and the DTIS consultative processes (with government, private sector, and civil society) was relatively inclusive. Moreover, the DTIS has contributed to the introduction and modification of numerous national policies and regulations (e.g., National Trade Development Strategy; Sectoral strategies on energy, tourism, transport and environment; the Sustainable Tourism Development Plan; and the update of the Investment code).

- **Coherence:** EIF interventions in Djibouti are overall very coherent, they are compatible with other in-country interventions. Project logframes and expected results are strongly aligned with the EIF's TOC. Moreover, the EIF's in-country delivery modalities (analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals. Lastly, there is strong evidence of efforts to coordinate with development partners: in 2015 the Ministerial Council created an institutional framework for dialogue between the government and technical and financial partners, comprised of an annual development forum, a strategic coordination committee, and sector working groups. The framework serves to promote coordination and harmonisation of partners interventions and ease the mobilisation of technical and financial resources.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching their objectives. Specifically, strong results were observed in terms of support to sustainability, contribution to trade mainstreaming (e.g. trade is mainstreamed in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and promotion of Employment and Djibouti Vision 2035); contribution to policy reform (e.g. the sustainability project included a review of the National Trade Development Strategy, the EIF supported a review of the tourism sector strategy within the context of the Tier II project on tourism) and training of officials (e.g. workshops on COMESA integration, training on financial management and negotiations techniques for the NIU). The EIF also contributed information dissemination and awareness raising through online presence (website, social media), promotional videos, newspaper articles and the drafting of a communication plan. However, in contrast to the above positive results, contribution to participation in international trade fora and information dissemination have been very limited. Apart from a Facebook page, no dissemination platform is currently operational.

As of Tier 2 projects effectiveness, good results are also observed in terms of contribution to results in the tourism sector. As a result of EIF's intervention in the sector, Djibouti was rated in the lonely planet magazine, the number of national and international tourists has increased significantly, and the number of productive investments in this sector has increased. Moreover as part of the support to tourism sector, training sessions were organised in hygiene quality, food safety, tourist protection, catering and hotel management. The EIF also supported the participation to several trade fairs (WTM London 2019, WTM Africa in Cape Town 2019 and the Dubai boat show 2018). Finally, contribution to trade facilitation and the adoption of new technologies was also observed.

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- **Efficiency:** Overall delivery of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 initiatives in Djibouti are characterized by a strong degree of efficiency. Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects performed well in accordance with the various approved workplans. However, despite overall positive results, various delays were experienced due to technical difficulties encountered by the NIU, insufficient communication, the frequent changes of the Focal Point and Coordinator. These delays are also due to the impacts of COVID-19.
 - **Impact:** Following EIF interventions in Djibouti some relative impact has been noted in terms of contribution to both sustainable development and integration of Djibouti into the global and regional trading systems. Within the framework of the project for the promotion of tourism, the EIF has contributed to the development of the sector, in particular through the preparation of the Master Plan for the development of sustainable tourism. The National Tourist Office is continuing to implement this master plan, which focuses on development of ecotourism in Djibouti. The EIF is also contributing to the formalization of the Djiboutian economy. In 2020, the tier 2 project on improving the business environment and developing entrepreneurship contributed to the formalization of more than 850 informal units in different sectors. In this regard, a master plan has been produced to support informal units to move away from this status.
 - **Sustainability:** Activities conducted, and changes introduced in Djibouti are overall sustainable. Evidence points out that EIF initiatives are well integrated into government priorities, activities, structures and processes. In particular, the Djiboutian government allocates an annual budget to support the implementation of the EIF. In addition, the NIU has been almost fully integrated into the government, meeting 3 of the 5 integration criteria: it is hosted by the Ministry of Commerce, there is an official decision on its institutional integration, it is responsible for coordination AfT initiatives and it plays a coordinating role in facilitating cross-sectoral trade related mechanisms. For the moment, Djibouti NIU only manages EIF projects. Moreover, there is evidence of the existence of coordination mechanisms: through the National Steering Committee, the EIF in Djibouti cooperates with other government agencies, donors and private sector actors, the National coordination unit supports the High Council for Public-Private Dialogue since 2014, and the NIU signed agreements, inter alia, with the Centre for Action and Empowerment of Women and the National Union of Women in Djibouti to improve the quality of products. Partnership agreements were also signed with the CLE, the CASAF and the OPDIC. However, better sustainability could have been achieved with stronger contribution to leveraging finance and expertise. Indeed, government funding is lacking and will likely affect the continuation of initiatives.

Equatorial Guinea

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	13-February-2017
Total budget (Total EIF Contribution)	Total budget: \$1,664,435 Of which <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EIF contribution: \$1,223,560 - Government contribution: \$400,875 - Development partners contribution: \$30,000 (World Bank and UNDP)
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	Government of Equatorial Guinea <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Commerce World Bank <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade Department (PRMTR) UNDP
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<u>Tier 1</u> All 3 EIF projects in Equatorial Guinea's are Tier 1, therefore align to Outcome 1. Under Outcome 1, there are strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks' and output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination', and output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation'. <u>Tier 2</u> There are no tier 2 projects.
National projects	<u>Completed projects</u> Pre- DTIS (Phase 2, Tier 1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: Government of Equatorial Guinea- Ministry of Commerce - Start date: 13-Feb-2017 - End date: 12-Feb-2018 DTIS (Phase 2, Tier 1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: World Bank, International Trade Department (PRMTR) - Start date: 30-June-2017 - End date: 30- Sept-2018 <u>Ongoing projects</u> NIA Support (Phase 2, Tier 1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIE: UNDP - Start date: 31-Jan-2019 - End date: 31-Jan-2022
Regional projects	LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status.

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June-2021 to August-2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-survey; Economic Analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NIU <p>Documents reviewed across Equatorial Guinea's projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOU - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budget - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Creating Equatorial Guinea's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Main Implementing Entities - Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Donor Facilitator (US Embassy) did not complete the e-survey.

3. Context

- Equatorial Guinea is bordered by Cameroon and Gabon and is situated in the Central African Coast. It has a population of 1.4 million people (2020). Equatorial Guinea's GDP per capita was \$21,771 in 2012, which fell \$7,143 in 2020.
- In 2019, Equatorial Guinea's Human Development Index (HDI) score was 0.592.
- Equatorial Guinea is on its way to becoming a regional natural gas producer and exporter, having recently delivered the country's first shipment of methanol to neighbouring Gabon in 2021. This was enabled by the AfCFTA.
- Equatorial Guinea is part of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Equatorial Guinea is among the countries worst hit by the CEMAC crisis which started in 2014, facing twin deficits and a rapid loss of international reserves stemming from dependence on oil exports, lack of sufficient buffers, and weak public financial management (PFM) procedures.
- On average, Equatorial Guinea's real GDP grew by -2.9% a year, compared to Africa's real GDP growth of 2.9%.
- On average, between 2008-2019, Equatorial Guinea's FDI inflows were \$727 million a year.
- Between 2008-2019, Equatorial Guinea received a total of \$5.3 million in Aid for Trade disbursements. Of this, \$0.4 million was spent on economic infrastructure, \$4.8 million was spent on building productive capacity, and \$0.1 was spent on trade and policy regulation.

- According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (2020), Equatorial Guinea ranked 178th out of 190 countries. Under the EODB indicator 'Trading Across Borders', Equatorial Guinea scored 32 percentage points in 2015, which remained constant at 32 percentage points in 2019, hence there has been no improvement.
- Equatorial Guinea's overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) was 2.3 in 2014 and has remained constant at 2.3 in 2018. By LPI indicators, its highest scoring LPI was timeliness and its lowest scoring LPI was infrastructure.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** EIF projects in Equatorial Guinea are well aligned to national needs and priorities. The EIF contributed to integrating trade into NDP 2020-2035; the DTIS was produced during the NDP cycle, and the DTIS/ AM recommendations have been integrated into the NDP's strategies. Moreover, the DTIS shaped the trade aspects of the National Economic Development Plan: Horizon 2035. There is written justification from the NIU/ FP that there is regular support to the private sector, MSMEs, women and youth working in rural agriculture. This support includes training, for example, in 2020 the EIF trained private sector actors in entrepreneurship (including 41 women and 118 youth) and trained 82 private actors trained on business management (including 23 women). More trainings in addition to these examples were held in 2020 and other years. In terms of adaptation to emerging EIF priorities, in 2019 the EIF arranged a DTIS workshop to sensitise stakeholders on the need to adopt a gendered approach to empower women economically through trade, agriculture and exports. Value chains, another emerging priority, is present as an indicator in Equatorial Guinea's 2020 annual report. While there are no Tier 2 projects in Equatorial Guinea, it is noted that a Tier 2 project proposal was submitted to the Executive Secretariat, which includes a gendered approach. Although COVID has affected some activities, (e.g., the initiative to support MSMEs has been affected financially by COVID-19, and seminars and meetings had to be cancelled), it has been reported that the EIF projects adapted well and were able to continue with regular implementation.

With regards to the relevance of the DTIS, there is evidence that the EIF supported General Trade Laws 2019-2020 by drafting the regulation. Moreover, through EIF support, Decree No.109/ 2.019 (5 September 2020) established the national committee for the improvement of the business climate & the competitiveness of the Equatorial Guinean economy. Public sector capacity building was provided, which included technical sessions for the Third National Economic Conference in April 2019; the National Economic Recovery Plan 2020-22; the next National Development Plan, Horizon 2035. The DTIS was designed with inclusive consultative processes, since it was carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry of Trade & Promotion of SMEs, as well as a one-off consultative workshop with representatives from the private sector and civil society. The DTIS incorporated information shared by several government ministries (including Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Forest; Fisheries and Water; Industry and Energy; Mining and Hydrocarbons).

- **Coherence:** There is clear linkage between the EIF project-level logframes and the EIF Theory of Change (TOC). Taking the NIA Support project as an example, its indicators on trade policy are identical to the following TOC outputs: national development and poverty reduction objectives; capacity building; integration into regional markets. The EIF projects are well coordinated with other initiatives, notably the National Development Strategy and other sectoral policies in agriculture, fisheries, and human development.

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- **Effectiveness:** The DTIS has been effective in contributing to increasing knowledge on Equatorial Guinea's constraints to trade (structural, policy, budget and supply-side constraints). This knowledge was disseminated into the design of the National Development Strategy at the third National Economic Conference in 2019. The DTIS has integrated trade into NDP 2020-2035 and the General State Budget 2021. The DTIS is mainstreaming trade into more ministries, namely the Ministry of Social Affairs and Gender Equality. While the NDP 2020-2035 includes strategic actions to build the capacity of new exporting firms, to adopt and transfer technology, and to strengthen legal protection, it is not clear whether the DTIS directly contributed to this.

EIF Tier 1 projects have been effective in contributing to trade mainstreaming and policy reform. This is because there has been written confirmation that the EIF projects have supported trade mainstreaming into the NDP 2020-35, the General State Budget 2021, and the Third Economic National Economic Conference. Moreover, the EIF has provided policy recommendations for increased resilience to commodity price shocks, for clarification on fiscal policies, and the need to address weaknesses in tax policy. These recommendations are now being assessed and implemented.

With regards to EIF Tier 1 project's contribution to regional objectives, there is written expression that the EIF has contributed to the objectives of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), although evidence is weak. The DTIS AM established a working group to pursue the ratification of the AfCFTA, which is housed in the Ministry of Trade. EIF projects have trained 53 people (of which 15 were women) on trade facilitation and WTO accession. There has been awareness raising on trade issues through flyers and sensitisation workshops.

In terms of the EIF operational model, there is written expression from the NIU/ FP that the ES and TFM have provided effective support in the design of monitoring systems, global communications and outreach, and guidance and feedback on reporting.

- **Efficiency:** To date, 75% of the NIA Support project budget has been spent to date, with the remaining 25% due to be spent by January 2022. Moreover, from a total of 21 activities, funding has not yet been spent across 6 activities. In addition, the NIA Support project's 2020 Annual Report indicates that only 74% of the logframe's result 1, and 61% of the logframe's result 2, has been achieved. These points raise concerns as to whether the NIA Support project will be completed by January 2022, hence raising doubts over its efficiency.

With regards to the DTIS project, on the contrary, this was completed on time with a remaining balance of \$333. Although the DTIS was completed on time, the NIU stated in the EIF Evaluation e-survey that the DTIS AM is not being implemented to schedule, partially due to a financial crisis. The pre-DTIS project was completed on time, and the knowledge hub shows a fund balance of \$688.

The EIF Evaluation e-survey from the NIU shows that COVID-19 has disrupted activities, because trainings, meetings, and seminars were affected by lockdowns, social distancing rules, and curfews. Nonetheless, as reflected in the NIA Support 2020 Annual Report, despite travel restrictions efforts were made to continue activities with regular implementation.

- **Impact:** Equatorial Guinea has started to integrate into global and regional trading systems, namely AfCFTA, CEMAC, and the WTO accession. Any technical issues are being assisted and coordinated by the EIF, such as the elaboration of Equatorial

Guinea's foreign trade policy memorandum for WTO accession and commitments on trade in services for the AfCFTA.

- **Sustainability:** The NIU has been integrated into government, as it is hosted in Ministry of Trade & Promotion of MSMEs. However, one concern is the sustainability of funds for the NIU, and this concern has been heightened by the fact that funds have not been disbursed for the last 2 years. Indeed, there are promising signs of the Government's ownership of EIF initiatives. Firstly, the Government has contributed \$400,875 to EIF projects. Secondly, the Government played an active consultative role in formation of the DTIS by sharing its priorities. However, the EIF evaluation e-survey responses from the NIU/ FP show that they are unsure whether EIF mechanisms and structures would continue after EIF support.

With regards to coordination, there have been some good developments. A public-private multisectoral coordination mechanism was established in 2019, which meets bimonthly. In addition, the NIU steering committee held three donor and development partner coordination meetings in 2019. However, there is little evidence of sustained coordination with the civil society. While there have been strong financial and expertise contributions from both the World Bank and Government, there is little evidence on the extent to which the EIF was able to leverage additional support.

Guinea

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	March 2012
Total budget	\$7,124,714.33
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of trade; • Office National de Contrôle de Qualité (ONCQ); • EIF National Implementing Unit (UNMOCIR); • Guinean Export Promotion Agency (AGUIPEX)
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are three (3) Tier 1 projects in Guinea which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, two (2) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment', one (1) project has linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment' and one (1) project has linkages to output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation'. Moreover, two (2) Tier 2 projects have linkages with outcome 1, outputs 1 and 2.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are four (4) Tier 2 projects in Guinea which therefore align under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 2, three (3) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment' and two (2) projects have linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTIS Update • NIA Support (Ph1 and 2) • Sustainability Support • Projet de Développement de la Filière Mangue en Guinée (PRODEFIMA) • Feasibility strategy: Formulation of a national trade development strategy <p><u>Ongoing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reverse linkage project between Guinea and Tunisia on enhancing the value chain for exporting agricultural products of Guinea • Projet de renforcement de la capacité opérationnelle de l'Office National de Contrôle de Qualité
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-Survey; Economic Analysis.
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey (answers NIU) Documents reviewed across Guinea's 5 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOUs (and MOU Amendments) • TORs • Project Proposals/ Concept Notes • Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) • Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports • Budgets (and Budget Revisions) • Work Plans • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Financial Reports <p>Guinea's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) • Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates • Project Tiers (1 or 2) • Project Phase (1 or 2) • Main Implementing Entities • Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low response rate on e-survey; • Documents generally available and diligently completed. However, the project completion report for PRODEFIMA was missing.

3. Context

- Guinea is a coastal country in West Africa that shares its borders with six countries (Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire). The agricultural sector is the country's largest employer and plays a key role in poverty reduction and rural development, providing income for 57 percent of rural households and employment for 52 percent of the workforce. In addition to this sector, natural resources, processing industries and services are also economic assets for Guinea.
- The Guinean economy has managed to show resilience in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. Its real GDP grew by 5.2%, only slightly less than the 5.6% of 2019. This outstanding performance is linked to a strong increase in mining activity of 18.4% in 2020, up from 8% in 2019, thanks to rising Chinese demand for bauxite and aluminium, for which Guinea has been the main supplier since 2017. In contrast, delays in major projects, the temporary closure of borders and measures taken to contain the pandemic have strongly impacted agricultural, manufacturing and service sector activities, whose growth has declined to 2.5% in 2020 from 5.1% in 2019.
- International trade has played a strong role in Guinea's economy, accounting for 76.8% GDP since over the period 2017-2019. In particular, merchandise exports totalled \$3.9 billion in 2019, up by 193% from 2008. Exports are highly concentrated on mining (bauxite, alumina, gold and diamonds) and on a few agricultural products (coffee, fishery products). By contrast, services exports only grew by 39.7%, reaching \$132 million in 2019. Overall,

Guinea accounted for 0.45% and 0.28% of the Africa's total merchandise and services trade, respectively, over the period 2008-2019.

- Inward FDI to Guinea have been fluctuating over the last decade with notable peaks in 2011 and 2016 at respectively \$0.9 billion and \$1.6 billion. On the contrary, FDI inflows to Guinea were comparatively marginal in over the periods 2008-2010, 2013-2015 and in 2019. In 2019 they amounted to \$44 million, a steep 97.2% decline from the corresponding figure in 2016. Overall, Guinea's share in Africa's total FDI inflows stood at 0.8% over the period 2008-2019.
- In 2019, AfT disbursements accounted for 1.1% of the country's GDP, or 0.89% on average over the period 2008-2019. From an annual average of \$68.3 million in 2008-2016, AfT disbursements more than doubled, reaching an average of \$147.2 million in 2017-2019. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements to Guinea accounted for 0.7% of Africa's. Overall, AfT flows to Guinea have mainly targeted economic infrastructure (67.1% of total AfT disbursements over 2008-2019), as well as building productive capacities (31.8%). The EIF has assisted Guinea since 2012, with disbursements to date totalling \$7.1 million, accounting for 0.89% of total AfT disbursements since 2010. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, strengthening national implementation arrangements, agribusiness, sustainability support and support to standards institution.
- Guinea is currently going through a deep social and political crisis which resulted in a coup on 5 September 2021 by the armed forces. Institutions are currently suspended.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, findings show mixed results with regard to the relevance of EIF intervention in Guinea. On one hand, there is evidence to suggest that the EIF is well aligned to national needs and priorities, with trade being integrated subsequently in the Strategic Document for Poverty Reduction and the National Program for Economic and Social Development. On the other hand, the lack of consultation mechanisms beyond public sector agencies suggests that alignment with the needs of the private sector and/or the civil society is poor. Moreover, although some interventions in Guinea align with the development of global value chains (e.g., mango, pineapple, reverse linkage project between Guinea and Tunisia) and regional integration (e.g., EPA, WTO, ECOWAS related support), in-country activities have not managed to adapt to other emerging priorities (i.e., gender and climate change). Lastly, the changing global context has severely impacted Guinea, including an Ebola outbreak, political changes, and COVID-19, derailing or delaying some of the EIF initiatives. The recent coup will likely have a further negative impact.
- **Coherence:** EIF interventions in Guinea are overall coherent, they are compatible with other in-country interventions. Results areas in project logframes and key outputs for the analytical support project are aligned with the EIF's TOC. Moreover, the EIF's in-country delivery modalities (analytical support, institutional capacity support and three supply-side capacity support) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals. Lastly, there is evidence of coordination with other development partners and donors through the Donor Working Group on Trade. However, this mechanism was set up in 2020, which is fairly late in the EIF timeframe.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF Tier 1 projects were overall not very effective in reaching their objectives. The best results were obtained in terms of contribution to trade mainstreaming and contribution to policy reform. In contrast, EIF had limited success in fostering participation in international trade fora, contributing to regional objectives,

training officials, disseminating information and raising awareness. However despite the negative result, some outputs can be highlighted: some survey study strips and professional internships were carried in the sub-region and to the WTO; training was provided in the development and promotion of standards in accordance with the WTO-TBT and ISO/IEC guide; the NIU organized 5 workshops and 2 sensitisation campaigns training 350 officials on different trade-related themes; the national press organ “Horoya” periodically publishes long reports on CIR activities since 2011.

Similarly, the EIF Tier 2 projects overall lacked effectiveness. Notable results were observed in terms of contribution to training in different value-chains: 1600 mango producers were sensitised on how to access the GlobalGap Certification, 4000 producers were trained on the planting of a new variety of mango orchards, and 200 private actors representing 150 MSMEs were sensitised on good export practices. It shall be noted however that a train the trainer program did not manage to yield results due to the non-availability in time and funds to multiply the training. EIF Tier 2 initiatives also supported participation to a trade fair in Germany (Fruit Logista) for Guinean producers. Besides the above results, more limited outputs were noted in terms of contribution to contribution to trade facilitation, contribution to the adoption of new technologies and contribution to results in different value-chains.

- **Impact:** Following EIF interventions in Guinea, only limited impact has been noted in terms of contribution to both sustainable development and integration of the country into the global and regional trading systems. With regards to the former, under the mango project, installation of commercial farms enabled producers to move from 100 to 200 plants/hectares. However, due to poor monitoring and evaluation of this activity, it is unclear whether it led to increased employment. Moreover, no activities focused on climate change or women empowerment. In terms of the latter, despite evidence suggesting that EIF supported Guinea in EPA negotiations, and participation in ECOWAS events, there is little visibility of actual outcomes of these initiatives.
- **Sustainability:** Overall, the prospect of sustainability of EIF interventions and results in Guinea is overshadowed by the current political situation. However, it should be noted that since 2011 Guinea has managed to integrate the NIU in government processes: it is hosted by the Ministry of trade, NIU management are appointed by Presidential decree, it engages in coordinating TRTA, it advises the minister on EIF and trade and development and it facilitates intersectoral trade coordination mechanisms. Moreover, although this is unlikely to continue given the current context, Guinea had shown good signs of ownership of EIF activities: it was the MIE for and contributed (either through funding or in-kind contribution) to 6 of 7 projects. Finally, results were also obtained in terms of leveraging finance and expertise. For instance, the EIF project on strengthening the operation capacity of the National Office of Quality Control has raised the interest of some economic actors who invested up to USD 5 million to construct new buildings, provide equipment and train staff. The construction will be handled by a private operator partnering with the state in a PPP.

Haïti

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	03 November 2010
Total budget	3,190,966.00 USD
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC; Small Island; FCAS
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Commerce • Steering Committee (COMCIR) • International Trade Centre • International Telecommunication Union • World Bank
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are six (6) Tier 1 projects in Haïti which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, three (3) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment', three (3) projects have strong linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment' and three (3) projects have strong linkages to output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There is one (1) Tier 2 project in Haïti which therefore aligns under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Specifically, this project has strong linkages with output 1 'improved participation of EIF countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets' and output 2 'improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains'.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed projects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-DTIS • DTIS • NIA Support (Ph1 & Ph2) <p><u>Ongoing project</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability Support • Strengthening productive and commercial capacities in the fishing and sea salt sectors • Feasibility study - Analysis of policy and investment options to improve the marketing of agricultural value chains
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status (<i>WTO</i>) • Enhancing the Digital Ecosystem and Digital Skills for the economic empowerment of women in LDCs (<i>International Telecommunication Union</i>)

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
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Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-Survey; Economic Analysis.
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey (NIU; DF)</p> <p>Documents reviewed across Haiti's 5 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOUs (and MOU Amendments) • TORs • Project Proposals/ Concept Notes • Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) • Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports • Budgets (and Budget Revisions) • Work Plans • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Financial Reports <p>Haiti's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) • Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates • Project Tiers (1 or 2) • Project Phase (1 or 2) • Main Implementing Entities • Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited availability of project documents, most notably for the feasibility study project and NIA Support (Ph2) (narrative reports and project completion reports missing). • Incomplete results database

3. Context

- Haiti is small island state extremely vulnerable to natural disasters and which economic and social development continue to be hindered by political instability. Although Haiti is not experiencing armed conflict, the prevailing socio-political situation has largely contributed to delaying the EIF implementation process. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future, given the recent assassination of the president Jovenel Moïse on 7th July 2021 and the earthquake which struck the country on the 14th August 2021.
- Haiti's economy has been recovering slowly since the devastating earthquake which hit the country in January 2010. The country's economy has been facing multiple shocks since the second half of 2018. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, the country's economy was contracting and facing significant fiscal imbalances. After contracting by 1.7% in 2019 amid political instability and social unrest, GDP contracted by around 3.8% in 2020, with the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbating the already weak economy and political instability.
- Over the 2008-2019 period, international trade accounted for around 40% of the country's GDP. Haiti's main exports are textiles and clothing. Food products, textile articles and machinery are the leading imports. The United States and the Dominican Republic are Haiti's top trading partners.
- Over the last five years, inward FDI to Haiti have fluctuated around \$100 million, with the notable exception of 2017 with a peak at \$374 million. In 2019, FDI inflows amounted to \$75 million, a 25% decline from the corresponding figure in 2015. Haiti's share in the Pacific's total FDI inflows stood at 0.03% in 2019.

- Haïti is amongst the most aid dependent nations globally. In 2019, aid for trade (Aft) disbursements accounted for 1,08% of the country's GDP, or 1.6% on average over the period 2008-2019. The EIF has assisted Haiti since 2010, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$3.1 million and accounting for 0.11% of total Aft disbursements since 2010. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, institutional support, and more recently, support to value-chain. Overall, Aft flows to Haiti have mainly targeted economic infrastructure (51.4% of total Aft disbursements over 2008-2019) and building productive capacity (46.5%).

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, EIF projects in Haiti are broadly aligned with national priorities and needs laid down in the Haiti Strategic Development Plan (HSDP), with the exception of the ongoing Tier 2 project (fisheries and salt) which has close linkages with some of the HSDP sub-objectives. Private sector and civil society needs are also taken into account, in particular through consultations during the design of the Tier 2 project and the development of the DTIS. Moreover, EIF activities in the country have not addressed emerging EIF priorities, however recently signed projects plan to focus on areas such as women economic empowerment, sustainable development and digital trade. Lastly, the relevance of the DTIS is not entirely established. In particular, it is unclear whether the DTIS process has resulted in capacity to develop future trade policies/action plans using local resources, and whether, any policy (besides the PIMT) were introduced or modified based on DTIS/AM proposals.
- **Coherence:** Overall, EIF national projects in Haiti are coherent: the project logframes are aligned with the programme-level results chains and logframe and the EIF delivery modalities are well-suited to delivering the EIF's goals and objectives. On the latter, Haïti benefited from a complete suite of support: (i) preparatory support (pre-DTIS and feasibility study); (ii) analytical support (DTIS); (iii) institutional support (NIA Phase 1 and 2); and (iv) supply-side capacity support (Tier 2 fisheries and salt). However, although efforts to coordinate with other relevant initiatives were noted, those remained vain as none of the nineteen (19) projects developed in the priority sectors of the DTIS action matrix have yet received funding by donors.
- **Effectiveness:** Despite Haiti's FCAS status, the Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching EIF objectives. The EIF has helped the country with policy reforms, specifically through the development of a trade strategy and action plan, the development of the Strategic Action Plan for Growth and Jobs; the update of the organic decree governing the functioning of the MCI in line with the institutional management requirements of the WTO, CARICOM and the EPA. Tier 1 interventions also contributed to training of officials and information dissemination, as well as to Haiti's participation in international trade fora. As of the latter, Haiti received support to answer to the WTO/OECD Aft questionnaire allowing the country to meet its commitment; and to participate to the EIF Unit in regional and global Aft activities during the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference enabling Haiti to participate fully in trade negotiations. In addition to the above, Haïti also participated to EIF regional workshops and received support to participate in trade negotiations at the regional level (CARICOM, CSME). In contrast with aforementioned positive results, concerns have been raised regarding the EIF's contributions to trade mainstreaming: trade is insufficiently integrated in the national development strategy, subsidiary documents, and sectoral strategies. Finally, regarding Tier 2 project, it is yet too early to determine their effectiveness as none of the planned activities have yet been rolled out.

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- **Efficiency:** Tier 1 interventions in Haïti are characterized by high expenditure rates for low levels of completions. In addition, timeliness was also an issue for most of the projects which required several no-cost extensions. As of Tier 2 interventions, it is yet to early to rate their efficiency.
 - **Impact:** Overall, to date the impact of EIF support in Haiti is not established. First, it is unclear whether the EIF interventions in Haiti have contributed to sustainable (and inclusive) development. The ongoing Tier 2 project (fisheries and salt) intends to support marginalised groups' capacity to leverage the country's aquacultural potential in a sustainable manner. Moreover, an ongoing regional project will aim at enhancing the digital ecosystem and digital skill for the economic empowerment of women in Haiti. However, no activities have yet been reported under both projects. Secondly, despite support in participation into international trade fora, the EIF contribution to the integration of Haïti into the global and regional systems is not established. There is written expression that at the outset of Tier 1 support and given that the supply of goods and services remains insignificant and undiversified in Haiti, the EIF did not create the material, human and institutional conditions for the integration of trade into the multilateral trading system. The above results are at least partly attributable to the local context (see Context section).
 - **Sustainability:** Overall, the sustainability of EIF support in Haiti is not clear. Given the country context, it seems unlikely that financing, which is instrumental to the continuation of EIF activities, will be provided by the government in the near future. Moreover, the main weakness of Tier 1 intervention in Haiti relates to leveraging finance and expertise from donors. However, in contrast to the above findings, the level of ownership of EIF activities is satisfactory: the government was engaged in the DTIS process and aligned national strategies with the AM, it has co-financed three projects and was the main implementing entity for five out of seven projects.

Malawi

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	06- September- 2011
Total budget (Total EIF Contribution)	\$5,400,995
Participation in EIF Phases	Both Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, landlocked
Key stakeholders	<p>Government of Malawi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Malawi Investment and Trade Centre - Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism <p>World Bank</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International Trade Department (PRMTR) - Poverty Reduction & Economic Management (PREM) <p>UNCTAD</p> <p>National Smallholder Farmer's Association of Malawi (NASFAM)</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>NIA Support Phase 1:</u> Objective: To assist the country to overcome supply-side constraints which are hindering Malawi's effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations. Results: Enhanced capacity to develop trade related policies and development strategies; Trade policy is mainstreamed into national development strategies and sectorial policies; DTIS/ Action Matrix priorities implemented and delivery of aid is coordinated; Trade- related information is efficiently disseminated; Trained personnel in both the Ministry of Industry and Trade and support institutions; Enhanced coordination between the public and private sectors; Improved knowledge and skills among all stakeholders (public, private and civil societies) to analyse trade-related information. Tier 1 Outputs (outcome 1): Trade and Export Development fully mainstreamed in the Malawi Growth Strategy [<i>links to output 1.1a</i>]; Trade-related indicators in sectors other than trade and private sector development, such as agriculture, transport etc; ad hoc dialogue with Malawi's Aid for trade Donors [<i>links to output 2.2b</i>]; revised DTIS Priority Actions to address supply-side constraints and technical assistance [<i>links to output 1.1c</i>]; Establish information dissemination networks in the Ministry, trade promotion, and support institutions, including strengthening of reference centres [<i>links to output 3.3c</i>].</p> <p><u>Smallholder Linkage to Agro-Processing:</u> Objective: To reduce poverty through agro-processing of products for both domestic and export markets, thereby contributing to on and off-farm employment. Expected results: Promotion of the anchor farm model that would strengthen the supply of agricultural produce as the major input into agro-processing as well as the quality (control of aflatoxin) of oil seeds commodities for exports. Tier 2 outputs (outcome 2): Train club leaders in 'value chain understanding'; training materials developed; training in good agricultural practices [<i>links to output 2.1.a</i>]</p> <p><u>Support to Agro-Processing:</u> Objective: increasing competitiveness of the Malawian value-added products (beverages, sugar cane products and oil seed products) for exports, through agro-processing special economic zones, to the Nacala corridor and SADC/COMESA</p>

	<p>markets, addressing market information gap and strengthening oil-seeds smallholder farmers (SHFs) linkage to anchor farmers and agro-processors.</p> <p>Tier 2 outputs (outcome 2): Training in export marketing [<i>links to output 2.1.e</i>]; skills of exporters in product innovation strengthened, and enhanced technical skills of small-scale suppliers and producers [<i>links to output 2.1.a</i>]</p> <p><u>e-Trade Readiness Assessment:</u></p> <p>Objective: to provide an up-to-date assessment of the Malawi's readiness to engage in and benefit from e-commerce, and to develop a framework for e-trade.</p> <p>Expected results: identify opportunities and barriers; provide input for Malawi's discussions on e-commerce and digital trade.</p> <p>Tier 2 outputs: Launch of 4G and extension of cross-border interconnections [<i>links to output 2.2.b</i>]</p> <p><u>Study on Special Activity Economic Zone:</u></p> <p>Objective: Develop a road map for SEZs in Malawi, targeting exports to and along the Nacala Corridor for regional and international markets.</p> <p>Expected results: reports on SEZ feasibility in Malawi; model SEZ law.</p> <p>Tier 2 outputs (outcome 2): Develop SEZ plan, specifically for Agro-Processing [<i>links to output 2.1.f</i>]</p> <p><u>Sustainability Support</u></p> <p>Objective: For Malawi to sustainably integrate into the multilateral trading system through addressing supply-side constraints.</p> <p>Expected results: Mainstreaming of trade policy into national development plans; improved leveraging of trade-related resources by development partners and implementing agencies; enhancing the Ministry's institutional capacity.</p> <p>Tier 2 outputs (outcome 2):: Engage with, & leverage resources from, government, donors & private sector [<i>links to outputs 2.3.c and 2.3.d</i>]; strengthen and train SMEs on value addition [<i>links to outputs 2.1.d and 2.1.g</i>]</p> <p><u>Cotton by-products</u></p> <p>Objective: To produce a feasibility assessment on developing cotton by-products and use this to secure technical and financial support to implement the assessment's recommendations.</p> <p>Expected results: Financial and technical support secured, and public/ private funds leveraged, to transfer technologies and know-how for value-addition from cotton by-products production/ processing/ trade.</p> <p>Tier 1 outputs (outcome 1): Assessment on cotton by-products utilisation and production, and identification of national priorities for cotton [<i>links to output 1.11</i>]</p> <p><u>Flagship National Export Strategy II (PPG)</u></p> <p>Objective: To develop two flagship projects and mobilize resources for the implementation of Malawi's National Export Strategy (NES) II.</p> <p>Expected results: Two fully developed flagship projects for the implementation of NES II.</p>
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	Tier 2 outputs (outcome 2): Secure at least 50% of funding for the developed projects [<i>links to output 2.3.d</i>]
National projects	<p>Completed projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTIS Update - NIA Support Phase 1 - NIA Support Phase 2 - Smallholder Linkage to Agro-Processing (NASFAM) - Support to Agro-Processing (MITC) Phase 1 - Support to Agro-Processing (MITC) Phase 2 - e-Readiness Assessment - Special Activity Economic Zone <p>Projects under implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sustainability Support - Cotton by-products - Flagship National Export Strategy II (PPG)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mainstreaming SPS capacity building into CAADP and other national policy frameworks

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June-2021 to August-2021
Inputs used	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-survey; Economic Analysis
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey: 1 response from the NIU (Ministry of Trade)</p> <p>Documents reviewed across Malawi's 11 projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOUs (and MOU Amendments) - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budgets (and Budget Revisions) - Work Plans - Project-level Log Frames - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Malawi's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Project Tiers (1 or 2) - Project Phase (1 or 2) - Main Implementing Entities - Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some misalignment between Malawi's project-level logframes and the EIF programme-level logframe (e.g., many project-level outputs do not align to the programme-level logframe) - Often, external evaluators do not use the 1-4 scoring system against the OECD DAC criteria, but use an independent scoring system. This means that external and internal project scoring cannot be compared.

3. Context

- Malawi is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered by Zambia to the northwest, Tanzania to the northeast, and Mozambique to the south, southwest, and southeast. Malawi has a population of 18.6 million (2019), with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at USD 625.3 million in 2015.⁸
- Malawi's economy has been heavily impacted by COVID-19 pandemic. Growth is estimated at 1.0% for 2020, compared with earlier projections of 4.8%, but is projected to rebound in 2021 to 2.8% subject to the pandemic's evolution.
- Malawi is a generally peaceful country and has had stable governments since independence in 1964. An election done in May 2016 as nullified in February 2020, with fresh elections being held in June 2020. Lazarus Chakwera was elected as President, with 58.6% of the votes. He leads a coalition of nine political parties
- Malawi's merchandise exports reach a peak in 2011 at USD 1425 M, followed by a smaller peak in 2014 at USD 1370 M. Between 2015- 2019, the average merchandise export was USD 955.8M.
- From 2008- 2019, the average FDI inflow was USD 104.6million per year.
- In terms of Aid for Trade (AfT), Malawi received USD 227M in 2019, down from USD 395M in 2018. AfT commitments have been higher than disbursements from 2008-2019, except for 2016 and 2018.
- Malawi was ranked 109 out of 190 countries in the World Bank (2020) ease of doing business. Over the years Malawi has made several improvements across various indicators. In 2018, improvements on the doing business rank noted that Malawi made exporting and importing easier by upgrading to a web-based customs data management platform, ASYCUDA World.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and specific projects are strongly aligned with the needs and national priorities of Malawi. The DTISU reflected the focus of the then Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MDGS II), while the NIA support ensured the mainstreaming of trade in MDGS III and the Malawi Vision 63; Transport and Agriculture policies. This included diversified commercial agriculture, tourism, energy, and mining sectors, as well as infrastructure development and exports. Evidence shows strong alignments with the needs of the private sector, but less so of those for civil society. The Agro Processing (Phase 1 and 2) and the NASFAM projects were aimed at building productive capacities for SMEs, with 81 out of 120 SMEs trained by project end. There is also strong adaptation to emerging EIF priorities such as value chains, regional initiatives and gender equality. For instance, the NASFAM as well as the Agro Processing (Phase 1 and 2) and the NES II projects are focused on enhancing exports and working in value chains, with targeted attention to MSMEs, women and youth. There is strong adaptation to prioritisation of regional initiatives, as can be seen from Malawi's engagement on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that brings together COMESA, EAC and SADC, as well as the construction of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP) at Mwanza and Dedza. There is also evidence of adaption to COVID-19 through the EIF project on e-readiness assessment, where Malawi is identifying opportunities and barriers to its e-commerce and digital trade agenda.

⁸ World Bank, Country Overview. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/overview#1>. See also <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MW>

- **Coherence:** Overall, the EIF national projects in Malawi are strongly aligned with the overall EIF programme's ToC and logframe, particularly under the Tier 2 projects. Malawi has utilised the whole spectrum of EIF delivery modalities and is among the few countries with 3 Tier 2 projects. Coordination with other initiatives has been very strong, with a substantial part of the DTISU/AM being implemented by other development partners. The World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme for example had flexible country support arrangements which enabled them to create funding lines directly into EIF activities such as the DTIS Update, Cross Border Charter or TIPSWAP Capacity Development plan or through other trade related development programmes such as the Agriculture Diversification project under the Agriculture Sector Wide Programme (ASWAp).
- **Effectiveness:** The Tier 1 projects have strongly contributed to mainstreaming trade, increasing knowledge, capacity building through training and policy reform. Contribution to regional objectives have been strong. Yet while a significant number of policies have been developed from the DTISU Matrix, only a few are directly linked to EIF projects, specifically the STR and TIPSWAP. While EIF supported the ratification of the WTO TFA by undertaking diagnostic studies, other donors especially World Bank, UNCTAD supporting TFA implementation likely played a larger role.

Tier 2 projects have strongly contributed to productivity, turn over and employment, with USD 47M worth of sales realised; 25% increase in number of employees among participating firms under the Agro-processing projects; 7 companies obtaining quality certification and 1 ISO certification, among others. The NASFAM as well as the Agro Processing (Phase 1 and 2) and the NES II projects are focused on enhancing exports and working in value chains, with targeted attention to MSMEs, women and youth. Through the EIF agro-processing project (both phases), more than 100 (35% female) export ready SMEs were trained on export procedures and documentation, quality control and requirements, rules of origin, simplified trade regime and SMEs pricing and marketing according to the Final Project evaluation.

- **Efficiency:** Results on efficiency are less strong, with a number of projects not being delivered within budget (the agro-processing projects were 136% above budget according to the Final Project Evaluation, while some outputs only spent 15% of their budgets. Project design, that did not anticipate requirement for a SEZ policy and protocols related to opening an official office in a foreign country caused a 21-month delay in project completion. The end of NIA (phase 1 and 2) evaluations established that most stakeholders (85% of KII) felt the projects could have done better in delivering results within time and budget.

There were challenges in implementing Tier 1 projects that lead to several project outputs not being met and budgets going above the set amounts. The end of NIA (phase 1 and 2) evaluations established that most stakeholders (85% of KII) felt the projects could have done better in delivering results within time and budget. There were delays in disbursements due to delays in submission of necessary documents by the Ministry / MIEs to EIF and poor quality of reports. Additionally, there were also delays in revision and extension of the MoU between Malawi and the EIF. The completion of NIA Support Phase 1 was implemented at 139% above budget.

Tier 2 projects have been implemented efficiently according to the reporting and evaluations done on them. There is evidence that some projects were not implemented within the timelines, even before the onset of COVID. For example, the Agro-processing project had a 21-months no cost extension, with delays being linked to project design and also recruitment processes. End of project evaluations of the completed Tier 2 projects (Agro-Processing Projects (including NASFAM)) rated overall efficiency at 80% performance, noting that there were challenges related to low utilization rate, which caused a 21-month delay in project completion. There is evidence that COVID has affected implementation of the on- going ones.

Sustainability: Given the strong integration of EIF model, structures and process into the Malawi government structures through TIPSWAp; the mainstreaming of EIF priorities in MDGS III and Malawi Vision 63, the strong ownership of initiatives, including coordination with other government agencies, donors and private sector, sustainability of EIF projects is strong. For tier 2 projects, the 2020 Semi Annual Report indicates that a Ministry led assessment of the NASFAM Anchor Farm model concluded that project activities are still being implemented and very few interventions need to link beneficiaries to other service providers like the Government projects under World Bank and the Agriculture Commercialisation Project. On the SMEs that were trained on export readiness, assessment by the Ministry showed that they had applied the knowledge to improve food safety standards of their products. However, the assessment concluded that these SMEs need financial support to fully exploit their export potential and over 40 of them were linked to financial institutions and to other TSIs. Evaluation of the Agro-Processing Project also noted that sustainability would have been enhanced through integrating Associations in the training through a Trainer of Trainers (ToT) model, to enable them to continue offering training. EIF has also strongly contributed to leveraging expertise and finance, further enhancing the sustainability.

Impact: Overall, there are several examples of EIF interventions contributing to sustainable development and the integration of Malawi to the regional trading system. On sustainable development, both TIER 1 and TIER projects have addressed various supply-side constraints, including at firm level, enabling companies to link up to regional markets buyers and distributors especially under COMESA and SADC. Integration has mainly been to these regional markets, as well as the African market through the AfCFTA.

Niger

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	25 February 2011
Total budget	5,764,214.00 USD
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, Landlocked, FCAS
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Trade, Industry and promotion of Young Entrepreneurs (MTIPYE); National Implementing Unit (NIU); National Steering Committee (NSC)
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are three (3) Tier 1 projects in Niger which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, all three (3) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment' and one (1) project has linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment'. The improvement of the leather value chain project (Tier 2) has linkages with output 1.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are two (2) Tier 2 projects in Niger which therefore align under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 2, both projects have strong linkages with output 1 'Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets' and output 2 'Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains'. Moreover, NIA Support (Tier 1) has linkages with output 1.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DTIS Update NIA Support (Ph1 and Ph2) Sustainability Support Project for the development of the hides and skins sector in Niger <p><u>Ongoing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support project for the development of the sesame sector in Niger
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status Transit, transport and trade facilitation in West Africa for better participation in value chains

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; e-Survey; Economic Analysis.

Methods used (data and document review)	<p>E-survey (answers from the Donor facilitator and NIU) Documents reviewed across Niger's 5 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOUs (and MOU Amendments) - TORs - Project Proposals/ Concept Notes - Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) - Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports - Budgets (and Budget Revisions) - Work Plans - Risk Mitigation Strategies - Financial Reports <p>Niger's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) - Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates - Project Tiers (1 or 2) - Project Phase (1 or 2) - Main Implementing Entities - Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • low response rate on e-survey; limited availability of data and documents on the EIF central document database (it has been noted that 120 documents or 95% of reports have been submitted to the ES by the country team), discrepancies between EIF results framework data and country-level project data.

3. Context

- Niger has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 1996. It has a total land area of 1,270,000 km², with an estimated population of 24.2 million. Its economy is not very diversified and is essentially based on agriculture, which represents 40% of GDP.
- While Niger's trade structure is dominated by merchandise trade, services trade is in ascendancy. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total services trade exhibited a robust growth (higher than merchandise trade), driven by growth in both exports and imports.
- On another note, FDI inflows has been generally trending up since 2016. In 2019, FDI inflows amounted to \$593 million, up from \$301 million in 2016.
- In 2019, aid for trade (Aft) disbursements accounted for 2.7% of the country's GDP, or 1.6% on average over the period 2008-2019. From an annual average of \$122 million in 2008-2015, Aft disbursements more than doubled, reaching an average of \$271 million in 2016-2019. Over the period 2008-2019, Aft disbursements to Niger accounted for 1.3% of Africa's regional Aft disbursements. The EIF has assisted Niger since 2011, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$5.7 million and accounting for 0.32% of total Aft disbursements since 2011. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, trade facilitation, institutional capacity support and support to supply chains.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country's performance has increased slightly in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Niger is

now around 35 percentage points away from the global best regulatory performance in trading across borders. In terms of the overall ease of doing business, similar progress has been made (an increase of 9 percentage points), but remains far from the best regulatory performance (i.e., 43 percentage points away from the best performance)

- In recent years, Niger has faced a security crisis in the border areas with Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, where armed groups have perpetuated attacks against security forces and civilians. A state of emergency has been declared in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabéri. In recent years, Niger has also faced an influx of refugees fleeing conflicts in the region, notably in Nigeria and Mali.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF intervention in Niger is relevant, its objectives and design respond to the needs and priorities of the country. In particular, Tier 1 and Tier 2 intervention are well aligned with nation priorities and needs, with *inter alia* the 2009 DTIS being in line with the Strategy for Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction and several projects being aligned the *Plan de Développement Economique et Social*. Likewise, EIF interventions are aligned with the needs of the private sector and civil society which are included in the National Steering Committee which meets on a regular basis. Finally, the scope of EIF projects in Niger is reflective of an adaptation to emerging EIF priorities: Tier 2 projects aimed at global value chain development in the leather and sesame sectors and Tier 1 projects included activities aimed at fostering the participation of young people and women in economic activities. Unfortunately, environment and climate change are not addressed within the interventions, reflecting negatively on EIF adaptation to emerging priorities.

The DTIS process in Niger is similarly relevant. Some EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and the action matrix, and the DTIS consultative processes (with government, private sector, and civil society) was relatively inclusive. Moreover, the DTIS has contributed to the introduction or modification of national policies: new legislative or regulatory initiatives match in content and coincide in time with DTIS/DTISU (i.e. National Trade Development Policy 2015, law on consumer protection 2019, competition law 2019, and the Agricultural Development Strategy).

- **Coherence:** EIF interventions in Niger are overall coherent, they are compatible with other in-country interventions. Results areas in project logframes and key outputs for the analytical support project are aligned with the EIF's TOC. Tier 1 projects also adopted a result-based management allowing for reports to be result oriented. Moreover, the EIF's in-country delivery modalities (analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals. Lastly, there is evidence of efforts to coordinate with development partners: government of Niger had bilateral consultation with EU delegation in 2016 to discuss EIF progress, and since 2019 work is ongoing to set up a proper dialogue framework with donors. While the latter results are optimistic, there is room for improvement.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching their objectives. Specifically, strong results were achieved in four areas: training, information dissemination and contribution to trade mainstreaming and policy reform. In terms of the former, monitoring of trainings conducted by the EIF revealed that on average 72% of the beneficiaries of the training workshops consider that they have improved their knowledge of the various customs regimes, the transit system in Niger, the procedures and advantages of formalization and business management; 90% of

the participants in these workshops transmitted the information received to their structures and on average 48% of the structures of the private sector and civil society, organized sessions to disseminate this information to their networks. Moreover, information dissemination was fostered through a communication plan rolled out during the sustainability support project. As of trade mainstreaming and policy reform, trade has been mainstreamed in the *Plan de Développement Economique et Social* as well as in the National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Tourism and the Strategy for Sustainable Development of Livestock. In contrast to the above findings, more pessimistic results were observed in terms of contribution to participation in international trade fora and contribution to regional objectives. It shall however be noted that EIF has assisted Niger address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status through a regional project.

Concerning Tier 2 project effectiveness, good results were observed in terms of contributions to results in different value-chains, especially through the hide and skin project which allowed Niger to access new markets such as India and resulted in an increase in export of hide totalling \$415 thousands. Moreover, Tier 2 projects have resulted in a contribution to skills development in value chains with 758 people receiving training and allowed artisans in leather works and jewellery to attend trade fairs in Paris, Marseille, Chennai and Dakar. Overall results were also reported in the areas of contribution to the adoption of new technologies and contribution to trade facilitation.

- **Efficiency:** EIF Tier 1 interventions were unsatisfactory in terms of efficiency. The NIA Support project was impacted by delays in activities due to the delay in the creation of the implementation unit, delays in setting up the technical team and cumbersome procedures for carrying out certain activities. Despite this situation, the project obtained positive results made possible by a series of no cost extension. In contrast, better results were observed in terms of efficiency of Tier 2 interventions. In particular, the leather and sesame projects were scored highly in the latest evaluation reports reflecting high project completion rates within the allotted and with the required means. Finally, evidence suggests that the EIF in-country governance structure has been affected by slow mobilization of government counterpart funds.
- **Impact:** Following EIF interventions in Niger limited impact has been noted in terms of contribution to both sustainable development and integration of Niger into the global and regional trading systems. As of the former, Tier 2 interventions supported building of skills for women artisans in rural regions across the country, sewing kits/machines were provided to a cooperative for the disabled in Tahoua and two certificates of environmental compliance were issued to the project certifying to its environment sustainability. However, despite these outputs, there is no evidence of outcomes. In terms of the latter, the EIF supported Niger's contribution to regional integration through a regional project (i.e. Regional Project Facilitation of transit, transport and trade in West Africa for better participation in value chains), however outcomes are yet unknown.
- **Sustainability:** Activities conducted, and changes introduced in Niger are fairly sustainable. Evidence points out that EIF initiatives are overall integrated into government priorities, activities, structures and processes. Commitment to align with EIF strategies and DTIS recommendations was also observed on behalf of the government, which is also the MIE in 4 of 5 in-country projects, overall reflecting positively on ownership of EIF initiatives. Moreover, coordination with other stakeholders has taken place, this has included a number of coordination meetings

such as the International Forum in London on Investors in Niger, a Round Table in Paris on the complementary financing of the PDES a meeting in Paris between the Government and the MDEF for investments. The implementation of the DTIS AM also resulted in the rehabilitation of the National Council of Private Investors in 2012, the organisation of an International Forum on Investors in Niger (London, 2012), and ultimately the approval by the World Bank of two financings for an amount of \$100 million aimed at improving the business climate and supporting competitiveness.

In contrast with the above positive results, there is still room for improvement regarding sustainability of EIF intervention in Niger. Notably, government consistently defaults on providing counterpart funding for projects which negatively impacts implementation, and the DTISU has been developed but has yet to be adopted by the Government. Moreover, lack of cofunding from development partners reflects negatively on EIF's contribution to leveraging finance.

Samoa

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	2012
Total budget	\$4,001,725 ⁹ (100% disbursement rate)
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	Graduated (2014), Small island state
Key stakeholders	<p><i>NIU</i>: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour</p> <p>Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade United Nations Conference on Trade and Development The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Scientific Research Organization of Samoa Women in Business Development Incorporated Samoa Trust Estates Corporation Samoa Chamber of Commerce & Industry Small Business Hub Samoa Bureau of Statistics</p>
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p>Key Objective/s:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide an updated perspective of Samoa's trade priorities, including an assessment of the country's readiness for e-trade - Develop a trade sector-wide programme aimed at improving production systems and productivity to ensure consistency in quantity and quality for export, market information, and appropriate technology for improved value-addition and competitiveness - Enable the country to use trade as an effective instrument for development by strengthening trade institutions, enhancing capacities for mainstreaming trade, and increasing AfT and its effectiveness <p>Linkages to EIF TOC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The analytical support project (DTISU) supports Outcome 1, Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment</i>) - The Tier 1 project on supporting national implementation arrangements (NIAs) has linkages to Outcome 1—Output 1 (<i>Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment</i>), Output 2 (<i>Strengthened institutional coordination for trade and development</i>), and Output 3 (<i>Enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation</i>) - One of the two Tier 2 projects on business support services and institutions (eTrade Readiness Assessment) links to Outcome 2—Output 2 (<i>Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains</i>), while the other project on trade facilitation (TSSP) supports Outcome 2—Output 1 (<i>Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets</i>) and (to a less but significant extent) Outcome 1—Output 1

⁹ Source: Portfolio review based on available data from the Knowledge Hub.

	<p><i>(Improved evidence based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment).</i></p> <p>Overall, EIF interventions in Samoa have contributed to both Outcome 1 and Outcome 2, with achievements across the 3 outputs in Outcome 1 and mainly outputs 1-2 under Outcome 2.</p>
National projects	<p><i>Completed Projects</i></p> <p>(i) Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies Update [Phase 1, Tier 1] (ii) Support to National Implementation Arrangements (Phase 1): "Strengthening Samoa's National Implementation Arrangements for the EIF" [Phase 1, Tier 1] (iii) eTrade Readiness Assessment [Phase 2, Tier 2] (iv) Trade Sector Support Programme (TSSP) [Phase 1 & 2, Tier 2]</p>
Regional projects	<p><i>Completed Projects</i></p> <p>(i) Pacific Quality Infrastructure Initiative (Phase 1)</p> <p><i>Projects under implementation</i></p> <p>(ii) LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC (iii) Pacific Quality Infrastructure Initiative (Phase 2) (iv) Gender Sensitive, Climate Resilient International Market Access through Fairtrade</p>

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	August—September 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review, Document and Data review, Economic analysis, e-survey
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Document Review</i> of project documents, including MOU and MOU amendments; project references, including project proposals, concept notes, project-level logframes; narrative reports, including technical, progress and project completion reports; the DTIS report; project evaluation reports; national policy documents • <i>E-survey</i>: 1 response from country e-survey (NIU Coordinator) • <i>Portfolio Review</i> covering project types and subtypes; EIF phase involvement; project approval, start, and end dates; main implementing entities; total project costs and EIF and non-EIF contributions; regional projects where the country is a recipient • <i>Review of EIF databases</i>, i.e., the Results and DTIS Action Matrix databases, Management Information System
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of discrepancies and variation in extent of reporting between project documents and EIF databases (both offline

	<p>and online) resulting to low probability and/or difficulty of triangulating evidence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low response rate on e-survey (i.e., from only one stakeholder, NIU), limiting validation on strength/consistency of reported results) • Results reported in the Master Results database and technical/evaluation reports at the indicator level do not necessarily conform to the indicator definitions set out in the EIF programme logframe, potentially leading to overestimation of results or mismeasurement. Notwithstanding this limitation, it is emphasised that the primary goal and basis of assessment in such instances would either be that the results reported between sources are not largely quantitatively dissimilar or are at least qualitatively consistent. • No stakeholder interviews • Time constraints limiting ability to review, analyse, and synthesise available documentary evidence comprehensively/ adequately.
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3. Context

- Samoa has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 2012. It has a total land area of 2,830 km², with an estimated population of 0.198 million and a labour force participation rate of 43%. Its exclusive economic zone (at 98,500 km²) is the smallest of all Pacific nations. The country's economy was traditionally based on agriculture and fisheries. However, industry and services have become significant contributors to its economic development, with services alone accounting for the majority of its gross domestic product (GDP).
- While Samoa's trade structure is dominated by merchandise trade, services trade is in ascendancy. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total services trade exhibited a robust growth (higher than merchandise trade), driven by growth in both exports and imports.
- On another note, FDI inflows has been generally trending down. In 2019, FDI inflows amounted to \$1.02 million, a steep 96.2% decline from the corresponding figure in 2015.
- Along with other Pacific countries and select African and Asian economies, Samoa is amongst the most aid dependent nations globally. In 2019, aid for trade (AfT) disbursements accounted for 7.8% of the country's GDP, or 5.0% on average over the period 2008-2019. From an annual average of \$25.8 million in 2008-2012, AfT disbursements more than doubled, reaching an average of \$52.6 million in 2015-2019. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements to Samoa accounted for 9.1% of the Pacific's regional AfT disbursements and 0.12% of global AfT disbursements. Samoa is a recipient of AfT from several donors, but primarily Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank Group. The EIF has assisted Samoa since 2012, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$4.0 million and accounting for 1.14% of total AfT disbursements since 2012. The EIF's investment has focused on analytical support, strengthening national implementation arrangements, business support services and institutions (particularly digital trade), and trade facilitation.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country's performance has remained stagnant in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Since 2015, Samoa was around 42 percentage points away from the global best regulatory performance in trading across borders. In terms of the overall ease of doing business, it has made moderate progress (an increase of 1.9 percentage points), but remains far from the best regulatory performance (i.e., 37 percentage points away from the best performance)
- Samoa's economy is highly sensitive to exogenous shocks due its narrow resource base and vulnerability to environmental shocks: its economy is primarily driven by tourism, agriculture, fisheries, trade services, remittances, and development aid. The country has a large merchandise trade deficit and high dependence on food imports. The small size of its domestic market, geographical remoteness, and susceptibility to natural disasters are key impediments to its economic development.
- Along with the measles outbreak in the country in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic led to an economic contraction, with the tourism sector mostly affected.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF intervention in Samoa is relevant, its objectives and design respond to the needs and priorities of the country. In particular, Tier 1 and Tier 2 intervention are well aligned with nation priorities and needs, with *inter alia* the Trade

Sector Support Programme (TSSP) being in line with the Strategy for the Development of Samoa and the Trade, Commerce, and Manufacturing Sector Plan 2012-2016, and the eTrade Readiness Assessment projection coinciding with the government's preparatory efforts to invest in eTrade. Likewise, EIF interventions are well aligned with the needs of the private sector and civil society. In the TSSP and NIA Support projects, for instance, consultations with the private sector and civil society were conducted during project design, and a targeted approach was employed in the TSSP's selection of beneficiaries. Finally, the scope of EIF projects in Samoa is reflective of an adaptation to emerging EIF priorities. Tier 2 projects have primarily supported e-commerce development and digital trade (e-Trade Readiness Assessment), as well as (refocusing) the development of value chains (TSSP). The TSSP also has an integrated element and/or approach of contributing to the economic empowerment of MSMEs, women, and youth; trade in services; private sector development; and adoption of new technologies.

However, relevance of the DTIS is more limited. Several EIF projects reflect the needs and priorities in the DTIS and the action matrix, and the DTIS consultative processes (with government, private sector, and civil society) was relatively inclusive. However, the DTIS has not contributed to the introductions or modification of national policies (with the exception of informing the monitoring indicators of the Trade, Commerce & Manufacturing Sector Plan). It is also unclear whether public sector capacity building under the DTIS has led to increased capacity for policy formulation. Lastly, inclusiveness of the DTIS consultative processes is limited.

- **Coherence:** EIF interventions in Samoa are overall coherent, they are compatible with other in-country interventions. Results areas in project logframes and key outputs for the analytical support project are aligned with the EIF's TOC, with broad similarity on some indicators under Outcome 1 and Outcome 2. The pathway to change has been mostly evident in outputs 1-3 of Outcome 1 and outputs 1-2 of Outcome 2. Moreover, the EIF's in-country delivery modalities (analytical, institutional and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals, particularly in terms of mainstreaming trade into national development plans and sector strategies; setting up structures (aligned with country structures) to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance; building sustainable capacity to trade; and promoting gender equality and inclusive trade. Lastly, there is evidence of the coordination by development partners on the implementation of the Trade, Commerce and Manufacturing Sector Plan objectives.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching their objectives. Specifically, strong results were observed in terms of contribution to trade mainstreaming (e.g. trade is mainstreamed in the Strategy for Development of Samoa, the Trade Commerce and Manufacturing Sector Plan); contribution to participation in international trade fora (e.g. support to participation to bilateral negotiations, PACER Plus negotiations, and key WTO meetings) and training of officials (e.g. on policy formulation and development, procurement, information systems and data analysis, etc.) . The EIF also contributed to policy reform, the Samoa's regional objectives and information dissemination and awareness raising. With regards to the effectiveness of Tier 2 effectiveness, achievements are also observed in terms of contribution to results in different value-chains (e.g. TSSP led to increased export and production in the cacao and coconut value chains and access to new markets), contribution to the adoption of new technologies (both e-commerce initiatives and technologies in support of value chains). Moreover, under the TSSP project, several trainings and several trade fairs were organized. However, although in-country interventions delivered results in

trade facilitation initiatives a need for greater investment in trade facilitation is recognised. Finally, EIF operational systems and processes, both at the programme-level and the country-level, provided support to country level results and performance

- **Efficiency:** Overall delivery of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 initiatives in Samoa is characterized by a degree of inefficiency. As of NIA Support, it has been affected by inefficiencies in government systems, particularly relating to procurement and financial disbursements which affected the cost-effectiveness of project activities. In terms of timeliness, the project was not completed in accordance with its original timeframe. Competing priorities of government personnel and changes in management also formed part of the challenges resulting in delays in the implementation of project activities. In terms of Tier 2 intervention, actual implementation of the TSSP was longer than the planned duration. Contributing factors to the delay in activity implementation include hold-ups in the government tender and procurement processes; delays in the recruitment and selection of staff and technical assistants; delayed release of funds and processing of payments, competing priorities of implementing agencies, and lack of alignment to project proposals with some key implementing agencies changing their focus from the original intentions of the project.
- **Impact:** Following EIF interventions in Samoa some relative impact has been noted in terms of contribution to both sustainable development and integration of Samoa into global and regional trading systems. For instance, the Tier 2 project (TSSP) has contributed to the economic empowerment of women and youth and supported trade associations and small businesses (particularly in the rural areas) through capacity building, knowledge transfer, job creation, and increased access to international markets. Furthermore, Tier 1 and Tier 2 projects have helped Samoa increase its participation in regional and global trading systems through improvements in policy and regulatory frameworks, institutional capacities and operational structures, and sectoral linkages and competitiveness.
- **Sustainability:** Activities conducted, and changes introduced in Samoa are sustainable. Evidence indicates that EIF initiatives are well integrated into government priorities, activities, structures and processes. In particular, the government subscribes to the DTIS/AM, and has mainstreamed trade into policy, planning, and sector-specific strategies. The Government also acts as the main implementing entity in 3 of the 4 national projects. Moreover, Samoan government shows signs of ownership of EIF initiatives and coordination mechanisms with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society are likely to last after the end of the programme. Lastly, EIF has contributed to leveraging finance and expertise, particularly through in-kind contributions from government through staff time and use of government office premises and equipment. Regarding continuation of EIF initiatives after the end of EIF support, the above findings show encouraging signs. However, it is well recognised that continued financial support will be instrumental in the implementation of recommendations from project activities, as well as in sustaining coordination mechanisms and completing remaining project activities/outputs that were not achieved during project delivery but have been integrated into the systems and processes of the implementing entities.

South Sudan

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	20-February-2013
Total budget	\$1,816,821
Participation in EIF Phases	Both Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC, landlocked, fragile
Key stakeholders	UNDP Government of South Sudan
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> All 5 EIF projects in South Sudan are tier 1, therefore align under EIF Outcome 1. Under Outcome 1, all 5 projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There are no tier 2 EIF projects in South Sudan. However, the NIA Support project has linkages to Outcome 2. Under Output 1, there is linkage to capacity building initiatives, boosting access to international markets and training producers in value chain practices. Under Output 3, there is mention of leveraging additional funding.</p>
National projects	<p>Completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pre- DTIS (Phase 1, Tier 1) - DTIS (Phase 1, Tier 1) - Trade Mainstreaming (Phase 2, Tier 1) <p>Ongoing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTISU (Phase 2, Tier 1) - NIA Support (Phase 2, Tier 1)
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generating increased pricing and new markets for the women engaged in the shea butter value chains of South Sudan and Uganda

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June-2021 to August- 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; interview with 1 KII, Economic Analysis; South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2013;
Methods used (data and document review)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with 1 KII (UNDP) - Documents reviewed across South Sudan's 5 EIF projects, including MOUs (and MOU Amendments); TORs; Project Proposals/ Concept Notes; Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports); Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports; Budgets (and Budget Revisions); Work Plans; Risk Mitigation Strategies and Financial Reports - South Sudan's Portfolio Review, covering Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution); Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates; Project Tiers (1 or 2); Project Phase

	(1 or 2); Main Implementing Entities and Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria.
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Little collaborating evidence as only 1 interview was undertaken with a KII and there has not been any response yet to the e-survey, limiting strength/consistency of reported results. - Time constraints limiting ability to review, analyse, and synthesise available documentary evidence comprehensively/adequately. - Lack of response to e-survey.

3. Context

- The Republic of South Sudan (RSS) is the youngest country in the world, becoming only 10 years old on 9th July 2021. It is designated as a country in a fragile and conflict-affected situation (FCAS) by the World Bank Group. It shares a border with Sudan from the north, Ethiopia from the east, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the south and the Central African Republic from the west.
- RSS is yet to achieve political stability and peace necessary for growth and development. Since 2011, it has experienced several major conflicts; a disagreement with Sudan over the border and oil transit fees in 2012; an internal conflict that broke out in December 2013 and another in 2016. The signing of a truce in September 2018 and formation of a unity government in February 2020 not only provided some needed peace and stability, but also led to resumption of oil production and a return of refugees. RSS, because of the cumulative years of conflict, remains in a serious humanitarian, characterised by acute food shortages and displaced people, often affecting children and women more. In 2020, intensified conflict and sub-national violence, a second consecutive year of major flooding, and the impacts of COVID-19 made an already dire humanitarian situation worse.¹⁰
- RSS's economy had begun to improve following the 2018 truce, with gross domestic product (GDP) real growth rising to 9.5% in FY2019/20 according to the World Bank. The economy is largely oil dependent, with oil representing about 68% of RSS's GDP; 98% of exports and a significant portion of government revenue. Poverty is high, with about 82% deemed as living below the poverty line according to the most recent estimates, based on the \$1.90 2011 purchasing power parity poverty line. The COVID 19 pandemic has deteriorated living standards due to reduced incomes
- The environment for doing business remains difficult for many reasons, primarily conflict related constraints, poor infrastructure, still developing institutional capacity, and low literacy rates. In the Doing Business Reports, while improvements were noted in 2019 following a period of stability, RSS was ranked poorly at 185 out of 198 countries in both 2019 and 2020, with a rank of 180 on trading across border.¹¹

¹⁰ World Bank, February 2020. South Sudan Economic Update: Poverty and Vulnerability in a Fragile Environment. Washing DC. See also South Sudan Overview (accessed from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview#1> on 23 September 2021)

¹¹ RSS is not yet included in the Logistics Performance Index.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF programme and in-country projects are very well aligned with the needs and national priorities of South Sudan as expressed in various government documents that have acknowledged the role of trade, trade facilitation and export in the development of South Sudan (i.e., the Trade Policy Guidelines 2009, the first National Development Plan 2011-2013, and the National Development Strategy 2018-2021). EIF Activities are also well aligned with the needs of the private sector and the civil society, insofar as projects support the capacity to develop the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks necessary to lay the foundation for trade and investment. There are also various mechanisms for engaging the private sector in the development of various policies (i.e., South Sudan Business Forum, Public Private Dialogue mechanism), although there is no evidence of regular PPDs being held. In contrast with the positive results above, EIF projects in South Sudan have not adapted well to emerging EIF priorities. The DTISU is currently being developed, but in the DTISU Concept Note, several emerging EIF priorities including regional integration and value chains (as part of sectoral trade and economic diversification) and digital trade and e-commerce have been identified as priority focus areas.
- **Coherence:** EIF national projects in South Sudan are strongly aligned to EIF Outcome 1, outputs 1-3, and although there are no country level projects focused on Outcome 2, under the NIA support, there is linkage boosting access to international markets and training producers in value chain practices and under Output 3, there is mention of leveraging additional funding. Moreover, as a newly established country coming out of a conflict situation, the EIF delivery modalities are strongly appropriate for South Sudan. Lastly, there is good evidence of coordination with other relevant initiatives. The EIF projects are implemented as part of a broader 'Support to Inclusive Growth and Trade Capacity Development (IGTCD) program implemented by UNDP, who are the EIF main implementing partner for all but the Pre-DTIS project, indicating some strong coordination. Strong coordination can also be seen with partner like the World Bank, TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), FAO and the AfDB. However, coordination could have been enhanced by having a donor coordinator for the EIF projects, who has yet to be identified/designated.
- **Effectiveness:** Despite South Sudan's FCAS status, the EIF Tier 1 projects were overall effective in reaching their objectives. Specifically, the EIF projects have strongly contributed to trade mainstreaming. Indeed, trade is now integrated in the latest NDS which seeks to create an enabling environment to support economic diversification through trade. Mainstreaming can also be seen in the stakeholder driven Trade Policy Review to respond to emerging trade policy issues including WTO accession, regional integration through the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), E-Commerce and the need to formulate National Export Strategy. Moreover, following the granting of Observer Status in the WTO in 2017, as well as application to join the EAC, the EIF trade mainstreaming project has strongly contributed to the RSS's participation in both WTO and EAC related fora. In contrast, EIF projects contribution to policy reform, to training of official and to information dissemination has been mainly average. As of training, annual reports report that several trainings have been undertaken, on EAC integration, WTO Accession, negotiation skills, however there is a strong lack of monitoring on their outcome. Regarding information dissemination, there is evidence that the communication needs of different stakeholders have been mapped by the NIU and the Ministry of Trade and EAC, but most of these tools are yet to be rolled out.

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- **Efficiency:** Overall delivery of the Tier 1 initiative has been affected by the challenges highlighted under the effectiveness section, particularly relating to design of project and procurement. Because of conflict flareup as well as Covid 19, the projects have not been completed on time. In terms of financial resource use efficiency, disbursement and expenditure rates stand at 100%. Moreover, COVID-19 has affected project implementation due to restrictions with regard to events and face to face meetings. For example, the DTISU was expected to be completed in 2020, but due to COVID, the timeline has slipped. The MIE has held meetings virtually here tenable and also supported the NIU by providing modems to address the challenge of internet.
 - **Impact:** Overall, there are several examples of EIF interventions contributing to the integration of South Sudan to the regional and global trading system, particularly the EAC and WTO as part of the accession processes. For both, this has been mainly through the institutional strengthening, capacity building and trade mainstreaming that has been supported by the Tier 1 project. Contribution to sustainable development is much less clear, given the nascent stage the country is in in development; the level of funding from EIF and the context within which the implementation occurred. As of coordination mechanisms with other government agencies, donors, private sector and civil society, they are likely to remain, however a coordination mechanism to coordinate donors for the aid for trade agenda is necessary.
 - **Sustainability:** Activities conducted, and changes introduced in South Sudan are fairly sustainable. Evidence points out that there is largely strong integration of the EIF initiatives priorities, activities and structures of the GoSS. The priorities identified in the DTIS/AM are integrated in the new NDC (2018-21) as well as the Trade Policy Framework. Furthermore, the DTIS/AM is deemed to serve as the national trade policy and programming framework. At the structure level, the NIU is integrated within the structure of the Ministry of Trade Industry and the East African Community, the ministry is the national government institution mandated with the coordination of trade development. Moreover, the ownership of the EIF initiatives is largely strong, through mainly linked consultative mechanisms. The EIF DTIS, specific projects and Annual Workplan are all developed through a consultative process and endorsed by senior government officials. There has however been no government funding to EIF initiatives except in kind, but there is evidence that the government uses the DTIS/AM as the framework to mobilise funding from other donors for trade activities. As a result, the country's trade agenda remains largely underfunded (despite the DTIS/AM contribution to leveraging finance), which will likely result in the discontinuation of the EIF model, structures and processes.

Togo

Summary country case study

1. Country summary

Start date of EIF support	22 December 2008
Total budget	\$7,098,159.81
Participation in EIF Phases	Phase 1 and Phase 2
Context	LDC
Key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Trade, Industry and Local Consumption; • Ministère du Commerce et de la Promotion du Secteur Privé; • GIZ
Key objectives and results and linkage to EIF Theory of Change outcomes and outputs (e.g., Tier 1, Tier 2)	<p><u>Tier 1</u> There are six (6) Tier 1 projects and one (1) combined project in Togo which therefore align under Outcome 1 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 1, six (6) projects have strong linkages to output 1 'improved evidence-based policy and regulatory frameworks for trade and investment', two (2) projects have linkages to output 2 'strengthened institutional coordination for trade development and investment' and one (1) project has linkages to output 3 'enhanced capacities for policy formulation and implementation'.</p> <p><u>Tier 2</u> There is one (1) Tier 2 project and one (1) combined project in Togo which therefore align under Outcome 2 of the EIF logframe. Under Outcome 2, both projects have strong linkages with output 1 'Improved participation of EIF Countries in strategic value chains for increased connectivity to markets', output 2 'Improved technology use in production and services in selected value chains' and output 3 'support to the EIF countries to leverage additional resources'. Moreover, a Tier 1 project has linkages with output 3.</p>
National projects	<p><u>Completed</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-DTIS • DTIS • DTIS Update • NIA Support (Ph1 & Ph2) • Projet de renforcement des capacité productives et commerciales de la filière soja au Togo <p><u>Ongoing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Trade Development Policy Update • Combined – Projet de Durabilité et de Renforcement des Capacités Commerciales de l'Anacarde et du Karité (PRODAK) • Transfert de technologies et de savoir faire pour le développement des coproduits du cotton
Regional projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme régional d'appui au développement commercial inclusif de la filière karité (PRADCIFK) - GSA • LDC Graduation and the WTO: Assisting LDCs to address the trade-related implications of graduation from LDC status

2. Approach and methods

Date when case study conducted (from-to)	June 2021 to August 2021
Inputs used (e.g., portfolio review, e-survey, economic analysis).	Portfolio review; Document Review; Economic Analysis.
Methods used (data and document review)	<p>Documents reviewed across Togo's 5 EIF projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOUs (and MOU Amendments) • TORs • Project Proposals/ Concept Notes • Annual and Semi-Annual Reports (inc. Technical Reports) • Mid-Term and Final Evaluation Reports • Budgets (and Budget Revisions) • Work Plans • Risk Mitigation Strategies • Financial Reports <p>Togo's Portfolio Review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Project Costs (with EIF contribution and non-EIF contribution) • Approval Dates/ MOU Signature Dates / Expiry Dates • Project Tiers (1 or 2) • Project Phase (1 or 2) • Main Implementing Entities • Project Scoring against OECD DAC Criteria
Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited quantitative and qualitative data reported in project progress reports and EIF results database

3. Context

- Togo has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 1995. It has a total land area of 56,785 km², with an estimated population of 8.6 million and a labour force participation rate of 58%. Although the poverty rate declined from 61.7 percent to 53.5 percent between 2006 and 2017, poverty and inequality remain very high, especially in rural areas where 69 percent of households lived below the poverty line in 2015.
- While Togo's trade structure is dominated by merchandise trade, services trade is in ascendancy. Between the early years of the EIF and in recent years, the country's total services trade exhibited a robust growth (higher than merchandise trade), driven by growth in both exports and imports.
- In 2019, aid for trade (AfT) disbursements accounted for 3% of the country's GDP, or 1.5% on average over the period 2008-2019. AfT disbursement are generally trending up, from \$27 million in 2009 to \$144 million in 2019. Over the period 2008-2019, AfT disbursements to Samoa accounted for 0.5% of Africa's AfT disbursements. The EIF has assisted Samoa since 2008, with its cumulative support through national projects amounting to around \$5.3 million and accounting for 0,68% of total AfT disbursements since 2012. The EIF's investment has focused on preparatory support, analytical support, strengthening national implementation arrangements, business support services and institutions and support to value chains.
- Between 2015 and 2019, the country's performance has increased in terms of reducing trade costs and times for goods and overall ease of doing business. Togo was around

36 percentage points away from the global best regulatory performance in trading across borders. In terms of the overall ease of doing business, it has made strong progress (an increase of 15 percentage points) but remains far from the best regulatory performance (i.e., 38 percentage points away from the best performance).

- Although the COVID-19 pandemic did not hit Togo hard, it halted the momentum of its economic performance. Real GDP, which had grown by 5% in 2018 and 5.5% in 2019, grew by only 0.4% in 2020, as a result of falling foreign direct investment, financial investment, private remittances and the slowdown in world trade. Despite prudent monetary policy, inflation more than doubled from 0.7% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2020, mainly due to supply disruptions.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance:** Overall, the EIF intervention in Togo is relevant, its objectives and design respond to the needs and priorities of the country. In particular, Tier 1 and Tier 2 intervention are well aligned with national priorities and needs, with trade being integrated in the Rapid Growth and Employment Strategy of Togo and in the National Development Plan. Likewise, EIF interventions are well aligned with the needs of the private sector and civil society. Evidence suggests NIU carries out awareness raising activities to the public and private sectors and that Togo has a public-private consultation mechanism. Finally, the scope of EIF projects in Togo is reflective of an adaptation to emerging EIF priorities: Tier 2 interventions aim to support cashew, shea, cotton and sesame value chain development, and by nature target women to a large extent. Relevance of the DTIS is also established although more limited. Several plans and strategies took into account the DTIS and DTIUS, and the DTIS consultative processes (with government, private sector, and civil society) was relatively inclusive. However, Togo faced difficulties in monitoring the implementation of the AM.
- **Coherence:** EIF interventions in Togo are overall coherent, they are compatible with other in-country interventions. Results areas in project logframes and key outputs for the analytical support project are aligned with the EIF's TOC. Moreover, the EIF's in-country delivery modalities (preparatory support, analytical support, institutional capacity support and supply-side capacity) are well-suited to delivering the EIF's objectives and goals. Lastly, there is evidence of coordination with other development partners and donors: this is overseen by the Ministry of Planning, the DTIS was presented to the group in 2018 and since then consultations happen bi-annually.
- **Effectiveness:** The EIF Tier 1 projects were overall fairly effective in reaching their objectives. EIF contributed to trade mainstreaming and policy reform: trade is integrated by up to 70% into various national policies and some ministries have integrated trade in sector strategies, and a trade coordination mechanism has been set up (International Trade Negotiation Committee and the National Steering Committee of the EIF). In-country interventions also supported Togo's participation in international trade fora and implementation of regional objectives. Activities were carried out towards improving trade legislation and supporting the participation of the Ministry of Commerce in sessions at the regional and international levels. Moreover, there has been consideration of regional challenges in the context of the CFTA, and support in CDEAO and UEMOA discussions. In Togo, the NIU also managed to set up a communication strategy integrating all the stakeholders in the project and to conduct awareness raising activities (e.g. magazine on cashew, shea and soybean promotional days, producing a documentary on the EIF and the soy project in process). Despite the above results, improvement is still required in terms of training officials.

Similarly, the EIF Tier 2 projects were fairly effective in reaching their objectives. Very positive results were obtained in terms of contribution to participation in trade fairs. For instance, in 2017 a hundred contacts were made and two delivery contracts for Togolese soybeans were signed (115 tonnes of organic soybeans for Holland and 500 tonnes of conventional soybeans for Vietnam) with transactions that continued between the players during the same year and during the years 2018 and 2019. It is estimated that trade fairs, together with training on new production techniques contributed to an increase in the volume of soybean exports by more than 80% between 2015 and 2018, as well as an increase in soybean export earnings of 353% over the same period. To a lesser extent, the EIF also contributed to trade facilitation in Togo, through training of the National Trade Facilitation Committee (which is still not fully functional). Moreover, improvements will be needed in terms of trainings in value-chains. Although several training programs were conducted, there is limited evidence on outcomes.

- **Efficiency:** Overall delivery of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 initiatives in Togo are fairly efficient with some room for improvements. Indeed, usually projects are largely delivered in line with the work plans with efficiency issues mainly linked to slow government budget commitments and disbursements or slow donor procedures.
- **Impact:** Following EIF interventions in Togo, only limited impact has been noted in terms of contribution to sustainable development, with the exception of job creation by the PRODAC project in the shea sector (where 90% of beneficiaries are women). In contrast, impact in terms of integration into global and regional trading system is more important. In particular, the support to the soya value-chain led to exports to new markets.
- **Sustainability:** Overall, activities conducted, and changes introduced in Togo may not be sustainable as long as co-funding remains an issue. Regarding the continuation of EIF Tier 1 initiatives, the ministry does not have funding to continue with institutional reforms and is seeking other funding partners instead. As of Tier 2 initiatives such as the support to the soya value chain, although market were created where these didn't exist and exports will likely continue after the end of EIF support, the lack of funding affects the ability to track results since project completion. Support of development partners is thus essential. Government has put in place a system of consultation with donors under the coordination of the Ministry of Planning and has effectively secured support of GIZ and the AfDB on several projects. Although results are limited, EIF also contributed to leveraging finance, inter alia, by facilitating access to credit for soyabean producers (around 281 FCFA from commercial banks). Lastly, good results were obtained having regards to the integration of EIF initiatives into government priorities: the NIU is part of the Ministry of Commerce, and part of the organizational chart of the Ministry, it provides financial and technical support to the Ministry on TRTA, coordinates trade related committees and 10 out of the 14 staff are civil servants.